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ABSTRACT 
 
Managing Stakeholders in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Context – 
A proposed Model of Effective Implementation 
 
Key Words: ERP, Roles, Responsibilities, ROI, Model, Stakeholders, Sponsors, Post 
Implementation, Go-Live, Holistic, Implementation. 
 
Organisations pursue Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems to achieve improvements 
in their performance. However, the literature reports that organisations that implement ERP 
systems still suffer from a gap between the promised ERP benefits versus the actual realised 
benefits after the completion of the implementation 
 
The literature review in this thesis examines the factors, which may prevent a newly-
implemented ERP system from being successful. Prior research suggests several models to 
assist organisations in managing their ERP investments for the sake of leveraging business 
performance and hence retaining or enhancing competitive advantages. Each implementation 
model addresses ERP implementation from a single perspective such as generic, process 
management and training management. As long as stakeholders in ERP implementation are 
concerned, a review of the critical success factors (CSF) in ERP implementation shows a gap 
in the literature regarding the holistic view of what key stakeholders perceived as the CSF 
that results in implementation success. This leads to the assumption that stakeholders’ views 
are not considered valuable, and as a result, they are receiving less attention of managing 
their roles and responsibilities. Throughout the thesis, stakeholders management is addressed 
along two main dimensions; 1) the effect of ERP on stakeholders; 2) the different roles of 
senior managers, ERP managers, consultants, suppliers and customers on the effectiveness of 
the implementation. 
 
The aim of this research is to establish a well-designed and holistic framework for ERP 
implementation, centred on the management of roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. 
The study is an exploratory investigation into the ERP implementation process. Therefore, 
the research design, involving qualitative methodology, covers: (1) the identification of ERP 
critical success factors commonly cited in the literature; (2) a review of the existing ERP 
implementation models; (3) using an in-depth case studies approach to understand how the 
roles and responsibilities among stakeholders being managed and how it can improve ERP 
ROI; and (4) reviewing Secondary data sourced from prior academic research studies, so that 
the findings from the cases investigated could be compared with the findings of this study, to 
provide triangulation and hence to enhance the validity of the findings. 
A holistic model for effective management of roles and responsibilities among ERP 
stakeholders is built, along with a set guidelines and recommendations representing an 
integrated framework that is straightforward to understand and implement by ERP sponsors 
to increase the degree of the ERP implementation success.  
 
The research findings explain clearly how effective management of roles and responsibilities 
can optimise return on ERP investment. It suggests three decisive points where ERP sponsors 
need to focus on how to define, review and amend roles and responsibilities to sustain ERP 
benefits which increase the long-term ERP investment.  
Finally the study provides a foundation and proposals for further research and investigation. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Research Problem  
Many of the world‟s leading companies consider Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
as an essential information systems infrastructure to survive and prosper in the 
modern economy (Hawking et al., 2004).  
 
ERP systems, as defined by Beheshti (2006, p.184), are: 
"a set of business applications or modules, which link various business units 
of an organisation, such as financial, accounting, manufacturing, and human 
resources, into a tightly integrated single system with a common platform".  
 
The continuous development of ERP systems for businesses exemplifies a major 
innovation in IT over the past two decades (al-Mashari, 2003). ERP represents the 
fastest-growing sector of the business software industry, with ERPs offering an 
efficient and effective way of linking all business operations, including planning, 
manufacturing, sales, vendor relations, inventory control, human resources and 
accounting requirements and systems (Legare, 2002). As Legare (2002) comments, 
ERPs are, therefore, important for businesses in terms of the streamlining that they 
offer across many different business and operational areas and systems. 
 
Despite widespread adoption of ERP only a minority of companies are able to reap 
the full benefits of ERP systems (Stewart, 2013).  A survey by IDC (2008), for 
example, indicates that ERP implementation feedback is very low in terms of 
realising ERP benefits.  
 
Such deficits in deriving the promised ERP benefits by organisations that implement 
ERP systems led researchers to identify a plethora of critical factors that can lead to 
successful ERP implementation from different perspectives.  
 
Introduction                                                                                                              1-2   
 
Chapter One                                                                                               Page 2 of 14 
 
A study by Nah et al. (2001) provides an example of the generic critical success 
factors (CSFs) perspective, in contrast to Ngai et al. (2008), who focus on the CSFs in 
a cross cultural context. Some studies attempt to examine critical success factors like 
the research by Momoh et al. (2010), whilst the change management perspective has 
also been used to propose CSFs models by researchers such as Francoise et al. (2009).  
Alternatively, some CSFs studies have centred on the training perspectives like the 
study by Kapp et al. (2001). A Process Change Management (PCM) for successful 
ERP implementation is suggested as an important perspective, according to a number 
of researchers notably including the study by al-Mashari et al. (2003) 
 
Although the failure rates of ERP implementations have been widely publicised, this 
has not deterred companies from making huge investments in ERP systems (Ehie et 
al. 2005). Over the last four years, the rolling average of ERP cost as a percentage of 
revenue of survey respondents was 5.5% (Panorama, 2013, p. 15). Organisations 
continued to focus on ways to strategically leverage their ERP investment (Hawking 
et al., 2004). 
 
It is widely cited that developing countries face additional challenges in implementing 
ERP solutions. Al-Turki (2011: p. 403) stressed that those additional challenges are 
applicable for oil producing countries in the Middle East. 
The ERP market in Saudi Arabia is expected to grow at a CAGR of about 18% to 
reach revenues of $494.4 million by 2017 (CommsMEA, 2012). 
In their study of ERP implementation in Saudi Arabia Al-Turki et al (2003) found that 
Saudi Arabia is in a transient phase with regard to ERP implementation and a number 
of organisations are either implementing or planning to implement one of such 
systems.  
Saudi Arabia‟s IT market, the biggest in the in the Gulf region valued at $3.8 billion 
in 2011, is forecast to rise to $5.7 billion by 2016, Business Monitor International said 
in its "Saudi Arabia Information Technology Report Q1 2012" (Saudi Gazette, 2013). 
 
This means that the scale of this problem was considered likely to increase as the ERP 
market in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular showed dramatic growth and 
organisations were increasingly requiring support in order to maximise their 
organisational benefits as a consequence of ERP implementation.  
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The literature indicates two critical elements to ERP success, 1) the role of top 
management; and 2) the definition of roles and responsibilities. 
 
Albert (2006), using a case study of a large organisation with 3 major divisions 
showed how changing role definitions (esp. of the Board - project sponsor) and lack 
of stakeholder responsibility agreements led to deviation from initial project goals 
with major conflicts by three stakeholder groups with their own interests, leading to 3 
separate ERP projects in various stages of implementation. 
 
The findings outlined above lead to the following conclusions, 1) organisations that 
implement ERP systems still suffer from a gap between the promised ERP benefits 
versus the actual realised benefits after the completion of the implementation., 2) 
there is a gap in defining roles and responsibilities in an ERP implementation context, 
and 3) the role of the ERP sponsor in driving implementation to success is crucial. 
 
In this context, good governance structures for change management and effective 
communication, and a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of all 
stakeholders by the top management become crucial in deciding ERP project success 
(Boyer, 2001; Wang and Chen, 2006).  
 
These findings suggest that strengthening the management of the roles and 
responsibilities among ERP stakeholders is expected to derive 
implementation success. 
 
The inference was that there remained significant opportunity to introduce a new 
CSF(s) model, which would assist ERP sponsors to improve the return from ERP 
investment. This model is centred on the management of the roles and responsibilities 
among ERP stakeholders.  
The research problem was therefore clarified as;   
Organisations investing in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems in 
Saudi Arabia continue to suffer from the gap between promised ERP benefits 
versus the actual realised benefits after the completion of the implementation, 
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as a direct consequence of the poor understanding and management of the 
roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders. 
 
The researcher studied a variety of highly regarded texts on research methodology in 
order to find the appropriate approaches to the research, which would enable the 
objectives to be met (Mouton and Marais, 1993). 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives  
The aim of this research project is, therefore, to establish a well-designed and holistic 
model for ERP implementation in Saudi Arabia. The model is centred on the 
management of roles and responsibilities among its stakeholders and it is intended to 
be used primarily by ERP sponsors.  
 
Examples of such ERP sponsors are Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), General 
Managers (GMs) or Chief Information Officers (CIOs) who are normally responsible 
for the decision to adopt ERP. In effect, they are accountable for ensuring that it 
achieves the highest possible ERP implementation benefits. The model is intended to 
be easy to understand and implement, and to equip organisational ERP decision 
makers to enhance their management of ERP stakeholders. This is expected to 
facilitate the achievement of maximum success from the ERP implementation.  
 
The holistic nature of the framework would ensure that the ERP implementation is 
perceived as an on-going and long-term initiative beyond the 'go live' stage. 
 
Specifically, this thesis is concerned with the achievement of the following objectives: 
 To explain how roles and responsibilities management interrelates with the 
targeted success from ERP investment 
 To identify, wherever possible, specific areas in which business benefits can be 
obtained throughout the implementation process 
 To demonstrate milestones where roles and responsibilities must be defined or 
amended during ERP implementation phases 
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 To demonstrate how roles and responsibilities management interacts with other 
key elements of the success of ERP implementation, such as the management of 
training, business processes, technical aspects and conflict. 
 To develop a model of successful stakeholder management in ERP 
implementation. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The significance of the study results from a number of reasons. Firstly the study 
focuses on the roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. The close linkage 
between the successes of the introduction of a new information system is specifically 
linked to the role of stakeholders within the organisation by Madhani (2012) who 
attributes the success of the implementation to the extent to which the new system is 
accessible to the people working within the organisation. Research conducted by 
Arlbjorn and Haug (2010) suggests that the key reason for the failure of ERP 
implementations is due to the fact that the methods which are used to manage the 
human issues that arise in relation to the ERP implementation are ineffective. 
Secondly, the study adopts a holistic view of the implementation. That the majority of 
failures that have occurred in the field of ERP in the past are due to the fact that the 
process of implementation has focused solely on isolated parts of the organisation 
(Murphy et al., 2012). The implementation of a new ERP system can result in 
significant changes to the management processes, culture and structure of an 
organisation and the success of the implementation of a system therefore requires a 
holistic view of such changes to be adopted (Madhani , 2012). In such cases, an 
insufficient amount of attention has been dedicated to managing the effects that the 
new ERP system is likely to have on the culture of the organisation, which has given 
rise to recommendations that a more cohesive and more comprehensive approach 
should be adopted, which acknowledges and manages the changes that the ERP 
system has on the entire range of stakeholders which exist within the organisation.   
 
Finally, the framework this study aims to produce is tailored to the needs of ERP 
sponsors in Saudi Arabia. Esteves and Pastor (2002), through a literature review and 
web survey identified the project sponsor (in a project champion role) as a critical 
success factor in ERP projects. 
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Top management support is vital in ensuring ERP project success (Ngai et al, 2008; 
Ike and Mogens, 2005; Davenport, 1998). 
 
This research aims to fill the research gap regarding the management of roles and 
responsibilities among stakeholders in increasing ERP success. In doing so, it will 
address various elements that can build a road map for ERP sponsors to achieve this 
mission. 
 
1.3.1 Significance to Practitioner 
The primary beneficiaries of this research are ERP sponsors who are responsible for 
maximising the organisational benefits implementation. 
Ike and Mogens (2005) in their survey study of 36 companies with ERP systems 
found that two-thirds of ERP projects were initiated by top management and that 
project management principles and top management support explained nearly 30% of 
the variances that impact ERP implementation success.  
 
Clear delineation of responsibilities of the two top management groups (Board of 
Directors and CEOs/Executives) in Saudi Arabia will ensure a cohesive “top 
management” team to provide fully integrated support to the ERP system 
implementation project (Fitz-Gerard and Carroll, 2003). 
 
This study will be of great help in assisting ERP sponsors in Saudi Arabia to choose 
appropriate approaches to derive the promised ERP benefits. The study will enable 
the practitioners to view ERP from two angles; 1) the targeted ERP implementation 
benefits, and 2) the return on ERP investments. Through its holistic focus, the targeted 
framework assists practitioners in the development of a longer view of ERP 
implementation. In other words, ERP is not necessarily confined to a single and large 
project where its benefits are constrained by the state of the go-live stage. In fact, the 
go-live stage may be regarded as the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of 
the end (Deloitte, 1999). 
 
The study also assists ERP sponsors in Saudi Arabia in structuring the project 
management team to prevent and resolve conflicts once they arise. Wang and Chen 
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(2006: p. 1056) also stated that visible top management support should be critical for 
inter-unit conflict resolution during the ERP implementation process. 
 
Finally, through the focus on roles and responsibilities, this study aims to assist 
practitioners to plan more effectively for necessary ERP resources. Planning for 
resources can be managed through external and internal hiring or through 
development and training programs for in-house resources. This is even more crucial 
as any ERP project team is a cross-functional one and companies often cannot find the 
resources to let all ERP project team members work solely on the ERP 
implementation alone; many individuals work on multiple projects at the same time 
(Ike and Mogens, 2005). This will make it more difficult to clearly allocate duties. 
 
1.3.2 Significance to Researcher  
Prior research report gaps have been identified in two areas; 1) deriving promised 
ERP benefits (IDC, 2008; Panorama, 2013), and 2) the lack of understanding 
regarding the significance of effective roles and responsibilities management among 
stakeholders and its importance in producing results (Burns, 2011; Garg & Garg, 
2013). This study aims to contribute by addressing the way in which effective 
management of roles and responsibilities may increase the business benefits from 
ERP.  
  
It attempts to unify and integrate different schools of thought regarding existing 
critical success factor models into a new integrative perspective. These schools of 
thought typically gather around existing CSFs models, which this study aims to build 
on by introducing a perspective on the management of roles and responsibilities. 
It will clarify how roles and responsibilities among stakeholders can be effectively 
managed during the implementation process. This includes the definition of factors 
that are closely related to the management of roles and responsibilities.  
 
In other words, introducing the management of roles and responsibilities can act as an 
enabling tool to leverage the value from the various CSF models suggested by the 
different perspectives. 
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For example, it has been widely suggested that senior management support is a 
critical factor for the success of ERP implementation (Nah et al., 2001; Holland & 
Light, 1999; Somers & Nelson, 2001; Umble et al., 2003). This study elaborates 
further on how ERP sponsors can best dedicate and demonstrate their support and 
commitment in further detail. In effect, top management can therefore 
successfully follow the recommendations suggested to them by the various CSFs to 
achieve ERP success. 
 
The final conclusions of the study are presented in the form of a holistic ERP 
implementation model using the perspective of roles and responsibilities management 
among stakeholders. The research findings of this study pave the way for further 
cumulative and positive research areas.  
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1.4 Overview of Research Framework  
As described earlier, the primary objective of this study is to establish a holistic model 
to be used by ERP sponsors to derive optimal return on ERP investment. This model 
is centred on the management of roles and responsibilities among ERP stakeholders.  
Considering the building of such a model entails a study of organisations that have 
experienced ERP Implementation. 
 
As a result, the purpose of this research is exploratory, as it considers ERP 
implementation from a stakeholder perspective. The relative paucity of available data 
and previous studies in the field of stakeholder‟s management in the context of ERP 
implementation in Saudi Arabia demanded a particular research philosophy and 
approach to data collection. The use of case studies can permit the researcher to 
conduct an in-depth analysis in a genuine „real life‟ context, drawing on multiple data 
sources across each organisation. It aims to investigate how roles and responsibilities 
are being managed in organisations. Issues of interest to the case studies are related to 
the operationalisation of key elements of ERP implementation in real organisational 
settings.  
 
The study will examine the management of roles and responsibilities among ERP 
stakeholders in four organisations in Saudi Arabia. The diversity of the chosen 
organisations ensures that different types of ERP implementation can be covered. 
 
By focusing on four specific cases that exhibited significant common factors in 
addition to profound differences, the data to be gleaned from interviews to be 
maximised in scope and so will permit a greater degree of generalisation necessary for 
the formulation of a potential model. 
 
It is intended to obtain a deeper understanding of the impact of the management of 
roles and responsibilities on implementation outcomes. It will do so by examining 
how critical ERP factors suggested by prior research may influence implementation 
results and improve the return on ERP investment. 
 
Due to the holistic nature and of this study, and the fact that ERP sponsors are top 
executives who have challenging priorities, their dedication to ERP in terms of 
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investment of time should be kept to the minimum. For those reasons, an approach 
with three implementation phases has been chosen to structure the data collection and 
analysis. This approach of dividing ERP implementation into three phases is 
supported by the work of Parr and Shanks (2000), which includes only three phases of 
planning, project and enhancement, and that of Shao et al. (2009), which has primary 
adoption, secondary adoption and assimilation.  
 
The three implementation phases are used as a guide to gather the related data from 
each implementation stage. 
 
The study by Finney and Corbett (2007) forms a useful starting point for setting the 
agenda for the interview questions. Besides its stated intention to find the CSFs, it has 
identified gaps in the CSFs literature. These factors were then divided into two main 
sections; strategic and tactical (Finney and Corbett, 2007: p. 331).  The basis for the 
interview discussions were then derived from the 26 factors suggested by the study. 
The list provided guidance for the development of the necessary interview questions, 
by providing factors around which the questions could focus.  
 
The use of secondary data that include empirical surveys and published case studies 
takes place after the completion of the process of data collection.  The role of the 
secondary data is to assist in enriching the analysis and to externally validating the 
primary data.  The proposed model is produced after a comprehensive discussion and 
interpretation of data. The model is centred on the effective management of roles and 
responsibilities among ERP stakeholders.  
 
Figure 1.1 displays the conceptual framework that illustrates the concepts and 
relationships analysed that guide this study. These concepts were derived from the 
literature review concerning the critical success factors of ERP implementation. The 
operationalisation of the conceptual framework was accomplished by developing 
interview questions and conducting a comprehensive analysis of the captured data.  
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1.5 Organisation of Thesis 
This research thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction 
to the thesis and organisation of chapters. It highlights the research problem followed 
by a brief description that defines the research aims and objectives. It also highlights 
the importance of the study and provides a brief overview of the research 
methodology and the contribution of the research. 
 
The literature review is the logical starting point of such academic research projects; 
therefore a comprehensive assessment of all related issues to the research topic is 
crucial to assure solid and accepted outcomes by research communities. On that basis, 
all relevant literature was surveyed in order to gain a) a full understanding of 
background issues related to ERP definitions and benefits, b) ERP implementation 
failures and existing ERP CSF(s) models, and c) the identification of ERP 
stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities in the implementation. This forms the 
main content of Chapters Two and Three. Chapter Two includes an introduction to 
theories associated with existing ERP implementation models. Chapter Three focuses 
on the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders in an ERP implementation 
context.  
 
A number of different sources have been consulted as part of the literature review. 
These sources include, but are not limited to, academic papers published in refereed 
journals, conference proceedings papers and academic books. Business communities‟ 
feedback represents a valuable source especially independent consulting firms‟ 
statistics, market research and reviews that relate to the research themes.  
 
Literature Review 
Investigating the 
process of the roles 
and responsibilities 
management among 
Stakeholders  
Critical Success 
Factors for ERP 
Implementation 
Implementation  
Phases 
A Model for deriving Implementation success 
centred on Effective Management of Stakeholders 
Fig 1.1 Research Framework 
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Chapter Four describes the reasons for selected methods of data collection and 
analysis. The use of case studies as part of this research aims to investigate how 
stakeholders are attracted, involved and interrelated, and how they participate and 
contribute to either the success or the failure of the implementation. Issues of interest 
to the case studies are related to the operationalisation of key elements of ERP 
implementation, from a stakeholder perspective, in real organisational settings. It is 
the role of the case studies to explore various elements including how these factors 
relate to maximising business benefits from ERP implementation. Those elements are 
extracted from the critical factors that prior research found to be significant to 
implementation success.   
 
This involves a study of ERP evolution drivers within organisations, either internally 
or externally, ERP strategies, stakeholder identification, implementation approach and 
the details of implementation plans and results. A greater focus will be placed on the 
soft elements that include human aspects, structural and cultural changes. These 
elements, and many others, will be scrutinised in the context of ERP implementation. 
In this study, organisations selected as case studies were intentionally chosen to 
permit different issues surrounding ERP implementation to be explored. As data 
richness was an aim of this study, it was considered of interest to study both success 
and failure experiences. This provides explanations of how certain elements of ERP 
implementation in the context of the management of stakeholders‟ roles and 
responsibilities can contribute to the success or otherwise of the efforts. To have such 
insights, it is necessary that the organisations selected agree to share the details of 
their ERP implementation related matters and allow the researcher to have access to 
documented data that might support the study. Research interviews with relevant 
personnel at different levels of the organisation are also essential. 
 
The selected organisations for case studies must fulfil certain criteria. 1) The selected 
ERP product must be one of the top 10 ERP packages (based on world class 
consulting ERP indices, such as Gartner, Meta); 2) a minimum of three core ERP 
modules must be implemented; 3) the „go-live‟ stage should have been reached for at 
least three modules. 4) two years must have passed since the „go-live‟ stage and 5) 
ERP remained as the main business application system. 
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Different perspectives have been considered in selecting the organisations for the case 
studies to ensure diversity. Firstly, the nature of the business was important, and the 
studies selected included project manufacturing, discrete manufacturing and retail, a 
mixture of contracting, retail and manufacturing and services and utilities. Secondly, 
the ownership varied from a limited liability company, to holding company (shares 
traded publicly), family business and government ownership. Thirdly, in terms of 
size, three organisations are classified as large corporations but a fourth one is 
classified as  medium to large. Fourthly, three organisations implemented one of the 
top two ranked ERP software packages while the fourth implemented one that ranked 
in the top ten. Fifthly, from a cultural perspective one of the companies was heavily 
influenced by western business culture, whereas three others had only experience of 
local culture. 
 
Chapters Five and Six present a description of the four cases that highlight the most 
relevant elements to the research theme. This includes a complete review of how ERP 
evolved in the organisation throughout the selection and implementation process. The 
description is also extended to cover as many related activities that emerged during 
this stage as possible. Through this presentation of the full description of the cases a 
strong basis is prepared to support the analysis stage. 
 
The analysis of the case studies addresses the preliminary findings of the cases 
investigated and key lessons learned. This is conducted via a number of sources used 
to inform the case studies. After collecting data, analysis of the transcription of 
interviews was undertaken. All data taken from interviews, observations and 
document assessment will be consolidated and linked together to create a holistic and 
comprehensive picture of the entire process of ERP implementation from the roles 
and responsibilities management perspective. The analysis will focus on distilling 
factors of success and failure in each case study in the context of the management of 
roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. The comparative analysis of the four 
cases is represented by the second part of Chapter Six.  
 
Case studies data will, therefore, be analysed in further detail through the large 
quantity of secondary data that includes published surveys and case studies from ERP 
literature. This is to provide more explanation, and facilitate comparison and analysis 
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for the success and failure elements in the stakeholder context. They would also 
enable further analysis and discussion of the qualitative findings. Chapter Seven 
provides a comparative analysis between the selected cases and validating surveys 
and studies derived from the secondary literature. A proposed framework can 
gradually be assembled as a result of the analysis of the case studies before it is 
further refined and shaped, and finally presented as the proposed framework in the 
second part of Chapter Seven. Final conclusions, limitations of the research and 
recommendations for further study directions are addressed in Chapter Eight.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
CSF(s) Models 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The considerable investment that organisations devote, in an effort to leverage business 
performance and hence retain or enhance competitive advantage, very often fails to meet their 
expectations (Lau et al. 2001).   
 
Teittinen et al. (2013) discusses the fact that ERP systems have changed, forever, the way in 
which business data is collected and the ways in which data is stored, shared and used across 
a company. ERP have made companies more efficient and more informed as to the state of 
affairs within the company. The implementation of ERPs, therefore, has drastically improved 
the ways of doing business and the potential that businesses have for success, given the 
unique information and perspectives that ERPs can afford to companies.  This is not to say 
that ERPs are only positive. They are not – ERPs have many challenges and problems, which 
will be discussed in later sections of this Chapter.  
 
This chapter of the Literature Review is divided into two parts, 1) literature review of a 
number of ERP issues, and 2) a review of existing models of ERP critical success factors.  
 
The first part starts by defining ERP, its benefits and drawing up a list of obstacles that hinder 
its success. It also highlights the issue of measuring ERP success, with a discussion and 
analysis of its failure. 
 
The second part of the chapter reviews the existing CSFs models that can assist organisations 
to leverage ERP benefits. Each model represents a different perspective of (on)ERP 
implementation. 
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2.2 Literature review of ERP issues 
Al-Mashari (2003) discusses how the continuing, and continuous, development of 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems for businesses has been one of the major 
innovations in IT in the last few decades. The benefits of ERP are that it allows the 
integration and streamlining of business processes and the associated workflow and 
information flows, meaning that businesses can become more efficient as a result of the ERP 
being implemented in their day-to-day business (Al-Mashari, 2003). The fact that the ERP 
technology can integrate with advanced mobile and e-commerce technologies is appealing to 
companies as it can allow them to offer customers what they want, via the modes they want 
to use to shop, whilst still enabling the business to have complete control of their accounting 
systems. Legare (2002) discusses how ERP systems represent the fastest-growing sector of 
the business software industry, with ERPs offering an efficient and effective way of linking 
all business operations, such as planning, manufacturing, sales, vendor relations, inventory 
control, human resources and all the accounting needs and systems (Legare, 2002). As Legare 
(2002) notes, ERPs are, therefore, important for business in terms of the streamlining that 
they offer across many different business and operational areas and systems.  
 
2.2.1 Implementation Phases  
Peslak et al (2008) refer extensively to the work of Boudreau & Robey in suggesting the 
importance of a phased approach to implementation of ERP, in order to ensure success of the 
latter. They highlight that if the system is not implemented in a systematic and phased 
fashion, then there is a significant risk of stakeholders simply ‘working around the system’,  
so that the project is doomed to ending up as 'costly duplication'.  
 Peslak et al draw parallels between the structured phased approach to ERP implementation 
and systems development theory. Such theory evokes the concept of lifecycle and ‘stages’ in 
dramatising the evolution of information systems. Traditional systems development theory 
models include: i) the waterfall model ii) the incremental model iii) Rapid Application 
Development (RAD) and iv) spiral model. Newer systems development approaches address 
‘component based development, agile development and the unified process for object 
oriented software development’ These approaches tend to reduce the number of 
developmental stages. All of the approaches de-emphasise the implementation and post-
implementation stage.  
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In the context of ERP implementation, there are different views on the number of stages 
of implementing ERP which vary between three to six phases. 
Tsaia et al (2010) refer to three ‘implementing guidelines’ which correspond to three 
different models of implementation.  
a) SAP provides the implementing guide ‘ASAP’, which identifies 5 stages of 
implementation: i) project preparation phase ii) business blueprint phase iii) realisation phase 
iv) final preparation phase v) ‘go live’ and support phase. 
b) Oracle provides the implementing guideline AIM, which provides 6 implementing stages: 
i) definitions ii) operations analysis iii) solutions design iv) build v) transition vi) production.  
c) Cooper & Zumd (1990) identify a 6 stage model of implementation which is identical to 
the Six Stage Implementation model discussed by Peslak (2008): i) initiation ii) adoption iii) 
adaptation iv) acceptance v) routinization and vi) infusion.  
d) Tsaia (2010) opt in their own study for a four stage implementation model based on 
Markus and Tannis (2000): i) charter ii) project iii) shakedown iv) onward and upward. 
The approach of choosing the three stages is supported by the work of Parr and Shanks 
(2000), which includes only three phases of planning, project and enhancement, and that of 
Shao et al. (2009) that has primary adoption, secondary adoption and assimilation.  
 
In his research, Tsai et al (2012) elaborate upon the ASAP (Accelerated SAP) five phase 
model of implementation: 
 
i) project preparation phase: this involves the establishment of project goals and scope, 
high level timelines, project charters, implementation strategy, the project team, office and 
equipment preparation, in addition to the arrangement of an induction meeting. 
ii) business blueprint phase: this involves establishing a common understanding of how 
ERP will support the businesses objectives. At the end of the process a ‘signoff’ is required 
which signals a consensus amongst the project team on the scope of the project. 
iii) realization phase: this involves the establishment of a ‘baseline’ configuration, which is 
subsequently tested and modified as necessary to ensure optimal functionality. A final 
configuration is produced as a result of the testing. 
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iv) final preparation stage: this involves ensuring the production system environment is 
optimal, completing all user training, resolving all critical open issues.  
v) go live and support phase: new system is declared ‘live’ and starts to be used by 
stakeholders.  
2.2.2 Impediments of ERP Success  
However, this does not mean that ERPs are without their problems. As Stewart (2013) notes, 
despite the widespread adoption of ERP systems, it is a fact that only a minority of 
companies are able to reap the full benefits of the ERP system. Many companies, after having 
installed and implemented the suggested ERP, fail to gain the significant benefits that the 
ERP promises, however well their initial implementation process went (Stewart, 2013). 
Stewart (2013) looks at the factors that influence the performance of the ERP at this stage, 
with the research that was conducted looking at six Korean firms and their experiences of 
implementing and using and ERP system. This research found that there were six factors that 
were found to be influential in determining the success, or failure, of ERPs. These six factors 
included, support from top level management, the competency of the internal ERP team who 
handle the implementation and maintenance of the ERP, the level of training of users, the 
level of communication and collaboration across departments in the company, continuous 
process improvement and continuous systems integration and extension (Stewart, 2013). 
These factors were used to create a model that describes the critical success factors of the 
ERP following its implementation, with the model suggesting that there are two main factors 
that influence the ongoing success of an ERP, namely continuous improvement efforts and 
on-going organisational support (Stewart, 2013). Without these two basic success factors, the 
full range of benefits of the ERP cannot be realised.  
 
2.2.3 ERP benefits  
This section will provide an exploration of the various ERP benefits and the various models 
that have been developed to describe these benefits. The section will focus more on exploring 
the non-technical advantages of the ERP implementation, including increased in overall 
business efficiency through streamlining business processes via inventory control, for 
example.  As Bingl et al. (1999) discuss, implementing an ERP system can set in motion a 
series of massive changes that need to be managed adequately, in order to ensure that the 
changes do not come too quickly and that, as a result, the changes are not rejected. There are 
several key issues that affect the benefits of the ERP that can be gained, including 
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commitment from top management, the re-engineering of existing processes, smooth 
integration of the ERP with other parts of the business, the selection of appropriate staff, 
including management, consultants and employees, and the training that is provided to 
employees in the use of the new ERP system (Bingl et al., 1999).  
Lin (2010) discusses the fact that ERPs are usually developed, and implemented, in order to 
help businesses to manage and to integrate their business processes, across all of the 
functions of the business and across the various departments of the business. Yet, as Lin 
(2010) notes, despite the fact that ERPs are becoming widespread across the business world, 
there is little agreement, in the literature, as to what constitutes a recipe for successful ERP 
implementation. The research conducted by Lin (2010) was, therefore, intended to allow a 
better understanding of the factors that lead to the successful implementation of ERPs. It was 
found, following the research, that many factors influence the successful implementation of 
ERPs, including information and system quality, user perceptions of the ERP, and 
satisfaction with the ERP system. Top management opinions of the ERP system and its use 
are also highly influential on the successful implementation of ERP systems. On this basis, 
Lin (2010) noted that a model could be developed to describe the successful implementation 
of ERP systems, including several of the above-mentioned variables.  
 
As Tsai et al. (2012) discuss, in their analysis of the link between performance and enterprise 
as a result of the implementation of an ERP, found that earnings management decreases as 
the ERP begins to perform better, with this leading to better earnings across the company as a 
whole following the implementation of an ERP. This is one major success for companies 
implementing ERP systems, n that they tend to see positive results following the 
implementation of the ERP. As Tsai et al. (2012) note, the DeLone and McLean model of 
information systems and their success can be applied to the implementation of ERPs, 
allowing the successful implementation of an ERP to be a key factor in the subsequent 
economic success of the company. It was found, following this modelling, that the 
relationship between the performance of the ERP and the earnings management of the 
company is dependent on the system quality following implementation, with the greater the 
quality of the implementation, the greater the earnings of the company (Tsai et al., 2012). 
This research shows, therefore, a clear link between the implementation of an ERP and the 
earnings of the company.   
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Hooshang and Beheman (2010) discuss the fact that measuring productivity is considered to 
be one of the main efficient utilisation of organisational resources, with productivity being 
measured in terms of the efficiency of the worker, or the organisations long term success and 
competitiveness. As Hooshang and Beheman (2010) note, however, the measurement of 
productivity in these terms can be harmful as it can corrode expectations of success and 
productivity in terms of operational productivity and performance productivity (Hooshang 
and Beheman, 2010). ERPs have enabled companies to focus more on the use of measures of 
many business characteristics to give a more holistic picture of productivity, this meaning 
that, aside from all the other positive aspects of ERPs, they can also be used to keep a check 
on productivity business-wide. As Hooshang and Beheman (2010) note, the ERP can be 
implemented as a way of reducing transaction costs but also as a way of improving, business 
wide, the productivity across the company, the levels of customer satisfaction and, as a result, 
profitability.  
 
Sumner (2009) conducted an analysis of various ERP implementations, finding that it is 
possible to develop a grounded theory of EP-supported processes, as this can allow 
companies to find the correct fit between the ERP system they think they need and the actual 
needs of the company. As Sumner (2009) notes, alignment strategies that support the best 
practices as revealed in the case studies presented by Sumner (2009) note that several factors 
are influential in determining the success of an ERP, namely functional expertise, knowledge 
integration, liaison mechanisms, the governance of the project and the scope and integration 
of the ERP company wide. If any of these factors are lacking, then it is probable that the 
implementation of the ERP will fail, as this can mean that the ERP is not supported as much 
as it could be, within the organisation, this meaning that the ERP is not as successful as it 
could be. The success of an ERP is, therefore, highly dependent on various factors.  
 
Kanellou and Spathis (2013) discuss how, over the past decade or so, ERPs have been 
adopted as a way of allowing better and more streamlined approaches to business. The 
research, however, has not looked in any detail about how accounting systems benefit from 
ERPs. Kanellou and Spathis (2013) look, therefore, at the advantages and disadvantages of 
ERP systems for accounting, with the research exploring, specifically, the impact that an ERP 
system can have on accounting information and accounting practice. It was found, following 
the research, that there were differences in the perceptions of the ERP system by accountants 
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and IT professionals, and that there are, despite these differences, a number of highly relevant 
accounting benefit that result from the implementation of ERP systems. These benefits 
include streamlined of processes, increasing efficiency, and lower costs associated with 
accounting, meaning that the accounting is more efficient and more cost effective. The 
overall benefits of the ERP system for accounting are, therefore, numerous and ensure that 
the efforts required to install and implement an ERP system is worth it.  
 
2.2.4 ERP failures  
Hawari and Heeks (2010) look at the fact that ERP systems are being increasingly used in 
organisations across the world, particularly in developing countries. These organisations are 
often, however, offset by high rates of failure, which has the effect of decreasing confidence 
in the idea of implementing an ERP system. The Hawari and Heeks (2010) research looked at 
why ERP failure occurs and how the failure rate can be mitigated. It was found, though the 
development of a case study from Jordan, that there are high rates of failure for ERP 
implementation as ERP implementation is time consuming, complex and often 
misunderstood across companies. Failing to address these perceptions, which negatively 
affect the successful implementation of ERPs, can lead to the failure of the implementation. It 
is clear, then, that when a company makes the decision to implement an ERP, the company 
must clearly communicate this to all staff, must ensure that the goals and aims of the ERP are 
clearly defined and must ensure that the system put in place works to ensure that these goals 
and aims can be met. Hawari and Heeks (2010) look at the issue of good practice in ERP 
implementation, finding that, actually, good practice is easy to define theoretically but not so 
easy to define practically. As Hawari and Heeks (2010) note, there should be a series of risk 
assessments and risk mitigation measures implemented prior to the ERP being implemented, 
as this would reduce the risk of the ERPs implementation being unsuccessful. Identifying 
risks in this manner, prior to the implementation process, can allow the implementation to go 
smoother and can lead to less rejections of the implementation process. As Hawari and Heeks 
(2010) discuss, however, despite this recommendation, there are limitations in some 
developing country contexts that may continue to limit the effective use of enterprise 
resource planning systems, as these factors can lead to unsuccessful implementations and 
prejudice towards and barriers against the implementation of ERPs.  
 
Sumner (2000) identifies the risk factors that are present for ERP implementation, finding 
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that there are many risk factors associated with ERP projects. These risk factors include the 
lack of experience of the top management team in implementing such a system, a lack of 
investment in staff training, a lack of software support members, and a lack of technical 
expertise. These factors can all mean that the implementation of ERP can be less effective 
than expected, as without the full support of all members of the business, and without full 
technical support, the system is likely to be rejected before it has even had a chance to be set 
up. Negative perceptions of the ERP system can mean that its implementation will be 
damaged, and that the ERP system itself will be less effective than it could be. As Sumner 
(2010) notes, mitigating the barriers to the successful implementation of an ERP system can 
lead to a situation in which the likely success of the ERP implementation is increased. By 
recruiting and retaining IT staff and other employees who are comfortable with the ERP 
system, for example, the company can ensure that the chance of success are maximised.  
 
2.2.5 Measuring ERP success  
Zhu et al. (2010) discuss the fact that ERP systems are now implemented globally, with their 
implementation having been the subject of research for over a decade now. Part of the interest 
that researchers have in ERP systems is the fact that whilst ERP systems can have proven 
benefits, there are still many companies who have tried to implement ERPs and which have 
struggled to see the benefits of the ERPs following their implementation. The Zhu et al. 
(2010) research aimed to develop a model to describe the post-implementation success of 
ERP systems, this being necessary because of the fact that there are so many factors that can, 
potentially, damage the successful implementation of the ERP. These factors include, but are 
not limited to, project management, system configurations, organisational readiness, 
leadership involvement, organisational fit and external support will all positively affect the 
success of the ERP system post-implementation. Using data from the Chinese retail industry, 
it was found that the ERP implementation quality and organisational readiness significantly 
affect post-implementation success, with external support, from the implementer, for 
example, having little effect on the success of the ERP post-implementation.  
 
Loh and Loh (2004) discuss the research that has looked at the implementation of ERPs in 
small and medium sized companies. The particular challenges facing such companies are 
different to those facing larger companies, meaning that it is more difficult to know how to 
measure the success of the ERPs. Loh and Loh (2004) discuss the elements that are critical to 
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the success of ERPs in small to medium sized companies, with the objective of the research 
being to identify the main constituents within the critical elements. To this end, a literature 
review was undertaken as to the critical factors for success, this review showing that there are 
three main critical elements that are fundamental to the successful implementation of an ERP 
system, namely critical success factors, critical people and critical uncertainties. It was found, 
following further analysis, that ten critical constituent factors are important, namely staff 
characteristics and uncertainty characteristics. As Loh and Loh (2010) conclude, the 
successful implementation of ERP systems depends on the identification and management of 
these critical factors and their constituents, as it is these that will determine the degree of 
success of the ERP implementation.   
 
Fui-Hoon Nah et al. (2001) discuss the fact that ERPs have emerged as one of the most 
important and potentially useful backbones of any organisation. Whilst the factors that are 
related to the failure of ERPs are widely studied, the factors responsible for the success of 
ERPs are not so abundant. Fui-Hoon Nah et al. (2001) look, therefore, at the factors 
important in determining the success of ERPs and the constituent factors that comprise a 
successful ERP. It was found, following the research, that relevant factors could be identified. 
These relevant factors include, ERP teamwork and composition; change management 
program and culture; top management support; business plan and vision; business process 
reengineering with minimum customization; project management; monitoring and evaluation 
of performance; effective communication; software development, testing and 
troubleshooting; project champion; appropriate business and IT legacy systems¨ (Fui-Hoon 
Nah et al., 2001, 285). Given the wide variety of factors identified, it is important that 
companies focus on several of these at a time in terms of attempting to improve the chances 
of a successful ERP implementation.  
 
Verville et al. (2006) identified ten factors that influence the successful outcome of ERP 
implementation. These ten factors were identified as including, but not being limited to, clear 
and unambiguous authority, a structured, rigorous and user-driven process, its planning, the 
establishment of criteria, and the sense of partnership that the team works to establish not 
only with various user commitments, but also with the potential vendor (Verville et al., 2006, 
665). Overall, then, the research found that there are many factors that influence the success 
of the ERP implementation, these factors each having a role to play in the success of the ERP 
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system within any particular company. Take the sense of partnership variable, for example. It 
is necessary to ensure that the company has clear communication regarding the aims and 
objectives of implementing the ERP and that, during and post its implementation, the staff are 
constantly monitoring the ERP and reporting on any blips in the system that are affecting its 
efficiency. Failing to establish a strong sense of partnership will fail the efforts to implement 
the ERP. This is counterintuitive, as the company should work, as a whole, to ensure that the 
ERP is efficiently and effectively installed.   
 
2.2.6 Analysis of failure – reasons  
In relation to how many attempts at implementing ERP have failed, Garg and Garg (2013) 
undertook research looking at the use of ERPs in India and the reasons behind their failures. 
As Garg and Garg (2013) note, many ERP implementations fail simply because 
implementing an ERP is hard and takes a lot of intensive hard work. ERP implementation is a 
demanding task that can take hours an hours of intensive work across many different staff 
and departments. Sustaining this level of commitment is hard. This explains why an 
estimated 75% of ERP implementations are doomed to failure.  
 
Following research across Indian companies, nine factors were identified as being influential 
in the failure of an ERP implementation. These factors include having insufficient resources, 
having poor levels of user involvement, having users that are resistant to change, having high 
attrition rates across team members, having poor project management skills, having 
unreasonable attitudes to change an poor change management procedures in place, having 
poor team compositions and having unrealistic project management expectations (Garg and 
Garg, 2013). Any and all of these factors can lead to the failure of the ERP implementation 
with the more factors being present, the higher the likelihood of failure.  
 
Zabjeck et al. (2009) discusses the fact that ERP systems are imperative for companies, as 
they can allow companies to be more competitive. As has been discussed, however, despite 
these benefits, the success rate of implementations is very low, standing at only around 25% 
of all implementations. Three main mitigating factors were identified as support from top 
management, effective change management policies and procedures and effective human 
resource management. As Zabjeck et al. (2009) note, these three factors are the basis of 
positive change in the company, through the successful implementation of the ERP, with the 
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more factors in place, the more likely the success of the endeavour. As Zabjeck et al. (2009) 
argues, companies should, ideally, treat ERPs as a secure basis for business change and 
should, therefore, increase the usage of ERPs in order to increase the possibility of the 
successful use of ERPs to encourage benefits for the company.  
In this regard, Momoh et al. (2010) found that there are nine factors that are critical to the 
long-term failure of ERPs, including excessive customisation of the software, leading to 
problems with its usage, and a lack of cohesion in terms of the internal integration of the 
software. Additionally, it was found that a poor overall understanding of the business 
implications of the ERP system, across the company, is linked to a higher failure rate, as 
failing to recognise, and work towards, the proper usage of the ERP system, as a tool to 
improve the day to day workings of the business, will mean that the ERP itself will fail. Poor 
data quality, for example, can damage the potential benefits of the ERP for the company, with 
misalignment with IT and accounting systems meaning that the ERP would be doomed to fail 
(Momoh et al., 2010). Aside from the aforementioned factors, limited training in the use of 
the ERP can mean that the ERP will be doomed to fail, as the lack of top management 
support for training can, essentially, damage the implementation of the ERP.  
 
Kim et al. (2005), similarly, looked at the factors associated with failure of ERP systems, 
finding that most of the critical impediments to ERP implementation and functioning are 
from inadequate support systems being in place and to the coordination of functional units 
which negatively affects the ability of the staff responsible to effectively implement, and 
manage, the ERP. This, in turn, affects how the staff respond to the change, for if the ERP is 
not implemented adequately, then users will come to have negative perceptions of the ERP 
which will lead to a general dislike for the system which could, ultimately, doom it to failure. 
Gargeya and Brady (2005) identify six factors that have been suggested as important in 
determining the success or failure of ERP implementation. These six factors include the lack 
of an appropriate culture and organisational readiness, which was identified as the main 
factor, and a lack of adequate project management, which was identified as another main 
influencing factor.  
 
Barker and Frolick (2003) discus the fact that while it is true that successful implementation 
of an ERP is a mammoth task, not all ERP implementations fail. This gives some glimmer of 
hope to those companies interested in implementing an ERP. If an organisation is really 
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committed to ensuring that the implementation of the ERP is successful, then the staff and 
management will ensure that all is done to develop a plan for success. Implementing ERP 
should, therefore, be seen as a necessary step in the implementation of the ERP, as a team 
mission that is of fundamental importance to ensure that the ERP system is implemented 
effectively. For this to work, companies must involve all employees and must instill in the 
employees the fact that the ERP is a worthy and necessary tool that will improve business 
operations. ERP is not simply another software installation, far from it, and this should be 
relayed to all staff at each and every opportunity. Through this reinforcement, it should be 
possible to maximise the chances of success and to minimise the chances of failure.  
 
2.2.7 Soft issues hindering ERP success 
Maditinos et al. (2012) discuss the fact that ERP systems can help to enhance productivity 
and to improve working quality, through the integration, standardisation and simplification of 
multiple business transactions. Maditinos et al. (2012) attempted to design a framework 
through which to look at how human inputs are linked to communication problems, which 
are, in turn, linked to the success of the ERP. The research found that, through questionnaires 
of 361 Greek companies, assistance from external consultants is essential, as they can provide 
their expertise knowledge in this area and, as such, avoid potential faults in the 
implementation of the ERP and its usage. Aside from this, it was found that knowledge 
transfer is extremely important in the success of an ERP, as it determines how well the ERP 
will be accepted and, on this basis, how effective it will be in terms of allowing the ERP to be 
utilised as the useful tool it is, enabling the company to reap the full range of benefits that the 
ERP offers. The research found that top management was not so influential in hindering the 
effectiveness of the ERP, as the users themselves were the ones who stopped the ERP from 
being fully implemented and fully effective. There is, however, clearly a role to be played by 
top management in terms of the management steering staff as to how they expect the ERP to 
be used and what benefits are expected from the implementation of the ERP.  
 
Parry and Graves (2008) discusses the fact that ERP provides a coherent and integrated 
approach to business planning and that, as such, the company as a whole should be aware of 
this and should, therefore, work towards the company as a whole and all is staff adopting a 
positive attitude to ERP. If this is not achieved, then the ERP is likely to fail. It is not 
acceptable for the power of the ERP to be underestimated, given the fact that this power has 
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great potential in terms of improving business performance and increasing the likelihood of 
the company going to greater and greater highs. As Parry and Graves (2008) note, the 
importance of knowledge management in ERP systems is clear. Failing to recognise this will 
limit the potential of the ERP for improving the business potential. It is clear, then, that the 
´soft´ factors such as human resources and knowledge management are clear threats to the 
success of the ERP in the short- and long-term.  
 
Lapiedra et al. (2011) discusses the fact that the ERP implementation has been, in many 
companies, a huge learning experience. The ERP is a critical investment for many companies 
as it can significantly improve the company’s performance but, due to its cost, if the 
implementation is not successful, it can leave a clear dent in the company’s finances, which 
can, at times, be impossible to recoup. As the research made clear, whilst management 
consultants are necessary for the successful implementation of ERPs, management 
consultants are often responsible for the failure of ERPs, this meaning that the company 
should be careful when choosing a management consultant, as the implementation success 
depends highly on the consultant in place to walk the company through the process. A poor 
quality management consultant will provide poor quality advice, which, in turn, will lead to 
problems with the implementation and failures in the ERP system. This soft issue does, 
therefore, need to be considered as it can make or break an implementation process.  
 
As Kraemmerand et al. (2003) discuss, soft factors such as the accumulation of incremental 
issues, such as poor communication or poor change management culture, can lead to a 
situation in which the ERP implementation fails as a result of these factors. Caution should 
therefore be used with these so-called ´soft´ factors as they can have negative cumulative 
effects on the implementation and use of the ERP system.  
 
2.3 ERP Implementation Models 
Failure in the post implementation phase is the most frequent and, as a consequence, there is 
increasing interest in identifying the aspects that represent success or failure.  The research 
studies that have been conducted focus to ERP failure generally fall under the following 
categories: 
1. Lessons learned from ERP implementation. 2. Failure case studies analysis. 
3. Success stories analysis.  
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Since the late 1990s, researchers have suggested several models or frameworks for successful 
ERP implementation. Those models/frameworks have investigated ERP implementation from 
different perspectives. The three main perspectives are generic, process-based models and 
learning-based models/frameworks. The studies that are included were sourced from online 
databases of academic journals and other reliable publicly available texts, using search words 
such as 'frameworks for ERP implementation', ‘critical success factors in ERP 
implementation’ and ‘models for successful ERP implementation. This search confirmed a 
number of existing models that enable the success or failure factors regarding the post 
implementation phase; these are discussed in this section.  The models vary from those that 
consider a collection of critical success factors (CSFs) to specific factors such as change 
management and knowledge of implementation objectives; there is, therefore, some overlap 
between the range of frameworks considered, which will either reinforce or may cast doubt 
on the generalisability of some aspects that are considered in those that comprise a large 
variety of factors. 
 
The first frameworks considered are those that provide a general view of CSFs and then 
move on to six other models of a more specialist nature.  
 
2.3.1 Generic Critical Success Factor Implementation Models 
The models considered in this section address ERP implementation without specific focus; all 
of the factors that could contribute to ERP success are be included.  As a consequence these 
are related to process, people or technology and their purpose is to identify and report any 
factor that could represent success of failure of the ERP project in the post implementation 
phase.  The literature review study by Nah et al (2001) sought to bring together the findings 
of the fragmented, and relatively rare academic research, on the post implementation phase at 
that time;  their literature search revealed just ten studies relating to CSFs in ERP 
implementation. The eleven factors found were then categorised into four life cycle phases as 
defined by Marcus and Tannis (2000); chartering, project, shakedown and onward and 
upward. Chartering was described as the phase in which decision were made as to how the 
project was funded, comprising of activities such as idea generation, business case 
development, project feasibility, selecting software and project planning.  The project phase 
was concerned with project planning and personnel, whereas shakedown referred to the 
period from the project going ‘live’ to the system being considered to operate normally, the 
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activities for which were, for instance retraining, finding inconsistences (bugs) and rectifying 
them; the shakedown phase could be lengthy since it continued until all of the system issues 
are resolved and it runs error free. The final phase, onward and upward was concerned with 
improving and maintaining the system until the time when it was upgraded or changed 
(Marcu and Tannis, 2000).   
 
Table 2.1 Life Cycle Phases and CSFs (Nah et al. ,2001) 
Life Cycle Phases and Critical Success Factors 
Chartering  Project 
 Appropriate business and legacy systems 
 ERP teamwork and composition 
 Top management support 
 Business plan and vision 
 Effective communication 
 Project management 
 Project champion 
 Change management programme and 
culture 
 Business process reengineering (BPR) and 
minimum customisation 
 Software development, testing and 
troubleshooting 
Shakedown Onward and Upward Phase 
 Monitoring and evaluation of performance   Business Vision 
 
In this study, ERP implementation concerned all phases, including the post implementation 
phase, as the newly implemented EPR system, whereas shakedown would appear to represent 
this in other perspectives.  It is evident that earlier phases will considerably influence the post 
implementation phase and, such a view would justify their being included, as seems to have 
been the approach taken by Lau et al. (2001).  Although Lau et al. (2001) identified eleven 
factors, they appeared to consider some more important than others, for instance, ERP 
teamwork and composition, which should be of a cross functional nature and team should 
collaborate in an environment of trust.  The change management programme was 
interdependent on there being an organisational culture, in which employees had a shared 
vision of the firm's objectives, were committed to its values and were change orientated.  
Change agents were considered to be a key element of ERP success since they were the 
vehicle to transform the current culture, so as to embrace the new aspects that ERP drove.   
 
While Lau et al (2001) suggest that these are three separate factors, change management 
guru’s, such as Kotter (2012) would suggest that these aspects were integral to a successful 
change management, rather than being separated this manner. The third area of most critical 
importance was suggested as on-going learning and support, although this had been included 
within the change programme rather than specifically highlighted. The findings may not 
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represent a high degree of generalisability, since they resulted from ten academic studies but 
this many have been a consequence of lower interest in ERP implementation at that time. 
A similar study of 70 articles, 45 of which were considered to contain CSFs, conducted by 
Finney and Corbett (2007) intended to find the CSFs, but also to identify gaps in the 
literature.  The authors identified 26 categories, although they report difficulty in describing 
them accurately; the factors were then divided into two main sections;   strategic and tactical 
(Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2  Critical Success Factors in ERP Implementation (Finney and Corbett, 2007) 
 Strategic Factors  Tactical Factors 
Seq Factor Description No of 
studies 
Seq Factor Description No of 
studies 
1 Top management commitment 
and support 
25 14 Project team, the best and brightest 21 
2 Visioning and planning 15 15 Balanced team 12 
3 Build a business case 3 16 Communication plan 10 
4 Project champion 10 17 Empowered decision makers 3 
5 Implement strategy and time 
frame 
17 18 Team morale and motivation 6 
6 Vanilla ERP 6 19 Project planning and management 4 
7 Project Management 6 20 BPR and software configuration 23 
8 Change Management 25 21 Legacy system configuration 5 
9 Managing Cultural Change 7 22 IT infrastructure 8 
10 Troubleshooting/crisis 
management 
6 23 Client Consultation 4 
11 Data conversion and integrity 5 24 Selection of ERP 7 
12 System testing 5 25 Consultant Selection and relationship 16 
13 Post implementation evaluation 7 26 Training and job redesign 23 
 
Many of these factors are similar to those mentioned by Lau et al. (2009), as might be 
expected in a literature review study that does include that earlier research;  the categorisation 
into strategic and tactical suggests a broader view over the length of the project, rather than a 
phase based one, which has some merit as a stage by stage approach to CSFs could lead to 
reducing focus on some areas that remain critical, such as on-going organisational learning 
after implementation, and post implementation evaluation to assess return on investment 
(ROI), as well as the system’s effectiveness regarding all elements of the business activity. 
The authors purpose in categorising in this was that the factors listed under strategic were the 
‘larger picture’ elements but broken down into 'do-able’ parts whilst the tactical factors were 
the elements that required skills and finer detail (Finney and Corbett, 2007, p 335).   
 
The factors identified that appear to be additional to those of Lau et al (2001), include Vanilla 
ERP, although this actually refers to software with minimum customisation as was included 
in the earlier study, and empowered decision-making, a factor not often cited separately in 
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many research findings but one that Finney and Corbett (2007) justify, on the basis that 
unless this is the case, implementation can be severely hindered. A particularly useful aspect 
of the findings of this review was the regularity with which each of these factors had been 
cited in the literature, which suggests a potential hierarchy.  The study also provides some 
additional detail about key aspects for instance job re-design is partnered with training, and is 
a separate factor, whereas it was included in change management by Lau et al. (2001).  The 
requirement to examine how the ERP implementation will change the work task emphasis 
and job description is stressed, as well as IT development training, in addition to user training 
and project team training; training of the project team is the aspect most frequently 
mentioned.  The complementary aspect of Finney and Corbett’s (2007) study was their 
critical approach to the aspects that the studies omitted, for instance, the lack of depth about 
what tactics change management should embrace and how it should be implemented, were 
highlighted.  This omission is surprising considering that this is the most frequently cited 
CSF in the studies that were reviewed. The authors commented on the diversity of the 
definitions used regarding change as well as how rarely the stakeholder perspective was 
considered;  the comment about stakeholders presumably referring to client consultation in 
just four studies. However the need for cultural change could also be inferred in stakeholder 
perspective, since this is a critical aspect of change management programmes (Kotter, 2012).  
 
The studies examined were stated to have generally explored just one CSF in detail, very few 
even considered the most critical ones as a group and no major research was found that 
considered ERP implementation from the perspectives of key stakeholders. The study’s 
conclusion stated that it was evident that general CSF frameworks for ERP implementation 
had been derived from reviews of the prior published literature or limited numbers of case 
studies and therefore significant duplication of factors occurred. 
 
The research conducted by Francoise et al. (2009) had the stated purpose of narrowing the 
gaps in the general CSF literature mentioned by Finney and Corbett (2007). Initially a review 
of the relevant literature was conducted and 13 major CSFs reported, which are suggested as 
factors to guide project managers to the types of intervention needed to enhance the chances 
of project success, but also emphasising that, without the practical means to implement them, 
there would be little effect.  Hence the study continued by attempting to identify and record 
the practical solutions to these issues from other academic research findings that focused on 
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the difficulties actually encountered, and found a total of 107 of those.  Two methods were 
employed to suggest the practical steps needed to enable the CSFs to be supported, in a way 
that would enhance outcomes, firstly previous studies directly or indirectly focused on ERP 
systems, and secondly professional texts and journals; 73 activities were identified, which 
were then validated by carrying out a Dephi Survey with those professionals that had 
experienced ERP implementation. The survey revealed that the detailed list of activities was 
not carried out to solve the known key issues with ERP implementation.  As a part of the 
model of generic CSF factors, this study provides a useful and practical support to 
implementing the accomplishment of the CSF factors cited.  
 
The quantitative research by Sun et al. (2005) focused on five CSFs in six organisations, 
contrary to the customary single focus identified by Nah et al. (2001); the findings reinforced 
the relative importance of some factors above others, inferred by the frequency of those 
factors in the Nah et al. (2001). The five factors, which represented 22 sub factors, were 
derived from a previous study by Cantu (1999) who had described the main factors as: 
management/organisation, people, data, process and technology, no mention of culture or 
change management in this framework.  The findings were that people factors should be 
given the highest priority followed by data and technology; the high priority of people aligns 
with Lau et al (2001).  
The models of generic CSF factors cited tend to complement each other providing the 
opportunity for a researcher to use the findings to create a more holistic model from these as 
appropriate to the specific ERP implementation system concerned 
 
2.3.2 Cross Cultural Generic CSF Models for ERP Implementation 
The generic CSF factors that influence ERP implementation in a cross cultural context, 
provides a complementary framework to that of the generic factors included in 2.3.1; the 
number of such studies is limited but growing.  The research conducted across ten countries 
by Ngai et al. (2008) provided such a model; the literature review used diverse sources that 
had been published in 2006 and 2007: journals, conference proceedings, doctoral 
dissertations and academic texts.  The range of sources was justified as a consequence of the 
subject matter being relatively new; 299 articles were identified but only 48 were used, these 
met three specific criteria.  The criteria used were that research must be;  empirical studies 
published in English, specific location of study and how CSFs were selected;  duplicates were 
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identified such as conference proceedings and papers with same source, for instance in the 
case of journal articles based on previous version, only the latest version used. The countries 
included varied from USA (17) to China/Asia (9), South America (2) the Middle East (2) and 
Denmark; studies examined often compared practice in two countries. The analysis was 
based on the eleven factors that were identified by Nah et al (2001) but seven new factors 
were found, hence 18 CSFs existed, of which 12 comprised of at total of more than 80 sub-
factors related to the main factor. Specific new factors were data management, country 
related functional requirements, national culture, ERP vendor and organisational 
characteristics. 
 
The conclusion focused on some of these additional factors in particular, suggesting that ERP 
implementation was more successful in developed countries, which this researcher suggests 
could be regarded as an additional CSF generic factor itself.  Another cross cultural CSF 
factor that Ngai et al. (2008) did not state from their findings, but that this researcher suggests 
is inferred, is the relative importance of the CSF factors according to specific global region in 
which the ERP implementation takes place and that the importance ranking was influenced 
by government factors, the norms of business practice, national and organisational culture, 
levels of expertise and resources;  reference was also made to national cultural dimensions as 
envisaged by Hofstede et al (2010).  Ngai et al (2008) suggested a west-east divide, 
describing the Chinese, for instance, making decisions based on experience and intuition, as 
well as on personal relationships rather than the standardised approaches used for planning in 
western developed countries.  In addition knowledge sharing is not a cultural norm in China 
but rather knowledge relates to levels of power, so that Chinese managers do not tend to 
favour implementation of systems, such as ERP but control information to retain power, 
which has hindered ERP implementation in China. Another potential inhibitor to ERP 
implementation was government standards, which tended to influence business practices, so 
that existing data models and system functionality developed in western developed business, 
might not be appropriate in other countries. 
 
A survey study carried out in China by Zhang et al. (2003) also examined the cross cultural 
differences between western based organisations and those in the east, specifically China; 
five factors were examined based on a literature review search, carried out prior to the 
survey.  These five factors were: organisational environments (management support BPR, 
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company wide support; people skill levels and degree of involvement; technical issues 
(software, hardware and data accuracy); ERP vendor commitment; culture. The most 
important CSF was found to be BPR and the related people factor; the findings mirrored 
those of Ngai et al (2008,) in that these were inhibitors owing to fear of loss of power through 
widespread knowledge of key information and the cultural reluctance to learn new 
procedures.  However the study was very limited, with only 43 respondents and a return rate 
below 35% so its generalizability is low   A third study, conducted in Sri Lanka by 
Wickramasinghe and Gunawardena involved 74 organisations that had implemented ERP 
systems, three broad factors were examined to discover their impact on successful 
implementation.  The findings were that two of them were critical and embraced the many of 
the eleven factors suggested by Nah et al. (2001) but as found in the study by Ngai et al. 
(2008) the second factor, which comprised on business planning and vision, clear roles and 
responsibilities and monitoring/evaluations, in other words standardised systems was not a 
factor in ERP implementation success.  
 
Hence implementation of ERP systems in a cross cultural setting has additional specific 
success factors that relate to national and organisational cultures and, in some cases the 
concept of ERP, which has the goal of sharing information is alien to the senior management 
of the organisations concerned. 
 
2.3.3 Critical Failure Factor (CFF) Models 
An alternative to examining critical success factors is to devise critical failure models, 
examples of which are discussed in this section.  The rationale for this approach, according to 
Momoh et al. (2010), is that it provides organisations with the reality of the problems that do 
occur and the potential consequences regarding human and financial resources.  
 
In identifying CSFs, the authors propose that these focus on the actions an organisation is 
advised to carry out to avoid failure and that CFFs incite a more urgent focus, since they 
provide direct description of the failure that ensues if all the CSFs are not appropriately 
implemented. Nine critical failure factors (table 2.3) were identified by means of an in-depth 
review of published research from 1999 to 2007, conducted by Momoh et al. (2010) and a 
description of each one from a live perspective. 
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The factors were  identified in large organisations and SMEs;109 studies in all, with 18 
conducted in developing countries, 36 in USA and 13 in UK. 
The studies were conducted across multiple industries, so that Momoh states that failure 
factors should be a considerable concern to all organisation types, and that the reliability and 
validity of the study is very high owing to the multiple approach; manufacturing was 
identified as the highest implementer of ERP. The authors are critical of some of the studies 
owing to the lack of depth apparent in the research; they also state that more in-depth study is 
required on each factor as well as the methodology to resolve it. 
 
The ERP implementation in a large Chinese manufacturing group of 14 companies was the 
subject of a study on CFFs by Pan et al. (2011); 37 failure risk factors were identified. The 
study focused specifically on post ERP implementation, rather on any risk factors that would 
cause ERP implementation failure.  The risks were rated and seven suggested as most serious 
of the CFFs, all of which were related to the organisational or people characteristics, rather 
than the technology (table 2.4). An ‘exhaustive’ literature review was conducted that 
identified 40 potential risks and formed the basis of two questionnaire surveys, to gather the 
different perspectives of ICT users and experts, to provide an operational view, and business 
managers, to capture the managerial and strategic opinion. 
 
The findings of this study may not all be generalisable to western developed organisations, 
for instance the loss of knowledge is likely to be  more critical in the eastern nations owing to 
their lack of knowledge management systems, exacerbated by the cultural aspect of not 
sharing knowledge, and it being at highest levels in senior managers, which infers that when 
such individuals leave an organisation there is a significant drop in organisational knowledge;  
this factor aligns with findings by Zhang (2003). 
 
The findings of this research tend to complement rather than duplicate Momoh et al. (2010); 
there is less attention to the technical and financial issues, although technical aspects of the 
seven CFFs align such ERP system failing to generate suitable materials and generation of 
MPS, as a consequence of data quality. 
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Table 2.3:  Critical Failure Factors Adapted from data:  Momoh et al. (2010) 
No Critical Failure Factor No of 
Studies 
Description of Failure (examples) 
1 Excessive customisation 
 
13 Increases implementation from months to years, confuses 
users, software and user specifications change, high cost 
implications, restructure organisation’s business processes to 
fit software. 
2 Dilemma of internal 
integration 
 
8 Inflexibility in software forces of firms to change business 
processes to fit software if end to end process design is not 
utilised. Many failures. 
3 Poor understanding of 
business implications 
and requirements,  
 
7 Organisation not organized in a manner that enables all 
benefits to be experienced, organisation not ready for 
integration, departments with own agendas, conflicting 
objectives 
4 Lack of change 
management 
 
12 Failure to recognise the impact that the change would have on 
entire organisation, lack of communication with employees, 
cultural lack of readiness, inadequate user training so do not 
know how to use and maintain, unplanned cost 
 Poor data quality 
 
9 Inaccurate, incomplete data and lack of timely data provision 
has substantial business and social consequences, data misfits 
when organisational requirements and ERP package do not 
align 
 Misalignment of IT with 
business 
 
3 Changes in environment not taken into account, since rare for 
technology and business needs to match, approach is not 
dynamic to accommodate  
 Hidden costs 3 Underestimate hidden costs particularly those for training and 
data conversion, as well as consulting cost and the perception 
of project end date 
 Limited training 
 
4 Managers and users cannot use functionality, do not 
understand the objectives of the ERP implementation 
 Lack of top management 
support 
5 Complex organisational issues not addressed, technology 
regarded as the solution, managers cannot adapt to change,  
 
 
Table 2.4:  Critical Post ERP Implementation Factors (Pan et al. ,2011) 
No Critical Risk Factor Relative Score 
1 Lose critical IT or ERP expert 164.4 
2 MPS generated by the ERP system is inappropriate  132.3 
3 Operational staff unwilling to use the ERP system 129.5 
4 Loss of  accumulated organisational ERP knowledge over time 127.8 
5 Not enough technical support from ERP vendors 127.3 
6 ERP system fails to generate the appropriate material 127.2 
7 Seamless Integration between ERP modules not accomplished 123.8 
 
A study of CFF by Hawari and Heeks (2009) and conducted in Jordan, found that failure to 
close specific gaps represented a significant CFF; its methodology was based on comparing 
the specific factors in the organisation before and after ERP system implementation.  The 
assumptions and requirements that comprised the original system design, as compared with 
the organisational reality, were not addressed during implementation and caused failure.  The 
seven gaps identified between the assumptions made and the existing organisational features  
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before implementation, were categorised according to how likely they were to cause failure;  
four were found to be very likely, those of objectives and values, staffing and skills, 
technology and process, in decreasing order of importance.  Information and management 
systems and structures gaps were less likely to cause failure and other resources rated as 
possibly influencing failure. An example of a gap description is that of technology, in which 
the infrastructure that existed was far more basic that was assumed.  Post implementation, the 
gaps in each factor had changed little, some not at all, particularly the highly rated failure 
factor of objectives and values, with staffing a skills reducing marginally.   
 
The CFF model that results is the design-reality gap model, which the researchers suggest to 
mitigate failure risk and to focus attention on the interventions to move away from failure, by 
highlighting the gaps and then designing actions to minimise them.  The authors apprise the 
issue that, as a developing county, these factors may be exacerbated by the culture, again 
making reference to Hofstede et al. (2010), and demonstrating similarity to Chinese studies, 
such as Pang et al (2011) and Zhang (2003). For instance, the authors discuss uncertainty 
avoidance manifested in resistance/fear of changes in job design, and suggest that closing 
gaps relating to a specific related failure factor may be more of a challenge than anticipated.  
It would appear therefore that issues that seem to be specifically related to developing 
countries may be generalisable over those eastern countries,  in a similar manner that ‘best 
practice’ appears so in developed countries. 
 
2.3.4 Change Management Model for ERP Implementation  
The importance of the Change Management Process as a success factor in ERP 
implementation has led to a few models based on this factor alone, for instance Francoise et 
al. (2009) proposed one that incorporated culture and had a number of specified steps: 
 Opinion leaders should be lobbied to support the change 
 Commitment of senior personnel must be secured 
 The organisation should be assessed as being capable of accepting the change 
 Training should be completed for the whole organisations 
 Risk management and actions to mitigate risk should be completed 
 Scope of change evaluated to meet the challenge of its impact and risks 
 Communication to all  of the benefits and limitations 
 Communication of the system functionality  
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 Ensure organisational readiness prior to implementation 
 Regular communication sessions to review progress 
 Pilot systems available in large conference type areas so that personnel can learn 
about system 
 Project leader receives specific training on handling problems of change effectively 
 
This list is comprehensive but appears to give little detail or rationale for cultural aspects, 
which are important those implementing to understand, to organisational and individuals 
beliefs and values (Schein, 1986; Kotter 2012). Since these activities could be processed 
without considering the softer change side related 
 
The change management model suggested by Kemp and Low (2008) was based on an 
innovation model devised by Klein et al. (2001) and was a consequence of the findings of 
research into a large Australian multinational firm. Two hypotheses were devised to discover 
whether specified change management activities (figure 2.1) influence the environment in 
which the ERP system was being implemented, and that the environment was therefore 
positively influenced in terms of feelings, awareness and intention to adopt the system. The 
methodology employed surveys, interviews and organisational documents. 
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The findings confirmed the important nature of the change management process on the 
environment and hence the success of the ERP implementation process.  The key activities 
were: communicating information about the system to users; ensuring that user skills were 
appropriately developed; the involvement of personnel in the change.  In cases in which this 
process did not occur there was a more negative attitude to the change.  However the 
shortcomings were found to be cases, in which managers publicly supported the change but 
were not convinced of the benefits of the system to the company, that users did not 
understand the reasons why the change was required, since they considered the new system 
less efficient and offered lower functionality than the previous system.  Additionally, the new 
system did not meet their expectations, indicating low levels of communication and employee 
involvement.  Hence Kemp and Low (2008) highlight an important aspect of the process, that 
managers must be better informed of the corporate purpose and objectives of the new system. 
Another aspect of the change process that had an unexpected outcome for the organisation, 
Figure 2.1:  Change Management Model (Kemp and Low, 2008) 
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was the activities allocated by the change management team; this team chose different 
activities for each department, based on their assessment of what was required, and with the 
purpose of providing the best outcome for reasonable effort.  The consequence was that, 
contrary to the team's belief that all employees would experience the same feeling/climate 
during the process, there was wide variation; the lower the number of activities provided for a 
group, the greater the resistance to change.  Although generalizability is limited, since only 
one organisation was studied, the results are likely to be generalisable to many large 
corporates, in which teams for managing change or similar decisions may be made, to decide 
on what activities should be conducted in each department, owing to size factor of total 
employee involvement (Momoh, 2011). 
 
A similar model was found to be appropriate, according to the findings of the survey study 
conducted by Ahmed et al (2006), in which 69 Malaysian manufacturing companies 
participated.  The research particularly focused on the resistance to change, and findings 
strongly suggested this resistance should be acknowledged and maximum attention given to 
interventions that were designed to minimise employee concerns;  participation in the change 
by all employees, regular, open communication and development of knowledge and skills.  
The study outcomes emphasise the soft factors that were neglected by Francoise et al. (2009), 
that the resistance is a consequence of anxiety of the unknown such as loss of pay, status and 
habitual working patterns with which they feel secure. 
A three stage model for the specific involvement of users to minimise resistance to change 
was proposed by Aldwani (2001): 
 the first stage was identify and appraise the attitudes to the change of individual users 
and influential groups, by asking specific questions; 
 then in the second implementation phase predetermined strategies can be included 
that build awareness, influence feelings by interventions such as training and gaining 
support of those whose opinion is most influential; 
  the third stage is an evaluation of the change management efforts in which feedback 
from users enable the senior management to appraise the degree of resistance 
remaining and to then to adapt activities as necessary  
 
In the second phase the authors emphasise the soft factor of feelings, and therefore the need 
of group leaders to have significant involvement in the ERP implementation planning. 
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These studies all focus on managing the change through employment of a planned process, 
but the degree to which there is practically based attention to the reasons for employee 
resistance based on the anxieties experienced, is somewhat varied but generally 
acknowledged as the core issue. As a group of perspectives there is significant practical 
perspective that aids leveraging the change management process in ERP implementation. 
 
2.3.5 ERP Implementation from a Training Perspective 
Training has been identified and further appraised as a key influencer on the success or 
failure of the ERP implementation by a number of studies.  One of these describes the 
Learning Requirements Planning (LRP) model, which focuses on integrated learning for ERP 
success; this focuses on the assumption that in ERP system implementation, the lack of 
enterprise-wide training is the core reason for failures (Kapp et al, 2001). The model 
considers training from a wider perspective, in that it involves six-step enterprise levels. Each 
level comes with a detailed checklist. Those checklists can be integrated together to form the 
LRP CSF(s) model. Table 2.5 briefly explains the LRP model. 
 
Table 2.5:  The Learning Planning Requirements Model 
No Stage Description  
0 What is LRP? LRP is the transformation of corporate strategic goals into discrete, measurable 
ERP training and implementation objectives, combined with proven feedback 
methods and systematic performance analysis  
1 Analysis The purpose of this process is to identify learning objectives based on the strategic 
business needs driving the organisation's ERP implementation. 
2 Diagnosis  In this stage the gap between the existing skills and competencies and the skills 
and competencies required to obtain the stated strategic and ERP implementation 
goals of the organization is identified.  
3 Design This stage aims to design training and development programme, including. the 
best training method, ways of presenting of information and of distributing the 
information to the learner. 
4 Implementation  Implementation involves utilising LRP process to effectively implement the ERP 
system  
5 Evaluation  The focus is on the evaluation of the training and learning that occurs in 
relationship to the ERP implementation.  
6 Continuation  This last stage addresses building an organisational mechanism to continuously 
develop employee skills as they relate to the ERP system. 
 
This integrated process is necessary since, according to Kapp et al (2001) training typically 
takes on a lower priority than the ERP process, it is often conducted in isolation from the 
ERP implementation, not relevant to the specific job roles held by the employees and/or 
training offered by the ERP Vendor does not support the employee to understand the 
integrated nature of the system, since it is based around technical training only.  In addition 
the lower priority given to it, means that that employees fail to complete all training sessions;  
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what was required, and rarely happens is the development of a systematic training and 
development plan.  The applicability of the LRP model was appraised by Shahin et al. (2010) 
in a survey study based on ERP implementation in a large Iranian steel company employing 
8000 people. This researchers evaluated the learning that employees received by 
benchmarking it to the stages recommended in the model, and confirmed Kapp et al.’s (2001) 
conviction that generally, the training programme related to the ERP implementation did not 
represent continuous learning;  the organisation had not been in an appropriate state for 
learning at the outset, and relatively scant attention was given to this aspect of 
implementation, since user learning and development had not been considered an important 
part of it. As a consequence the implementation had been hindered. 
 
Another framework for learning related to ERP system implementation, was proposed by 
Dorobat and Nastase (2012), which has the purpose of identifying problems relating to 
training, as well as reducing resource consumption in other ways, such as time and money. 
The model was accomplished by a literature review, in which 9 CSFs related to training in 
ERP implementation, were identified: 
1. Top management support 
2. Project management in which an initial step is to identify the user needs 
3. The Training Curriculum, designed to give significant user support including system 
command language and new business processes 
4. Users commitment training, achieved by explaining the objectives of the training and 
its benefits.  
5. Personnel skills and competencies: so as to plan and deliver appropriate training 
individual users/groups 
6. Training schedule, which is synchronised with the implementation  project, so that 
time lag between training and use of the ERP module is minimal 
7. Training budget, which is usually the most underestimated cost in ERP and is high, 
since new processes must be learnt, it relates to existing employee competences and 
extra training and support for new employees must be factored in 
8. Training evaluation to ensure knowledge transfer has been effective, including cost 
effective, and that acceptance of the associated organisational change has taken place 
and benefits are seen 
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9. Training methods should be varied and appropriate to the difficulty of the issues 
concerned; the most difficult should take place in a classroom setting and the training 
should be available in all the languages that are relevant to the company’s operation 
(those spoken by employees).   
 
The training is delivered by means of CBT (computer based training methodology) which 
can be customised for individuals; it is called the ERPT training model which used ULM 
(Unified Language Modelling) technology.  The key features of the model are that: the 
user’s individual learning preference is determined at the outset; the training method is 
selected to match this preference;  a training scheme is then produced for each business 
process user; when the user deviates from the schema, for instance in generating data, this 
is detected automatically.  The ERPT model can also calculate the time and cost 
associated with each user’s learning and provide the Training Manager with reports on 
individual user progress. The ERPT model was successfully tested with Romanian SMEs, 
which suggests that it has satisfactory applicability but requires more widespread 
application to objectively judge its effectiveness.  However the nine CSF factors that 
emerged show some similarity to Kapp et al (2001), reinforcing that model and the ERPT 
model is focused on individual learning, which is a strength that Kapp et al (2001) do not 
emphasise. 
 
2.3.6 ERP implementation framework from a process change perspective 
A Process Change Management (PCM) for successful ERP implementation is suggested as an 
important one, according to a number of researchers. An example is one that was developed 
by Al-Mashari et al. (2003), the main features of which are shown in table 2.6.  The various 
PCM constructs are described in the context of SAP R/3 (a leading ERP application) 
implementation. The evidence of how these constructs are operationalised in practice is 
drawn from a large collection of R/3 case studies, which represent various organisational 
experiences. This model is linked the PCM framework provided by Grover (1999), which 
embodies five facets, each of which corresponds to the key ERP issues to be considered. In 
essence each step of ERP implementation is closely integrated to the related business process 
that takes place. 
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In order for this model to be successfully implemented Al-Mashari et al (2003) emphasise the 
requirement of a well-defined vision and close involvement of a business director, with an IT 
strategic process integrated into the business strategy for the short, medium and long term. 
 
Table 2.6:  Process Change Management CSF(s) (Al-Mashari ,1999) 
No PCM facet ERP Factors 
1 Change management 1. People 
2. Communication 
3. Tools and methodology 
4. Interactions 
2 Project Management 5. Team formation and development 
6. Roles and responsibilities 
7. External entities 
8. Measurements of progress 
3 Continuous process management 9. Process redesign 
10. Process performance measurements 
11. Continuous process improvement 
4 Strategic planning 12. Performance gap analysis 
13. Change justification 
14. Projects strategies 
5 Technology management 15. Software selection 
16. Technical analysis and design 
17. Installation 
 
A value chain is created by focus on the business processes in this manner.  As with other 
models discussed in this Literature Review, there is a lack of detail about practical 
accomplishment of the steps, even though this researcher appreciates that each ERP system 
implementation is relatively unique. 
 
An alternative business process model, called the Composite BPM approach was devised by 
Stemberger et al. (2009) shown in figure 2.2.  Essentially it is a seven stage model in which 
the steps do not necessarily have to be followed in the order in the diagrammatic 
representation; the concept of composite is that some business processes need adaptation to 
the ERP system while others can be custom built. 
 
The first stage is to examine current business process models, which are stated to be rarely as 
conducted in practice and need some adaptation, but a critical factor is matching the system 
capabilities to the business needs, stages two and three can occur at the same time as the 
initial stage. Stage four is considered critical since it involves making key choices about 
processed to adapted to the ERP system, and those that need to be specifically designed to the 
business needs;  the core processed such as accounting will probably be categorised  under 
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group one but those processes that lead to the organisation's competitive advantage should be 
customised.  The business process change is integrated with the implementation in stage five, 
which requires change to managed and appropriate interventions in place to accomplish this 
successfully; changes in organizational structure and culture are specifically mentioned as 
crucial at this stage.  Stage six is only required non-standard modules are required by the 
business, using standard modules makes the implementation simpler but for new modules in 
this stage, development time will be required. 
 
 
 
 
However Stemberger et al. (2009) suggest that steps five and six should occur together 
because the processes will be highly connected.  Step seven is the continuous monitoring 
process, one that does not end, since process changes need to be documented.  The processes 
need to have this flexibility, in order for organisations to adapt to changing requirements 
from the external environment.  The authors stress that ERP is not about technology but about 
business process change and that many ERP system implementations fail because the BPM is 
not afforded the required attention.  Although this model lacks the detail of the integral links 
that are represented by the ERP factors in Al-Mashari et al.  (2003), it provides an outline 
Figure 2.2:  The BPM Composite Model (Stemberger et al., 2009) 
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framework that ensures that the firm considers the business process change adequately and 
could be used in a complementary manner with Al-Mashari et al. (2003) model. 
 
2.3.7 ERP Implementation and Knowledge of Implementation Objectives 
A framework for ensuring knowledge of implementation objectives is offered as being one 
that will influence success.  Essentially Wei (2008) offers an eight stage framework to 
identify key factors and to construct performance indicators (PI) for stages of the ERP 
process, as well as the means to evaluate outcomes at those stages. This approach enables 
continuous performance monitoring and, if the performance indicators are well designed, can 
support development of desired attitudes, for instance shared vision and lower resistance to 
change.  The ERP objectives are aligned with the business goals;  considerable guidance is 
given on how to accomplish the final list of PI from the larger number that will be initially 
generated from a dedicated team that generate an initial list (table 2.7) 
 
Table 2.7:  Knowledge of Performance Indicators Model (Wei et al. ,2008) 
No Step Detail 
1 Form ERP PI Content Development Team Critical managers, user representatives and ERP system 
experts 
2 Expand the Implementation Objectives to 
appropriate ERP PIs 
Develop PIs linked to ERP objectives and strategic 
objectives 
3 Survey and add other appropriate PIs on the 
ERP output view 
Survey other PIs on expected usage and outputs from the 
adopted system 
4 Reduce the number of PIs Rate as essential, important but not essential and not 
important 
5 Construct PI structure based on the 
knowledge of ERP Implementation 
Objectives 
Categories into project management factors, system 
factors (functionality, user friendliness, reliability etc), 
vendor factors and impact factors (customer, user, 
organisation) 
6 Develop the detailed evaluation 
performance method 
Team decide on what data to collect and how to collect it 
7 Evaluate the performance of the ERP PI Provide rating scores 
8 Undertake the periodic measurement Changes in system inevitable so new PIs will be required 
 
This model is detailed, logical and relatively easy to implement and appears to represent a 
robust procedure for continuous monitoring of the ERP system implementation and 
minimising the probability of failure.  Its limitation will be the quality of the PIs generated 
and the measurement criteria. 
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2.4 Summary 
This review of the literature on factors, which impact on the success or failure of ERP system 
implementation, demonstrates the degree of interest in the issues of implementation and the 
continuing difficulty that practitioners experience.  The breadth of recommendations that   
have been made suggest that from the very outset of considering ERP,  a detailed roadmap 
needs to be configured that is reviewed several times before any activity begins.  This would 
assist organisations to better assure that key issues such as change management, cultural 
aspects and business processes are carefully; the perspective of identifying and developing 
appropriate PIs for each stage of the ERP process, together with robust measurement of them 
at regular intervals represents a fundamental framework for ensuring that the other 
interventions happen and their progress is measured.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
 
The role of stakeholders in effective ERP implementation 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
An issue which has been highlighted by many researchers concerning the existing research is 
that the majority of these studies conceptualise an information system purely as an abstract 
and material factor, and fail to consider the extent to which the success of the system 
implementation may be affected by human factors (Ifinedo & Nahar, 2009). In other words, 
there have historically been relatively few studies which examine the extent to which the 
process of organisational change is linked to the establishment of an ICT system, and which 
analyse the impact that the role of different stakeholders can have on the success of such a 
system.  
 
Despite this, Tiwana and Keil (2010) suggest that the studies which have been conducted in 
this area during the last decade have started to place greater emphasis on the relationship 
between an ERP system and organisational stakeholders. This represents a significant 
transition from the traditional attitude of viewing technology within a deterministic 
framework which dates back to research which was conducted in the 1980s.  
 
This literature review aims to provide an overview, and a critical analysis, of the research 
which has been conducted into the relationship between the implementation of an enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) system and different stakeholders within an organisation. 
Specifically, the literature review aims to ascertain the extent to which the actions which are 
taken by different stakeholders within an organisation are likely to affect the success of an 
ERP implementation. The review focuses in particular on the extent to which the roles played 
by ERP sponsors, senior managers within an organisation, ERP managers, organisational 
customers, organisational suppliers and specialist ERP consultants are likely to affect the 
success of implementation.  
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3.2 The role of stakeholders in effective ERP implementation 
3.2.1 ERP Sponsors  
The success of ERP is greatly influenced by the morale of the sponsor. The role of the 
sponsor should be clear and consistent from the first day to the completion of the project. The 
project sponsor must provide strategic ownership of the project and ensure that the top level 
management are made aware of the goals and expected outcome of the project. The sponsor 
of the project is instrumental in ensuring that the top level management is committed to the 
implementation of the ERP system.  
 
The sponsor has the ability to set timelines and goals to be achieved during the 
implementation of the project and compel the senior executive to work towards realising 
these goals. The sponsor should also be a member of the steering committee that is mandated 
with the duty of ensuring that the project is successfully completed. Various authors have 
documented the roles and definition of the project sponsor or champion. Roure (1999 p.4) 
defines a project champion as “any individual who made a decisive contribution to  the 
innovation by actively and enthusiastically promoting its progress through critical stages in 
order to obtain resources and/or active support from top management”. Based on this 
definition, a project sponsor should evaluate the information, choose to install the system, 
motivate the top level managers to support the system and provide a guarantee that all 
materials and resources will be availed during the implementation of the project. According 
to kale (2000), a project sponsor is the a member of the steering committee who is actively 
involved in the process of maintaining the project credibility and is committed to supporting 
the implementation of the ERP system through all the phases. The role of the project sponsor 
differs from that of a manager in that, his role is mainly that of steering committee chairman 
while the manager oversees the implementation of the day to day activity during the 
implementation phase.  
 
The main functions of the sponsor are that of ownership of the project and leadership of the 
steering committees to ensure that the implementation process is successful. The project 
sponsor is also the final budget authority and is responsible of ensuing that the ERP project is 
funded as per the requirement. Lack of the sponsor commitment may result to underfunding, 
lack of resources and delayed payments which affects the success of ERP systems. The 
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change management process which results to business disruptions must be authorised by the 
project sponsor and hence, he plays a critical role in the development of the project.  
 
3.2.2 Senior organisational managers  
Much of the empirical research which has been conducted in this field suggests that instances 
of failed ERP implementation can be linked specifically to the inadequate views of strategy 
which are held by many senior managers within companies. In particular, Grabski et al 
(2011) argue that the actions and viewpoints which are adopted by senior organisational 
managers often have a serious impact on the likelihood of whether an ERP system 
implementation will be successful or not. It is argued that the majority of senior managers 
tend to visualise the process of strategy as a linear process; as a result, their view of 
organisational change is highly mechanistic and they are more likely to conceptualise change 
using traditional project management models. As a result, many senior organisational 
managers are unlikely to accurately consider the impact of organisational change on 
individuals within the organisation. According to Koh, Gunasekaran and Cooper (2009), this 
failure to consider the welfare of individuals within the organisation is indicative of a failure 
of senior managers to utilise relationship based and processual models when evaluating 
change; as a result they are unlikely to achieve the best possible results of the new ERP 
system since they are essentially clinging to ideals which are associated with the linearity of 
industrial age thought. This is expanded upon by Dorobat (2009) who criticises senior 
organisational managers by stating that they generally assume that the implementation of a 
new ERP system will in itself be sufficient to bring the required benefits to the organisation.  
 
Typically, only limited attempts are made to ensure that the new technology which is 
implemented is fully understood and integrated within the social context of the organisation. 
This is contrasted with an example of a successful ERP implementation by Dezdar and Ainin 
(2011) who claim that an organisation which is able to successfully manage a new ERP 
system does so because they ensure that all of the stakeholders within the company have 
shared goals. Furthermore, successful managers take the time to ensure that all of the 
stakeholders have a clear understanding of the business model of the overall organisation, and 
of the way in which the technology which is encompassed within the new system fits into this 
business model. This is further underlined by Madhani (2012) who conducts a survey of 
different ERP implementation projects and concludes that a key issue which prevents many 
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organisations from reaping the benefits of ERP projects is the fact that the interactions which 
take place between different stakeholders, or „change agents‟ within the company are poorly 
managed. Most of the senior managers which are in charge of organisations where a new 
ERP system is being implemented tend to view themselves as being a single leader who is 
responsible for unilaterally imposing a linear process of change. Dorobat (2009) contends 
that this perspective is fundamentally mistaken and suggests that it is actually more realistic 
to assume that there are a number of different groups which are associated with any type of 
organisational change – these groups include middle managers, teams, senior leaders and 
external consultants. The different interests and motivations of these groups meant that there 
is significant potential for conflict between these different cohorts, and it is the failure to 
effectively manage the different interests of these groups which is likely to contribute the 
problems concerning the issues which arise with the implementation of ERP systems. 
 
Indeed, if one examines the prescriptions of the empirical studies which have been published 
in this area with regard to the key factors which determine the success or the failure of ERP 
systems, one immediately notices that these factors are closely intertwined with the roles and 
strategies which should be adopted by the senior managers within an organisation. For 
example, Bezawada (2012) argues that the success of an ERP implementation is closely 
dependent on extent to which the senior management team of the organisation displays long 
term commitment to the project. This is expanded upon by Koh et al (2009) who argue that 
the success of an ERP project relies heavily on the quality of communication which is 
implemented by the senior organisational team with the rest of the stakeholders within the 
organisation.  
 
Aside from this, however, the consensus within the secondary research appears to be that the 
most important quality which needs to be exhibited by the senior manager of an organisation 
implementing an ERP system is the quality of good leadership. In other words, it is essential 
for senior managers to be able to effectively convey to the stakeholders within the 
organisation the way in which the change which is related to the new system is related to the 
company‟s overall goals and to the mission statement of the organisation. In other words, it is 
necessary for the senior manager to emphasise the fact that the change which will ensue is 
„institutional‟ in nature rather than being confined to a single area of the organisation 
(Arlbjorn & Haug, 2010). Furthermore, it is necessary for the senior manager to demonstrate 
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that the implementation of the ERP system is related to business‟ needs to respond to changes 
in its market environment and that it is not merely the product of business requirements 
which are related to technological issues. The need to emphasise the fact that the 
establishment of a new ERP system is an issue which affects the entire organisation, it is 
important for senior managers to ensure that the responsibility for the management of 
technological change is not relegated to the technical divisions of the organisation, but that it 
is something which is managed on an organisation wide level in order to support the idea that 
it is an organisation-wide change.  A study which was conducted by Silva, De Silva and 
Gunawardana (2011) suggests that, in order for the implementation of an ERP system to be 
effective, it is also necessary for the high level of commitment which senior managers give to 
an ERP project to be clearly visible to the rest of the organisation. When other stakeholders 
within the organisation see the level of commitment which is being associated with the 
project from such a high level they are more likely to see it as a more holistic initiative which 
affects the whole organisation, and are likely to reciprocate. The importance of ensuring a 
high level of visible commitment from the senior organisational team is also reflected in a 
series of case studies which were conducted by Alsalem (2009). In particular, the case study 
of a finance company which was located in China indicated that the ERP implementation 
initially failed due to the fact that the senior managers perceived it to be a purely technical 
issue; rather than adopting a holistic view of the system implementation, there was little 
commitment to the project from the senior organisation and the management of it was wholly 
left to the IT division. However, the poor beginning of the project was reversed when the 
senior managers adopted a clear strategy of signalling their commitment to the 
implementation of the project by talking about their enthusiasm for the project within 
corporate newsletters and by talking about the benefits of the new project with the 
employees, retailers and suppliers of the company. 
 
In addition to displaying high levels of commitment to an ERP project, research suggests that 
it is also essential to ensure that the senior managers establish clear desired outcomes and 
clear outcomes in relation to the implementation of an information system. This can be 
achieved by ensuring that a new mission statement is developed by senior managers which 
outlines the shared values of the organisation, the way in which these values are met by the 
implementation of the new system, and the various roles and responsibilities which need to 
be fulfilled in order to increase the effectiveness of the project (Arlbjorn & Haug, 2010). The 
Literature Review (II)                               3-6   
 
Chapter Three                                                                                                         Page 6 of 29 
 
aim of taking this action is to ensure that all of the stakeholders within the organisation fully 
understand the value which is associated with the implementation of the ERP system. This is 
described by Ifinedo and Nahar (2009) as a form of „symbolic management‟ since its key aim 
is to provide the rest of the stakeholders within the organisation with a rationale for the 
changes which are taking place as a result of the ERP implementation, and also to establish a 
strong foundation for change. In order for such symbolic management to be effective, it is 
necessary to ensure that senior managers are involved in all stages of the implementation of 
the ERP system and that their contribution to the ERP project is visible within all ranks and 
throughout the entire hierarchy of the organisation. Research which has been conducted by 
Koh et al (2009) suggests that one way in which the commitment of the organisation could be 
effectively displayed would be by ensuring that there are regular meetings which are 
organised between the senior managers, the employees and the mid level managers, in order 
to ensure that everyone working at all levels of the organisation is fully apprised of the 
progress which is being made within the ERP project and of its likely benefits. 
 
A second key issue which must be dealt with by the senior managers within an organisation 
in order to increase the likelihood that an ERP project will be successfully implemented is for 
managers to effectively manage the different concerns and motivations of various groups of 
employees. This is due to the fact that, as outlined by organisation behavioural theory, the 
majority of organisations are essentially loose conglomerations of individuals who all have 
very different interests and preferences. It is therefore likely that the advent of a fundamental 
change to an organisation, such as the establishment of a new ERP system, is likely to 
constitute a severe threat to the status quo which may result in the emergence of conflict 
between different interest groups in an organisation. This is confirmed by Ghazanfari et al 
(2009) who argue that the most common cause of a failed ERP project is actually due to the 
failure of the senior managers within the organisation to manage conflict between different 
employees. In order to manage these issues, Spitzley and Kumar (2012) suggests that it is 
necessary for senior managers to obtain strong approval for the project from prominent 
people within the organisation. These individuals can then act as opinion leaders by 
encouraging other employees within the organisation to embrace the new ERP project with 
greater enthusiasm. This is effectively summarised by Silva et al (2011) who suggests that it 
is the responsibility of the senior managers in a company to make it easier for the 
stakeholders in the organisation to more easily „bid farewell‟ to the former status quo which 
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existed prior to the new ERP system, and to enable them to successfully adapt to the new 
system. If this role is not effectively fulfilled by the senior managers, it is likely that the 
introduction of the new system would be met by feelings of employee demoralisation and 
demotivation; this is likely to have long term effects in reducing the likelihood that the new 
ERP system will be full heartedly embraced by members of the organisation. If such feelings 
of employee demoralisation persist, it is possible that this could have a significant negative 
effect on employee turnover and, consequently, on organisational profitability in the long run. 
 
A third area in which the actions of the senior managers are likely to have a significant 
impact on the success of an ERP system implementation is in the nature of the 
communication which they have with their employees. As has been stated by Ganesh and 
Mehta (2010), employee acceptance of a new ERP system, and consequently, the overall 
success of the ERP system, is significantly more likely if there is a high level of 
understanding, acceptance and approval of the new ERP system among all organisational 
stakeholders. In order for such a condition to exist, however, it is necessary for there to be 
continued close communication between the managers and all relevant stakeholders. As part 
of this communication, it is necessary for all organisational stakeholders in the new ERP 
system to be regularly updated with the progress of the new information system 
implementation – this will help to significantly reduce the level of confusion which is 
experienced by stakeholders concerning the new system and will also make them feel like 
they are playing a more important role in the change (Dezdar & Ainin, 2011).  An empirical 
study which was conducted by Grabot, Mayere and Bazet (2008) on the case of a US 
company which was in the process of implementing a new ERP system found that the failure 
of the communications strategy which was implemented by the organisation‟s senior 
managers meant that employees were not fully convinced of the need for the new system. The 
failure of communication in this case had a long term impact on employee morale, resulting 
in the annual rate of turnover among staff within the financial and accounting divisions of the 
company increasing to 100 per cent three years after the new system was fully implemented.  
 
The need for senior managers to embark on a clear strategy of communication with their 
stakeholders is emphasised as being crucial for the overall success of the ERP project by 
Wenrich and Ahmad (2009). This is due to the fact that all of the stakeholders in the new 
project need to be fully informed of the benefits which are likely to accrue to them as a result 
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of the changes in order to obtain their „buy in‟. Research which has been conducted by 
Ifinedo and Nahar (2009) suggests that senior managers need to begin to communicate 
effectively with their organisational stakeholders from the very beginning of the process of 
implementation.  
 
Furthermore, as the communication with stakeholders continues, it is important to ensure that 
it is consistent in nature, that it provides stakeholders with continued regular updates, that it 
explains to stakeholders the way in which such change is integrated with the overall vision of 
the business and how this change will be underpinned by existing systems.  
The process of communication with organisational stakeholders needs to be structured in 
such a way that is sufficient time for stakeholders to get used to the idea of the new system 
and the changes that it will produce before it is actually implemented.  
 
In addition, senior managers need to ensure that the transition to the new system is eased by 
providing adequate training and support documentation to all of the relevant stakeholders. 
Such training would help to increase the level of confidence of employees with respect to 
their ability to use the new system and help to increase the likelihood that the new system 
will be fully accepted. Indeed, the failure to provide adequate training to employees has been 
cited by Wagner and Antonucci (2009) as being an issue which is likely to significantly 
reduce the likelihood of ERP success. It is therefore necessary to ensure that senior managers 
within the organisation take charge of the staff training process. In a study which was 
conducted by Tsai and Hung (2008), it was suggested that those companies which are more 
effective at implementing new information systems facilitate effective communication by 
providing their employees with a single point of contact whom they can ask for any particular 
information. This system of communication is likely to be more effective within larger 
corporations where it is not always possible for employees to contact senior organisational 
managers for information.  
 
One way in which regular communication could be ensured in such cases would be for an 
intranet to be established which would provide stakeholders with access to relevant sources 
of information. Kuhn and Sutton (2009) suggest that it would be useful for all status updates, 
company presentations and meeting minutes which are related to the ERP implementation on 
the intranet so that they can be easily accessed and help to decrease feelings of employee 
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insecurity and uncertainty. This is expanded upon by Silva et al (2011) who argues that an 
effective strategy of communication needs to rely on using a range of different forms of 
media to promote the same message. If only one form of media is used to convey the desired 
messages about the new ERP system, it is likely that employees will simply be indifferent to 
the message which is being conveyed, and this is likely to do little to reduce the resistance 
that employees are likely to have to launch of the project. 
 
Research which has been conducted by Singh (2009) suggests that senior managers within a 
company which is implementing a new ERP system should also ensure that they prepare their 
employees for the change in culture which is likely to result as a consequence of the new 
system. According to Wenrich and Ahmad (2009), the extent to which senior managers deal 
with cultural change is likely to predict the likelihood of success of the overall ERP system 
implementation.  
 
Organisational culture is defined by Williams and Pollock (2009, p.18) as the „sense of 
belonging‟ which exists within an organisation where „people share a common history‟; it is 
arguably the nature of the culture which exists within an organisation which determines the 
way in which the stakeholders within that organisation will react to a new system and thus 
decide its overall success. This is due to the fact that the changes which result from the 
introduction of a new ERP system are so far reaching that they are likely to trigger 
fundamental changes within the culture of an organisation. This is expanded upon by Kuhn 
and Sutton (2009) who go so far as to suggest that organisational culture, and the way in 
which it is managed, is a key determinant of the success of any form of technological change 
within an organisation.  
 
Indeed, Nair, Reddy and Samuel (2011) claims that the adequate management of 
organisational culture is instrumental in determining whether the implementation of a new 
ERP project will be successful or not. Specifically, it is necessary for a senior manager within 
the organisation to ensure that the necessary incentives and rewards are established within the 
company in order to mould the prevailing culture of the organisation to the features of the 
ERP system. It is important for the employees within the organisation to fully internalise 
these new behaviours and to use these to contribute to the development of a new 
organisational culture in order for the introduction of the ERP system to be effective. This is 
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an issue which is explored by Singh (2009) who claims that one of the most important roles 
which should be played by the managers of an organisation is obtaining the support and the 
trust of the employees for the new ERP project.  
In various case studies into corporations which have experienced failed ERP 
implementations, Tsai and Hung (2009) demonstrate that the failure of the project could be 
directly attributed to the fact that the managers of the organisation were not effective in their 
attempts to build up a level of trust with the stakeholders within the company. As a result, 
there was a high level of insecurity which was experienced by employees who felt that their 
existing positions within the organisation were being threatened and who were therefore 
resentful of the new ERP system. This lack of trust also manifested itself in longer term 
negative effects on the organisation as the senior managers struggled to recruit suitably 
qualified people to work on the project. Again, the consensus which has emerged in the 
existing research is the fact that the need to adequately prepare employees for the 
introduction of a new ERP system is closely related to the need to maintain open channels of 
communication (Longinidis & Gotzamani, 2009).  
In the previously cited company, the failure to establish trust among employees is directly 
attributed to failures of communication. The communications which were provided to 
employees were often inaccurate or completely erroneous; many of the new features and 
benefits which had initially been promised to employees failed to materialise once the ERP 
system was actually implemented, and highly disruptive changes to the system were 
introduced after employees had already become used to using the new system.  
 
A fifth area which falls within the responsibility of senior organisational managers and which 
they need to deal with effectively in order to increase the likelihood of ERP success is the 
need to conduct regular change reviews. Specifically, it is necessary for a series of regular 
reviews to be carried out which enables the organisation to evaluate the extent to which they 
have been successful at fulfilling their various goals. Examples of goals which can be 
reviewed include whether or not the company has been successful at meeting their timelines.  
 
In response to such evaluations, Williams and Pollock (2009) suggests that such reviews can 
be useful at allowing the organisation to utilise various process mapping tools for the 
implementation of the new system and to formulate various contingency plans which can be 
established in the event of unforeseen circumstances which may affect the implementation. 
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Nair et al (2011) suggest that it is essential for senior managers to utilise tools such as process 
mapping because it will be a way of adopting a more holistic perspective of the entire ERP 
system implementation. This will be achieved by making it possible for different employees 
to understand the way in which the new processes which are related to the ERP system will 
interact with the prevailing processes in the organisation.  
In order for such a methodology to be used, it is important for senior managers to form the 
relevant teams of people with the necessary expertise, to develop key cycle times, to identify 
different areas for improvement, and to formulate a clear plan for implementation. The 
effectiveness of such an approach towards reviewing the progress of ERP implementation has 
been appositely summarised by Wagner and Antonucci (2009) who argue that such an 
approach is a „common language‟ which can be embraced by both managers and employees 
alike. 
 
Finally, it is commented by Morris and Laksmana (2010) that the success of the ERP project 
is dependent on whether the senior managers within the organisation adopt a long term view 
of the benefits which are likely to accrue as the result of a new ERP system. In particular, 
research suggests that those companies whose senior managers have a more long term view 
of the ERP project which is being implemented are significantly more likely to enjoy the 
desired benefits of a successful ERP implementation. In particular, it is necessary for senior 
managers to adopt a perspective in which the implementation of the ERP system is not 
perceived to be the end point, rather it should be interpreted as the beginning of a new 
process of getting the organisation to adapt to cultural change.  
 
The advantages which are associated with the adoption of a longer term view is due to the 
fact that those senior managers which only emphasise the short term „have lost opportunities 
to drive cultural change and online value from the organisation‟ (p.290). The value which is 
associated with adopting a longer term view of ERP implementation is emphasised in a 
survey which was conducted by Longinidis and Gotzamani (2009) which claims that there 
are essentially two phases in the process of implementing an ERP system. The initial phase of 
implementation refers to the period during which the relevant tools for ERP implementation 
are utilised and culminates in the „going live‟ of the ERP system. The mistake which the 
majority of senior organisational managers make is to focus unduly on the initial stage of the 
ERP implementation process and to see the going live of the project as their end goal. As a 
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result, Bharat (2012) comments that this failure to see beyond the short term means that the 
ERP systems which are implemented are very generic in nature and are not adequately 
tailored to the specific requirements of the company.  
It is important to note that while the adoption of such a short term view may have short term 
advantages, namely, in ensuring that the implementation of the ERP system is completed on 
time, in the long term, it is likely that this will have negative results as employees will fail to 
adequately embrace the new system and more experience feelings of demotivation as a result. 
Furthermore, an emphasis on the short term implementation of the ERP system is likely to 
encourage companies to take short cuts in order to accelerate the implementation process; 
such short cuts may have the effect of limiting the effectiveness of the final ERP system and 
of resulting in a generic „vanilla‟ system being implemented.  
 
The short term view of ERP implementation which is commonly adopted by senior managers 
is also criticised by Morris and Laksmana (2010) who argue that such companies typically 
fail to obtain the expertise and the knowledge which is necessary for an effective ERP 
implementation. The pressure to complete the implementation within a certain amount of 
time and the emphasis on short term cost constraints acts as a factor which serves to deter 
many managers from recruiting specialised ERP consultants. As a result, such managers have 
a tendency to rely on using in house expertise for ERP implementation even if such expertise 
is essentially inadequate. This tends to result in the implementation of an ERP system which 
is substandard and which fails to meet the requirements of the company.  
 
Research tends to identify the second phase of an ERP implementation as beginning from the 
point at which the new ERP system is actually implemented live; Bharat (2012) emphasises 
that this phase is as, if not more, important than the initial phase of ERP implementation. 
However, the second phase of ERP implementation relies on the maintenance of continued 
efforts by managers to ensure that the any deficiencies, breakdowns or general flaws with the 
new system are promptly identified. Managers should continuously monitor the outcomes of 
the new system and ensure that they are effective in providing the desired benefits to system 
users by continuing to invest in training of users. In addition to the simple maintenance of the 
ERP system, the continued long term success of the system is dependent on the reengineering 
of existing functionality and the continued integration of the ERP system by means of future 
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third party products. Thus, the success of the system is essentially contingent on ensuring that 
it continues to evolve in response to the changing needs of the business.  
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3.2.3 ERP managers 
Research which has been conducted by Longinidis and Gotzmani (2009) suggests that one of 
the most important roles which are played by ERP managers is project management, and that 
on a basic level, the success of an ERP project in terms of its budget and its timelines is 
dependent on the effectiveness of such project management. This is specified by Wagner and 
Monk (2008) who argue that ERP managers need to ensure that they have a suitable plan in 
place for available resources, the desired objectives of the project, a work plan and that the 
progress of the project is subjected to continuous monitoring. In addition, the ERP manager 
needs to ensure that the structures which are in place within the specialist team who is 
responsible for overseeing the ERP implementation is structured in a way which is likely to 
result in successful implementation. Specifically, key change concepts need to be fully 
understood by all members of the implementation team, progress reviews need to be 
scheduled, as do reviews and time scales, while the efficiency of the implementation is also 
dependent on the existence of a pre-defined hierarchy of decision making (Ganesh & Mehta, 
2010).  
 
Furthermore, the relevant people within the team need to be provided with the empowerment 
that they require to be able to make the necessary decisions. This is reiterated by Grabet, 
Mayere and Bazet (2008) who comment that one of the key roles of the ERP manager should 
be to ensure that all of the core business processes which typify the business are closely 
realigned with the requirements of the software and that there is a high level of integration 
between the technical division and the rest of the departments within the company. 
Furthermore, it is essential to ensure that, in his project managing capacity, the ERP manager 
establishes a realistic timeline for completion in order to ensure that employees are reassured 
about the time which will be taken for the completion of the project and to ensure that they 
have a higher degree of trust in the process.  
 
The significant extent to which the ERP manager‟s role as a project manager is likely to 
affect the success of an ERP implementation is emphasised by Peng and Nunes (2008) who 
argue that it is not sufficient for an ERP manager to be simply „organised‟ in their approach 
to an ERP implementation. Rather, the success of system implementation requires the ERP 
manager to follow a very specific process. Firstly, it is necessary for the ERP manager to 
clearly decide upon what the scope of the ERP project is and to determine the way in which 
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the outcome of the ERP system will fit into the strategy of the overall organisation. This 
should then be followed by the appointment of relevant teams of individuals who have the 
expertise necessary for the implementation of the system. These teams should be responsible 
for outlining the key training needs and the requirements for documentation which are 
associated by the company which can be determined by an analysis of the existing systems of 
the company. These requirements can then be used as the basis for the development of a 
prototype system which will help to crystallise the key requirements of the organisation from 
the new system. The constructed prototype should incorporate all of the company‟s business 
processes which should be mapped onto the various functionalities of the ERP software; in 
order to ensure that the ERP system will be effective, it is suggested that the ERP manager 
should instigate field testing which will play the role of validating the relevant conversion 
programs and technical interfaces. This process of field testing will also be useful in 
highlighting any problems which arise with the system, and can proceed to form a useful 
basis for further amendments to be made to the system on the basis of feedback which is 
received from employees (Wagner & Monk, 2008). It is also suggested that the ERP manager 
should ensure that a wide range of quality assurance testing is carried out in order to produce 
different configurations of the ERP system; training of end users should also be provided and 
after the insertion of real data onto the system, it then should be implemented.  
 
Aside from the need for efficient project management, Peng and Nunes (2008) argue that an 
important role which should be played by the ERP manager is to effectively manage the 
teams who are responsible for the project. Such team management is essential to ensure that 
people feel that they have ownership of the ERP project. This is reiterated by Pabedinskaite 
(2010) who argues that it is the responsibility of ERP managers to ensure that the way in 
which various teams are assembled is such that the differences between the employees 
working in the non technical and the technical areas of the organisation are bridged 
effectively. This will contribute to the sense of creation of a more holistic sense of ownership 
in the project and essentially signals a shift from a traditional, linear conceptualisation of IT 
project management which proceeds on the assumption that the only requirements for ERP 
success are clear budgeting, controls and planning.  
 
Stair and Reynolds (2011) go so far as to argue that effective ERP managers need to embrace 
a new paradigm of management where they are expected to perform the role of moderating, 
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managing and interpreting organisational change. As a result of this new paradigm, ideally, 
the ERP manager should select teams which are comprised of people who are used to 
adopting more flexible modes of thought, who are able to effectively interpret different 
change related scenarios and who are adept at being able to communicate change to existing 
stakeholders. This could arguably be achieved by ensuring that the ERP managers select a 
range of key individuals who can act as project managers and who can use their influence to 
simultaneously obtain much needed support from the senior managers of the organisation 
while also ensuring that the end users of the system buy into the project and are suitably 
motivated. This will require such project champions to be able to fulfil a range of different 
roles, and most importantly, the ability to assume an empathetic role of counsellor when 
reacting to the concerns of employees and encouraging them to buy into the process (Stair & 
Reynolds, 2011). While the suggestion of electing project champions appears to be a useful 
way of bridging the gap which exists between the senior managers of the organisation and the 
end users, the extent to which these findings can be generalised to apply to all organisations 
is limited by the fact that all of the companies which featured in the secondary research are 
large corporations and are therefore more likely to have access to the necessary resources. 
The same issue applies to the role which is played by ERP consultants. It is eminently more 
feasible for larger corporations to be able to afford to recruit a specialised, external ERP 
consultant who is able to produce multiple configurations and prototypes of the ERP system. 
It is highly unlikely that a smaller organisation with more limited resources would have the 
capability to recruit such a consultant and it is more likely that they would be forced to rely 
on in house expertise.  
 
3.2.4 ERP consultants 
Empirical research suggests that there are close links between the effectiveness of ERP 
consultants which are recruited to implement ERP systems within corporations, and the 
overall success of the ERP system. The majority of companies which choose to implement a 
new ERP system do not have suitable levels of in house expertise and are therefore forced to 
rely on the expertise which can be obtained by recruiting an external ERP consultant. Wang 
et al (2008) comment that the effectiveness with which a company is able to engage external 
expertise is a fundamental attribute in determining the success of the ERP implementation. 
According to Wang et al (2008), the key roles which are played by an ERP consultant is the 
provision of technical expertise, the provision of business expertise, the configuration of the 
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ERP systems which are deemed to be most appropriate, and the training of the eventual end 
users of the ERP system. The overall effect of fulfilling all of these functions is to lessen the 
learning burden of clients which is typically associated with the adoption of a new system. A 
survey which was conducted by Li, Xu, Tjoa and Chaudhry (2009) examined a sample of 85 
corporations within the Taiwanese manufacturing industry within which ERP projects were 
implemented. The results of the research revealed that consultants who were more effective at 
resolving conflict and at enabling communication within the process of ERP consultation 
were significantly more effective at increasing the quality of ERP system which were 
implemented. Indeed, the results of the multiple regression which were conducted in this 
study revealed that the role which was played by ERP consultants in determining the success 
of the ERP implementation was even more significant than the role which was played by 
senior organisational managers. The outcomes of the study also revealed that the extent to 
which continued support is provided by the ERP consultant to the organisation after the initial 
go live of the project is likely to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the new 
system, suggesting that in order to ensure the effective implementation of an ERP system, the 
engagement of the ERP consultant with the company needs to be long term in nature.  
 
Aside from outlining the desirable factors which need to be present in any ERP consultant in 
order to ensure an effective ERP implementation, much research has been conducted which 
examines the various instances of companies in which the actions taken by ERP consultants 
have restricted the success of the ERP implementation. In particular, Ifinedo and Nahar 
(2009) comment that the key reasons why many companies are not satisfied with the 
outcomes which are associated with the hiring of an ERP consultant are related to the fact 
that the ERP consultant did not properly understand the requirements of the client; the ERP 
consultants failed to provide a solution for the company‟s needs which adequately reflected 
their requirements, and was instead a generic package; the ERP consultants did not properly 
understand the organisational culture of the client company and failed to provide an ERP 
solution which took into account such key cultural factors; and many consultants simply 
aimed to get more work from the client company rather than genuinely trying to address their 
needs.  
 
In summary, therefore, it appears that in many cases ERP consultants have not fully focused 
on the needs of the company and have failed to act in the interests of the client – rather, they 
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have simply provided clients with a standard solution which is not adequately tailored to the 
client‟s needs. Wenrich and Ahmad (2009) claim that the reason for the disappointing 
contributions which are made by many ERP consultants can be explained by means of agency 
theory – in particular, it is suggested that the aforementioned issues arise as the result of a 
fundamental conflict which exists between the goals of the client (the principal) and those of 
the consultant (the agent). Essentially, the way in which such conflicts of goals is to be 
managed is only through the implementation of control mechanisms which can act either to 
increase the extent to which managers are able to supervise the actions of the agents, or 
which can act to incentivise the consultants to work more closely to meet the desired 
objectives of the client. This is emphasised by Li et al (2009) who argues that, in order to 
result in the effective implementation of an ERP system, it is essential to ensure that the 
relationship between the client and the ERP consultant is such that they are able to closely 
cooperate in order to meet all of their specified objectives. It is therefore important to ensure 
that controls are in place which enforce such cooperation – an example of such controls could 
include the introduction of greater coordination between the client and the consultant so that 
they can come to a common agreement about the goals that they are both working towards.  
 
An effective way of solidifying such coordination could be through the formulation of a 
contract between the client and the ERP consultant which outlines the terms which have been 
agreed upon, although empirical research which has been conducted by Partharasathy (2010) 
suggests that such client consultant contracts are rare.  
 
Research which has been conducted by Stair and Reynolds (2011) also comments that the 
role which is played by the ERP consultant should also reflect the fact that ERP systems are 
implemented in a variety of interdependent models. It is important for the ERP consultant to 
ensure that they effectively coordinate and manage the interdependencies which are related to 
the various ERP modules, especially given their disparate nature. Indeed, Pabedinskaite 
(2010) goes so far as to suggest that the effectiveness of ERP implementation is directly 
correlated to the extent to which integration between these different modules is achieved. It is 
also argued that, in most cases, instances of failed ERP implementation can be traced to the 
lack of suitable coordination and communication between different modules of ERP which is 
in turn due to a failure of the ERP consultants to fully acknowledge the complexity which is 
associated with the implementation of an ERP system.  
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Finally, a study which was conducted by Stair and Reynolds (2011) suggests that a key error 
which was made by many ERP consultants when they are recruited to implement a new ERP 
system is to focus solely on the technical issues which are related to the implementation. In 
contrast, it is advisable for ERP consultants to focus equally, if not more, on building a 
consensus within the organisation about the new ERP system, and getting the stakeholders 
within the organisation to commit to change.  
 
Indeed, Lytras and Ordonez de Pablos (2009) argue that being able to achieve functional 
coordination within the company is a task which it is significantly more important for the 
ERP manager to undertake than issues which are related to the functionality and 
configuration of the ERP system itself. This is emphasised by a case study which was 
conducted by Lytras and Ordonez de Pablos (2009) focusing on the case of a Mexican 
company which had recently implemented a new ERP system. It was found that the new ERP 
system failed to result in the expected benefits for the company due to the fact that the 
organisation was not adequately prepared for the change which was related to the new 
system, so that, even though the technical issues which were related to the implementation of 
the information system were managed adequately, this was not sufficient to result in an 
effective system implementation. Indeed, those companies which were most likely to 
experience successful ERP system implementations were those companies in which the initial 
specifications of the ERP project were continuously modified in response to various obstacles 
and organisational changes which occurred over time. Those companies which were less 
successful in the implementation of their ERP systems were typically characterised by the 
ambiguity of their objectives, the lack of commitment and support by senior managers, and 
the failure of the ERP managers to unite the objectives of the ERP project with the values and 
motivations of the employees working within the organisation (Olson & Kesharwani, 2009).  
 
3.2.5 Organisational Customers  
A quantitative methods survey study by Yeh et al. (2005) to investigate the impact of ERP 
implementation on service quality, and hence customer satisfaction, in the Taiwanese 
semiconductor industry revealed that ERP systems had been recognised as providing a better 
service.  However the findings also revealed that the organisation had underestimated the 
level of service that customers had expected from ERP implementation, and that customer 
requirements should be carefully considered in the ERP planning and implementation, if 
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customers were to receive appropriate service quality. A complementary influence concerns 
the marketing of products and services to customers, for instance a study by Pan et al. (2010), 
that found 39 ERP failure factors, discovered that poor implementation impacted on the 
organisation‟s ability to provide the required level of customer service.  Specifically these 
were, if use of the systems fails to predict new product demand, sales forecasts, and to 
support the work of salespeople to conduce special offers to existing customers, which is a 
key factor in generating more sales with the highest profit margins (Wilson, 1998).  
 
An ERP implementation study of five companies, describes one of the cases as focusing on 
the role and influence of customers in ERP (Skok and Legge, 2001).  The feedback was that 
when another supplier had introduced such a system, a decline in levels of communication 
had occurred. This company therefore set up a number of interventions to avoid a repetition 
when it was planning and implementing its own ERP system. Firstly it arranged internal 
workshops for employees in a customer facing role, so that agreement could be reached on 
how to inform customers of the changes.  As a part of that workshop, the employees were 
familiarised with the key elements and concepts of the intended SAP system.  Following that 
intervention,   Account Manager Teams held presentations for their most important customers 
and also met with smaller accounts to sustain customer confidence with the implementation.  
In addition the Account Managers collaborated with their key contacts in the companies 
during the go live phase, so that panic purchasing did not occur prior to this point and the 
company devised contingencies, in case there were any supply issues at the time of „go live‟. 
The fact that the interventions made are stated in this study makes it useful as an example of 
practical actions and preparation that organisations might employ to recognise the importance 
of their customer as a stakeholder when implementing ERP systems.  
 
In Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software is described as an example of ERP 
by Maleki and Anand (2008),  whose studied revealed that sales of CRM software had risen 
by 23.1% from 2006 to 2007, representing US$6.6 billion market value (Gartner, 2008).  The 
key factor in the implementation is to derive competitive advantage by offering a superior 
service to the consumer, inferring that this primary stakeholder has a key role in the manner 
in which the CRM system is implemented, and on the functionality of the implemented 
system.  The superior service takes the form of identifying, recording and manipulating data 
on the personal preferences of each individual, so that even unperceived needs can be 
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predicted and delivered.  In addition greater competitive advantage is a result of an ability to 
forecast the outcomes of these interactions with the end-consumer; hence CRM is a 
fundamental business performance strategy tool (Piercey and Lane, 2009; Maleki and Anand, 
2008).    
 
Both ERP and CRM manage business processes but have different core purposes:  ERP has 
traditionally been concerned with business operations and functions, whereas CRM has 
focused on contacts, opportunities and individual accounts.  When the two systems are 
merged and ERP vendors offer the integrated package, customer activities and related 
operations are more effective and the integrated system is expected to have the same CSF 
factors as ERP (Maleki and Anand, 2008).  However there is evidence that the CRM focus 
would need substantial attention its own CSF factors, even though there is similarity with 
those of ERP, such as the requirement of setting quantifiable targets and therefore these drive 
the functionality that the system must possess, consideration of the factor that it  is the 
customer relationship that derives from the technology that makes the technology crucial.  In 
the case of customisation of CRM, over customisation  within the ERP context can have a 
damaging effect on the customer focused outcomes, and the functionality of the CRM 
software should be examined carefully to establish how well it matches that required for 
optimum customer relations outcomes (Maleki and Anand, 2008).  
 
The researchers suggest that the CRM aspect should be considered carefully in the early 
planning stage, and that organisations should conduct customer surveys to measure the 
impact of the CRM on attitudes and buying behaviours.  The loss of customers is a crucial 
cost factor for companies, not only owing to the decline in reputation but also the high cost of 
replacing those lost with new ones;  a new customer can represent up to ten times the cost of 
retaining the existing one (Piercey and Lane, 2009; Wilson, 1998).  The lack of  marked 
improvement in customer services levels when the ERP system was implemented was 
suggested as being the consequence of a failure to integrate a CRM package, in an ERP case 
study of an Egyptian branch of a global chemical company by  Elragal and Al-Serafi (2011).  
 
The branch firm considered itself more akin to an SME (Small-Medium Enterprise) and, 
although the parent had implemented SAP, it had chosen a system considered more 
appropriate to an SME. In addition the ERP materials module had been rejected partly as a 
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result of there being no accurate sales data from the sales people so that material planning 
could be effected, and the job costing module was not implemented since there was no 
existing system for that purpose. However there had been some positive aspects related to 
customer service from the modules that were implemented, which were described as being 
derived from the logistics module implementation;  shortened delivery time, reduction in 
stock that enable quicker response time, better communication with the customer and 
reduction in shipping errors and return of goods.  However there was disagreement between 
key personnel, the logistics and operations managers, as to the degree of customer service 
improvement with the operations manager stating that not all customers had experienced an 
improvement in service.  The findings suggest that the role of the customer as stakeholder 
was secondary to the main thrust of the implementation and the improvements made to 
customer service were a by-product, indicating that more attention needed to be focused on 
the customer at the planning stage.  The study also implies that operating a different ERP 
system from the parent also impacted on expertise with ERP, which could have been 
leveraged by parent‟s input, and therefore on the functionality that could be achieved 
 
One of the most important and contemporary business issues concerning the customer is 
linked to the influence that customers have as stakeholders in ERP implementation, in the 
form of consideration when implementing corporate governance polices. The external 
stakeholder is better served if organisations implement ERP, according to the findings of a 
study in China by Jidong et al. (2010), as a consequence of better information flow that 
serves to enhance corporate governance.  The findings also suggested that companies with 
weak corporate governance policies were most likely to implement ERP for this reason, as 
well as state owned companies, which had few independent directors. The rationale was that 
ERP would provide consistent data about the operation to external stakeholders, instead of 
the high risk of internal managers providing shareholders and customers with incorrect data.   
 
This factor was particularly critical in companies in which there were few or a low 
percentage of independent directors, as was typical of state-owned Chinese companies 
(Jidong and Liyan. 2010).  The findings of this study also infer that cultural and historic 
factors need to be considered when the customer stakeholders influence of role in ERP 
implementation is examined. Hence the insinuation is that ERP is considered vital to create 
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an effective communication of corporate integrity to consumers and other external 
stakeholders. 
 
Although there are several ways in which ERP implementation appears to impact on 
customer relationships, as is evident from the studies described, there appear to be very few 
studies that consider that factor to any significant degree, that the role of customer 
stakeholders should be a core factor when planning and implementing ERP in organisations.   
 
Since effective ERP implementation is acknowledged as representing competitive advantage, 
hence organisational profit levels and credibility with customers, at minimum there should be 
customer facing personnel involved from the very early stages.  Critically appraising 
customer feedback on the types of improvement in service that would increase their loyalty to 
the organisation should be a core factor in system functionality, whether it is collected from 
an existing CRM system of by means of customer surveys or meetings between key 
customers and the sales teams.  The lack of attention to customers as stakeholders in ERP 
implementation represents a big gap in the existing literature. 
 
3.2.6 Organisational Suppliers  
A review of the literature on critical success factors for ERP refers specifically to the role and 
influence they have on ERP success, and also suggests that organisations, which use the 
vendor‟s tools are likely to reduce the costs of the project.  The study by Somers and Nelson 
(2001)     sets the scene for an overview that makes the case for the supplier being considered 
as an important stakeholder in the effective ERP implementation. The studies reviewed 
identified the nature of the relationship, which they stated should be one of strategic fit so 
that vendor and organisation collaborate to ensure the end of goal of leveraging the 
organisation's effectiveness and hence competitive advantage.  This could be further 
enhanced by employing supplier‟s development tools, technologies and programs, which 
would ensure that implementation was quicker and accomplished at lower cost.  The transfer 
of knowledge, such as understanding how to use the software and employing industry 
acknowledged best practices was a further success enabler.   
 
The vendor as key stakeholder for SMEs was investigated by Poba-Nzaou and Raymond 
(2011), using an in-depth case study approach from the perspective of risk associated with 
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ERP system implementation. The findings were, that in cases in which the vendor was of a 
similar organisational size and structure, had a strategic approach mirroring that of the SME, 
was flexible and demonstrated compatibility of a personal level with the senior managers, 
there was substantial reduced risk of failure.  Hence the researchers suggested such factors 
were 'mission critical'; the outcomes of study are in agreement with Somers and Nelson 
(2001). 
 
The vendor influence as a single factor on ERP success, was examined by Teo et al. (2009); 
the views of ten with ERP consultants, developers and project managers in a multinational 
consulting company based in Singapore, were gathered using semi-structured interviews, 
which resulted in valuable descriptive information. The research focused on what the vendor 
believed were the key factors in success and hence the inference is that this findings of the 
study will permit the organisation to devise a framework for assessing the vital on criteria 
which to select a vendor, as well as articulating why the supplier should be considered as an 
important stakeholder that has substantial influence on outcomes.  If the supplier‟s input was 
to results in the optimum outcome, the supplier would need to work with a competent project 
team, who have the requisite experience, rather than new graduates, which is often the case; 
the speed and effectiveness of implementation is strongly influenced by this factor.  
 
The manner in which knowledge is managed and retained within the supplier organisation is 
also critical, if there is a turnover of staff during the project this will extend the time horizon 
for completion, since new personnel then have to learn about the organisation before making 
a satisfactory contribution.  Another factor was managing relations between stakeholders, 
which should be collaborative and professional despite their different focus;  consultants were 
concerned with organisational functions, whereas developers focus on the technical aspects 
and effective co-working produced quicker and more effective solutions. Excellent 
communication was a core factor in this, and extended to all users as well as the vendor's 
team of consultants and developers, since it enabled visibility as to how each group's 
contribution complemented those of the others. Project management must embrace all 
variables and uncertainties relating to the project and fair allocation of workload to retain 
motivation and productivity levels.  The vendor would also look for detailed and accurate 
user specifications, and that resources allocated were sufficient including the budget and that 
the users were committed to the transformation.   
Literature Review (II)                               3-25   
 
Chapter Three                                                                                                         Page 25 of 29 
 
The importance of vendors as stakeholders in ERP success was approached from the 
perspective of the negative aspects of organisations not selecting the vendor carefully by 
Skok and Legge (2001), who proposed that these external staff often represented a substantial 
source of conflict, especially if the experience of such personnel was limited, knowledge 
transfer was poor and self-interest high; the first two factors concurring with other studies 
(Teo et al.  2009) but third highlighting a possible additional negative stakeholder supplier 
role if vendor selection occurred.  If the organisation allowed the vendor‟s team to take too 
much control then this would also impact on the outcomes, since the organisation was not 
able to guarantee the outcomes it desired from the project, potentially leading to failure. 
 
The influence of ERP implementation on the supply chain and its consequences for efficiency 
and cost reduction were one of the findings of the Elragel and Al-Serafi (2011); improvement 
in communication between departments, partners and customers, reduced stock levels and 
better response times. A study of the link between supply chain management (SCM) 
improvement and ERP implementation in Malaysian companies was carried out by Shatat 
and Udin (2012).  Of the 123 companies, approached 80 returned the questionnaire survey 
which focused on SCM and ERP in terms of integration, materials management, production 
planning and workflow management;   participants, which were IT/MIS experts employed by 
the organisations, were asked to rate each of these on a five point Likert Scale.  The research 
revealed that the relationship between SCM and successful ERP implementation was 
substantial in all four of the areas examined; hence effective use of ERP enhances SCM 
outcomes. The specific SCM features that improved were better internal information flow, 
flexibility, more integrated business processes, collaboration with suppliers, SCM partners 
and customers, product quality, stock levels and organisational costs.  
The researchers also highlighted the additional benefit of avoiding use of redundant data and 
being more responsive to changes in the environment, particularly if there was a CRM 
module complementary to the SCM module.  
 
Reinforcing this link, the investigation by Stratman (2007) into manufacturing firms that had 
implemented ERP, found that those, which had goals for ERP that strengthened the supply 
chain, only began to realise them after an effective internal user performance had been 
accomplished.  This finding strongly infers that, at the core of success, is the selection of the 
appropriate vendor by the organisation, the fit between them and those vendor characteristics 
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that were mentioned by Teo et al., (2007), Somers and Nelson (2001 and Skok and Legge 
(2001), in other words the finding  suggests the supply chain management and the related 
customer service, competitive advantage and cost efficiencies, will only be realised if the 
supplier, the vendor  is regarded as a core stakeholder and its influence and role appropriately 
acknowledged so that the appropriate module and their configuration and functionality are 
selected and implemented. 
 
3.2.7 ERP Users  
The user as a stakeholder is considered in a variety of studies and reasonably well 
documented in the literature, both from a perspective of what causes resistance to the ERP 
implementation or factors that enable effective implementation.  A selection of prior studies 
is documented, which focus on a variety of perspectives. The meaning of user satisfaction as 
a measure of the success of ERP implementation has been framed in a number of ways in 
previous studies, for instance as the aggregation of attitudes and opinions to the manner in 
which information is delivered (De Lone and Maclean, 2003) and their perception of how it 
meets the user‟s workplace needs and/or that of the organization, in terms improved 
performance (Somers et al. 2003; Wu and Wang, 2007;  Anjum, 2011). 
 
The satisfaction levels of users in the healthcare sector, such as doctors and administrators, 
was the subject of a study that aimed at producing a model for implementation of ERP in a 
Dutch hospital (Boonstra and Govers, 2009).  The purpose of the research was to understand 
what the expectations of user stakeholders were, in diverse departments, were to ERP and the 
nature their attitudes to its adoption; hence this study was most concerned with the user role 
and influence at the pre-planning stage and the need to establish the barriers and enablers to 
agreeing to consider an ERP system.  The model for ERP implementation that was ultimately 
derived from the findings, paid significant importance to the power positions of the players in 
this type of institutional environment, and their perceptions of the importance of 
implementing ERP. Specific aspects, such as the meaning the stakeholders associated with 
ERP, their interest in the concept, and the issues they perceived ERP will raise.  
 
These were important factors that need to be considered and understood, in addition to the 
technical and financial ones. Firstly understanding the organisational philosophy was 
essential, since this might not match the types of management philosophies integral to ERP.   
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A second factor was the doctors, who were described as having the freedom to implement 
their personally preferred systems, and so choose the practices they wished to employ; this 
factor could result either in a final system that was not integral, such as one in which a doctor 
or group of medical practitioners used a parallel system, or rejection of an ERP 
implementation plan. It was therefore crucial that powerful end-users were involved from the 
outset and their influence understood and considered adequately. The findings of this study 
revealed that failing to appreciate the attitude and interests of key users resulted in high levels 
of resistance after implementation, such that a crisis ensued.  
 
Two other findings are important to this researcher‟s model:  that users views may change 
over the implementation period, that those opinions may be a result of politics, self-interest or 
perception, for instance if problems with implementation arise; the overoptimistic expectation 
of the system benefits by those who supported implementation, since they failed to 
understand the social, historical and cultural environment in which the changes would occur. 
The study's findings infer that key users need to be represented at every stage, from the 
moment the potential of  ERP as a system to improve operational performance and 
communication is raised, and then continuously until the post-,implementation phase and 
beyond so that changes in opinion are made visible and commitment to the successful 
implementation is retained. This political or power perspective is also emphasised by Elragal 
and Al-Serafi (2011) and mirrors the position of doctors in Boornstra and Govers (2009.   
 
In this case ERP modules were implemented for most key operations but there was resistance 
by a key group, the plant managers in the Chemical Company. As a consequence, the 
material requirements planning module was not included in ERP implementation, because 
they did not wish to use it.  This factor restricted the potential outcomes from the software. 
 
The users of ERP in a contact centre of a large energy company were studied by Davis 
(2004); the ERP package adopted had integrated a customer service module.  The users were 
asked to appraise the success of the module, eighteen months after its introduction („go live'), 
in terms of changes in the level of services to internal customers that resulted; diverse 
attitudes and opinions were found. There appeared to be no shared vision about the way in 
which the ERP functioned or  by what means its success was  evaluated, for instance whether 
by the increase in call volumes handled, which was concerned with work processes or by 
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customer satisfaction levels, which related to work performance levels by the users. There 
were also strong user objections to suggestions that the technology was responsible for 
improvements in customer satisfaction, rather than human effort, since it was attitude to the 
customer that was in the hands of the customer service agent not the technology. Negative 
views also included having little control over own work operations since the system dictated 
them, that there was little opportunity to improve processes and that ERP was basically a 
management control tool.  It also became evident that the users were not adequately involved 
in the functionality design, since they raised ideas to increase the effectiveness of the 
software, but the modifications were stated as being too difficult to implement Davis (2004).   
 
This study is of limited value since just 25 participants were interviewed but its value is in the 
fact that it is likely to be generalisable to other organisations, in which the communication of 
the end goals of the ERP implementation are not well understood, leading to a sense of 
dissatisfaction, particularly if the user's ability to produce enhanced outcomes is not 
acknowledged. The study also highlights the possibility that the potential to create better 'buy 
in' by key users was lost early in the ERP process, since their contributions to improving the 
outcomes from the systems that might benefit the customer were not fully appraised. The 
findings in Davis (2004) are similar to the recommendation by Maleki and Anand (2008), 
who stated that, in the case of ERP system in which CRM software is integrated, all users of 
the CRM system, all personnel and mangers, are key stakeholders in implementation and 
should be involved in the implementation of ERP from the very earliest stage to post 
implementation and beyond. 
 
A survey study by Desder and Ainin (2010), in which  there were 384 participants  with 
diverse working roles, lengths of service and educational backgrounds, working in Iranian 
companies, stressed that both ERP vendors and those responsible for ERP system 
implementation must elicit user feedback on aspects such as system reliability, appropriate 
functionality, degree of user friendliness.  The first reason  was that if the system did not 
meet user and organisational needs, there would be lower commitment to its use and  
secondly, if the system needed modifications then these would be difficult to complete and 
that vendors were not happy about making such changes.  These findings are very similar to 
those stated by users of CRM packages integrated into ERP software. 
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A review of the literature conducted by Shang and Su (2004) found that user resistance to 
ERP implementation could be embraced by five categories:  
 self Interest such as potential loss of status, influence, career advancement or job loss; 
 lack of understanding of the benefits or nature of  ERP  and  how it will be used; 
 assessment of the benefits does not align with those perceived by others; 
 unwillingness to change, as a consequence of insecurity, potential loss of valued 
social relationships at work or the need to develop higher levels of skills; 
 the perceived need to make more effort potentially combined with the being more 
heavily monitored. 
The review also emphasised the effects of this resistance, in terms of lower work 
performance and service, which could be categorised,  related to the system itself as being 
non-destructive, proactively or passively destructive (Shang and Su, 2004).  All three 
categories are detrimental to the organisation, if not directly to the system, since the 
resistance type that is non-destructive results in lost performance represented by leaving the 
company, absenteeism and/or communicating negative attitude to others. Examples of 
proactive destruction include direct damage to the system, as well as deliberately making 
mistakes, whereas passive destruction is refusing to collaborate with the ERP consultants or 
work colleagues.  This study is just one of many that could be cited but is included because it 
brings together many symptoms of resistance and provides examples of their potential effects 
on ERP implementation success.  It provides concise evidence for the need to involve all 
personnel in the project as stakeholders that have a variety of ways to influence the outcome. 
 
3.3 Summary  
This literature review chapter focuses on the extent to which the roles played various ERP 
stakeholders affects the success of implementation. Firstly, the role of the ERP sponsors is 
discussed including a demonstration of the significance of the commitment and support of 
senior management. Secondly, the different roles played by senior and functional managers 
within the organisation in the success of the implementation are reviewed. Thirdly, the nature 
and the critical role of ERP managers are articulated. Fourthly, the review of the literature 
also shows the impact of the organisational customers and suppliers on ERP implementation. 
Finally, the link between the effectiveness of ERP consultants who are recruited to implement 
ERP systems within the organisation and the overall success of ERP implementation is 
demonstrated through the review. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
  Research Methodology  
 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters formed the Literature Review and placed this study in the 
context of previous research, focusing on the key elements that were fundamental to 
informing this study and providing a conceptual framework to assist the researcher in 
his core objectives. This chapter will describe and justify the research methods that 
were selected to critically appraise the research problem. The appropriate choice of 
research approach is critical to achieving the desired outcomes of the investigation, 
and must take into consideration the specific requirements of the area of research. In 
this case, the scarcity of comparable studies, and the fact that the investigation 
focused on ERP implementation and stakeholder management, required a hybrid 
approach to the research philosophy, data collection and analysis.  
 
This chapter will firstly discuss the research philosophy and overall approach of the 
researcher in the context of different approaches to research in IS. It will then describe 
the manner in which the research problem evolved from the review of the ERP 
literature and set out the research aims and objectives. The research design, strategy 
and methods will be critically evaluated and justified, and the data analysis process 
described in detail. Finally, this chapter will identify and critically assess the 
limitations of the research and areas for further improvement.     
 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
The fundamental research philosophy, or paradigm, used in this thesis was 
interpretivism, due to the fact that both facts about ERP implementation and the 
relationships of humans, with process and each other, were taken into consideration.  
However, an additional element of this research compared findings from the case 
studies with those from other organisations that had implemented ERP, which meant 
that a positivist cause and approach effect was also integrated.  As a consequence the 
research paradigm bridged interpretivism with positivism (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010).  
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The interpretivist philosophy enabled the required focus on facts that were informed 
by the published research in the Literature Review chapters, in addition to the vital 
opinions and beliefs of the participants, who were involved in the ERP 
implementation phases in varying roles, a factor which also diversified their 
experiences considerably.  These experiences had substantial impact on the extent to 
which they considered the ERP phenomenon as an integral part of the environment in 
which they worked. A purely objective approach to the facts surrounding ERP 
implementations, often referred to as the linear management view, has been proven to 
result in failure and was not deemed appropriate in finding a solution to this research 
problem; cause and effect infers logic but human reaction to a phenomenon varies and 
is therefore uncertain.  Therefore, ignoring the human aspect would have lost the rich 
insights regarding the environmental setting and the manner in which the individuals 
made choices as they interacted with their work environment (Johnson et al. 2009).   
 
The use of interpretivism in research into information systems and their management 
has increased substantially in recent times (Walsham, 1995) and is particularly 
relevant to this thesis, since Klein and Myers (1999) suggest that it assists researchers 
working in this specialist area to better comprehend the human thoughts and actions in 
the social and organisational environment in which they occur.   This is reinforced by 
De Villiers (2005) who states that since IS research is primarily concerned with 
interactivity, the user centred approach, empowerment software and the usability of 
systems, interpretivism captures the human aspects of system design when developing 
IS solutions based on objective criteria.  
 
The researcher in this thesis considers the human aspects as being described as by a 
normative epistemology and an ontology of subjective idealism, which infers that 
each person constructs his own reality but also that there are objective criteria or facts. 
Reality is independent of an individual’s conception of its meaning (Walsham, 1995). 
Hence interpretivism enables an approach that acknowledges an individual’s freedom 
of choice to make moral judgements and decisions; this unpredictable human factor is 
at the core of this research problem.  Qualitative research methodology and data 
gathering was founded on these principles since it focused on human interpretation of 
knowing about the social world (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010).    
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Bridged interpretivism with positivism is a further extension of this, conceived by 
Weber (1864-1920), cited in Ritchie and Lewis (2010), which enables the positivist 
cause and effect approach and the subjective, human value/belief approach to be 
combined. In this way, it became possible for the researcher to gather direct 
understanding, resulting from observation, together with the motivational 
understanding resulting from the unique value set of the individual.  According to 
Walsham (1995) when conducting research in the IS field, the researcher should 
choose the combination of epistemologies and ontologies that are most appropriate for 
his specific research. For this reason, bridged interpretivism with positivism is the 
selected research philosophy of this study. 
 
Both of these aspects were respected when the interview questions were designed and 
when the researcher interpreted the participants’ responses (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010).  
An empathetic approach to the working environment of the various groups of 
stakeholders in the group was adopted by the researcher, with the purpose of being 
able to view the world as the participants did; this was supported by the researcher's 
own professional background and experience in this specialist sector.  Business and 
management research studies often involve a focus on unique, complex contexts of 
this nature (Saunders et al. 2009). 
 
Deduction and Induction 
This thesis involved using two distinct approaches to enquiry, deduction and 
induction.  The deductive approach is fundamentally concerned with testing a theory, 
whereas induction is a process involving the identification of patterns and trends and 
appraising the way in which they connect to specific views of the world held by 
participants. Induction, therefore, is associated with theory building rather than testing 
theory (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010; Saunders et al. 2009).  The comparison is 
represented in figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1:  Induction and Deduction Source:  Emerald Insight 
 
This thesis relied substantially on induction since its fundamental aim is to build a 
new framework for stakeholder management in the ERP implementation phase. This 
was based on a consideration of the views and beliefs of the diverse stakeholder 
groups, aiming to draw conclusions from the specific observations made and then 
draw further conclusions that would be used in framework design.   
 
The combination of inductive enquiry with exploratory research is one that has been 
used extensively (Naden and Lewins, 2010). The process of inductive inquiry is 
described by Creswell (2008) as having the five steps that are characteristic of the app 
roach in this thesis:  gathering initial information, the researcher employing open-
ended questions in interviews, data analysis that focused on identification of patterns, 
examining themes identified to define patterns or theories and taking a broad view, to 
make suggestions and theories based on his past experiences and the literature. 
 
Deduction was used predominantly after the main study findings had been analysed 
since the researcher had used a small number of cases and sought to compare these to 
the findings from previous studies, looking for patterns of convergence or divergence 
(Taylor et. al. 2006). The model used to accomplish this followed Robson (2002), 
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which began with deciding which variables to compare with the previous studies, how 
those variables would be determined, then to compare the two sets of findings and 
amend the existing theoretical base as necessary.  In deduction the researcher must 
remain independent of the phenomenon in order to make objective comments; in this 
case his written study findings and those of previous researchers were the only criteria 
considered (Saunders et al. 2009).   
 
Although deduction was associated closely with quantitative methods it also presented 
a valuable tool in qualitative research, in cases in which prior academic studies 
informed the developing thesis, in order to extend the existing knowledge and build a 
framework, which was a fundamental purpose in this case. If a deductive approach is 
incorporated into qualitative methods, Ritchie and Lewis (2010) emphasise the need 
for the researcher to retain an open mind and to take a multi-directional approach to 
design and data gathering.  
 
The case study research strategy and interpretivist philosophy used in this thesis were 
frequently combined with deduction (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010).  The use of deduction 
and induction together combined the benefits of each type of enquiry, at the same time 
as minimising the risks associated with them, provided such an approach is relevant to 
the research (Creswell, 2008).  Induction represented significant time invested to 
complete the field research and there was significant potential that patterns would not 
be identified, but the advantage was that changes in research emphasis could be 
incorporated as the thesis progressed. On the contrary, deduction was often quicker, 
based on one set of activities and time schedules were therefore predictable.  In 
addition, those who assessed the quality of the research tended to favour the deductive 
approach; the inductive enquiry was not so widely accepted (Saunders et al 2009).  
 
The two approaches also enabled triangulation of the data between the findings 
established by this investigation with those of other studies (Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
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4.3 The Research Context and Approach 
An Enterprise Resource Planning system is one of the most complex information 
systems to implement because it may touch practically every employee and process in 
an organisation (Usher, 2010: p.7). 
 
Recent statistics indicate significant room for improvements to assist organisations in 
achieving the highest possible ERP implementation benefits. Figure 4.2 and Figure 
4.3 from Panoramic Consulting’s 2013 report on ERP usage indicates negative trends; 
60% of ERP customers received 50% or less from ERP benefits, 61% from the 
customers suffer from time over run and 53% were adversely affected by the 
overrunning costs. 
 
Figure 4.2: ERP risk factors (Panorama Consulting Group, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 4.3: statistics on the realised ERP benefits (Panorama Consulting Group, 2013) 
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ERP projects were adversely affected by the lack of clarity in defining the roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders involved in the implementation process; a major 
concern that contributed positively or negatively to ERP implementation was the 
management of stakeholders. 
 
A study by Burns (2008), that sought to discover the ten most frequent selection and 
implementation mistakes of 2007, found that (clearly defined) roles and 
responsibilities were amongst the key factors vital to the success of ERP 
implementation. An article by Burns (2011) continued to stress the high cost and 
failure rate of ERP implementation, owing to the specific absence of effectively 
planning the people involvement; key people in the organisation should be taken away 
from their normal roles to take specific critical ones in implementation. A recent 
survey study of ERP implementation in the retail sector in India, conducted by Garg 
and Garg (2013) found evidence that the management of stakeholders roles and 
responsibilities was crucial to success; although this is evident from the description 
given in the findings it is not fully articulated in the conclusions.  Despite the 
limitations of the study, which was limited to 175 participants, it represents a valuable 
addition to the sparse literature of the field. The absence of a reference to management 
of stakeholder’s roles and responsibilities indicates that researchers may also 
underestimate its significance. However, a study of Sri Lankan firms conducted by 
Wickramasinghe and Gunawardena (2010) involving 74 organisations that had 
implemented ERP systems, appraised the impact of three broad factors on successful 
implementation.   
 
The findings revealed that the factor of roles and responsibilities was not critical to 
success. The paucity of studies in this area, and the conflicting results of the little that 
has been published, illustrates the lack of understanding of the impact of management 
of stakeholder’s roles and responsibilities on implementation success.  In fact, a 
review of the literature regarding critical success factors (CSF) in ERP 
implementation, conducted by Finney and Corbett (2007), resulted in a key finding 
being that there was a huge gap in the literature regarding what key stakeholders 
perceived as the CSF that resulted in implementation success, which suggests that 
their views are not considered valuable, much less effective management of their roles 
and responsibilities. 
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As discussed in the introductory  chapter (see page 1-2) a developing country like 
Saudi Arabia faces additional challenges in maximising the organisational benefits 
from implementing ERP systems.  
 
Based on the above, the problem of the research has been defined (see section 1.1). 
The inference was that there remained significant opportunity to introduce a new 
CSF(s) perspective, which would assist organisations in defining the research aims 
and objectives (see section 1.2). 
 
What is a model? 
As the aim of the research is to develop a model, it is therefore necessary to define its 
meaning. 
 
A situation (problem and solution) is presented using a model to show the 
understanding of the problem, how the solution addresses it and the relationship 
between them (March & Smith 1995). Some researchers like Bjekovic B and 
Handerik A (2013) believe that a model always has a purpose; this purposefulness 
dimension is explicitly present in most of the model definitions. Models help us to 
comprehend the world by representing only those major features of the world that are 
important for our purposes. Often they provide only an approximate account of the 
complexity that exists in the real-world phenomena they cover. They compromise 
precision to achieve cognitive economy” (Weber 2012, p. 5).  
 
Modelling is the field of ERP and its interrelated themes addressed in the literature. 
Business modelling is a central activity to many different areas, including Business 
Process Reengineering, Organizational Development, Enterprise Modelling & 
Integration, Business Process Management, Enterprise Application Integration, ERP 
System Configuration, E-Commerce, Software Development and Information System 
Planning and Development (Montilva C and Barrios A, 2004). 
 
ERP Return on Investment  
The term ‘return on ERP investment (ROI)’ will be used frequently in the three parts 
that cover the analysis and discussions, and in deriving the intended model. It is 
therefore necessary to it is therefore necessary to define its meaning. 
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The ROI in this research is a single term that refers to the degree of success in 
achieving most of the ERP benefits that have been discussed in section 2.2.3. Most of 
those discussed benefits are intangible in nature, which has led to the inclusion of a 
wider span of elements in the measurement ERP success. The intangible elements 
represent the majority of the comparative attributes in the measurement of ERP 
success as discussed in section 2.2.5. 
 
4.4 Research Design 
Research is described by Petre and Rugg (2012) as the process of exploring 
phenomena in order to improve knowledge and understanding of them, which implies 
that the researcher finds something that is new, whether it is totally new to him or in a 
general sense. Primary research is a result of finding something not yet known, as is 
the primary aim of this thesis, where the researcher, in discovering something new to 
him, refers to the secondary research that he conducts to find gaps in the knowledge 
and to create a conceptual framework for the thesis (Petre and Rugg, 2012).   
 
This infers that research is a two stage process, which embraces empirical research 
and theory, which can occur by doing empirical research and then building theory, 
referred to as induction or examining current theory, and then conducting empirical 
research referred to as deduction;  some theses contain elements of both (Saunders et 
al. 2009).  Research is, however, more than merely gathering information. It involves 
critically analysing that information and asking questions about it, by comparing 
different findings and relating sources to each other and then using it to develop, 
understand and test theories.  Three characteristics of good research are that it is based 
on keeping an open mind, examining data critically and being able to discover 
something that has generalisable application, within specified limits (Phillips and 
Pugh, 2010). 
 
The research design is the overall plan of the approach to finding a solution to the 
research problem discussed in 5.1.  The purpose of the research is reflected in the 
types of study that would be appropriate; there are three major types of study, 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, which could be used separately or in 
combination (Saunders et al. 2009). Exploratory research concerns uncovering new 
knowledge about a known phenomenon in order to generate better understanding of 
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that phenomenon; it often employs three distinct methods to accomplish this, namely 
interviews, focus groups and literature searches (Phillips and Pugh, 2010;  Saunders et 
al.  2009). 
 
Explanatory research seeks to examine specific variables and their relationships;   for 
instance why individuals or groups behave in a certain way in a given context 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Descriptive research attempts to find new insights into a 
phenomenon and is used for purposes such as creating profiles and making 
predictions; its purpose is usually to answer questions such as ‘how’ or ‘why’.  
However the fact that the outcomes are purely descriptive makes its use limited to 
gathering initial information that would be gathered prior to an exploratory or 
explanatory study (Saunders et al. 2009; Richey and Klein, 2007;  Petre and Rugg, 
2012). 
 
The purpose of this research is exploratory, since it seeks to consider ERP 
implementation from the stakeholders’ perspective. Research concerning this topic is 
in state of relative infancy and as a result of the inadequacies of existing theory, an 
exploratory approach was considered most appropriate. The process of exploratory 
research necessitated a review of substantial published academic studies and other 
materials, with the purpose of gathering extensive data, in order to develop a holistic 
and integrative understanding of the management of roles and responsibilities of the 
stakeholders involved in the implementations of ERP.   Conseqently, the scope of the 
thesis is extremely broad. This approach is also sufficiently flexible to enable the 
researcher to adapt, as required, to changes that might be needed as the research 
progressed; new data might be found, requiring a different focus or additional 
elements (Saunders et al., 2009).  Data gathering is also relatively unstructured, owing 
to the lack of published research and the requirement to change approach or focus as 
participant views are established.  
 
In this study the fact that participants had joined the ERP implementation at later 
phases of the process, and some who were present at the initial phases had left the 
organisations involved, inferred that the researcher would have to attempt to fill gaps 
in knowledge gained from interviews by other means such as secondary data. The 
data gathering tools, which were interviews, observations and published 
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documentation, are typical of the exploratory approach (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010).  In 
this study, critical appraisal and synthesis of the data gathered was vital to solving the 
research problem and, since people were involved, whose views were diverse and not 
subject to simply cause and effect relationships, the purely descriptive or explanatory 
study was inappropriate (Saunders et al.2009).   The components of the research 
design figure are briefly explained in table 4.1: 
 
Table 4.1 Research Design  Components 
Stage Detail 
1 Reviewing existing ERP literature  
2 Identifying research problem(s) and setting research objectives 
3 Conducting qualitative research through case studies 
4 Complementing and confirming the findings externally through secondary data  
5 Deriving a framework for ERP implementation from a holistic stakeholder perspective. 
 
The purpose of these components is as follows:  Part 1 reviewed literature that 
identified ERP implementation phases and ERP stakeholders; Part 2 ascertained gaps 
in existing CSF(s) models or frameworks and the introduction of the Stakeholder 
perspective identification and significance; Part 3 is the research methodology, 
qualitative data collection; Part 4 is the preliminary analysis of the qualitative findings 
and comparison with secondary data regarding other published case studies; and 
finally, Part 5  is to develop a framework for managing Stakeholders ERP 
implementation.  The Literature Review, figure 4.3, stage 1, comprised the following 
components: 
 
 An investigation into whether the investment on ERP Implementation generates 
a higher return to organisations. 
 An exploration of the significance of stakeholders and the management of roles 
and responsibilities in an ERP implementation context.  
 ERP Implementation failures and existing ERP CSF(s) models. 
 Stakeholders’ significance and identification. 
 Identification of ERP Stakeholders and their roles in the implementation process 
 Identification of implementation phases 
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The composition of the design plan is diagrammatically represented as a number of 
tasks, figure 4.4. These tasks will be discussed further during the course of this 
Chapter 
 
 
 
  
Explore the Significance of the 
stakeholders and the management of roles 
and responsibilities in ERP 
implementation Context  
Develop Interview questions for Case studies 
Case Studies Interviews - Primary Data 
Deriving a Holistic Model for Managing Roles and Responsibilities among Stakeholders 
 in ERP Implementation Context 
L 
I 
T 
E 
R 
A 
T 
U 
R 
E 
 
R 
E 
V 
I 
E 
W 
Analysis of the case studies findings from the Perspective of the Management of 
the Roles and Responsibilities among ERP stakeholders 
Case Studies – Secondary Data 
Identify ERP Stakeholders and 
their roles in the Implementation 
Identify gaps in the Management of 
Roles and Responsibilities in the 
existing models 
Investigate whether the investment on 
ERP Implementation generate higher 
return to organisations  
Secondary Data 
Case Studies and Published 
Surveys 
Studying Existing ERP Implementation 
Models 
Define Most 
Recommended 
Critical Factors 
for 
Implementing 
ERP 
Successfully 
Discussion of Findings 
Define 
Implementation 
Phases 
Figure 4.4 Research Task Structure 
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4.4.1 Research Strategy - Case Study 
The case study strategy was selected since the phenomenon under examination is 
investigated in a ‘real life’ context and its purpose is to gain a highly in-depth 
understanding of the links between processes and behaviours in organisational 
environments. This method is frequently adopted in IS research (Walsham, 1995).   
 
The case study strategy was particularly appropriate in this case, due to the fact that 
the number of organisations to be investigated is small, (just four companies), and the 
research aimed to answer questions such as 'what', 'why', ‘where’ and 'how’ by 
employing multiple data sources (Saunders et. al. 2009; Yin, 2009; Creswell, 2008; 
Ritchie and Lewis, 2010). The strategy is frequently preferred when studying complex 
phenomena (Yin, 2008).  
 
Since the key objective of this thesis was to develop a theoretical framework as the 
research progressed, it commenced with an under developed theoretical base, gathered 
data and then interpreted it, as is frequently the context for theses using qualitative 
methods.  This process led to the emergence of a theoretical lens that could then be 
used to provide meaning in particular circumstances, but that would also have a more 
general application. The case study enabled the researcher to place the emphasis of 
the research in the context in which it happened and, hence, to ensure that the 
framework would embrace the key aspects, about which little was known.  As a result, 
the research focus is on the context, which could be represented by an interpersonal 
relationship, for instance between a business unit manager and an IT manager, or an 
organisational issue in which multiple stakeholders were involved. The range of 
potential contexts along this whole continuum, is a feature of the ERP implementation 
phenomenon. 
 
The researcher was, therefore, tasked with gaining understanding of the various 
contexts in each organisation, in order to select the sample for carrying out the 
primary research in such as way that the contributions of all parties could be recorded 
and compared (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010). The case study strategy was flexible and 
adaptable, ideal for an exploratory study with limited numbers of organisations and, in 
which, the evidence gathered revealed patterns and themes that could either show 
similarity to existing theory and/or enable the emergence of new knowledge/theory.  It 
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was the role of the researcher to determine which facts and views that emerged were 
most relevant and from which, inferences could be made that would support 
development of the appropriate framework (Yin, 2009).  
 
This emphasis on the researcher focusing on the key aspects, whilst being prepared 
for the totally unexpected to emerge, is the basis of rigorous, high quality research, 
according to Stake (1995). In addition, this thesis emphasised its intention of taking a 
holistic view to the ERP implementation process, which the case study strategy 
embraced owing to its 'live' nature and use of multiple data sources (Yin, 2008; 
Creswell, 2008).  Case study designs were comprised of five distinct elements, which 
in the case of ERP implementation were: the research questions (for instance why, 
how and when); the influencing factors and their links with success and failure in ERP 
implementation; the unit of analysis, which was each organisation; the link between 
data gathered and its interpretation; the criteria used to interpret the data, for instance 
building explanations, matching diverse views. 
 
4.4.2 The Sample - Selection of Case Studies 
The interpretivist philosophy and the case study strategy did not rely on large 
samples, as a consequence of the investigation comprising an in-depth examination of 
the phenomenon. 
A non-probability purposive sample model was therefore appropriate to this thesis 
(Yin, 2009; Saunders et al. 2009). The participants were employed in roles at different 
organisational levels in the companies implementing ERP systems, were consultants 
advising those companies and ERP software vendors supplying the firms; the 
participants also had diverse lengths of service or relationship with the organisations 
on which the cases were based.   
 
The case studies aimed to investigate how stakeholders were attracted, involved and 
interrelated, and how they participated and contributed to the success or the failure of 
the implementation process. The issues of interest to the case studies were related to 
the operationalisation of key elements of ERP implementation; a major focus was 
placed on the soft elements that included human aspects, structural and cultural 
change. A further focus was placed on the way in which these elements interrelate 
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with roles and responsibilities management to achieve a higher return of the ERP 
investment.  
The organisations selected had different ERP implementation issues from a 
stakeholder perspective, which could be assessed and, since accomplishing data 
richness is an aim of the thesis, success and failure experiences had to be embraced.   
 
In order to ensure strong bonds between the potential data that are to be gathered from 
the case studies in achieving the research aims and objectives, a number of 
dimensions have been suggested that should differentiate the selected organisations 
for case studies. On the other hand, to allow proper comparative analysis after 
gathering adequate data from the cases a number of criteria have been also suggested, 
that each organisation must meet in order to be selected for the study. 
 
Dimensions to differentiate chosen organisations  
Firstly, as the main user of the targeted model is the ERP sponsor, the nominated 
cases need to have different types of ownership. Such variety in the nature of 
ownership is expected to cover a wider span of the issues that can face ERP sponsors 
in different ownership setups. The authorisation power in family businesses for 
example is not expected to be similar to the power that ERP sponsors have in publicly 
traded organisations. Such variety from the ownership perspective can be expected to 
cover more of the issues the ERP sponsors face during the ERP implementation, 
leading to better findings that can enrich research results. Secondly, the nature of 
business also plays a remarkable role in exposing the issues that affect the process of 
managing roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. If all chosen organisations 
fall into the same business sectors, the findings from the research might be viewed as 
industry-specific, which is not the intention of this research. The diversity in the 
business sectors of the chosen organisations can lead the research to address a wider 
and more varied range of scenarios in the management of roles and responsibilities 
among the stakeholders. It is expected to highlight different areas where ERP success 
can be increased and to suggest common areas where the management of roles and 
responsibilities can either be defined or amended.  
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Another dimension in nominating organisations for the case studies is the size of the 
organisation. It is widely cited in the literature that SME’s face different problems in 
implementing ERP in comparison to large ones. 
Last but not least, the culture of the organisation in terms of the influence by western 
business practices has been taken into account while nominating the samples. This is 
due to the fact that it has been widely cited that in the literature that western 
organisations in Europe and US faces fewer problems compared to the organisations 
in developing countries. 
 
Common criteria for the nominated organisations 
Eight cross-industry companies were identified as meeting the criteria and four were 
selected for the study based on fulfilment of the following criteria: 
 The selected ERP product was one of the top 10 ERP packages (based on 
world class consulting ERP indices, such as Gartner, Meta) 
 A minimum of three core ERP modules must be implemented 
 The ‘go-live’ stage must have been reached for at least three modules 
 Two years must have passed since the ‘go-live; stage 
 ERP remained as the main business application system 
 
The Selection of Case Studies  
In order to gain such insights and meet the aims of the case studies, the organisations 
selected agreed to share the details of matters related to their ERP implementation and 
to allow the researcher access to documented data that might support the study.  
In addition, permission had to be granted for research interviews with relevant 
personnel at different levels of the organisation.     
Hence self-selection was the fundamental approach, rather than a particular industry, 
product, or service (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
These conditions facilitated the examination of the elements that the research 
required, but each case had unique features, which represented the opportunity to 
enrich the research findings by exploring several scenarios and practices that could be 
subject to further investigations and discussions. This strategy, which mirrored the 
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exploratory, inductive enquiry, was expected to lead to valuable outputs for the 
proposed framework. 
The differences between the selected organisations are exemplified by:  
1. Nature of the business:  the first organisation is a project manufacturing 
company; the second a mix of discrete manufacturing and retail; the third 
company is a mixture of contracting, retail and manufacturing and the fourth 
organisation provides services and utilities.  
2. Ownership varied, ranging from a Limited Liability Company, to Holding 
Company (shares traded publicly), family business and government 
ownership. 
3.  Size:  three of the organisations are classified as large corporations. A fourth 
corporation is classified as medium to large. 
4. ERP software: three companies had implemented one of the top two ranked 
ERP software while the fourth implemented one of the top ten ranked ERP 
5. Cultural influences: one of the companies was heavily influenced by Western 
business culture, whereas three others had only experience  of local culture 
 
The diversity of issues represented by the four case studies had the advantage of 
enriching the data collected (Swanson and Beath, 1989; Yin, 1989). This richness of 
data facilitated comparative analysis between the cases, and led to theory 
improvement.  The family business case study was expected to demonstrate how 
local, family owned and medium size organisations tackled ERP initiatives; facilitated 
by observing how implementation issues arose and were handled in their cultural 
context. The agriculture company had almost executed three implementation projects 
at the time of this study; the first was a total disaster; the second was highly 
successful, and the third was partially successful. The service company also 
experienced varying success rates: of the three implementation projects executed, the 
first was a failure and the other two were very successful. The service and agriculture 
companies shared similar experiences, particularly in terms of turning the difficulties 
and failures into success, which represented a substantial opportunity to enrich the 
research observations and findings. The electronic manufacturing company, which 
was based on western culture and standards, did not experience implementation 
failure. However, many other aspects of interest were observed in this case which 
were expected to add value to this thesis. 
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Since the researcher had worked in the ERP field for many years, he utilised his 
strong network to reach the best contacts, those individuals who had key roles in ERP 
implementation.  The researcher sent an initial informal request for participation 
before making an official approach, as this process met the ethical procedures of 
requesting research data.  Initially one company was reluctant to participate, since it 
would have preferred an approach after its ERP application had been enhanced but the 
researcher convinced the CEO that the issues and errors represented a major 
opportunity from a research perspective. The demonstration that the university's 
ethical procedures would underpin the information gathering from participants, 
provided the company with the assurances required to agree to be one of the cases.  
 
4.4.3 The Structure of the Cases 
The presentation of the data collected from the cases follows a flexible structure that 
includes both a common data element and special elements for each case.  
 
From the common data element perspective, each case followed the high level 
structure of description, analysis, and further analysis represented by chapters Five, 
Six and Seven. This is followed by a comparative analysis between the four cases. 
Within each part, namely the description, analysis and further analysis, each case 
displayed common elements. For example, all cases included a brief to explain the 
organisation background that aims to describe the organisational aims and which 
customers it serves. This is followed by a description of the ownership type and the 
nature of its shareholders, its current state in terms of its competencies and market 
position versus its competitors. The organisation background is followed by a brief 
detailing how ERP implementation was first initiated in the organisation. This 
includes an adequate description of all necessary details that may assist in later 
analysis. The organisation background and the ERP evolution are followed by a 
review of the implementation process. This review begins from the point where ERP 
has evolved, and continues until a number of years after the implementation is 
complete. 
 
The second perspective considers the distinctive elements of each case. Within the 
standard structure that has been described, each case has its own nature by which it 
represents itself in terms of the description and the analysis through its own elements. 
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Those elements are extracted from the exploratory review without any preconditioned 
structure. It highlights the most critical issues that are found to be significant to the 
implementation description and analysis. 
 
The further analysis which is represented by the first part of Chapter Six aims to 
scrutinise both the preliminary as well as the further analysis and extract most relevant 
findings to the research objectives. This is believed to be critical to allow the 
comparative analysis to produce as interesting findings as possible, which will in turn 
assist in the production of the model outlined in Chapter Seven.  
 
4.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
4.5.1 Data Collection Method 
Data collection was conducted using qualitative methodology, which was most 
frequently employed in cases in which the inductive enquiry was the major approach. 
This consisted of an assessment of what was occurring in the environment, with 
interpretation and analysis conducted in in the context of paucity of knowledge and/or 
research.  The prime aim of qualitative research was innovation/invention, 
interpreting meaning in what was observed, reflecting on that meaning and making 
sense of it, so that greater understanding of the phenomenon emerged to support new 
learning (Ramanthan, 2009). It was based on open-ended enquiry methods, in which 
participants provided a wide range of views that resulted in the collection of rich data 
(Saunders et al. 2009). 
 
The qualitative data obtained comprised words and phrases, in addition to non-verbal 
communication observed directly by the researcher, which significantly assisted in 
understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ phenomena.  Qualitative methods have been 
regarded as weak by some academic experts, owing to the fact that the knowledge 
gained may not be generalisable to other groups or situations, particularly in studies in 
which few cases were investigated. However, this study attempted to increase the 
generalisability, or external validity of the findings by comparing them with those of 
other studies that had formed the secondary research as part of the data collection 
methodology (Kirk and Miller, 1986; Saunders et al, 2009). 
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4.5.2 Primary Data Collection 
Primary data was collected using semi-structured interviews with a variety of 
stakeholders from the organisations, the software vendors and the consultants 
involved in the implementation of the ERP system; observation through visits to the 
organisation was an additional element of primary data collection (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2010).  In order to fill gaps in the information, secondary evidence was gathered from 
the companies;  for instance when participants were unable or unwilling to provide 
full details of certain aspects of the implementation or individuals initially involved 
with the ERP implementation were no longer employed in the organisation concerned.   
 
The primary data was collected predominantly by means of semi-structured 
interviews rather than other alternatives of a structured or unstructured nature.   
Structured interviews have been frequently described as formal discussions, in which 
a set of predetermined, mainly open questions could be prepared by the researcher. In 
the meeting the researcher would adhere to the specified order and control the 
interview.  Conversely, unstructured interviews enable the participants to take control 
in initiating the discussion; this form of interview was considered a difficult task for 
an untrained and/or inexperienced researcher and inappropriate in this context.    
 
The semi-structured interview utilised in this study represented a combination of the 
two approaches; the researcher was able to plan the questions in a logical sequence 
thus creating a prepared framework for the discussion. Furthermore, it permits the ad-
hoc omission of questions that have been answered or rendered inappropriate by an 
earlier response.  Similarly, additional questions could be added to gain further insight 
and, therefore, semi-structured interviews were considered more valuable for the type 
of rich data required for the research problem to be fully explored (Ritchie and Lewis, 
2010). A pre-prepared meeting plan assisted both the researcher and the participant, 
prompting the researcher to remain focused on the key questions and enabling a 
confident approach, which is particularly important when interviewing new people in 
unfamiliar circumstances and focusing on technical input, in addition to opinions and 
feelings (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010; Creswell, 2008; Jonker and Pennink, 2010; 
Saunders et al, 2009).  The format, timing, content and location of the interviews 
varied according to the personnel concerned. 
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A preliminary interview was sought with the key person who had the most 
information about the implementation history, documentation and details; this enabled 
the researcher to gather published documents, in order to achieve a basic 
understanding of the implementation details and to gain any clarification necessary 
before question design and interviewing began (Jonker and Pennink, 2010).  The 
interviews with executives were scheduled towards the end of the interview period for 
two reasons; firstly the executives’ busy schedule required the appointment to be 
made well in advance, and secondly it was considered that greater value could be 
gleaned from the executive interviews after capturing and studying the most important 
findings from those with the non-executive participants.   
 
The interviews were all conducted on the organisation’s premises, face to face 
wherever possible. Telephone interviews supplemented these, but were limited to 
cases in which the participants were not considered key personnel or a face to face 
interview was not possible. The time period allocated for the interviews varied, 
depending on the availability of the interviewees and the time slots they could 
dedicate.   Wherever possible, the researcher requested interviews to be divided into 
sessions:  the first was to collect preliminary data from the individual, whereas the 
second was to discuss and develop a dynamic conversation after the researcher had 
developed a preliminary, holistic understanding of the entire implementation. 
Therefore the maximum time for interviews requested did not exceed three hours, 
with breaks; the minimum interview time was not less than forty-five minutes.  A 
location that was convenient to the participant and that allowed sufficient privacy was 
selected (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010; Jonker and Pennink 2010; Creswell, 2008).   
 
Interviews were not recorded since the researcher considered that this may be 
perceived as inappropriate to the local culture; and may have had the consequence of 
inhibiting interviewees from expressing their honest opinions and beliefs (Johnson et 
al. 2009).  The researcher took notes using pencil and white paper only. Since the 
companies had different approaches to the design of ERP implementation, the number 
of participants interviewed varied, ranging from three to six people from the customer 
side, a minimum of two from the consulting side and one representative from the 
vendor side. During the interviews, the interviewees were allowed to raise any topic 
or idea of interest to the study. Follow-up phone calls were also made to seek 
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clarification or more information regarding the data collected; this process added to 
the reliability and validity of the study (Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
 
The consistency that was evident in the responses from the participants in each case 
was a measure of the reliability.    The researcher sought to improve the level of 
reliability by ensuring that the psychological environment in which the data was 
collected was appropriate to gaining accurate data in terms of facts, feeling and 
attitudes; the lack of recording techniques, the fact that researcher's native language 
was the same as that of the participants and the familiarity of the locations used for 
the semi-structured interview locations were likely to have provided a feeling of 
privacy, security and confidentiality (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010;  Jonker and Pennink, 
2010).  Reliability was also improved by retesting of qualitative data against the 
transcripts (Creswell, 2008).  
 
4.5.3 Question Design  
The researcher was aware that question design was an important success factor for the 
thesis and so he followed the techniques suggested by acknowledged research 
methods experts, such as Jonker and Pennink (2010), Ritchie and Lewis (2010), 
Creswell (2008) and Saunders et al. (2009). 
Every attempt was made to frame questions so that they did not contain double 
meanings or lead the participant to a particular response; these questions were tested 
by interviewing academic peers and amended appropriately.  This process also 
improved the validity of the thesis. Prior to designing the questions the researcher 
developed a document that summarised his basic understanding of the implementation 
so that he could highlight the specific issues that were of interest to solving the 
research problem. Questions were also informed by the content of the literature 
reviews of Chapters Two and Three. 
The preparation and conducting questions and interview settings are based on two 
findings from the literature review namely 1) Implementation phases; and 2) Critical 
success factors.  
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4.5.3.1 Implementation phases 
Prior research suggests a number of implementation phases for implementing ERP. 
The total number of the phases varies between three and six (See section 2.2.1). The 
targeted model this thesis aims to achieve has two characteristics; first, it is a holistic 
in nature; second, ERP sponsors are the primary users of the model. Due to the 
holistic nature and the fact that ERP sponsors are top executives who have 
challenging priorities, their dedication to ERP in terms of investment of time should 
be kept to the minimum.  
 
For those reasons, an approach with three implementation phases has been chosen to 
structure the data collection and analysis. The first stage refers to period from 
planning stage until the starting of the implementation project; the second stage 
covers the implementation stage until the go-live. The post implementation and 
continuous improvements are covered by the third stage which starts from the go-live 
point. 
 
This approach is supported by the work of Parr and Shanks (2000), which includes 
only three phases of planning, project and enhancement, and that of Shao et al. (2009) 
that has primary adoption, secondary adoption and assimilation.  
 
4.5.3.2 Critical Success Factors (CSFs) 
Prior research is rich in establishing critical factors that can lead ERP to successful 
implementation. More recent studies have provided classification of such factors 
based on the number of studies that support each factor. Other efforts also classified 
those factors based on the nature of its effect on the implementation. The literature 
review chapter has included a number of those studies that review the most critical 
factors affecting ERP implementation among the various CSFs.  
 
The literature review chapter presents three CSF(s) reviews (Table 2.2) by Finney and 
Corbett (2007), (Table 2.3) by Momoh et al. (2010), (Table 2.4) Adapted from Pan et 
al. (2011) and (Table 2.5) by Kapp et al (2001). 
The factors obtained from these studies have been used as a starting point for setting 
agendas for the unstructured interview questions.   
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4.5.3.3 Question types and samples  
Open Questions 
Open questions used in semi-structured interviews aimed to gather facts, views and 
feelings and represented the majority of questions.   The six key types: who, why, 
where, when, how and what were employed to encourage the recipient to be as open 
as possible.   Table 4.2 include examples from each element. 
Table 4.2  Samples of the six key questions: who, why, where, when, how, what’ were 
No Type Example 
1 Who Who has promoted the notion of implementing ERP in the organisation? 
2 Why Why it took the organisation such long time to realise that it has a serious 
implementation problem in this specific area? 
3 Where From where finance department adopted this business practice that they claim it is 
the best practice? 
4 When When the implementor completed the configuration of the manufacturing modules?  
5 How How did the new HR director successfully manage to tune HR modules 
implementation from failure to success while his former peer failed to do this in two 
years? 
6 What What are the primary reasons that led the organisation to choose implementing 
planning module? 
 
The researcher did not interrupt and actively listened to the participant’s answer.  An 
additional tactic used in questioning was to ask the interviewee’s opinion about the 
degree to which an intervention had been successful as well as to ask him/her to 
describe or explain a certain scenario, in order to elicit substantial detail on an issue 
(Jonker and Pennink, 2010, Ritchie and Lewis, 2010).  
 
Closed Questions 
Closed questions were used, as required, to check understanding of the points made 
by the participants, or  after summarising what the researcher had recorded as the 
main points  (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010;  Saunders et al. 2009). Examples of this type 
of questions are provided in table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3  Samples of closed questions used in the interviews  
No Example 
1 Can we conclude that the only justification for deciding to implement ERP that your primary 
competitor announced his initiative in implementing ERP? 
2 Do you main that because there were no pressure on the project manager to bring the project 
closer stage it kept dragging all these months? 
3 Can I understand from this that finance has no bench mark reference that justify adopting this 
business practice? 
4 Would it be fair to say that such revolution in HR behaviour towards ERP implementation is 
simply because the new director has much more experience in dealing with information systems 
in comparisons to the former HR director? 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY                                                                            4-25  
Chapter Four                                                                                              Page 25 of 29 
 
4.5.4 Secondary Data Collection 
External validity was high in this study, owing to the measures taken, particularly 
regarding triangulation but also by attempting to increase generalisability of the 
findings by comparing them with those of other published case studies after the main 
study had been concluded (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010; Kirk and Miller, 1986) 
 
The secondary data was gathered from a variety of reliable, published and publicly 
available sources; for instance data on the organisations was sourced from their 
individual websites, Chamber of Commerce databases and the stock-exchange, in the 
case of the company that was listed in the stock exchange. In addition more specialist 
documentation was requested from senior personnel in the organisations involved in 
the ERP implementation; to include reports, power point presentations, progress 
reports, and minutes of meetings. Once interviews had taken place, the researcher 
obtained further written documents from the personnel concerned (Johnson et al. 
2009) 
 
4.5.5 Data Analysis 
Following each interview, the researcher summarised the interview findings and 
arranged a second interview to confirm or to clarify the points he had recorded.  In 
addition, after completing all interviewees for a single case, in cases in which there 
were contradicting results, either between two different interviews or between an 
interviewee and other sources of data, the researcher sought additional interviews or 
advanced secondary sources to ensure that the information was accurate.  The 
researcher also summarised the interview outcomes and sent them back to the 
interviewee to confirm his understanding, to ensure accuracy of written data and to 
enable a better collection and use of evidence, as well as to enhance the level of 
reliability (Kirk and Miller, 1986; Ritchie and Lewis, 2010; Creswell, 2008).   
 
Once all the data had been collected, the researcher transcribed all of the data gathered 
for each case from interviews, observations and document study. He organised the 
words and phrases and made notes on associated non-verbal behaviours, and began 
the process of coding the data, line by line, seeking patterns.  This was followed by 
the division of the findings into themes or trends and transferral to tables or matrices 
using Miles and Huberman’s (1994) model. The researcher iterated over the data 
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several times to ensure the accuracy of the themes and to enhance reliability, as 
suggested by Creswell (2008). The revisiting and rechecking data was also intended to 
minimise the personal interpretation bias, which could be a significant limitation 
generally, and in IS qualitative research (Walsham, 1995).  A process referred to as 
bracketing was employed, which involved the researcher separating his views and 
beliefs from those of the participant; this process was supported by the researcher not 
making quick judgements based on the first transcript and hence keeping a more open 
mind about the findings (Bernard and Ryan,  2009).  The matrices assisted the 
researcher in the comparison of the four cases in addition to providing a diagrammatic 
representation of each one. 
 
The Ranking Approach  
For a better presentation of the comparative analysis of the implemented ERP projects 
within the four cases, a ranking approach will be used.  Using this approach, the 
results of the qualitative analysis of the eight implemented projects are classified as 
‘excellent, very good, good, fair and poor’. These five values have been given a 
numeric value ’80-100, 60-80, 40-60, 20-40 and 0-20’ respectively. This ranking 
approach allows us to present presenting the qualitative data in a graphical form so as 
to suggest various relationships between comparative elements. These potential 
relationships can be further tested in a quantitative manner to improve the theory in 
managing roles and responsibilities in ERP implementation context. 
 
Secondary data was also sourced from prior academic research studies, in order to 
supplement the findings of this study, to provide a basis for comparison, and to 
enhance the validity of the findings through triangulation. This was particularly 
effective in the stakeholder context, providing deeper explanations, facilitating 
comparison and assisting in the analysis of success and failure elements. 
 
Limitations of Data Collection and Analysis 
Studying stakeholders of ERP throughout implementation phases required choosing 
the longitudinal case study approach, in order to capture organisational experience 
from initiation to the post implementation phase, including the close monitoring of 
organisational behaviour during this latter phase. However, time constraints did 
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emerge that inhibited this study from capturing more details and suggesting more 
detailed and solid recommendations (Johnson et al. 2009) 
 
The small number of cases that were employed to investigate the manner in which the 
'soft' issues of implementing ERP effectively, which centred on the roles and 
responsibilities of the stakeholders involved, and the fact that the experiences of 
different organisations varied meant that generalisability towards all organisations 
was limited.   
 
The scope of the study was somewhat limited by the number of people-related issues 
that could be uncovered and explained during the field and desk research.  This 
reflected the greatest limitation, which was the time that the researcher had to plan 
and complete the thesis, as well as the restrictions on organisational documentation 
that was made available by each firm involved. The time that participants in the study 
were able to devote to providing their views and understanding of the ERP 
implementations process, was also a limitation on the accomplishing a truly 
representative view, even within the confines of the four organisations. The 
participants' experiences were restricted to the period in which they had been 
employed by the firm; some employees had left during the implementation phase so 
that experiences could not be accessed and others had joined the organisation at some 
stage during implementation and could therefore provide time-limited data. 
 
The openness of some participants was likely to have been limited by fear of 
revealing certain feelings and opinions that might be detrimental to the organisation in 
which they were employed, or with which they were associated for the completion of 
the project, as well as to their position within it.  In other cases participants may have 
provided restricted input in terms of what they felt the researcher wanted them to say 
or what he should be told. There was also the potential agenda that admitting any 
misjudgements in any stage of the ERP process would be viewed as critical of certain 
personnel as well as the danger of revealing confidential information.  The researcher 
also had inherent bias, owing to his knowledge and experience in the sector and hence 
his values and beliefs (Walsham, 1995). 
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The principle of an ethical approach to research was that participants should not be 
negatively affected, as a consequence of their involvement in it.  Hence the 
participants in this study were ensured confidentiality regarding their input and that no 
individual could be recognised from any comment made in this thesis.  The researcher 
did not name the companies, which agreed to take part, nor did he reveal details that 
would make them recognisable. 
 
The researcher obtained permission from the companies who agreed to participate in 
the study and he made no contact with potential participants prior to that permission 
being granted.  The researcher also made the senior personnel of the companies aware 
of the university’s ethical guidelines that he was obliged to follow.  The locations for 
the interviews were chosen to ensure privacy. 
 
All participants were provided with written details of the purpose of the study and the 
confidentiality of the information that would give to the researcher. Participants were 
informed that they could withdraw from the study at any time and refuse to answer 
any question, which they did not feel comfortable to discuss. Participants were 
requested to sign a written declaration concerning these points.  All notes and 
documents related to the thesis were retained locked cabinets and the associated 
electronic data was securely, password protected (Ritchie and Lewis, 2010; Saunders 
et al. 2009). 
 
4.6 Summary  
This chapter aimed to describe and justify the research methods chosen during the 
course of this study, and to establish the aims and objectives of the investigation. The 
primary objective of this study is to establish a holistic framework for ERP 
implementation and to enable ERP decision makers to enhance the management of 
key stakeholders. As a result, the purpose of this research is exploratory, as it 
considers ERP implementation from a stakeholder perspective. As described above, 
the relative paucity of available data and previous studies in the field of ERP 
implementation demanded a particular research philosophy and approach to data 
collection. The adoption of both interpretivist and positivist approaches enabled a 
focus on the diverse opinions and beliefs of the individuals under study to be 
combined with the positivist cause and effect approach. This hybrid method provided 
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the necessary flexibility demanded by the research problem and permitted the 
researcher to adapt quickly during the course of data collection, as the need arose.  
Furthermore, the use of case studies permitted the researcher to conduct an in-depth 
analysis in a genuine ‘real life’ context, drawing on multiple data sources across each 
organisation. By focusing on four specific cases that exhibited significant common 
factors in addition to profound differences, the data gleaned from interviews was 
maximised in scope and permitted a greater degree of generalisation necessary for the 
formulation of a potential model. The data collected was primarily subjective, which, 
as acknowledged above, is problematic in the formation of general models. However, 
it is expected that by setting this research in the context of other studies, sufficient 
validation may be established to draw effective conclusions.   
In conclusion, it is suggested that the primary demands of this study required a 
holistic, flexible approach, which justifies the methods adopted. It should be noted, 
however, that a more expansive study accommodating more cases studies is desirable 
to validate the conclusions drawn from this investigation. In addition, this study must 
be situated in the context of other available data regarding ERP implementation, 
which may provide further validation of the conclusions drawn in subsequent 
chapters.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Description and Analysis of Case Studies  
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the description and analysis of the four case studies that form 
the basis for this investigation. It will address each case study in turn, providing a 
detailed description of the implementation process and experience, and outlining the 
particular circumstances affecting each case. In addition to this, it will also provide a 
deep analysis of the ERP implementation in each case, discussing the various 
successes and failures experiences by each company, positing reasons for some of the 
outcomes that were realised.  
 
5.2 The description and Analysis – Case DiversCo  
5.2.1 Case Study Description - DiversCo 
5.2.1.1 DiversCo background and ERP evolution 
DiversCo is a family business that celebrated its 30
th
 anniversary in the year 2010. 
The DiversCo group started as a number of small isolated establishments before it 
gradually became a larger group consisting of eight companies and establishments 
across three different industries, namely contracting, retail and manufacturing. Seven 
out of the eight units serve the construction sector, with one unit specialising in 
fashion. The organisation started to generate profit from 2005. 
 
In 2002, the owners appointed a consulting firm to recommend actions that could 
prevent a repetition of such financial crises. After the consulting firm was hired, 
policies and procedures were recommended in several business areas. The owners 
recruited a new general manager (GM) who holds an MBA and who has a successful 
record in leadership and information systems. The new GM joined the consulting 
team at the last stage of preparing their final report. It consists of clear 
recommendations, including the adoption of ERP as a prime solution for the 
organisation. 
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5.2.1.2 Preparation Process 
5.2.1.2.1 Engagement of Supervisory Consultant 
Two months after joining, the GM hired a part time consultant that he had worked 
with previously, to assist in the selection process. In a couple of short meetings, the 
GM shared his thoughts with the consultant regarding what he thought was required in 
the company. The message from the GM was clear in that he urged the consultants to 
not get trapped by endless functionality comparisons in order to save energy for the 
implementation itself. The consultant took the lead in this process, as per the 
directions from the GM. He also stated clearly that, as GM, he was not interested in 
becoming involved in selection discussions until the consultant had shortened the 
vendor list to three vendors only for the final comparison.  
 
5.2.1.2.2 Demo Sessions by ERP vendors 
After the consultant shortened the list to three vendors, the GM requested the 
nomination of various end users from different departments and units to attend the 
demo sessions. The GM attended the first session with each vendor to stress the 
importance of end user feedback in the decisions to be made. He also noted that 
attending these sessions represents valuable knowledge and an increase in the market 
value of the member who was actively involved in the process. 
During demo sessions of the first product, the vendor consultants admitted that 
standard features of the system do not comply fully with the local rules and 
regulations according to labour law. Additionally, they mentioned that despite the fact 
that the project module is not part of the remit, labour costing data of the projects will 
need to be captured with alternative solutions needing to be provided. Demos and the 
discussion of these consequences revealed that the employee master had poor details, 
and was missing important fields like GOSI (General Organization for Social 
Insurance) and was very weak in manipulating employee benefits such as tickets. 
 
During the demonstration phase, it was understood that there is no issue at all in 
running the system remotely. Therefore, since its inception, all ERP servers for all 
companies and branches have been located in the head office. After the demo sessions 
were completed, only two vendors were requested to submit their proposals. The first 
vendor was ranked as the top ERP product that year, while the second is known as the 
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best fit for medium organisations; it was largely cited as an easy to use and easy to 
implement product. 
 
5.2.1.2.3 Selection Final Decision 
A meeting was called by the GM, with the Vice Chairman of the group, the Finance 
Manager and the ERP consultant. The GM summarised the discussion, which 
concluded that the comparison has been limited to two products: 
1. The first one satisfies the long term plans of the organisation as the product has 
advanced functionalities that covers not only the existing practice and business 
but can also meet future advanced requirements. 
2.  The second product is likely to satisfy the short to medium term plans only. 
The product functionalities meet the existing and probably the midterm business 
requirements. 
 
The Vice Chairman supported the first choice. A letter of intention was sent to the 
proposed ERP vendor. DiversCo decided not to purchase any add-on software 
applications and rely only on ERP modules. The selected modules include finance, 
distribution and HR. Project and manufacturing modules were not included in the 
project scope. 
 
5.2.1.2.4 ERP Project Announcement 
The general manager directed the supervisory consultant to prepare a presentation on 
what has been accomplished in the ERP project so far. The general manager requested 
the administration manager to book a large meeting room in a professional area such 
as a hotel or a convention centre for a full day. The main agenda was to present the 
ERP project to the entire DiversCo companies and branches. The invitation was 
extended to all executives, middle managers, senior staff, salesmen, accountants and 
personnel. The agenda included one session presented by the supervisory consultant 
to demonstrate the basic ERP concepts and the progress made to date. All the 
remaining sessions were presented by the GM. 
 
The GM developed and announced two more strategic initiatives alongside the ERP 
initiative. These are summarised in the table below. 
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The event concluded that all organisational members are expected to extend their 
support to ensure that the ERP project is a success. Further emphasis was placed on 
end users, and as such, these end users will need to attend full demo sessions and 
contribute positively in these sessions, with their honest feedback.  
 
Table 5.1 Three initiatives in parallel with ERP – DiversCo 
No Initiative Name Description 
1 COMMUNICATION A project name for implementing electronic email services 
2 BASE ERP project name. The name “Base‟ was chosen to establish that 
this is the foundation of the information systems infrastructure 
3 VIAGRA To spin-off companies and branches in to limited liability 
companies managed by a holding company; each company has its 
own operational management and legal identity. The name 
"VIAGRA", inspired by the medicine, aims to inspire an immediate 
and massive impact of the project to the business 
 
5.2.1.2.5 Final Negotiation and Contract Preparation 
The selected vendor sent a draft agreement to DiversCo, whom, under the direction of 
the GM, forwarded it to the DiversCo lawyer for review. The GM forwarded a copy 
of his previous ERP contract, that he implemented before joining DiversCo, to his 
consultant. A few days later the DiversCo lawyer sent his suggested agreement to the 
GM who forwarded it to his consultant. The consultant found that the revised version 
of the contract did not include any issues related to core implementation activities, 
such as training, testing, data migration, etc. The GM directed the ERP consultant to 
draft his own version that incorporated related clauses from the three available 
agreements (i.e., Vendor master agreement, DiversCo lawyer agreement and the 
agreement brought from the other client). A few weeks later, the DiversCo ERP 
consultant prepared the draft contract and sent it to the GM for review and comments. 
The GM requested a fixed price contract and to tie payments for the system with the 
rate of progress of its implementation. A couple of negotiations took place between 
DiversCo & ERP until the best and final offer was provided by the ERP vendor, the 
final contract was prepared and was then signed by both parties.  
 
5.2.1.3 Implementation Issues 
This section describes the key issues involved in the implementation process. The 
ERP supervisory consultant suggested hiring a new IT member to the DiversCo team 
to specifically handle the ERP software and implementation matters. This was 
suggested as DiversCo had only one IT technical member who handles all PC, 
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network and technical matters. The GM formed an ERP implementation core team 
headed by the ERP consultant along with the finance manager, senior accountant and 
the IT technical member. The GM headed a couple of meetings with the ERP core 
team, assuring them of all the support and resources that they would need to make the 
project successful. It was suggested by the supervisory consultant that the new 
member should be able to work with the consulting team hand in hand to facilitate the 
implementation process. 
 
The ERP team observed that the company suffered from cash deficits once again, 
before it was announced that sanitary division has been sold. The ERP team was 
disappointed by this announcement, as the purchased license includes sanitary users 
and the system configuration was almost completed.  
 
5.2.1.3.1 HR Implementation 
The contract specifies that the implementor must develop an add-on software 
application to meet HR requirements that can be summarised as follows: 
1. Generate a pay-slip from the system including all necessary details, which 
complies with the local labour law. 
2. Generate various statistic reports of employees for costing and non-costing 
purposes. 
 
The original plan was to complete the HR add-on features in one month, with a view 
to asking end users to test the system over a period of one month. Following this, a 
request would be sent to end users for them to use the system in the test server. 
Following this process, the end users, administration and finance staff provided their 
findings to the ERP team for rectifications, before a new version was developed for 
the next end user trial in the new test version. 
 
The coding was completed on time but the add-on part always failed during the test 
stage, as it failed to generate target reporting details. The supervisory consultant 
looked at this issue several times until he found that not all taskforce movements 
between various projects were being updated in the system, which led to inaccurate 
project costing reports. The Chief Accountant criticised the HR system as it did not 
track worker movements between DiversCo construction projects. The Chief 
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Accountant explained the ERP HR module‟s failure in tracking workers movements 
between DiversCo construction projects. The HR representative explained two issues 
in this regard. First, personnel can only identify worker movements from the 
following monthly sheet, and second, a lot of DiversCo workers were not yet 
registered under DiversCo sponsorship and therefore personnel cannot register them 
in the employee master.  
 
DiversCo Decision to Suspend HR Implementation  
A couple of follow-up enquiries revealed that no progress had been made in resolving 
the HR requirements. The general manager asked the team to provide an honest and 
clear answer to the following question: "Does the team believe they can implement 
HR module successfully? If the answer is yes, the following question is, would they 
be able to identify precise completion date? And the third question was, could you 
provide a checklist of the remaining tasks? The team responded with a “No” for the 
first question. Both the chief accountant and the personnel team confirmed that the 
HR module cannot be implemented successfully due to the huge amount of data and 
the pre-requisite administrative procedures that have to be followed, strictly, to ensure 
accurate outcomes. The General Manager thanked the team for their clarity and 
honesty and promised them to make a decision shortly.  
 
The next day, the general manager asked the ERP consultant for a one-to-one meeting 
to take a decision. At this meeting, the consultant explained the existing obstacles that 
prevented the HR module from going live. The general manager, in return, confirmed 
to the ERP consultant that some of the existing obstacles are corporate obstacles that 
the personnel section cannot resolve, and he confirmed that it could not be resolved, at 
least in the short term, because the cost of meeting the HR pre-requisite data 
outweighs the benefits identified from HR implementation. After the discussion, both 
the general manager and the ERP consultant agreed to stop the HR module 
implementation.  The GM directed the chief accountant to find alternative stand-alone 
software packages that could be quickly implemented and contain only standard 
features to avoid any complexity, which might cause extra delays. 
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5.2.1.3.2 Fashion & Electro-Mechanic Issues  
A number of issues within the fashion and electro-mechanic divisions are explained 
across the following sections. 
 
The Struggle of Automatic Invoice Generation  
The implementation started in the fashion branch in the head office. Requirements 
were gathered, followed by the creation of a chart of accounts and preparation of the 
system configuration. When the fashion manager asked to start using the system, he 
was distressed that the point of sales facility was not ready. He made it clear that the 
system would be of no benefit if this service was not ready. The implementation team 
informed the fashion team that it would be done at later stage, with a view to starting 
to key-in customer invoices into the new system whilst the point of sales facility was 
completed. The fashion accountant had to work overtime for a long period of time in 
order to enter the manual invoices in the legacy system and in the ERP at the same 
time. A back-log of two months of un-entered data accumulated due to this work load. 
 
The testing process of the system was very slow, also, due to unexpected and 
enormous number of support calls from the sales task force. Most of the support calls 
related to networking, PC set-up and basic data entry mistakes, as most of the 
salesmen were first time PC users. The technical team had to provide hands on 
training for several salesmen in basic data entry and computers skills to enable them 
to use and test the system properly. Several meetings were held between the fashion 
manager and the implementation team in order to expedite the implementation of the 
automation of customer invoice generation from the system, in order to eliminate the 
high costs of manual entry. At a later stage, the fashion manager urged the ERP 
management team to expedite the automatic invoice generation and to enable the 
enquiry feature of all stocked items, from any showroom, whether they were in the 
store or in outlets. He further explained that if the customer was interested in buying 
an item but either the colour or the size was not available, then the system should be 
able to advise in a timely manner if other show rooms have it in stock or not. 
 
The GM requested a one-to-one meeting with the fashion manager and the ERP 
consultant to develop a firm decision for the fashion business unit and requested them 
to provide their final feedback in no more than one week. One week later, the ERP 
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consultants met with the DiversCo general manager who divided his feedback into the 
following points: 
 
1. Fashion requirements maybe more easily met by implementing point-of-sales 
software packages. 
2. The ERP vendor does not have such point-of-sales software solutions. 
3. Most of the point-of-sales software products can fulfil all the fashion 
requirements with no need for full ERP implementation. 
 
The GM approved the purchase of the point-of-sale software application under the 
condition that fashion to continue use ERP financial modules to manage their 
financials.  
 
Final Reporting Problem for Electro-Mechanic Retail Company 
Due to the pressure from the GM to go live, one of the accountants reported that an 
important report could not be generated in the electro-mechanic retail company. The 
DiversCo technical team reported the issue to the ERP local support member who 
could not resolve the issue before he requested the vendor support assistance. No 
reply was received from the ERP vendor, which meant that the going live cut-off date 
was dramatically delayed. After a lot of pressure from the DiversCo team, one 
member from the ERP local vendor admitted, informally, that they lacked the 
experience to resolve such problems, and they didn't receive the expected support 
from the ERP head office. 
 
5.2.1.3.3 Restructuring from ERP Vendor Side 
A few weeks after the first launching of the finance module in the contracting unit, 
DiversCo received a generic e-mail from the ERP vendor head office that they had 
delegated a new Second Implementor that has been recently established, to complete 
pending projects. DiversCo obeyed this instruction and processed the due 
implementation payments to the second implementor, while the license and 
maintenance fee continued to be paid to the ERP vendor.  
 
The backlog of ERP support that had not been attended or resolved by the ERP 
vendor increased in several areas until the GM decided to put the ERP vendor 
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payments on hold. A few days later, a representative from the second implementor 
visited the GM and explained to him that the ERP vendor span off implementation 
consulting to several partners. At this point, the second implementor became the 
official partner in the country. Following that meeting, and for the next few weeks, no 
progress was made by the second implementor to resolve the issue of the pending 
ERP logs.  
 
A couple of months later, the GM was invited for a promotional event arranged by the 
ERP vendor, at which he managed to coordinate a side meeting with the regional 
manager of the ERP vendor and the second implementor. The regional manager 
implicitly stated that resolving existing DiversCo ERP issues is the responsibility of 
the second implementor. The GM of the second implementor, on the other hand, 
stated that he was unable to recover the implementation due to unpaid bills. The GM 
asked how they could request for bills to be paid while the work associated with those 
bills has not been completed. The GM of the second implementor replied that, as per 
the handover document between the ERP vendor and us, the implementation parts 
were completed and, as such, the payments were due. 
 
The GM invited the supervisory consultants who investigated the matter and found 
out that most of the implementation consultants who used to work with the ERP 
vendor were dismissed as a result of this spin-off process. The GM decided to 
motivate the in-house team to fill this gap where, slowly, most of the ERP logs were 
resolved. A couple of weeks later, DiversCo received a letter sent by a law firm, 
requesting the bills to be paid, for services that the second implementor and the ERP 
vendor claimed had been completed. DiversCo refused to pay, continued to handle 
ERP support internally, and the relationship with the ERP vendor was terminated. 
 
5.2.1.3.4 Discarding Legacy Systems vs. Launching ERP Modules 
Finance modules were successfully launched in contracting, constructing and 
maintenance, as planned, by Dec 31
st
. For construction, the accountant did not stop 
the parallel run, to enter transactions in both legacy and ERP system. A few weeks 
later, the GM discovered that practice before he insisted on the definition of a cut-off 
date for the exclusive use of ERP for the entry of financial transactions.  
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For the Fashion Company, the backlog for the dual entry was found to be too difficult 
to be entered to the ERP. It was decided, therefore, to start another parallel run, with 
the cut-off date postponed till the end of the next year.  
 
The electro-mechanic retail company reached the go-live stage three years after the 
original completion date. The electro-mechanic retail faced several problems in the 
parallel run stage. A number of problems were related to the discrepancy of data. The 
parallel run focuses on checking and validating the data between the legacy system 
and the new system. In any data discrepancy case, a support request was made to the 
local support team who, in most of the cases, sent the request directly to the 
implementer consulting firm. Although this is the support cycle process across all the 
companies, for the electro-mechanic retail, the responses to the support requests were 
very slow. According to the feedback from the implementor support company, bad 
quality data represents the root cause of the majority of the problems. 
 
 When the factory reached a point when they could start using the system, the network 
communication link could not be established properly and the ERP data could not be 
accessed from the factory. The implementation in the factory lagged behind the rest of 
the companies and branches until the network issue was resolved. After investigation, 
it was found that the telephone line link was poor, as it was established for voice 
service only. The local telecommunication company could not commit to a date for 
changing the communication link. Several months later, the local IT team suggested 
installing the complete ERP applications within the factory itself. A local server was 
installed inside the factory premises. After a couple of experiments, the ERP system 
was ready for use in the factory. The original ERP delegate from the factory 
transferred to the main office. His replacement was trained for the system during idle 
time while waiting for the data communication link problem to be fixed. He then 
resigned and a new member of staff had to be trained completely from scratch. The 
factory did not resume entering data in the system and continues to use the legacy 
system, claiming that they have no time to start the parallel run. Top management 
urged the factory team to discard the old system starting from the next fiscal year (i.e., 
three years from the original completion date).  
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5.2.1.3.5 The Creation of the Application Support Department 
Before the go-live stage, chief accountant accused the ERP vendor implementation 
team of inaccurate system configuration. To strengthen his stand, the chief accountant 
showed the GM several unattended support requests to the ERP consulting team. Such 
ignorance, in the opinion of the chief accountant, confirms that something was wrong 
in the configuration itself. The GM called for a one-to-one meeting with the ERP 
consultant to discuss the issue. After his investigation, the ERP supervisory consultant 
explained that this is not the first time that such complaints have arisen. The scenario 
is frequently repeated, where the chief accountant blames the system configuration; 
when the investigation takes place, wrong data entry or misuse were the common 
causes of such problem, which has nothing to do with the proper configuration. The 
GM states that it is the role of the in-house application consultant to handle first line 
support requests in order to avoid unnecessary escalation to ERP vendor. He further 
requested an assessment report regarding the performance of the internal ERP 
consultant performance. The team provided a semi-consensus opinion that he did not 
meet the job requirements and the GM decided to ask him to resign. To fill this gap, 
the senior technical member who was responsible for networking and technical 
matters, requested to handle application matters as well.  
 
Shortly after, it was noticed that one of the accountants took the initiative of 
developing informative reports based on self-initiated learning and practice during 
and after working hours. The GM took the decision to create a new department for 
applications support. He decided to dedicate the newly discovered, and talented, 
accountant to that department, with a new, fresh, IT member being hired. Within a 
year from the discarding of the legacy system, the GM delegated most of the 
operations to the maintenance manager who was promoted to the position of vice-
general manager. 
 
After this organisational restructuring, the GM worked closely with the newly created 
unit to monitor the company performance through continuous IS reporting, 
brainstorming sessions and round the table meetings. Throughout this process, the 
leverage of ERP increased through continuous follow-up from the unit to operational 
staff, who defaulted to using the IS system properly. Through the use of reporting 
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tools, the unit managed to develop reports that allowed the viewing of the entire 
organisation´s performance and cash position in a timely manner. 
 
5.2.1.3.6 The GM Resignation  
Within two years from the set-up of the internal support department, the GM resigned 
from the organisation. The GM of construction took over and urged the team to find a 
better ERP solution that suits the current growth of the organisation. He mentioned 
that through substantial revenue increases, the organisation was able to allocate an 
adequate budget to purchase the best ERP product. A few weeks later, DiversCo 
announced that it had purchased a license for the number one ranked ERP, to achieve 
efficiency, increase productivity and to provide solutions for exchanging information. 
Furthermore, it provided solutions for internal operations that include finance, 
accounting, purchasing, HR, sales, manufacturing, project management and 
maintenance. The announcement further states that the new ERP will maintain 
corporate data, support more accurate decision making, develop infrastructure, 
strengthen data security, continuity of technical services and develop human resources 
that are able to provide necessary support with highest quality for all users. In 
addition, the project aims to manage the entire organisation in a professional manner 
that meets the existing and future business requirements, which will enable DiversCo 
to achieve its development targets and to implement international standards, as part of 
its efforts towards performance excellence, quality and the best utilisation of their 
financial resources. 
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5.2.2 Analysis - DiversCo Case 
5.2.2.1 The Role of  Information Systems  
This section addresses the investment on the information systems before and during 
ERP implementation. It discusses how this investment correlates with the business 
growth and profitability of DiversCo. 
 
5.2.2.1.1 Introducing E-mail Services  
Most of the DiversCo task force had never worked in professional organisations that 
used modern business practices and tools, including the use of e-mail. Using e-mail as 
a communication tool at the time the GM had been hired was considered a very 
advanced step among organisations in the construction business. Once they activated 
their e-mail accounts and started using them, the task force found it a very effective 
tool to attract attention, as they can reach the GM, for example, without the traditional 
communication barriers. Shortly, the number of staff who started to actively use e-
mail exponentially increased. The GM viewed the e-mail initiative not only as being 
able to speed up communication, to reduce the cost of unnecessarily paper 
distribution, but also to break the barriers between the task force and their use of 
technologies.  
 
5.2.2.1.2 Development, Hiring, Promoting and Retaining IS Staff  
IT has, as a department, in terms of staff, practices and skills, has developed through 
several phases until it reached an advanced maturity level. Building local IT 
capabilities was one of the early initiatives that was started before adopting and 
starting the ERP implementation. From the beginning, the decision was made to hire 
an in-house application consultant to maintain the ERP implementation and any 
potential existing and future enhancements. The analysis of how and why this position 
was opened indicates various goals from this initiative. First is to ease the 
communication process between the consulting implementer and DiversCo 
implementation members. Second, his involvement in the communication process 
represents an excellent educational opportunity at the business and the application 
level. Third, it was intended that he act as a first line support layer for DiversCo 
implementation matters. The GM approved the request and informed the supervisory 
consultant that his involvement is not only needed to achieve the project plan goals, 
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but also to sustain the ERP knowledge within DiversCo, so it can manage ERP 
support internally without depending on external consultants. 
 
When the GM joined the organisation, there was only one member in the fashion 
business unit who voluntarily handled the limited and basic technical services that 
mostly relate to PC configurations, maintenance and accessories. Once the GM 
realised the potential and positive attitude towards IT self-learning by the fashion 
accountant, he made a decision to move him from fashion to the IT department. This 
was followed by continued allocation of budget for IT related matters, that included 
buying and upgrading PC‟s, laptop and the maintenance and upgrade of the computer 
network and the purchasing of software applications and tools. The GM hired new 
fresh graduate members who demonstrated very positive attitudes towards learning 
and supporting the development of IT systems and practices. Gradually the 
information systems skills became gradually an essential competence that one has to 
obtain in order to get promoted.  
  
Promotion IT Achievements  
1. Accountant in the fashion company. 
 
 
2. Promoted as a prime accountant at the group level  
 
3. Promotion plus extending role to support ERP 
modules. 
 
 
4. Promotion with official assignment to develop 
and supervise IS projects. 
 
5. Extension with promotion to become audit 
member at the board level. 
 
1. Successfully implements ERP in fashion. 
 
2. Initiative of developing executive reports 
from ERP. 
 
3. More influence and support more ERP 
modules to reach go-live. 
 
4. Initiative to motivate and supervise the quality 
of data entered to ERP. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Impact of developing IT skills on employee incentives – DiversCo 
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Figure 5.2 Relationship between IS investment & Business Growth – DiversCo  
 Description & Analysis of the Case Studies                                                           5-15   
 
Chapter Five                                                                                             Page 15 of 79 
 
Financial analysis indicates that from the ERP starting point until eight years later, 
DiversCo had seen exponential growth in terms of growth, profitability and diversity. 
The revenue has increased by 600% and the return on equity exceeds 30%. Various IS 
initiatives, projects and plans developed at the early stage of this success journey, 
where DiversCo was seen as one of the advanced organisations, in the contracting 
business, in terms of adopting modern technological practices, such as e-mail and 
ERP system. Despite the ERP difficulties in some areas, it can be seen that the 
progress in developing IS based resources and initiatives was always one step ahead 
of the progress made in the financial and financial growth and improvements. In the 
beginning, DiversCo announced three major IS initiatives at the beginning of the year; 
the organisation celebrated its first year of making profit after several years of 
generating losses. The go-live stage of the finance modules preceded a few months of 
generating 40% per cent profitability growth. Last but not least, within two years of 
the creation of the IS department, the company significantly achieved exponential 
growth in revenue, profitability and market share, after the go-live stage. 
 
5.2.2.2 Positive Effect of Appropriate GM selection on IS Project Success 
ERP implementation is one of several initiatives in DiversCo´s transformational 
journey. It has been demonstrated that DiversCo advanced its name in the market 
among its competitors by adopting such IS based initiatives. The implementation cost 
of these initiatives compared to its influence and realised results are minimal (Figure 
5.1). It can be suggested that such cost optimisation resulted in 1) proper selection of 
the GM, and 2) adequate authorities that are granted to him. Such empowerment did 
not only lead to massive change, but also the budget allocated to the various change 
initiatives can be seen as very small compared to the change initiatives‟ size and 
effect. 
 
The case shows that the GM was the prime initiator, governor and supporter of the 
change through his previous experience in initiating and leading change through ERP 
implementation. The main lesson that can be learned is that proper selection of the 
GM who possesses IS based change management knowledge and has the right attitude 
towards nurturing IS based change programs can not only ensure that such change 
will succeed but can also ensure that the budget allocated for the change can be 
minimal, which increases the ROI of the change investment. 
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5.2.2.3 Appropriate Usage of the Supervisory Consultant  
The optimal value of the supervisory consultant can be seen as another extension of 
how DiversCo saves tremendous consulting costs through the proper selection and 
optimal use of supervisory consultant involvement and services. This can be seen 
from the great benefits achieved from the supervisory consultant‟s involvement and 
the low consulting rate. Both the GM and the supervisory consultant acted as two 
faces of the same coin regarding ERP sponsorship and support. 
 
The critical success factors of the supervisory consultant (SV) are summarised in 
Table 5.2. , which provides a summary of the success factors of the (SV) engagement. 
 
Table 5.2 Success Factors for Supervisory Consultant 
No Description 
1 Clarity of assignment scope. 
2 Adequate empowerment 
3 Positive attitude of SV toward making ERP a success. 
4 Mutual understanding of ERP requirements between GM and SV. 
 
5.2.2.4 Selection Process Analysis 
The selection process analysis can be divided into the following subsections: 
 
5.2.2.4.1 Smooth and Cost Effective 
The selection process was completed in timely manner with a very low cost. This can 
be inferred from the following: 
1. The supervisory consultant started before the end of the second month of the GM 
employment. 
2. The selection report was completed within two and a half months from the date of 
starting the consulting assignment and within four and a half months of the 
official joining date of the GM. 
3. Although there was a small gap between contract signing and the implementation 
starting date, which was related to an external financial difficulties faced by 
DiversCo, which had nothing to do with the steps of the selection process by 
itself. 
 
It can be inferred from the GM‟s attitude towards ERP implementation that he 
believes dedicated effort should be put towards execution much more than the 
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selection. Moreover, the expected value from implementation execution focus 
outweighs the attempts at obtaining perfect functionality comparisons between ERP 
products. 
The supervisory consultant states: 
“The major factor that allows completing the selection process in a timely 
manner is that I was instructed clearly by the GM not to exaggerate the 
comparison in product functionalities. It gave me more people focus by which I 
could better identified real obstacles that hinders implementation from succeed 
and suggest developmental plans to resolve them”  
 
The general manager believes that the comparison between ERP products in terms of 
the functionalities should not dominate the selection process for two reasons. First, 
more coordination will be required from key end users, especially when they cannot 
dedicate enough time to do a comprehensive functionality comparison between the 
ERP products. Second, people tend to resist change and they are normally afraid to 
make clear recommendations on certain products, so they will always prefer 
somebody else to make the ERP decision. The GM offered the following description: 
“From my experience, I see management invest a lot in terms of both 
resources and time in the selection process much more than what they do 
in the implementation and post implementation. Therefore, I took a 
position that we need to complete the selection process in a timely manner 
and save our budget and energy for implementation and post 
implementation challenges” 
 
5.2.2.4.2 Product Selection Mistakes 
ERP was first suggested in DiversCo through the recommendation by management 
consultants who reviewed and assessed the organisational systems, procedures and 
organisational structure before the GM took the lead on the ERP journey. The GM 
developed a strategic plan based on the input received from the management 
consulting process. The proposed strategic plan stated clearly that DiversCo was a 
diversified organisation that aims to gradually spin off its business into independent 
business units responsible for its growth, financing and profitability.  
 
The ERP selection process started under the light of the strategic plan developed by 
the GM before the supervisory consultant took the lead in nominating and 
recommending the best ERP vendor who fits the strategic direction of DiversCo. 
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Figure 5.3 explains the link between forming the corporate strategy and ERP 
selection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the point of forming and finalising that strategy, GM communicated the strategy 
in a clear manner to internal and external stakeholders which focuses on two simple 
facts: 
1. DiversCo will undergo a transformation plan from one establishment owned by 
one owner to a multiple limited liability companies managed by a holding 
company. 
2. DiversCo will remain a diversified company. 
 
The execution of the overall strategy can be seen as successful. The VIAGRA project 
mission was achieved, as five business units were successfully changed to limited 
liability companies. The COMMUNICATION project initiative also succeeded as the 
manual memorandum circulations dramatically decreased and e-mail became the 
predominant communication tool. The transformation process was being done in 
parallel with the ERP implementation. 
 
Inappropriate Selection for Contracting Needs 
The cost incurred in implementing ERP in contracting exceeded its original budget. 
Contracting managers suffered heavily in order to generate meaningful reports from 
ERP to facilitate timely decision-making. Only a few years after going-live, through 
Figure 5.3 Impact of Strategic Plan (SP) on ERP Selection - DiversCo Case 
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intensive effort from the IS team, were proper financial reports prepared through tools 
outside ERP. 
 
The legitimate question to be asked is why were such ERP product complexity and 
limitations not discovered or raised during the demo sessions? 
 
The stake-holders being involved in the selection process were: 
1. The general manager. 
2. Supervisory consultant. 
3. Pre-sales and sales consultant from the ERP vendor side. 
4. Contracting accountant. 
5. Finance manager. 
6. Functional managers. 
 
The contracting accountant pointed out that he noticed at an early stage that 
contracting requirements were not clearly addressed in the system, but he was not 
aware of the full consequences or repercussions of this observation. Furthermore, the 
pre-sales consultant responded to the requirement gaps and shortages with answers 
like "that will be addressed elsewhere in the systems" or "we can provide solution for 
this particular case". The construction accountant explained: 
"I have noticed that the selected ERP product lacks meeting standard 
construction requirements but I could not convince my management. 
Consultants always confirm that the system can meet all requirements until we 
realised at very late stage of the implementation that it was not true" 
 
The finance manager who used to be the electro-mechanic contracting senior 
accountant points out that he felt that management was pushing to implement the ERP 
system regardless of the requirements shortages. The senior accountant stated: 
"Although we have been requested to provide our feedback on the product 
functionalities, pre-sales consultants provides rosy pictures about what they 
can do to bridge the gap. Furthermore, the supervisory consultant and the 
general manager stood by their side at least most of the time" 
 
It can be seen that, during the selection process, DiversCo identified itself as a 
diversified organisation without a priority preference for contracting. Management 
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underestimated the effect of those limitations for the advantage of implementing a 
single product from all business units. 
 
After DiversCo shifted its focus to contracting business, however, the effect of 
requirements shortages from ERP product expanded and the problem was exposed, as 
it was clearly found that the selected product and its configuration is too complex for 
contracting. This complexity resulted from the nature of the contracting business, as 
being solely a project base by nature. This mistake is connected also to the effect of 
not maintaining consistency between corporate strategy and ERP plans which will be 
discussed in the strategy section. 
 
5.2.2.5 ERP Vendor & Implementor(s) Issues 
5.2.2.5.1 A Good Beginning 
The analysis shows that the ERP vendor made a good implementation start-up. This 
can be seen from their enthusiasm during the demo sessions preparation and their 
offering of free training before implementation starts. Unlike the traditional practice, 
the ERP vendor was directly involved in playing, initially, a dual role as an ERP 
vendor and a consulting implementer. The ERP vendor communication, before and 
during the early phase of the implementation, can be seen as dynamic and effective 
with both DiversCo team as well as with the supervisory consultant. 
 
The general manage stated 
"The ERP vendor was a greater partner to us during early implementation 
stage. They have put us on track and guided us to lead in the start-up phase 
with confidence" 
 
 
5.2.2.5.2 Poor Handover to the Second Implementor  
This strong bond between the implementation consulting team and the ERP vendor 
ensured that the implementation progressed smoothly until the ERP vendor ownership 
evolved. The support channel between the ERP vendor and consulting firm was 
completely lost and, as a result, the DiversCo ended up complete puzzled as to who 
they should contact for the ERP support they needed. The remarkable observation is 
that there was no consideration for DiversCo requirements during the merger process 
between ERP vendors. In other words, they were not considered as an influencing 
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stakeholder in such a process. This can be noticed from the method the ERP vendor 
used to communicate such change, which was only an e-mailed letter sent to 
DiversCo pointing out that implementation invoices need to be directed to a new firm 
as they had become the official representative. The consulting team members who had 
been involved from the vendor side disappeared from the implementation scene. 
 
The reasons for merger and acquisition between ERP vendors can be seen as 
legitimate, including strengthening their financial position, gaining more market 
share, improving operations efficiencies and meeting the global expansion needs. 
However, despite these benefits, it also created adverse effects to the DiversCo 
implementation. There was no proper hand over or formal transition of the project 
between the new and the old implementation team from the vendor side. The lack of 
transparency and the complete ignorance of existing ERP customers‟ obligations is a 
fundamental ERP vendor mistake. The absence of proper coordination between the 
new and old consulting teams who handled the implementation was a complete 
responsibility of the ERP vendor, as they should have ensured that targeted 
acquisition benefits should not come at the expense of jeopardising on-going 
implementation projects. The general manager commented: 
"It's a complete ERP vendor responsibility to communicate with us a client 
with transparency and honesty any organisational changes that has direct 
effect on the implementation" 
 
The main lesson learned is that the ERP vendor should have developed a transition 
plan that removed the risk of negative impact on the on-going implementation 
projects. The behaviour of the ERP vendor was not ethically acceptable. A former 
ERP consultant from the ERP vendor side chose to resign to avoid being involved in 
such practice. He explains that he had either to hide the truth to the customer, which is 
non-ethical practice, or was to tell the customer the truth, which would offend his 
employer. He also refused to join the customer as an independent consultant out of 
respect, as the customer was still part of his former employer customer list. The 
former consultant from the vendor‟s side expressed:   
"I walked away because I couldn't watch my previous customer suffering 
from such inappropriate practice but in the same time it's going against my 
ethical values if I make business from my former employer customers, 
therefore I decided to change my job completely and transfer to a new post 
not related to the same ERP vendor applications" 
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The transition between the first and the second consulting teams created adverse 
effects for the implementation. There was a roles and responsibilities gap between the 
implementation parties, which resulted from the disengagement of DiversCo from the 
transition process. Such a gap and its subsequent conflict would have been avoided if 
DiversCo was engaged fully in this transition, including a proper verification of 
unpaid bills and pending technical support issues that not resolved. Unfortunately, 
such a transition was not dealt with by the consulting firm as a process; only generic 
e-mails were sent to the anonymous list, including DiversCo, informing them that a 
new implementor had been appointed to receive the upcoming payments and 
inquiries. At the time of this announcement, DiversCo had several unclosed technical 
support requests for several months until DiversCo decided to freeze the ERP 
payments. The new implementer, thereafter, requested to meet with DiversCo not to 
resolve those pending support issues but rather to chase what they considered as due 
bills. It was expected by the new implementer to arrange a meeting with ERP vendor 
and DiversCo as a client to determine precisely the implementation status including 
all due bills and pending implementation problems, however, the new implementer 
chose to penalise DiversCo by ignoring all pending support requests as a silent 
punishment for not paying the perceived due bills. 
 
The CEO of the new implementor offered this description: 
"Once we realised that DiversCo was not willing to pay due bills, we 
decided the turn off the tap i.e. to discontinue the delivering the 
consulting services" 
 
The situation could have been much better if the new implementor has communicated, 
at the time of accepting the task from ERP vendor, their understanding of considering 
the implementation as complete, where both the new implementor and the ERP 
vendor, along with DiversCo as a client, would have reached a mutually beneficial 
agreement. The finance manager explained: 
"If both ERP vendor & new implementor were clear to us from the 
beginning that ignoring resolving implementation problems is connected 
to payments; or if they stated clearly that they will discontinue the support, 
we could have developed fair solutions that assures a win/win type of 
agreements and saved considerable cost; and huge implementation delay 
would have been avoided" 
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5.2.2.6.3 ERP vs.  Off-the-Shelf Software Packages  
ERP is, by nature, a long-term investment by the organisation, where the relationship 
with its ERP related vendor is expected to be long-term. The software license 
represents only a small part of the value that ERP customer pursues. The more critical 
parts include the services, processes, best practices and the global network of ERP 
vendor support agencies. However, the ERP vendor behaviour in DiversCo case 
demonstrates very low consideration of what they have sold to the customer. The 
long-term commitment from the ERP vendor side seems to be missing; in fact, the 
transition between the old and new consulting team of confining their relation with the 
customer to chase invoices for in-completed ERP tasks demonstrate that the ERP 
vendor is not considering that they are selling a strategic solution that calls for long-
term services and enhancements and the software license represents only a small part. 
The GM of DiversCo offers the following explanation: 
 
"This claim by ERP vendor and its consequences uncover to us as a client 
the fact that ERP vendor, through the newly appointed partner, deal with 
ERP as if it is an off-the-shelf type of product rather than a providing 
strategic IS solution". 
 
5.2.2.6 Go Live Review 
The project follows the phased-implementation approach where not all modules or 
companies reached the go-live at the same time. The go-live stage varies from module 
to module and from one company to another. At one extreme, some modules and 
companies failed to reach the go-live whilst some reached the go-live within time. 
The companies and modules in terms of reaching the go-live can be divided into the 
following categories: 
 
Three companies reached the go-live before the end of the first year. These companies 
are electro-mechanic contracting, construction contracting and maintenance. The go-
live dates, in the case analysis context, can be defined by the discarding of the legacy 
system and relying solely on the ERP, especially in terms of the finance data.  Three 
companies struggled till they reached the go-live stage due to different reasons 
namely the fashion-retail, electro-mechanic retail and the factory. The fashion 
company reached the go-live stage thirteen months after the project original 
completion date. One of the reasons for such delay was that it was rescheduled to start 
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with the official beginning of the DiversCo fiscal year. The factory faced a unique 
obstacle among other branches and companies within DiversCo in that it is in a very 
remote location. The factory reached the go-live stage four years after the original 
completion date. 
 
5.2.2.7 Can the Case be Considered a Success or a Failure? 
It may be argued that the case demonstrates several aspects that can be considered as 
successful (partially or fully), while others can be considered as a failure (partially or 
fully). From a pure ERP implementation perspective, as a project implementing 
finance module, it may be considered successful as the entire group successfully 
discarded all fragmented applications and now rely only on ERP. DiversCo succeeded 
in unifying technical infrastructure of software application, operating system and 
database.  The chosen ERP application, however, could not be implemented fully in 
key areas including in fashion and HR. The effort made in implementing the system in 
the sanitary business was discarded as the whole unit was sold out. In some areas, 
integration could not be leveraged to unresolved issues at the process level such as the 
practice of including sales invoices of non-stock items. 
 
Despite the ERP partial failures, there were side-effect gains achieved. It is argued, 
for example, that ERP implementation within the company positively changed the 
underlying organisational culture. Through ERP implementation, the organisation 
advanced its development of various skills, experience and practices. Several lessons 
were learned in project management and regarding teamwork. The organisation prior 
to the ERP implementation is completely different from where it is a few years from 
the go-live point in terms of attitude, work practices, skills and knowledge. If these 
significant improvements were to be measured in monetary terms, this would 
definitely outweigh the ERP partial failure. The culture of moving from a 
departmental to process-oriented thinking has emerged, for example, and has 
improved through integration and sharing resources. The professional level of staff 
members has dramatically improved.  
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5.3 The Description and Analysis – Case ElectCo  
5.3.1 Case description – ElectCo 
The company was established in the late 1980‟s in a developing country under the 
directives of local government to create local capabilities in strategic areas such as 
advanced manufacturing technologies, communication systems, and product support. 
It is currently a leading company in the region, which is capable of manufacturing 
sophisticated military and commercial electronics exceeding the most demanding 
military and commercial standards. The company is certified and accredited by 
international suppliers. 
 
The main legacy system since 1988 is a business application (manufacturing, 
distribution and finance). Not all system modules and functionalities were in use, 
especially in manufacturing. The system was used mainly for bookkeeping; most of 
the analyses and decisions were made outside the system, with the spread sheet being 
the dominant tool. Other applications were run in a completely isolated manner using 
different platforms (Oracle, dBase, Access, etc.). The IT department, at the end of 
each month, performed integration activities manually to consolidate financial and 
project costing data. IT and end users (especially in finance) were completely 
frustrated by such a lengthy process. This practice was consistently criticised by 
auditors. Some areas like human resources, shipping & MRP were not using any 
system. Most of the administrative staff especially secretaries, data entry clerk, data 
entry processing staff were eager to have a new system to ease their day-to-day work. 
Executives were expected to have necessary information for decision-making under 
their fingertips, as easily accessible as excel. Furthermore, the ElectCo business plan 
showed enormous projected sales in the pipeline in various sectors. The Executive 
Vice President shared the business plan with the IT director and requested that the IT 
systems and infrastructure be ready to meet the growth requirements. 
 
5.3.1.1 Selection Process 
5.3.1.1.1 Product Selection 
The director of IMIS department took the lead in selecting ERP solution for the 
organisation. He nominated four ERP vendors that could potentially fit the needs of 
ElectCo. Starting from Feb 1997, an RFP was developed in-house and was sent to 
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vendors. Two vendors showed serious interest in contributing. The two vendors were 
given a chance to demonstrate their packages to ElectCo staff based on a show-me list 
prepared by end users. After the demonstration, a detailed question list from each 
department was sent to each vendor. It took ElectCo around one year to decide on the 
package until a letter of intent was sent to an ERP vendor. It took the company 
another seven months to develop an ERP contract. Upon signing the contract, ElectCo 
received a report showing rapid negative financial performance of that selected 
vendor. The decision was put on hold until the vendor proved better financial 
improvements.   
 
During this gap, the computer systems manager who handled the ERP project 
resigned from ElectCo.  Most of the IMIS members started to resign and the IMIS 
performance and attitude went down. The management decided to promote a young 
programmer analyst to handle the management of ERP and the computer systems 
department. As soon as he was put in charge, the newly appointed computer systems 
manager took the lead and invited a third ERP vendor to go through the same process 
used by the previous two vendors by submitting a proposal, conducting demo sessions 
and answering end user questions. In three months, ElectCo took the decision of 
selecting ERP vendor and instructed IMIS to start the process of to select the 
implementor partner. 
 
5.3.1.1.2 Implementer Selection 
The selection process went slowly during the third and the fourth quarters of 1999, as 
the company was busy with Y2K. Three consulting firms were considered during the 
implementer evaluation (one local and two from the top six leading consulting firms). 
The reason behind considering the local implementer was because the expected 
flexibility and potential support after the implementation was completed. An external 
consultant from the vendor side was assigned to support the implementation by 
conducting infrequent visits during the implementation. The appointed implementor 
agreed on the tough fixed price contractual clauses requested by ElectCo. The 
company implemented the latest ERP vendor release, which had just been released. 
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5.3.1.1.3 ElectCo Project Structure 
Figure 5.4 explains the ERP project structure. The CEO is the sponsor, the COO is the 
chairman, the IMIS director is the vice chairman while the applications manager is the 
project manager. ElectCo PM in coordination with the Implementor PM developed an 
official document to explain implementation guidelines (Table 5.3). The project 
structure was designed to adopt ERP as a process oriented application in the existing 
departmental structure. 
 
 
 
 Table 5.3 ElectCo Implementation Guidelines 
No Description 
1 ERP is a high priority project that will transform ElectCo from current legacy systems to the 
state-of-the-art system. ERP is a platform on which we can add more functionality, such as e-
business. 
2 No compromise for the target date. This tight schedule is full of critical and parallel tasks, 
which leave no room for anybody to delay his responsibilities. 
3 The ERP project may transform the way we do business towards a more process-oriented 
organization. Thus, full cooperation between departments is a fundamental requirement. 
4 Customization is extremely discouraged unless there is a fundamental need for it. (COO 
approval is required for any customization). We should be flexible and cooperative to change 
our procedures rather than to customize. 
5 Avoid using multiple systems (reduce the fragmentation) even if we have to do workaround 
solutions within the ERP framework. 
6 60-70% success of the project depends upon the ElectCo. The whole staff is expected to 
extend their full support and cooperation to make this project successful. 
 
The project manager was a computer systems manager from the IMIS department. 
Five team leaders were assigned to each main module (Figure 5.4). The main key 
areas were manufacturing, material and finance, the three team leaders in these areas 
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Figure 5.4 ElectCo Project Structure 
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had between approximately two to three years of experience and they all held a 
university degree. Most of the implementation issues came through these channels 
and they are the coordinators with other areas and fully assigned to specific modules. 
For example, the material team leader was fully assigned to inventory management, 
shipping and the prime coordinator for purchasing because both purchasing and 
material fall under the responsibility of the material director. Each team leader is fully 
supported by an IT member and consultant. Other ERP members were identified to 
support each group. 
Those three team leaders in those key areas in addition to the related IT members 
were responsible for most of the critical milestones. Two additional consultants were 
hired on a need basis (one consultant for manufacturing and distribution and the other 
for defence requirements). Several replacement decisions of ERP members were made 
due to internal movements of staff or due to attrition. Main examples were the change 
of the costing manager and a number of HR employees. In the case of HR, three 
members assumed the team leader responsibility, one after another. 
 
5.3.1.2 Implementation Process 
The COO started the project by an informal meeting followed by issuing the 
implementation guidelines (Table 5.4). Most of the important documents (guidelines, 
instructions, memos, forms…etc.); were posted in the outlook bulletin boards, and 
95% of the written communication was done via e-mail.  Most of the training plans 
„other than ERP‟ were suspended, and new system development requests put on hold 
as well. 
Each module was managed as a sub project. Each team leader was assigned to provide 
consultants with necessary feedback to their questions, inquiries and data preparation. 
If team leaders did not have answers, they were to escalate the matter to the 
department head for decision. The department head decisions vary among modules, 
being fast in finance modules, moderate in the project and distribution modules, and 
extremely late in HR modules (Figure 5.4). Some interdepartmental issues that could 
have been resolved in a week took the company several months to close. In many 
instances, the decision that had been agreed at the operational level, was changed 
completely at the executive level. 
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Managers, including the COO himself, knew many stories like FoxMeyer and Nike 
failures in the mid and late 1990‟s. Whenever a project manager put extra pressure on 
ElectCo users, project team, they were accused of meeting the date at the expense of 
quality or jeopardising the core business. The purchasing module was the first module 
to be completed after the finance modules. During the weekly executive meetings, the 
CEO used to raise several inquiries on the purchasing modules. The CEO questions 
advocated several debates that turned into improvements requirements in the system. 
The purchasing manager was the focal point of the purchasing module and demands 
for a full automation of the PR and PO process. After reaching the go-live stage of the 
purchasing module, an appreciation letter was prepared by the ElectCo project 
manager and signed by the ERP chairman sent to the concerned team members by the 
ERP chairman. The implementation was done in eighteen months, no extra funding 
was allocated for the project (some savings were achieved from the external 
consulting budget) and IT and team leaders were considered at bonus time and most 
of them were promoted even before the completion of the project.  
 
5.3.1.2.1 Project Management at a Glance 
The implementer project manager submitted an initial implementation plan in a task 
list form.  This plan was handed over to the ElectCo project manager. The ElectCo 
project manager could not manage the project using this master schedule for two 
reasons. First, several activities would arise on daily basis that were not shown in the 
plan. Second, the dynamic nature of the project made it difficult to update and to 
communicate this schedule to the relevant team.  Alternatively, a project management 
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Figure 5.5 Impact of roles and responsibilities on decision making effectiveness – ElectCo Case 
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software tool was used heavily to manage sub-activities such as rolling out and cut-off 
plans. Meetings, workshops and one-to-one discussions were conducted on a need 
basis within a maximum of one week‟s notice. It was common to call ERP members 
to attend meeting even after the meeting had started without advance notice.  
 
The implementer declared that they would use the standard implementation 
methodology of the ERP vendor. ElectCo did not make any customisations during the 
implementation apart from few customizations that were allowed in reports only. 
Regular reviews used to be conducted at all levels of the project structure. The task 
force group met and decided on operational issues. Both project managers were close 
to each other in resolving all project issues. Several steering committee level meetings 
took place and were attended by both senior executives from the implementor side 
COO from ElectCo.  
 
5.3.1.2.2 Executive Review  
As part of the contract, ElectCo requested an external consultant to conduct a quality 
review in several areas in manufacturing and distribution. During the second visit 
after launching the manufacturing and distribution, the consultant conducted a 
presentation in front of the CEO where he criticised some behaviour from the ElectCo 
side. The CEO felt that the external consultant stood by the implementor side so he 
intervened aggressively. The CEO requested an internal meeting after the external 
consultant presentation. The ElectCo project manager stood up and commented to the 
CEO that he was responsible for the completion of the project provided he was 
allowed a ten minutes presentation every week in front of the CEO and the executive 
staff. The ElectCo project manager, thereafter, started to brief the company on the 
status in front of the CEO. Comments and directions were gathered and applied 
accordingly. During this briefing, the ElectCo project manager was allowed to report 
any issues either to ElectCo or to the implementer members. Key milestones like Item 
master migration, Bill of Material and Routing were dealt with as high priority in 
terms of communication, follow-up and attracting the management attention. The 
team morale increased after finance went live and launched the purchasing module. 
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5.3.1.2.3 Conflict & Conflict Management 
Three incidents of conflict made a steering committee meeting necessary. The 
chairman was approached several times to resolve interdepartmental issues. In many 
instances, there was friction, hard discussions and very emotional conflict, either 
between ElectCo members themselves or between ElectCo and consultants. There was 
no single case reported that was considered as a conflict between the two PM(s). The 
IMIS director who assumed the vice-chairman position in ERP structure handled all 
formal communication to the implementer management not the ElectCo project 
manager.  
 
5.3.1.2.4 Policies & Procedures 
At the end of the project, the CEO instructed the QA department to start the process of 
updating the procedures. Several departments resisted addressing such requests as 
they believed that ERP implementation was not completed, although their connected 
modules passed the go live stage. It was always a back and forth communication 
between departments, QA and IMIS. The QA director took the lead on assigning a 
process owner for each module to review and redesign the process when required. 
Before ERP was introduced not all business areas had legacy systems. In those areas, 
there were a lot of changes in business requirements, which in effect caused a lot of 
rework effort. 
 
5.3.1.2.5 Planning Module 
At the analysis stage of the project, the external consultant recommended a slight 
change in organisational structure by combining the material planning along with the 
production planning in order to leverage the MRP module. The COO did approve the 
merge to be under the production side. A long discussion took place inside the 
organisation about the justification, timing and the position of this merge. The 
material department did complain to the president who decided to hold on the 
decision. It was agreed that module ownership would be placed with the production 
planning section and to postpone the merge after the implementation. The planning 
module failed many times to generate MPS (Master Planning Schedule) due to 
nonstop problems that included, but were not limited to, some items where master 
attributes were not defined properly. 
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5.3.1.2.6 Training  
Finance did express that they needed to attend all the training sessions in order to 
ensure all areas do not conflict with finance roles or requirements. IMIS was the first 
line support for end-users during the implementation. IMIS provided a small set-up of 
a help desk to streamline the support process. Both the implementer and in-house staff 
developed many training guidelines, user manuals and hand-outs. It did happen 
infrequently that training facility was occupied for more than on session at the same 
time. In many cases, training was repeated several times. At the beginning of the 
training it was suggested by one of the executives to conduct an exam at the end of 
each class, however, the team leaders and consultants discouraged the suggestion. 
 
5.3.1.2.7 Technical Issues  
The payroll module was supposed to be modified according to the local rules and 
regulations of the country (as the standard product was designed for the western 
taxation systems). The localisation of the new release was found to be incomplete by 
the product vendor when it was expected, which had an adverse effect on the 
implementation schedule. When the localisation was completed, the ElectCo 
Company was not ready, which created another delay. After the fixing of the 
employee master bugs, it was discovered that missing attributes were not completed in 
the employee master table, which resulted in a further delay in the payroll site.  
 
The system possessed the feature of capturing time sheet data on-line. After 
announcing the launch of the time sheet, the support helpdesk received many 
complaints. After the investigation, it was found that the new release was not installed 
in the production system, whereas the problem did not exist in the production. In 
order to fix the newly discovered bugs, the ERP vendor requested to install technical 
patches. After some time, the consultants decided to synchronize the two instances. 
One area requested to re-enter some data after migrating the TEST server without 
sufficient coordination. The user department was frustrated.  
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Customisation 
The only approved screen-customiation was done in the WIP (Work In Progress) 
module. After one month of the pilot run, the screen was launched in the Repair 
facility (six miles distance from the head office) and the screen failed at launch due to 
the slow pace of system performance. Lucky enough, ElectCo was in the process of 
upgrading the connection line anyway, but that was not in the ERP original master 
plan. However, it did delay the WIP implementation for about three months, which 
had an adverse effect on the remaining activities. After the stock migration was 
completed, the material team leader started his vacation. After going live, his 
replacement could not handle the support load and the material manager got confused 
until he decided to go back to the old system. It took ElectCo two months to fix the 
problem until they could complete a physical inventory at the end of the year.  
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5.3.2 Analysis – ElectCo Case  
5.3.2.1 ERP Evolution Analysis  
Expansion requirements 
The three years sales forecast of ElectCo before considering ERP anticipated that 
sales would increase 300%. This forecasted increase involved ElectCo executing a 
new type of project that had different customer requirements. The forecasted sales 
alerted the COO to ensure that ElectCo would be equipped with all the necessary 
development plans and resource allocation to capture and execute those forecasted 
projects successfully. The COO stateed to the expats computer systems manager: 
"The sales forecast indicates that we expect 300% increase in sales in 
addition to implement new type of projects so I want our information 
systems to be ready to support this substantial sales increase” 
 
Internal Pressure to Discard Legacy Systems 
Key and end users were, in general, perceived by the legacy system as the root cause 
of the inefficiency. The two main key users from both the production and projects side 
had always complained that the legacy systems were the root cause of several 
business process inefficiencies. The IMIS technical supports also were not happy 
about being restricted to support business applications that were built on outdated 
technologies.   
 
External consulting Advisors 
ElectCo periodically received reports prepared by independent consulting firms such 
as Gartner group and many others.  Those reports promote ERP as a candidate 
information systems solution for the business. 
 
ERP Vendor’s influence 
ElectCo used to receive several reports from advisory group services that promote 
ERP as a business and information systems solutions. Both the IMIS director and the 
COO attended several ERP conferences and user forums in Europe and United States 
where they have attended several activities that increase their level of interest and 
confidence in the expected gains from adopting ERP as business and an information 
systems solution. 
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5.3.2.2 The Intensive Focus on the Product Selection 
From the analysis of the time duration of the three implementation phases it may be 
observed that approximately fifty per cent (50%) of the time was dedicated in the 
selection process of ERP product. This unnecessary delay had an adverse effect on 
team morale and IMIS strategic directions. There was no accurate figure on the cost 
associated with the selection process but it can be easily confirmed that the cost of 
that process was high since it contains the following cost attributes: 
1. Business trips attended by several executives and managers. 
2.  The cost in working days for those members during their business trips and 
internal meetings and discussions can make this figure much bigger and 
higher. 
3. The cost of working days of the fully or semi fully dedicated team members 
for the selection process especially IMIS members. 
 
The selection process took ElectCo a much longer time than the implementation 
(Figure 5.7). At one end, this reflects the fact that ElectCo considered this project as 
important and essential, but at the same time, it implicitly reflects that the dominant 
perception remains, namely that ERP implementation is as akin to an off-the-shelf 
software application. It would have been more efficient if ElectCo had diverted part of 
product selection budget and focus to develop a change management program that 
goes in parallel with the ERP implementation process. 
 
. 
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Figure 5.6 Driving Forces for Adopting ERP – Electco  
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5.3.2.3 HR Modules Implementation Analysis  
HR, in comparison to other modules, failed to reach the go-live stage until the third 
year of the implementation. All other modules passed the go-live milestone within 
two years. The company started realising ERP benefits as early as nine months from 
the implementation starting date. Figure 5.8 demonstrates the main stakeholders 
involved in HR implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The feedback received from the interviews demonstrates that the HR consultant 
possessed the minimum technical and application understanding of HR modules. He 
had, however, the following deficits: 
1. He lacked understanding of the complete picture of HR implementation. This 
may be inferred from his inability to explain the effect of how detailed 
configuration choices of certain HR module part can affect the HR processes. 
HR dept Consultant 
 
 
 dep IMIS dept 
Top Mgmt. 
Figure 5.8: The four stakeholders of HR modules 
 
Figure 5.7 Analysis of the Implementation Activities – ElectCo Case 
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2. His communication skills in general were weak, so ElectCo members including 
PM, key and end users usually faced difficulties in understanding the current 
position of HR module implementation. 
The project manager from the implementer‟s side admitted this fact and he further 
explained that since he, personally, has no experience in the HR area he could not 
complement and fill the deficits of the HR consultant. The implementor PM stated: 
“Our general manager and I possess a variety of competencies in 
technical, applications and business knowledge in all most all 
business areas over an experience of nearly twenty years. However, 
HR is a very specialised area that require specific knowledge which 
we do not have so we could not, in effect, provide a very close or 
hands on support to the HR modules implementation”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ElectCo project manager explained that the HR department took advantage of the 
weaknesses of the HR consultant in order to hide their own weaknesses. The PM 
states:  
“Unlike other modules; the immediate support I used to get from 
implementer PM has assisted me to fight internally to resolve all deficits 
inside ElectCo. However, I failed to do this in HR since no adequate 
support received neither from the implementor nor from the vendor”. 
 
Table 5.4 summarises the HR implementation steps until it was finally completed. 
 
 Table 5. 4 ElectCo HR Implementation Summary  
No Description 
1 Both PMs worked hard until the localisation of the payroll module was completed. 
2 More pressure from the ElectCo PM on ElectCo HR to expedite completing the back-log activities 
of HR implementation. 
3 Internal conflict developed and exposed between IMIS and HR management. 
4 The COO intervened and managed to cool the internal conflict and advise to place further pressure 
on the implementor. 
5 After introducing the post implementation presentation, the CEO received the message that poor 
progress was made in HR due internal reasons. 
6 The CEO took the lead and placed further pressure on HR. 
7 A few days later the VP-HR resigned; another executive took over and he managed to complete 
pending activities successfully. 
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usersLack of 
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Increase Implementation Time + Adverse Morale effect 
Poor ROI Results 
Figure 5.9 Impact of consultants incompleteness on ROI results – ElectCo Case 
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5.3.2.4 Planning Module Failure Analysis  
Before the implementation started, the perception persisted on the part of many 
ElectCo members that MRP process was not automated because of the deficits of the 
legacy system.  
Few members of ElectCo have expressed a contrary opinion to that of the failure of 
automating the MRP was not because of the legacy system; other internal issues 
needed to be resolved to automate the process. 
 
The material control manager, for example, stated before the implementation started: 
“If I am in a position of the computer systems manager before I 
decide to replace or change the system I will do a proper assessment 
to investigate why we fail to automate the MRP as I am personally 
not in agreement that the legacy system is the root cause for not 
successfully implement MRP using the current legacy system” 
 
The IMIS senior member stated during the demo sessions of ERP planning modules: 
“End users admired several features of ERP planning modules; most of 
those features are already exist in the current legacy MRP modules but not 
used” 
 
It can be argued that if the organisation had paid adequate attention to those 
stated views and analysed thoroughly why MRP function failed to run by the 
legacy system, a significant ROI saving would have been achieved from the 
unnecessary on-going attempts to make ERP planning module more successful. 
 
Recalling the historical evolution of ElectCo may shed light on why such a merger 
decision could not go through. ElectCo started as a manufacturing company of hi-tech 
and sophisticated industry in a developed country. ElectCo had been viewed as a 
unique business model case. The operations department had always earned the full 
credit of ElectCo success, especially as the operations VP had been promoted to be 
the COO then the CEO thereafter. From this point onwards, it became embedded 
within the organisational culture that operations  is the most important department in 
the company. Therefore, it should always get the highest priority of power 
distribution, allocation of resources, etc.  The logistics, supply chain and similar core 
back-office operations that are crucial for improving efficiency and effectiveness 
continued to be considered as a secondary priority. What had complicated that cultural 
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difficulty was that most of the former operations members transferred to the projects 
departments who gradually became as important as the operations. Both departments 
started to compete over resources and the attention of top management at the expense 
of the back-office logistic and supply-chain operations which, in effect, created 
unseen problems including failure to assign clear ownership of an important process 
such as planning. The absence of such badly required ownership led to fragmented 
planning bodies among different units under different departments where expensive 
and extensive coordination effort could not fill the lack of integration gap between, 
more specifically, material planning, which was owned by the material department, 
and the manpower and equipment which belonged to the operations department. 
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that ElectCo suffered from a cultural problem that 
hindered the company from assigning proper ownership of the planning process. This 
legacy problem did not only lead to the ERP planning module failure but it also can 
be seen as the main reason of the failure of using the MRP module of the legacy 
system. 
 
5.3.2.5 Smooth Transition to the Post Implementation Phase  
The case reveals that the ElectCo project manager had excellent timing and a good 
approach in terms of introducing the post-implementation plan. He succeeded in 
setting their expectations properly by drawing attention to the fact that there is always 
an expected temporary performance dip after reaching the go-live stage. This message 
had successfully communicated to the CEO that they should take successful actions, 
as summarised in table 5.5. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Positive Actions as a result of proper Post Implementation plan presentation ElectCo Case 
No Description 
1 A package of reward and incentive schemes was approved for the ERP core team to reward and 
retain them. 
2 The CEO clearly understood his role in placing more pressure on department heads to complete 
pending ERP tasks. 
3 A subcommittee headed by the CEO was formed to recover the HR implementation failure. The 
analysis revealed that VP-HR was the source of the failure where he had no choice other than to 
resign. 
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5.3.2.6 The Ownership of the Project   
The case demonstrates that ElectCo owns the project. This can be inferred from 
several behavioural acts demonstrated by executive management. Table 5.6 
summarises different examples of the sponsorship by the CEO, COO, CFO and 
project manager. 
 
 Table 5.6 Ownership Practical Examples by Executives – ElectCo Case 
 No Description 
C
E
O
 
1 The CEO placed strong emphasis on ensuring the selected ERP product meets ElectCo 
requirements and he took always a challenging position to the team to proof it. More 
emphasis from his side was made on the contract preparation to ensure ElectCo side is fully 
protected. 
2 His active participation during the self-service feature of purchasing parallel run sent clear 
message to the entire team that CEO is behind ERP and will not allow its delay or failure. 
3 He demonstrated excellent leadership and decisive interference to recover HR module. 
4 Finally, he demonstrates excellent leadership in the transition period between the go-live 
and post implementation stage. 
C
O
O
 
1 He empowered the project manager for all ERP decisions. 
2 Based on the request of the project manager, the COO interfered to support and lead pieces 
of task in the project as needed 
3 His heavy involvement in the selection process enriched his understanding of how ERP 
implementation works and how it can be implemented successfully. 
C
F
O
 
1 Expedite and lead finance module implementation. The Go-Live of finance modules 
motivated other module owners to proceed to the Go-Live. 
2 Urges other module users to expedite the implementation and increase their awareness, 
readiness and educational level towards ERP. 
3 Advice, support and mentoring the PM in driving module managers to cope and complete 
ERP tasks. 
P
ro
je
ct
 M
an
ag
er
 1 The PM (who was appointed in the middle of the selection process) led the effort to finalise 
the selection process decisions. 
2 Whenever end users blamed the implementor for underperformance, his attitude can be seen 
to fix the problem, not the blame. 
3 To use the Implementor criticism to motivate ElectCo to build its local experience and 
competencies so the organisation can be completely independent from relying on the 
implementor for ERP support requirements. 
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5.3.2.7 Identification of ERP Stake-holders  
This section focuses on the identification of all external and internal stake-holders 
involved in the implementation.  
 
5.3.2.7.1 External Stakeholders Analysis  
There were a number of external stakeholders involved at different levels during the 
course of implementation. The implementer represents the major external 
stakeholders; his involvement is discussed in the following section. Other consulting 
stakeholders include: 
1. The external consultant. 
2. The law office. 
3. The external auditor. 
The involvement of the law office was very minimal. The legal service was requested 
in the beginning of the contract preparation to provide general agreement terms.  Most 
of the contractual reviews and activities were handled internally between IMIS, the 
purchasing manager and the internal contracting department. Since the CFO was 
heavily involved in the entire implementation, he insisted on engaging the external 
auditor to assure full compliance between ERP configuration and the leading financial 
and accounting practices. 
 
The External Consultant 
The notion of hiring an external consultant was initiated to assure ElectCo that the 
ERP could be fully complied to by the Aerospace and Defence requirements. The 
below observations can be made regarding the involvement of the external consultant: 
1. ElectCo aimed to find a consultant to assist in two areas, Aerospace and 
Defence, and in the project manufacturing. 
2. The hired consultant had experience in project manufacturing only, although 
the implementer contract specified clearly that external consultant must have 
Aerospace and Defence experience. 
3. The contractual relationship was between the implementer and the external 
consultant. He was expected to assess and review the work of the 
implementer; therefore, it would have been much better and more appropriate 
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if the payment and the contractual relationship was formed directly between 
ElectCo and the external consultant. 
4. His major impact can be seen in raising the assurance and satisfactory level of 
ElectCo top decision makers (primarily CFO, COO & CEO). His presence 
increased the pressure on some executives to expedite their ERP related 
activities.  
 
5.3.2.7.2 Internal Stakeholders Analysis  
A representation of the stakeholders is provided in the following tables and graphs. 
Table 5.10 indicates that the total number of stakeholders involved in the 
implementation was fifty four.  Figure 5.7 shows that the distribution percentage for 
those stakeholders between business departments, IS departments and executive staffs 
are 67%, 18% and 15% respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Stakeholders Distribution – ElectCo Case 
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Table 5.7 Stakeholders Distribution (business, IT and executive) 
  No Name # Occ.  Type 
1 President 1 
E
x
ecu
tiv
e 
2 COO 1 
3 IMIS Director 1 
4 Senior executives 5 
5 Internal Auditor 1 
B
u
sin
ess 
6 Contracting department 2 
7 Purchasing Manager 1 
8 Key users 7 
9 End users 25 
10 ERP Project manager 1 
IS
 
11 IMIS Focal points 5 
12 Data base administrator 1 
13 Networking & data canter team 3 
  Total 54  
 
Figure 5.11 provides a graphical representation of the number of stakeholders in 
different positions and departments. Table 5.9, on the other hand, represents the same 
from the implementer side. 
 
 
                     
 
 
Figure 5.11 Stakeholders in different positions and departments – Implementer side 
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Table 5.8  Implementor Stakeholders List - ElectCo Case 
 No Name # Occ. 
1 President 1 
2 EVP 1 
3 General manager 1 
4 Project manager 1 
5 Applications consultant 4 
  Total 8 
 
 
5.3.2.7.3 The Implementer Analysis  
The Implementer is the main and major consulting stakeholder in the project. The 
analysis of their involvement can be divided into the following points. Firstly, being a 
local firm, the implementer demonstrated strong understanding of the culture, which 
assisted in proper project and conflict management. 
 
The project manager from ElectCo states: 
”Flexibility represents the major advantage of the implementer; my major 
challenges as a project manager was with my internal team of ElectCo so I 
was in a bad need for a flexible consulting implementor who is flexible 
and can easily cope with any changes that might be required” 
 
Secondly, the implementer project manager can be considered as a prime success 
factor of the implementation success. He possessed a comprehensive mix of technical, 
functional and depth business background. The implementer GM had less technical 
expertise but they both shared a strong ERP and business background, which enabled 
them to attend promptly and resolve immediately all implementation issues. Thirdly, 
the competency level of the functional consultants varied between modules. The 
finance consultant can be seen as highly competent; the supply chain consultant can 
be seen as between average and above average but there were almost consensus 
agreement that the HR and manufacturing consultants were seen as weak. The 
implementer project manager seconded and supported the supply chain and 
manufacturing consultants, however, no backup support was provided to the HR 
consultant. The interference and support of the project manager to the consultants of 
all modules other than HR consultant led ElectCo members to view the implementer 
as a one-man show consulting organisation. 
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5.3.2.8 Can the Case be considered as a Successful or a Failure? 
It can be suggested that several case aspects can be considered as successful (partially 
or fully) while other aspects can be considered as a failure (partially or fully). The 
achievements acknowledged by ElectCo at the end of the implementation are 
displayed below: 
 
Table 5.9  ElectCo ERP benefits as per the post implementation plan Presentation 
No Benefit Description No Benefit Description 
1 Unify and standardize the technical 
environment for OS, data base and tools. 
6 Transform ElectCo from being a Month 
end processing to access data in real time. 
2 Substantial decrease of the fragmented 
systems (islands). 
7 Develop E-business infrastructure. 
3 Streamline, design and revise various 
processes. 
8 Automated non-automated processes like 
Order entry, recruiting, training, planning, 
warranty, …etc. 
4 Adequate experience developed that used to 
implement other e-business total solution 
initiatives like CRM, SCM, etc. 
9 Centralized critical ElectCo data for 
consistency, accuracy and security control 
like   Employee Master, G/L accounts, 
..etc. 
5 Develop local capabilities to maintain and 
leverage ERP features. 
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5.4 The Description and Analysis –AgriCo Case 
5.4.1 Case Study Description (AgriCo) 
AgriCo is the biggest national share-stock company in the agricultural and dairy food 
processing industry in one of the developing countries. It has played and is still 
playing an efficient role in supporting national agricultural development. It won the 
national first prize for the ideal food processing plant in the country and has an 
International ISO 9001. 
 
5.4.1.1 Initial Situational Climate 
AgriCo has two main local competitors in the agriculture and food processing 
industry. One of the competitors is managed by a western team and they have more 
advanced systems and business practices than AgriCo. The second company is also 
part of a very successful and famous group and they have gained several international 
awards of excellence in several initiatives that they adopted and achieved. Before ERP 
evolved within AgriCo, the company was under pressure because of the Y2K 
problem. Data was fragmented among islands of heterogenic systems such as 
COBOL, MS Access and Ingress data base. The total number of personal computers 
in the company was only twelve. It was suggested to move directly to Oracle as a 
database.  
 
AgriCo board decided before 2000 to appoint a new general manager to take the lead 
towards transforming the company to be profitable, successful and to become a leader 
in its industry. A few weeks after his joining, the new CEO started to hire a complete 
management team including the hiring of new IS director who assigned to take the 
lead in implementing the ERP system. ERP was among several initiatives in all 
business areas, including a tremendous effort and enormous budget for promoting 
AgriCo as remarkable brand.  
 
The IS director took the lead in the ERP selection process, with ERP product 
competition not taking a lot of time to evaluate between vendors but more effort was 
taken for selecting proper implementor before a non-famous consulting firm from 
India was hired to manage the project offshore. The scope was to implement what was 
named as “as-is approach” which means that ERP applications will be installed „as is‟ 
and data will be migrated without any changes. In the early days of announcing the 
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ERP projects, consultants claimed that the integration feature of the new system 
would automate all business processes. They further claim that all processes and 
services will be managed by the system so there will be no paper processing. Some 
end users describe their perception by stating that „upon the project completion by 
only pressing a button by an accountant, the salary will get transferred to the 
employee pocket‟. 
 
5.4.1.2 The Implementation Process 
The implementation consultants started to capture the user‟s requirements through 
interviews with the presence of translators most of the time as there is no common 
spoken language understood by end users and consultants. The CEO was active in 
developing several strategic initiatives in parallel with ERP in various areas in sales, 
marketing and public relations. A few months  from the project starting date, the 
consulting implementation team requested end users to start testing the system; all the 
feedback was negative and none of the modules could be used in production.  Apart 
from the ERP project, the board expressed their frustration, since most of the various 
initiatives led by the CEO could not generate tangible benefits to recover the huge 
costs connected to these initiatives. This was followed by the decision to dismiss the 
CEO. A senior engineer was promoted to become the new CEO. Most of the line 
managers who had been hired by the previous CEO started to leave gradually, 
including the IT director. 
 
The new CEO took the lead in assessing the underlying reasons of ERP failure and he 
hired a new IS director to look after ERP implementation. The newly appointed IS 
director  suggested to the CEO to coordinate with the ERP vendor to  conduct a health 
check by ERP vendor to assess the ERP project status and to determine what was 
required to turn its failure to success. The health check team started their investigation 
assignment by examining key elements of the implementation such as the 
methodology used, review of the project management attributes and data migration.  
 
5.4.1.3 The Health Check 
The Recover Consulting Team (RCT) consists of seven consultants from ERP vendor 
from different modules for the health check. The consultants conducted interviews 
with the AgriCo management team, key-users and the information systems team of 
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each module. Several visits were arranged at sites and sales centres. The health-check 
process had been conducted over the three phases demonstrated in table (Table 5.10). 
 
Table 5.10 The phases of the First Health check 
No Phase One No Phase Two No Phase Three 
1 General Ledge 1 Planning & MP 1 Sales Analysis 
2 Accounts receivables 2 Production 2 ERP express 
3 Accounts Payables 3 Inventory  
4 Fixed Assets 4 Assembly 
5 Cash Management 5 Quality Control 
6 Purchasing 6 Manufacturing and financial 
integration 
7 Payroll and 
personnel 
7 Cost analysis 
8 Self service 8 Order management 
9 Financial Analysis 9 Asset maintenance 
 
A complete review was conducted for the implemented modules status including the 
contract, inputs and outputs of the modules and the modules hand-over procedures. 
The health-check process considered eleven attributes to be examined during their 
investigation, with each examined item result falling into one of three results 
(adequate, inadequate or needing improvement). RCT started to review all documents 
available that included the contract with the implementer, the minutes of meetings and 
all circulated documents. Specific questions were asked relating to how the 
implementer started the implementation, how the requirements definition had been 
captured, testing procedures and go-live preparations. Other questions related to the 
project being managed in terms of defining its milestones and deliverables. Detailed 
investigation was also undertaken to assess whether and how data had been migrated. 
Functional managers and end users were asked if and how the ERP training should be 
delivered.  Finally, the servers and network specifications setup and installation had 
been reviewed including the verification of the basis of how specifications and 
configurations been requested and configured. 
 
The details of the health check findings contained four parts. The first part addressed 
the remarks and recommendations of the methodology including the remarks that 
must be followed by the implementer. The second part focused on the existing 
modules implementation status at each implementation phase, including the 
requirements that had not been fulfilled. The third part was concerned with general 
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remarks and recommendations including the change management and expected 
outputs that the implementation partner should produce. The fourth part addresses the 
overall project issues, including risk assessment that the project might face. The 
findings of the eleven attributes are explained in Table 5.11. 
 
 Table 5.11 The first health check elements 
No Element Result 
1 Project Management. In-Adequate  
2 Project Infrastructure. Need Improvement 
3 Requirement definition Need Improvement 
4 Applying requirements on the system In-Adequate  
5 System configuration Need Improvement 
6 Customisation In-Adequate  
7 Data transfer Need Improvement 
8 System documentation Need Improvement 
9 System inspection In-Adequate  
10 Training Need Improvement 
11 System use  in the real scenario In-Adequate  
 
This was followed by several meetings with the CEO and key executive members, to 
understand future directions for the company and set-up a priority list of the most 
important business areas where implementation is badly and urgently needed. Before 
the final report which consisted of their finding and investigations, a detailed question 
list was circulated to explore specifically how different business units would react if 
the system went down, the implementation was delayed or the data was lost during the 
migration process. During a one-to-one discussion with key business managers those 
what-if findings where included in the report. 
 
The health check analysis process concluded with a specific remarks and set of 
recommendations demonstrated in table 5.12. 
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Table 5.12 Generic Remarks & Recommendations first health check report 
No Description 
1 Apply the monthly closing procedures including all financial statements. 
2 Obtain income statements of all divisions, profit centers and projects. 
3 Obtain product and unit cost. 
4 To make the system bilingual. 
5 Capitalise the cost of cows and plants to be dealt with as assets. 
6 Implementing financial module alone without implementing other supporting modules will 
not meet all requirements of AgriCo as most transactions that affect financial modules is 
entered manually to the system through financial constrains or sales invoices.  
7 The implementation process should take into consideration the connectivity and the 
integration between systems during capturing user requirements even if the implementation 
process conducted over phases to ensure all requirements covered and to avoid major changes 
for the early implemented parts of the system. 
8 The sign-off step should be done after the successful completion of all implementation phases 
as specified by the approved methodology and after the review and approval of all inputs of 
implementation phases by AgriCo executive managers. Moreover, the final handover sign-off 
is obtained after the completion of all modules specified in the contract and the completion of 
the technical support and maintenance period. 
9 Resolve the internal sales. 
 
The health-check analysis process was followed by a development of a new plan 
including risk assessment.  
The consultants advised AgriCo to consider two phases of new plan as per Table 5.13 
below. 
Table 5.13 The two phases of the new plan advised by the first health check  
Project management 
No Phase One No Phase Two 
1 Complete the modules of Finance, HR, 
purchasing, material management, 
financial analysis. 
1 Implement manufacturing, order management, 
asset management and MRP. 
2 Study the requirements of the new phase. 2 Apply necessary changes of phase one. 
 
The RCT team strongly recommended assigning dedicated project teams as per the 
suggested organisation structure (Figure 5.12), to be responsible for the project 
planning, day-to-day follow-up and problem solving activities. The RCT also strongly 
recommended the following sequence of execution: 
 
1. Move inventory system to the first phase to be connected with the G/L. 
2. Suspend the implementation of phase two until the completion of phase one 
modules. 
3. To complete the first phase in the following three months. 
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4. After one month of the real use of the system, AgriCo is to implement the 
manufacturing module in three factories, namely asset management, the order 
management and MRP. 
 
Figure 5.12 Suggested Organisation structure of Phase II 
 
A few days later, the CEO approved the organisation structure that included full 
dedication of the team to the project. In addition, the plan that was suggested by the 
RCT was officially approved. 
The implementation led by the IT director was supported by two key members in the 
IT department. The first member was a very senior application specialist who served 
the company for several years. The second member was a high calibre application 
manager who had just completed a successful ERP implementation before joining 
AgriCo. The CEO used to attend the weekly meetings of ERP reviews in addition to 
one-to-one short meetings with the IT director on a need basis. The IT director 
delegated most of the implementation tasks to his two assistants. He spent most of his 
time and effort with business managers to discuss ERP issues.  The implementation 
was completed as planned within three months; ERP assistants received three months 
bonus for the outstanding ERP results. 
 
5.4.1.4 The Future of AgriCo Project 
  A few years later, AgriCo has made significant organisational changes that include a 
new hiring of several executive positions, most of them hunted from competitors. The 
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new executives criticised information systems in AgriCo: more specifically they 
accused the existing ERP product of not meeting business needs compared to the ERP 
product that was used by competitors. 
 
A few executive members discouraged the notion of implementing another ERP 
product. Alternatively, it was suggested to invite an existing ERP vendor to conduct a 
comprehensive health check, which would ensure that the existing ERP could fill 
existing requirements gaps and resolve all issues. The outcome of the health check 
confirmed that there was no need to change to different ERP vendor. Alternatively, it 
was suggested by the health check team to combine all deficits and issues to be 
tackled under new project. In addition, it was suggested that this team was not led by 
IT and the PM should be appointed from the business side. “AgriCo future” was the 
chosen name of the project to reflect its strategic importance. The project was led by 
the general manufacturing manager who held a degree in industrial engineering, 
majoring in operations research. He had five years of experience in a competitor 
company to AgriCo. Table 5.14 summarises the project objectives, while Figure 5.13 
explains the project structure.  
Table 5.14 „AgriCo future‟ objectives 
No Objective  
1 Monitor company performance. 
2 Reduce the cycle times. 
3 Capture more revenue opportunities. 
4 Improve inventory visibility and accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 5.13: AgriCo future organisation 
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The PM assumed his responsibility along with his normal day-to-day activities. He led 
the coordination efforts among the various stakeholders including IT department, ERP 
consultants, functional managers and the CEO. Project tasks were divided in to three 
phases, based on their priority and urgency as per the Table 5.15 below.  
Table 5.15 Priority list of the AgriCo future project 
No Phase Activity 
1 I Identify and finalize all the company KPIs that will be measured and monitored in 
the ERP 
2 I Address and solve all the issues raised in the assessment report (100 issues) 
3 I Arrange for ERP training to refresh the end-users knowledge and maximize the 
system usage effectiveness for the current implemented functions 
4 I Identify and finalize all the company KPIs that will be measured and monitored in 
the ERP 
5 I Address and solve all the issues raised in vendor assessment report (100 issues) 
6 I Arrange for ERP training to refresh the end-users knowledge and maximize the 
system usage effectiveness for the current implemented functions 
7 II Implement Process Manufacturing and Mobile Supply Chain Applications 
8 II Implement Business Intelligence 
9 III Implement Advanced Procurement Modules (i-supplier, i-procurement, Sourcing 
and Services Procurement) 
10 III Implement Projects and Project contracts 
11 III Implement i-Recruitment 
 
All deficits, issues and problems were combined in a complete list. The PM, with the 
assistance of IT and ERP consultants, started acting on items in the list where the PM 
had to obtain the approval from the functional managers and resolve their issues if 
they still had any. The PM faced continuous difficulties in convincing functional 
managers to accept implemented ERP parts. Functional managers always claimed that 
they need proof that developed changes reflect best practices. It was a norm that 
functional managers always requested new ERP changes before accepting previous 
ones. Sometimes the PM accepted these unplanned changes for the sake of obtaining 
acceptance from users for completed tasks. 
The implementation record does not show formal acceptance for all implemented 
parts, although it was in production for long time. Several challenges evolved during 
the implementation process; the first challenge was the costing method that the 
company should agree to use for the system configuration. It took the team more than 
four months before they took the decision.  
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Sales Invoices - Asset Management  
One of the key challenges noted was that software needed to be developed to capture 
sales data before it could be entered into financial modules. It was found that sales 
outlets were not interlinked with any computer system and there is no mechanism to 
aggregate sales transactions from sales points. As a result, a new software application 
had to be developed to capture all sales transactions from sales outlets to ERP in a 
timely manner to eliminate the off-the-record manual entry.  
 
Asset management can be seen as another challenge due to the surprising discovery 
that enormous assets were not recorded in the system. It was found that the practice 
only to record basic asset data without a breakdown. 
 
Status Review  
Executive reviews detailed the implementation status of each module and provided 
updates of the deadlines and the issues faced by the team. Table 5.16 demonstrates an 
example of the status review. 
The main comment made by the CEO during the project review meeting is the 
availability of system reports that allow him to visualise the company overall 
performance. The project reviews were attended by the CEO and all executive staff.  
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Table 5.16 Sample Status Review Report 
Applications Current Status Remake 
AR Completed by November 2009 It required a lot of customization to reach 
to end user satisfaction 
HR Completed by December 2010 The reason for extending the deadline is 
the late approval of HR policy  
Inventory Completed by August 2010 It was ready since February 2010, but 
business owner doesn't start  
OPM Setup completed, 
 Dairy Processing Go Live 1
st
 
December 2010 
- Unexpected long setup time 
- Some delay from the Implementer  
- Date Factory setup is completed, just 
need new go live date 1
st
 Jan 2011  
Budget Completed - General enhancement requested from 
Budget team 
- The setup completed according to 
finance view. 
Agriculture 
Project 
Pending/Postponed No available application can fit with our 
requirement without a lot of customization, 
The best available application is very 
expensive and requires a new license  
OM Completed, Started from 1
st
 of 
August till mid of August, then 
postponed till 09
th
 October 2010 
- Unexpectedly long setup time 
- Long-time taken from sales to test Auto 
order through Rout pro (then cancelled). 
- Need to setup another solution. 
- Then, final setup is completed  
EAM - Supply Chain EAM: 
completed. 
- Dairy Plant EAM postponed 
till Q1 2012 
- IT team advise us to start the implement 
EAM for the dairy plat after upgrade to 
next release. 
- Expect to complete by Q1 2012 
DBI HR – Completed. 
Finance – Completed  
Supply Chain : 
– Purchasing – completed. 
- Inventory – completed 
- Order Management (Standard) 
– Completed 
- Order Management (Standard) 
– On going  
- There was an error in the application 
(delayed the project 4 months) 
- Also, there is a delay from the 
implementer 
 
There was no formal closing for the “AgriCo future” project, however the IT 
department announced that the 2012 plans consisted of ERP improvements including 
complementing parts of the “AgriCo future” project activities. The status of the 
implementation is demonstrated in table 5.18. The overall technical and application 
set-ups were completed for all tasks but the use of the system varies due to different 
reasons that may be summarised in table 5.17. 
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Table 5.17: The final Status Review this research Investigated 
Applications Request Current Status Remake (Reason/ completion Time 
frame) 
AR Aging Report Completed  
AR Manuel Daily Receipt (standard) Completed  
AR Auto Daily Receipt (customize) Completed  
Budget Control on Purchase Requisition  Completed - The setup completed according to 
finance view. 
- Hold by purchasing and requested 
new setup which can‟t achieve by the 
application. 
- Need final agreement between 
both departments. 
Fixed Asset Improving the existing 
Application in Dairy Processing  
- General 
analysis 
done. 
- Data Sheet 
completed 
- Ready for 
implementati
on with R12 
Q1 – 2012 
Purchasing Improving the existing 
Application) 
Many issues 
solved and 
improved 
 
Agriculture PR New approval hierarchy  Completed  
DBI – GL Cash Flow Statement  Completed  
Agri – OM Implement OM for Daily Agri 
sales activities 
Completed Go Live from 7
th
 May 2011 
ROUTPRO/ERP   Completed  
General There was too many reports 
requested from different users get 
developed in the system  
Completed  
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5.4.2 Analysis - AgriCo Case 
5.4.2.1 ERP Drivers 
It is obvious that the new general manager was full of enthusiasm to make 
remarkable changes in all areas including the information systems by adopting ERP 
solutions. The other two main competitors of AgriCo started ERP implementation 
before AgriCo, which can be seen as an extra motive for AgriCo to adopt ERP to 
cope with competition. The other two main competitors both are less affected by 
government practices which enables them to minimise bureaucracy in advancing 
business practices, which left AgriCo behind in terms of new technologies and 
business practices. The general manager who came from the private sector was 
under pressure to make total and massive change in a very short time, including 
ERP implementation. 
 
Figure 5.14 ERP drivers - DiversCo case  
 
5.4.2.2 Gap Analysis between Implementation Phases  
The first implementation started in the year 2003 and the case was  reviewed until the 
end of year 2012. These nine years of implementation efforts can be divided into 
different phases (Table 5.19), based on the analysis of the case history into four 
phases: 
1. The first “as is” implementation: this phase covers the period from 2003 until 
2004 where the first failure exposed. 
2. The second “as is” implementation: this phase covers from 2004 until 2005 
where AgriCo has successfully implemented the “as is”. 
3. The third phase “the future of AgriCo” that includes more modules and an 
expansion of the “as is”. 
4. Y2012 plans that covers extension of the previous phase. 
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It may be observed that there was a three years gap between the successful “as is” and 
the process based implementation phase. The senior applications consultant refused to 
consider this period as unnecessary delay as he considered it to be a continuous 
improvement of the “as is” phase. The senior applications consultant stated: 
“I refuse to consider the so-called gap between the second and the 
third implementation phase to be considered as unnecessary delay; in 
fact it‟s part of the continuous improvements process within each 
module without enabling the integration” 
 
Year 1
st
 Period 2nd Period GAP1 3rd Period GAP2 
12            
11            
10            
09            
08            
07            
06            
05            
04            
03            
02            
                            
  
Figure 5.15 - Agrico Implementation Gaps 
 
5.4.2.3 Analysis of the First Failure 
The implementation was a complete failure in its first implementation cycle. This is 
obvious from the fact that not a single module was successfully implemented. A 
fundamental mistake that can be identified is that the first implementer did not engage 
AgriCo in the process of building and configuring the system, which, in effect, 
created an adverse implementation effect. The RCT described that deficit: 
Table 5.18: Agrico Implementation Phases 
Year Implementation phase 
2002-2003 The failure As IS  
2004-2005 The successful As IS  
2006-2008 Continuous improvements 
2009-2011 Process based implementation 
2012-…. Continuous improvements 
Gap of two 
years Year 
2011- 2012 
Gap of three 
years 2006, 
2007 & 
2008 
 
T
IM
E
 
ERP PROGRESS 
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"IS team members of AgriCo had been disengaged from the process of 
building and configuring the systems that adversely affected the 
knowledge transfer process which in negatively affect the support and 
maintenance of the system after the implementor leave AgriCo  site” 
 
The disengagement adverse effect increased through the absence of good 
documentation. There was no reference to the necessary documents and various 
activities were not documented. The RCT describes the documentation deficit:  
” There is no unified reference for all necessary documentation for ERP 
project as it is difficult to get an access to it in a timely manner. Required 
documentation, as per the contract, was not completed as per the contract 
with the implementor” 
 
Poor training management represents the third major failure factor. Training was 
not only poorly managed, but it was also limited to specific areas, was 
inadequate and ignored major important implementation aspects. The RCT 
described those shortages in the training process: 
”No training plan in place and the training material that had been handed 
over to end users is limited to demonstrate how to navigate and access the 
system. All end users explains that training was in-adequate, un-planned 
and very limited to specific parts” 
 
From a project management perspective, the absence of real project sponsorship, 
especially after the previous project manager left, represented a major finding in the 
project failure.  There was, in addition, inadequate documentation of the agreed 
actions and solutions between AgriCo and the implementer. 
 
From a requirements definition perspective, the implementer had prepared four 
documents recommended by the approved ERP vendor methodology for that purpose, 
including existing business scenario definition document, the application of 
implementation of the requirements, the documentation of the future business 
procedures and the configuration and building of the system. The implementer, 
however, had ignored necessary documentation of the acceptance of AgriCo end 
users.  
 
The health check process found that no proper testing was conducted. The AgriCo end 
user should have tested the system configured by the implementer to ensure that the 
solutions suggested by the implementer were appropriate and to ensure that all 
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activities and special AgriCo requirements had been considered during all phases of 
the implementation. Previously highlighted issues drove the go-live to inevitable 
failure. 
The RCT describes such expected results despite the failure to reach the go-live stage; 
ERP integration strength was lost through such inappropriate plans. The RCT report 
states:” 
1. No clear plans for AgriCo when to move to the production version. 
2. By the narrow focus of implementing modules in isolation, AgriCo 
lost the integration strength of ERP system. 
3. We cannot consider that AgriCo has reached the go-live stage as 
while using the system in real data changes are still going on.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.2.4 The First Health Check Analysis 
5.4.2.4.1 Proper Methodology & Scope 
The use and the process of the health-check by the ERP vendor can be seen as a prime 
factor in the success of the second implementation cycle. The logical sequence of 
steps followed through the process proof were found to be comprehensive and should 
have led to success. This began with studying and analysing the existing position, 
followed by a review and evaluation of the infrastructure and implementation 
procedure before concluding with a risk assessment and recommendation. The 
methodology of the health-check is demonstrated in Figure 5.17. 
 
 Figure 5.17: Methodology of the 1
st
 health-check 
Disengagement of end users            No Documentation  Poor Training  
No sponsorship                               No Acceptance        No Testing  
TOTAL FAILURE 
Figure 5.16 Failure Analysis of the first Implementation Cycle 
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The methodology had been complemented by comprehensive and clear scope that 
details task list that can be easily understood and measured. The task list of the health 
check scope is aggregated into Table 5.20 below. 
 
Both the comprehensive use and execution of methodology and proper management 
and execution of the task list led the PM to make the very wise recommendation to 
split the implementation into two phases as detailed in Table 5.19 below. This split 
allowed AgriCo to focus and prioritise specific tasks that could generate quick wins 
by demonstrating a quick ROI from ERP investment. 
 
Table 5.19 The scope of the Health Check 
No The scope of the health check 
1 The application of the suggested implementation methodology by the ERP vendor. 
2 Review of the project management attributes. 
3 A comprehensive review of the entire documentation. 
4 A review of the customisation made on the system. 
5 The data migration process. 
6 A review of the process of the system acceptance by end users. 
7 A review and evaluation and in particular the acceptance of the new system from end users. 
8 Review and evaluation of the end user training. 
9 Review and evaluate the status of product implementation. 
10 Review and evaluate the project infrastructure. 
11 Review and evaluate the Go-Live plan. 
 
5.4.2.4.2 The Clarity and Focus in the Roles and Responsibilities  
The role of the health check process in turning the implementation from a failure to a 
success is obvious. While examining its nature, the health check can be seen at its 
core as a comprehensive roles and responsibilities management process. The CEO 
found the health-check outcome as a tool that is easy to understand that is presented 
to him in a form of detailed definitions and identifications of the roles and 
responsibilities between various ERP stakeholders. The roles and responsibilities 
within the first health check process covered (Table 5-20) all necessary areas that 
affect the implementation. This included the investigation of the documentation, 
system testing, the actual use of the system in production, the systems building and 
configuration, data migration and customisation.  
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Table 5-20 First  health-check Roles & Responsibilities Summary 
Documentation 
Implementor AgriCo 
1. Complete necessary documentation as stated in 
the contract. 
2. To coordinate with AgriCo for procedures and 
authorities to review and approve documents 
and outputs from authorised bodies. 
AgriCo is requested to explore all documentation 
material and save it with the program management 
office either in a printed or electronic form with a 
proper filing. Furthermore, access to these files needs 
to respect the table of authorities 
System testing 
1. Develop testing procedures and scripts in detail, regarding 
what is agreed with AgriCo in the To-Be-Processes. 
2. Discuss testing results with AgriCo and amend inappropriate 
parts and re-conduct the testing by AgriCo end users that 
ensures issues exposed during the test are being considered. 
3. Change documentation as necessary especially the document 
of the future procedures, build and configure the system as per 
the agreed testing results. 
1. Emphasis that Key users to test the 
system as per each business cycle 
while taking into consideration to 
ensure the integration testing. 
2. Ensure that Implementor amended 
system documents and all test issues 
and problems being addressed and 
resolved. 
The actual use of the system in production 
1. Complete unimplemented modules. 
2. Apply, for each module, all remarks stated in the 
detailed health check report. 
3. Apply all other generic remarks stated in the detailed 
report. 
1. Identify business requirements of all 
systems and financial reports for middle and 
top management. 
2. Work closely with Implementor to find 
solutions for unresolved remarks. 
The systems building and configuration 
1. To ensure full engagement of AgriCo IS members and key 
users of the modules that not implemented yet and to ensure 
proper training of this process for the modules that had been 
built and configured already and to ensure that they are able 
to maintain it before IMPLEMENTER completed their 
assignment. 
2. To validate, review and make necessary changes of the 
business requirements document during the system building 
and configuration process till they become consistence and 
fully compliance with each other. 
1. Ensure that IS members are fully 
engaged with IMPLEMENTER 
consultants in the system building and 
configuration process. 
2. Ensure that Implementor made 
necessary update of the business 
requirements process to be fully 
compliance with the real system 
development and configuration 
The customisation 
1. It is imperative to clarify the meaning of customisation and 
exclude other activities that should not be understood as 
customisation such as data transfer considering generating 
financial statements as customisation. 
2. The customisation approval should come from department 
and program managers and approved by the AgriCo ERP 
project manager who should be the focal point to follow-up 
those approved customisation requests all the till its 
completion. 
3. Those customisations need to be completed by 
Implementor before AgriCo start using the system in real 
data. 
4. The contract states clearly data migration is IS 
responsibility so they should not consider it as 
customisation. 
1. Agree on principal and types of 
customisations. 
2. Agree on preparing reports to be 
developed. 
3. Agree on the customisation cost. 
4. To test and double check the 
customisation and not rely only on the 
test done by the Implementer. 
5. Knowledge transfer to AgriCo to ensure 
a continuity of developing future 
customisation when required 
Data Migration 
1. Data and information that need to be migrated and transferred to 
the new system, testing and verifying that data is transferred 
correctly. 
2.  To link the migration date of the data along with the cut-off date. 
3. Tools and types of data transmission and migration and equip IS 
department with tools used by Implementor of data migration. 
1. Review the plan of data 
transmission and migration. 
2. Review and verify data that 
migrated to the new system 
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5.4.2.5 “AgriCo future” Analysis  
The second implementation cycle, in terms of a pure project management perspective, 
can be seen as more successful than the „AgriCo future‟ project.  This can be seen 
from the compliance with the project time line and the completion of the tasks 
assigned in each project. That perspective alone, however, is not a fair comparative 
factor between the two projects. The “AgriCo future” project scope is connected with 
business performance and efficiency while the second implementation cycle is limited 
to the “As IS” implementation approach.  
 
The analysis of the third implementation process can lead to an extraction of the 
factors that led to its success. One of the positive findings of the third implementation 
cycle comes from the proper selection of objectives to be achieved that are linked 
with comprehensive KPIs. This has enabled the PM to divert the effort and resources 
against specific performance targets to be achieved. Not only were the objectives well 
defined, but each objective was linked with as precise KPI setting as possible, Table 
5.21 demonstrates objectives and KPIs of the third implementation cycles). 
 Table 5.21 : “Future of AgriCo” project Detailed Objectives 
No Objective Description KPI 
1 Shorten the financial 
closing times. 
Shorten the month-end and year-end 
closing times, while increasing the 
accuracy.  This will give the 
management faster and more accurate 
information about the company 
performance to speed-up the decision 
making process and corrective actions. 
1. Shorten the month-end 
closing time to be (month-
end+2 days)  (compared to 
month end+6 days now) – 
more than 50% enhancement 
2. Shorten the year-end closing 
time to be year-end+3 days  
2 Reduce the cycle 
times. 
To reduce the major business cycle 
times. More specifically to reduce the 
overall procure-to-pay cycle by 20% 
compared to the existing one including 
the following KPIs. 
1. Reduce the Purchase 
Requisition to Purchase 
Order Cycle  
2. Reduce the late Payments 
number and % compared to 
the number of payments  
3. Produce Supplier evaluation 
reports based on 
commitment to delivery and 
quality of supplied goods.   
3 Capture more 
revenue 
opportunities. 
1. Increase the order fulfillment rates 
(number of placed orders against 
fulfilled ones) and product availability 
2. Study the factors that are affecting the 
processing time including the system 
processing time, distribution systems 
and procedures. 
 
4 Improve inventory 
visibility and 
accuracy. 
This will help in achieving a better 
planning and delivery for the right stock 
at the right time including 
1. Under Process inventory 
2. Finished product at Factory, 
Sales Centers, Sales Persons 
and Customers. 
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Another success factor is that the health check consultants supplemented AgriCo with 
very specific critical success factors to be considered to derive most of the success 
listed in table 5.22. 
  Table 5.22 “AgriCo future” success factors 
No Success Factor No Success Factor 
1 Clear Strategy and Vision  5 Readiness of AgriCo current business 
process 
2 Executive and management strong 
sponsorship 
6 Effective partner project management 
capability with clear implementation and 
project management methodology 
3 Allocation and dedication of project team 
with proper qualifications 
7 End User, Middle Management Buy-in 
4 Business management commitment and 
ownership 
 
 
Clarity on setting implementation goals allowed the CEO to dedicate necessary 
support and resources to the project to achieve the desired success. This included the 
strong sponsorship, allocations and dedication of project team.  
 
Other factors that the organisation could not handle were pure people related issues. 
More precisely, the combination of the knowledge gap and the absence of proper 
documentation of existing processes and business practices developed together a 
resistance to change from key business areas which in effect had lengthen the 
implementation schedule, reduced the targeted performance targets and eventually 
reduce the bottom ROI from ERP. These findings can be further demonstrated 
through a review of the underlying reasons of the major sources of the project delay, 
as per the project review, is summarised in table 5.23. 
 
Table 5.23 Main Reasons for The “Future of AgriCo” delays 
No Sources Of The Delay 
1 A/R integration with the stand alone sales software package. 
2 The costing method decision took the business owner more than four 
months although it could have been made in no more than a weak time. 
3 Order management dispatch. 
4 Enterprise Management (EM) delayed because of the absence of 
recording assets in the system “a project of multi-million recorded as 
one item in the system without any break-down of any assets. 
 
Because of the absence of proper documentation of the business process and business 
practice, the PM faced serious issues regarding how to integrate the standalone sales 
system with the ERP back-office. The problem was not limited to how to integrate 
that standalone system with ERP only, but also the legacy practice did not provide 
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integration of sales data as each sale outlet was as if it is a separate unit within the 
system. A further complication resulted from the legacy practice that allows changing 
accounts receivable (A/R) balances after posting to general ledger (GL), which is 
considered as bad practice from an audit and process management perspective. ERP 
team discovered that in order to rectify this surprise finding, they needed to develop a 
software application to integrate relatively thirty-five sub systems into the new 
application to be posted, after aggregation and integration, to finance modules. 
 
If the sales as process was defined clearly at the starting point of the project not only 
would this defect have been discovered, but proper alternative and cost effective 
solutions would have been suggested and implemented while maintaining ROI from 
ERP through proper control on the implementation schedule. In order to resolve the 
costing method issue, the PM had to extend his role to develop the existing process 
and business practices as they were managed in the present time but the business 
owners still refused to acknowledge that this is reflects the current practice. However, 
business owners neither agreed to accept nor amend necessary changes. 
 
The analysis shows that business owners lack key pre-requisite understanding of ERP 
and process improvements fundamental which seemed advocate their resistance of 
change attitude. Such resistance demotivates them to document existing processes and 
business practices. It was also found to be difficult to convince executive managers to 
go through basic orientation and training program for ERP and process management 
to handle the change facilitated by ERP implementation. The manufacturing general 
manager describes the resistance to change by some business owners that they need 
more training and need, also, to increase their level of awareness in order to know 
what the systems can provide and solutions that can be offered. The manufacturing 
general manager describes this resistance: 
“It was difficult that some business owners need to attend classes and 
increase their awareness level but it was more difficult to explain that fact 
to them without an adverse effect to their Ego” 
 
Despite the challenges the GM had faced, the CEO seemed neither satisfied nor to 
appreciate the progress made as compared to the hidden resistance of change inside 
the organisation, as his expectations were very ambitious in terms of managing the 
whole company from his key board through complete, comprehensive, accurate and 
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up-to-date information. The manufacturing general manager described the CEO 
expectation: 
“The CEO still waits for the time where he can view the company 
performance from a keyboard fingertip without any delay” 
 
In conclusion, improper awareness of the importance of the business process 
management and a lack of understanding of how business process was to be 
documented before ERP was present. Requests to be better advised about processes 
and business practices led to confusion in developing clear roles and responsibilities 
among ERP stakeholders in this aspect. Perusing the implementation, while this roles 
and responsibilities gap in the business process management led to an atmosphere of 
resistance to change, extraordinary implementation delay and very slow decision 
making and conflict between stakeholders. These subsequent issues decrease ROI 
from ERP by increasing the implementation cost and reducing ERP returns. 
 
5.4.2.6 Can the Case be Considered Successful or Failure? 
There is no straightforward answer to this question. A number of observations can be 
recalled which can collectively extract whether the implementation is to be successful 
or a failure. Firstly, the first implementation cycle is an utter failure. This is because 
there was no single module that successfully reached the go-live stage. End users 
were completely disengaged and the whole implementation process was badly 
designed and poorly managed. Secondly, the second implementation phase was very 
successful. This is can be demonstrated by the fact that modules were implemented 
successfully according to budget and according to the project plan. The 
implementation was properly designed and effectively managed. All mistakes that 
were apparent in the first implementation cycle were avoided. However, the scope of 
the implementation was limited to the „as is‟ approach were ERP implementation 
effect to the business efficiency was very limited. The third implementation cycle was 
adopted to address business efficiency, however there were two problems associated 
with that. The first problem was that there is an unnecessary gap between the second 
and the third implementation phase which had weaken the return on ERP investment 
as the most benefits were realised at very later stage. The second problem is that the 
third implementation cycle can be seen as an open ended project and could not 
achieve all targeted benefits. In brief, it can be said for the sake of simplicity that the 
implementation achieved only moderate success. 
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5.5 The Description and Analysis – Case ServCo  
5.5.1 Case Description – ServCo 
5.5.1.1 Privatisation Background 
The water services in the country are served in a typical government manner operated 
by the Ministry of Water. Serving water in this manner continued until a government 
decree was announced for developing the mechanisms, frameworks, and necessary 
arrangements in the private sector for investing in the Water Sector in terms of 
financing, implementation, operation and maintenance. The Ministry of Water had 
started the development plans for establishing a national company after another 
government decree, providing for the approval on the license to establish the National 
Water Company. The company issued capital amounts to $ multi-billion figure. The 
decree stated further approval for establishing the new company board. 
 
5.5.1.2 ERP Evolution  
The Ministry of Water took the lead in facilitating the necessary for the newly 
company that was to be established. The aim was to complete all necessary 
preoperational foundations for the national water company before it was officially 
established, so that once the official decree was released and the legal entity existed, 
the organisation could be in a more mature position, both financially and 
administratively. This included the information systems services.  
 
The Ministry of Water also governed the sewage service which has its own 
independence through a form of general organisation. The sewage organisation had 
just implemented an ERP solution and the newly appointed CEO for the new water 
company was also heavily involved in implementing ERP in the sewage organisation. 
After a few discussions, it was decided to adopt the same ERP as the Sewage 
organisation, using the same implementer. The tendering and awarding process 
followed the existing purchasing and tendering regulations followed by the Ministry. 
 
5.5.1.3 The Engagement of the First Implementation Partner  
The deputy minister, who assumed the CEO role of ServCo at later stage, hired a 
consultant from the University to assist in all the IS requirements of the new 
company. Before his role as a deputy minister, he was the ERP sponsor of ERP 
 Description & Analysis of the Case Studies                                                           5-68   
 
Chapter Five                                                                                             Page 68 of 79 
 
implementation at the water desalination organisation which represented as a prime 
entity of the ministry of water. The purchasing department in the Ministry produced a 
public tender for ERP service where a number of IT companies applied. The technical 
committee has awarded one implementer „I-a‟, who had just completed ERP 
implementation in the water desalination organisation. The contract had also been 
developed by the ministry contracting department which stated that „I-a‟ should 
complete the implementation in eight months in the centralised region only. The 
implementation started after one month from the signing date. Within three months 
and a half „I-a‟ received a formal extension of ten per cent from the project value to 
extend the implementation to cover another region that had recently fallen under the 
ServCo responsibility. During the requirements definition, „I-a‟ demonstrated its 
frustration for the incomplete and the slow response from end users who always 
defend their position that they have provided all known details to the consultants; for 
the unanswered parts they could not answer because they have no clear directions 
from their line managers. After six months from the date of when the implementation 
started, „I-a‟ received an official request from the Ministry to suspend the 
implementation. 
 
Seven months after that suspension date, „I-a‟ received a formal request from the 
Ministry to resume the implementation. The date of the letter is one day after the 
announced decree, stating that the water company was officially formed. This was 
followed by a detailed decree that stated that all government assets, infrastructure and 
properties of the water services are transferred to the newly established water 
company. Three months later, a formal extension to „I-a‟ received for eight months 
work to complete the implementation in the two regions.  A month later, ServCo 
announced that it had signed an Operations and Maintenance agreement (O&M) with 
a technical partner to manage the operations of the second region. Gradually, „I-a‟ 
raised its frustration that they struggled to configure some modules and they were 
unable to complete the requirements definition of other modules due to the incomplete 
and slow response from end users. After a number of escalations to higher ERP 
management authorities, „I-a‟ received another official suspension letter. Two months 
and a half later, „I-a‟ received another official letter to resume the implementation. 
  
 Description & Analysis of the Case Studies                                                           5-69   
 
Chapter Five                                                                                             Page 69 of 79 
 
5.5.1.4 The Operations & Maintenance Partner Involvement 
Six months after the signing of the contract between ServCo and the O&M partner, 
the ERP teams received several inquiries on the ERP implementation status. The ERP 
team discovered that the lead time for O&M agreement is seven years and it includes 
by the technical partner to be compensated based on the saving made from water 
leakage and consumption. For this claim to be made, the ERP and associated systems 
should be completed before the billing can be made by O&M. The ERP project 
manager explained that he had absolutely no idea that O&M requirements were to be 
included in the current ERP scope. A formal report by O&M submitted to ServCo 
stated clearly that ERP implementation significantly delayed the O&M plans. The 
report includes specific rectifications and road map includes several alternatives for 
ServCo to recover the situation by aligning ERP with O&M plans. One week later, 
ERP project manager circulated a memo that states clearly a fast-tracked ERP release 
which includes business applications that should have been completed five months 
earlier to fulfil the partnership agreement with O&M partner. The memo stated that 
the fast-track is divided into two phases where end users are requested to use the 
system intensively and strictly register all comments in the support registry log. The 
ERP support team will implement, thereafter, all necessary changes to the system 
until phase one is fully stabilised. The same process will be repeated for the second 
phase as well. 
 
5.5.1.5 The Emergence of the Second ERP Implementer 
During the ERP fast-track release implementation, a new CIO was hired to manage all 
information systems requirements. The first priority assigned to him was to assure 
complete information systems fulfilment of O&M partners that include necessary 
integration and consistency with ERP implementation. The CIO took the lead in 
capturing all necessary tasks needed to meet this mission and started a new discussion 
with the implementer „I-a‟. The implementer responded that these requirements are 
major and completely new where it requires a new implementation assignment. The 
CIO took a firm stand towards „I-a‟ to include these changes within the existing 
implementation with no extra cost. The discussion between the CIO and „I-a‟ reached 
a semi dead-end position. „I-a‟ become a black-listed supplier and CIO refused to 
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release their remaining payments. This conflict with the existing implementer created 
an urgency to find an alternative implementation partner.  
 
A new implementoer (I-b) was approached and informed that ServCo had recently 
completed an implementation and rollout of Phase 1 of ERP in two locations, that the 
application has not been utilised or used satisfactorily, and is still undergoing changes 
to cater to the business requirements. The approached implementer requested to 
submit a proposal for providing services to rectify existing modules and to provide 
post-implementation maintenance and support services for ERP modules Finance (AP 
& GL), HRMS (Core HR & Payroll) and supply chain modules (Inventory & 
Purchasing) application environment at ServCo. The new implementer (I-b) was 
awarded after eight months from the ERP fast-track plan for a six months contract.  
 
5.5.1.6 The Emergence of the Third Implementation Cycle ERP  
In parallel to the assignment of „I-b‟, the CIO was developing a long-term plan that 
could ensure the full integration and fulfilment of O&M requirements and information 
systems applications. The CIO had experience with different ERP applications before 
his joining ServCo. He suggested implementing another ERP product that was 
implemented by his former employer.  He supported his view by an offer from one of 
the top five consulting firms and he requested a budget to arrange for ten executive 
members‟ site visits to Europe to review how the newly suggested ERP vendor had 
successfully integrated ERP with O&M requirements for similar organisations. The 
internal auditor refused to approve the budget of the site visits as this fund is for an 
on-going investment where higher approval is required. The CIO started obtaining 
approval for the site visits several times however his attempts ended to failure where 
the CEO took a firm stand not to change to another ERP vendor. Alternatively, 
international implementer „I-c‟, who had been requested initially to submit his offer 
for implementing the new ERP product, had been requested to conduct a total 
assessment review of the existing implementation gaps. 
 
5.5.1.7 The Assessment Review  
The international consulting firm started the assessment process by stating a number 
of objectives that include evaluating the actual modules/functionalities installed in 
ServCo to assess the current usage of the system, functions activated but not used, 
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functions not used and recurring issues. The assessment also included evaluation of 
the completeness of current implementation for the implementation of the new 
module requested for Phase II. The final objective was to evaluate the requirements 
for the implementation of new modules in Phase II, taking in to consideration the 
contents and plan of the new implementation project. The assessment started to check 
the setup documentation related to the existing modules, conducted four meeting 
sessions with the key reference of both business units and the headquarter in the three 
main areas of Finance, Supply Chain and  Human Resource (Table 5-24). This 
process was targeted to verify the detailed requirements in each specific area, compare 
the setup in the production environment with the setup documentation and evaluate 
the integration flow designed for the ERP modules with the other systems in the to be 
solution (Phase I, Phase II and the new phase to be started.) 
Table 5-24 : Scope of the second assessment Review  
Areas AS IS Modules 
Finance 
General Ledger 
Account Payable 
Supply Chain 
Inventory 
Purchasing 
Human Resources 
HR 
Payroll 
 
The assessment concluded with a detailed report that was submitted and discussed, 
with ServCo stating clearly the current position in addition to a detailed plan of what 
is required for the new implementation phase. 
 
5.5.1.8 The Launch of the Third Implementation Project  
Two months after ServCo discussed the assessment review, the implementer „I-c‟ was 
awarded to implement the third cycle. ServCo & „I-c‟ who was announced as the 
strategic partner in information technology, celebrated the new project, which will 
significantly contribute in raising the efficiency of the services quality in ServCo. The 
ServCo CIO and the director of „I-c‟ said that project started its activity four months 
ago and would be fully implemented in the upcoming nine months. The new project is 
introduced as a global initiative that seeks to transform and enhance the way ServCo 
operates its business and delivers service to customers. More specifically, the 
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transformation was claimed to arrive through unified, lean and robust business 
processes and state-of-the-art technology. Customers were expected to benefit from 
the project, thanks to the new Customer Service processes and the implementation of 
the Customer Care & Billing system. Employees were also promised that they would 
benefit from the project, thanks to the new Maintenance processes and the 
implementation of the enterprise asset management system. It was, also, stated that 
project would link all the mentioned systems with the latest techniques of geographic 
information and control system and networks and resource planning system which is 
currently under establishment, and would be linked to a call centre in order to enable 
the ServCo to take maximum advantage of all these systems to serve its customers. 
The CEO of ServCo asked for the development of the services to be enabled through 
the use of the technical programs that are offered by the strategic partners of the 
company, and called everyone to redouble the efforts in next phases. At the end, the 
CEO rewarded 38 employees for their contribution to preoperational project in the 
Plan & analyse phase, in both headquarter of the company and business units. 
 
As part of the implementation activities, it was decided to dedicate a team to look 
after the training requirements. That team differs from the ERP implementation team 
and consists of members who had experience of how to set the training curriculums 
and how to assure the quality of the training. The consultants do not train end users 
directly but they do train key users who will be training end users thereafter. 
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5.5.2 Analysis – ServCo Case 
5.5.2.1 High-Level Stakeholders Analysis of the Privatisation Process  
The case analysis indicates that the ERP plans started at a very early stage of a large 
privatisation process. A number of key decisions and supporting regulations from 
different government agencies were still to be developed and approved. In fact, the 
royal decree of the forming of the company was not yet made at the time of finalising 
ERP plans of the first implementation cycle. The high level stakeholders involved in 
the overall privatisation process is discussed briefly in the below sections. 
 
5.5.2.1.1 The Ministry of Water  
The Ministry of Water was, at the time of adopting ERP, the sponsor of water services 
in the whole country. All business operations therefore followed government practices 
and strictly adhered to government policies and procedures. The existing culture in the 
Ministry dictates that water services are not provided under the commercial 
conditions. This culture places only weak emphasis for cost versus profitability. 
Although the Ministry is charging citizens and business for the water services, in 
reality these services are very much subsidised and the charges do not cover the cost 
of operations.  
 
5.5.2.1.2 The Ministry of Finance 
The Ministry of Finance governs all financial transactions across ministries. Its 
mandate includes the management of all ministries expenses and revenues. All 
ministries requested to adhere to the unified purchasing rules and regulations no 
matter what type of project or services the ministry is in a need for. This can justify 
why the contract and the scope of the first implementation can be seen as 
inappropriate to the nature of ERP implementation. This can be connected to the fact 
that the standard purchasing system that is governed by the Ministry of Finance 
should be strictly followed. In Ministry of Finance practices there is no room for asset 
depreciation, the cycle count or commercial stock valuations. These deficits remained 
unfilled during the first ERP implementation adoption where the mandate to the 
implementer was confined to configure ERP for ServCo as a pure commercial 
organisation. 
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5.5.2.1.3 The O&M Partner versus ERP Implementation 
As part of the privatisation process, the government encouraged the development of a 
relationship in the form of PPP (Public Private Partnership). The two PPP agreements 
were signed after the ERP implementation project started where the operating and 
maintenance partner requirements were not considered in the first implementation 
cycle. Recalling this fact, it is important to evaluate and understand the results of the 
first implementation cycle. It is believed, also, that it is important to develop further 
insight to understand and measure the outcomes of the second and the third 
implementation cycles. Legitimate questions need to be asked, for example, why was 
ERP started before signing these agreements? Why ServCo did not engage ERP 
management team in the execution of the recently signed agreement with operating 
and maintenance partners? The answers to these questions are tightly connected with 
the roles and responsibility management of various stakeholders of ERP 
implementation. Each stakeholder has his own reasoning to defend his position and 
can easily drift from the responsibility of such ROI deficits that have not only 
adversely affected ERP investment. In fact, the losses hit the corporate results as well, 
since the whole purpose of the operating and maintenance agreement is to incentivise 
the technical partner by the measures of the consumption reduction of water which 
could not achieved. 
 
Conclusions  
ERP implementation started at very early stage of the corporate privatisation process. 
The stakeholders involved in the beginning lacked basic ERP knowledge, which 
adversely affected the management of the first agreement with the first implementer. 
The limited results achieved from the first implementation cycle did not, therefore, 
come as a surprise. The ERP implementer could not capture necessary requirements in 
timely manner. Key users and team leaders hired after requirements been gathered and 
after the implementer started the configuration process. In fact, the first 
implementation cycle started before the formal legal foundation of ServCo as the 
royal decree is announced at later stage. End users, functional managers and ERP 
consultants were not involved in the process of the agreement between ServCo and 
the O&M partner. More specifically, the relationship between the contract signed with 
the O&M and ERP readiness was not communicated in a timely manner. During the 
preparation for the go-live; end users received contradicting instructions from two 
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parties. The first party consisted of their line managers who tried to comply with ERP 
implementation instructions and guidelines while the second party is the operating and 
maintenance partner who used their power from the mandate obtained from the 
contract.  
 
In fact, the ERP implementation was shocked by the magnitude and critical nature of 
the operations and maintenance partner requirements that should have been 
thoroughly considered at very early initial implementation phases. Such a head start 
left no room for functional managers to amend ERP plans to accommodate their 
detailed requirements. It was too late for ERP consultants to accept those 
requirements after completing the configuration process. In effect, the scope of the 
ERP modules decreased gradually as it was found, through the implementation 
process, that significant requirements deficits had not been considered.  
The holistic view of the implementation indicates, on the other hand, that the second 
and the third implementation cycles produced better results. The success is directly 
correlated with proper identification of stakeholders and the effective management of 
roles and responsibilities between them. 
 
5.5.2.2 Policies & Procedures Focus  
The Ministry hired a consulting firm to develop all necessary policies and procedures 
for the new organisation before it was officially formed. When functional managers 
were hired at a later stage, they had significant comments to make about those written 
policies and procedures. A number of deficits were found which makes it incomplete 
and difficult to cope with in several areas. This adversely affected the implementation, 
since these policies and procedures represent the main source for the implementer in 
configuring the system changing.  
 
The driving forces for the head start of developing policies and procedures are well-
understood. However, approving those policies and procedures before giving HR and 
functional managers adequate time to review those policies and procedures and advice 
their feedback can be seen as irrational decision. This finding is seen from the 
tendency by several end users to manage core business operations outside the system 
as much as they could which defeated adopting an advanced system such as ERP. 
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5.5.2.3 Implementation Phases  
The analysis of the implementation history suggests that it can be divided into three 
phases. The first implementation phase covers the stage prior to forming the company 
when all planning activities were being performed by the Ministry. The second 
implementation phase is when the implementation is physically started after forming 
the company until the decision to dismiss the first implementor. The third 
implementation phase addresses the engagement of the second then the third 
implementers (i.e. „I-b‟ and „I-c‟). The first phase includes the selection process and 
all other preparatory activities that include developing policies and procedures for the 
new company. The second phase covers core implementation activities that have been 
built around the policies and procedures developed in the first phase. The third 
implementation phase covers the hiring of a temporary implementer to provide 
necessary support and renovate existing implementation. The fourth implementation 
phase covers the second implementation project, which addresses all findings and the 
tasks that could not be completed in the second phase.  
 
Table 5.25 Implementation phases of  ServCo case 
Implementation Phase Implementation Description 
First Phase - A  
 
First Phase-B 
1. Preparation activities that include the development of the policies & 
Procedures, selection process and contract development. 
2. Core implementation of the As-Is of ERP modules based on the 
policies & procedures developed in the first phase 
Second  phase A new implementor hired to provide support and to renovate the existing 
Implementation 
Third Phase The advance implementation that covers all user requirements and the 
operations and maintenance partner considerations. 
 
5.5.2.4 Project Management Review  
The IT department assumed the predominant role for of project management. 
However, a different project management style using IT was utilised in managing the 
ERP project (Table 5.26). An external consulting firm who assumed the responsibility 
of developing policies and procedures was requested to act as project management 
operations (PMO).  
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Table 5.26 Project management forms used in the Case 
No ERP Project Management Roles and Responsibilities 
1 Hiring external consultant from the 
university 
To assume the full responsibility of ERP project 
preparation, planning, coordination and 
management. 
2 Assigning international consulting firm to 
assume the project management 
To document all meeting conducted, managed or 
requested by the CEO 
3 Hiring of a new Consultant from the 
industry 
To assume fully the project management 
responsibilities of ERP transitions, development 
and support of existing implementation. 
4 Assigning IT member  To manage the recently announce project 
 
While examining the PMO role it can be seen (Table 5.27) that their services cannot 
be considered as a full project management operations rather than a supporting office 
for the CEO and their primary role was to handle the coordination and the 
documentation of the ERP project management activities. 
 
Table 5.27 Project Management Summary – ServCo Case  
Cycle# 1st Cycle 2nd Cycle 3rd Cycle 
Objective implement ERP As IS implement ERP As IS Align business process 
Results Failure Success Survival 
Project 
Management 
Description  
A number of PM techniques 
and tools used but in a typical 
task list format assuming a full 
ignorance of the change 
process and the end user 
engagement. In result, good 
pieces of project management 
practices did not lead to ERP 
success. 
PM management tools and 
practices used in a more 
realistic and rational view 
of the nature of ERP 
project. The project 
management process places 
a lot of emphasis on the 
coordination of activities 
that ensure quality of 
results.  
This stage touches more 
insights of the underlying 
business processes and real 
ERP implication on business 
activities. However, it shows 
minimal use of project 
management practices, 
formalities and tools. 
 
5.5.2.5 Can the Case be Considered a Successful or a Failure?  
The holistic review of the implementation process includes the various 
implementation cycles and leads to the conclusion that deciding whether the 
implementation is successful or not is problematic. The second and the third 
implementation cycles can be considered successful. Both projects were completed on 
time, according to budget and the objectives were achieved. On the other hand, the 
experience of the first implementation cycle was one of failure. The project was not 
completed; the cost and the time over-ran. The combination of three cycles indicates 
that, ultimately, the ERP achieved most of its target benefits, however, ROI is 
significantly less than what it should be as ServeCo invested in two extra unplanned 
projects to achieve the same objectives. 
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Despite these implementation deficits, the ERP implementation produced 
supplementary gains. First, the hard lessons from the first implementation cycles 
motivated the company to focus significant attention on change management. Second, 
the organisation learned the significance and the importance of managing roles and 
responsibilities to ERP success; which can be demonstrated in the examples shown in 
the following tables (Table 5.28 and Table 5.29). 
 
Table 5.28 Roles & responsibilities examples: ServCo -2nd phase  
Role/Responsibility No Activities for the Role 
ServCo Project Sponsor 1 Provide management sponsorship and direction to the project  
 2 Provide limited time for executive interview and review project progress  
 3 Chair the steering committee meeting 
ServCo Project Manager 1 Conduct reviews and weekly status meeting  
 2 Engage with I-b support manager in decision making process around – 
support processes  
 3 Facilitate management decision and approvals.  
 4 Single point of contact for I-b team from communication perspective 
 
 
Table 5.29 : Roles & responsibilities examples: ServCo – 3rd phase  
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 Representative of the HR department  - To cover also the Change Management part – He will be 
assumed to be the gateway with Business Users for Training needs and schedule finalization and 
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Assist the Change Manager in his daily work 
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5.6 Summary  
This chapter has presented the description and the individual analysis of the four case 
studies. 
The description of DiversCo case shows that the organisation started as a medium-
sized organisation at the inception stage and become a large organisation by reaching 
the implementation completion. The description includes a review of key incidents 
such as the selling of the sanitary business, the change of the implanter at the middle 
of the implementation, the creation of the information systems department, the 
difficulties in the point-of-sales in the fashion company and the struggle in resolving 
the invoice generation in the electro-mechanic company. A number of extracted 
dimensions used to analyse the case that include 1) the role of information systems, 2) 
the positive effect of the proper selection of the GM in implementing ERP, 3) the 
appropriate usage of  a supervisory consultant, 4) the selection process analysis, 5) 
ERP vendor and implementer issues and 6) the go-live analysis. 
 
The description of the ElectoCo case started with describing pre-implementation 
activities. This is followed by highlighting a number of issues that include 1) the 
project management, 2) executive review, 3) conflict management, 4) policies and 
procedures, 5) planning module, 6) training and 7) various technical issues. 
The analysis of the case has been divided into the following parts, 1) ERP evolution, 
2) the intensive focus on product selection, 3) HR implementation, 4) planning 
module failure, 5) training and 6) technical issues.  
 
The ServCo case started by describing the ERP evolution within the transition 
challenges at the organisation the resulted from the privatisation process. The 
engagement process of the operations and maintenance partner has been described 
including its effect to the implementation. The analysis started with a review of the 
ERP stakeholders in the context of the privatisation process. The second part of the 
analysis covers the management of developing policies and procedures in an ERP 
implementation context.  This is followed by a review of the implementation phases 
and project management review. 
 
The analysis of each case has been concluded with a discussion on whether the case 
be considered a success or failure?. 
Comparative Analysis Chapter                                                                                      6-1   
 
 
Chapter Six                                                                                               Page 1 of 67 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
Comparative Analysis of Case Studies 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will build on the results of the previous chapter by extending the analysis of 
each individual case study discussed in Chapter Five. It will consider the lessons learned 
through the experience of ERP implementation across all four companies, covering the 
different phases of implementation in each case, the roles of stakeholders, effective 
management and leadership strategies, and will isolate recommendations for improvements 
that emerged from the key case studies. The second part of this chapter will provide a 
comparative analysis of all four case studies, focusing primarily on critical success factors 
and analysis of the post-implementation phases.  
 
6.2 Further Analysis 
6.2.1 Further Analysis - DiversCo Case 
6.2.1.1 Essential Business Strategy Changes 
The analysis indicates that contracting became the main line of business. This can be inferred 
from the fact that all credit facilities are connected with contracting projects and that 
contracting generates around eighty per cent of the total revenue and represents around ninety 
per cent of the total task force. This unplanned strategic change from being a diversified 
organisation to become primarily a contracting one led to various adverse effects during the 
implementation (Table 6.1). 
 
Although most of those issues were resolved at later stages of the implementation, the ROI 
from ERP implementation is adversely affected as a result of both time and cost overrun and 
the failure to achieve the projected efficiency targets.  
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Table 6.1: Impact of Strategic decisions on ERP Implementation  - DiversCo Case 
No Business Unit ERP adverse effect 
1 Factory The local factory could not start using the system until five years after the starting 
date of the implementation. The second factory of the manufacturing was not 
completed until four years after the implementation starting date. 
2 Sanitary  The whole branch was sold in the middle of the implementation. 
3 Fashion Utilises very limited system functionalities. This is due to the fact that 
there was no point-of-sales solution provided, despite of the enormous 
effort to integrate ERP with third party software applications. 
4 Electrical 
retail 
Uses very limited functionalities due to the fact that customer invoices 
could not be generated from the system due to several problems related to 
both networking and communication obstacles and to the inefficient 
business practice which requires changes in the sales process. 
 
 
ERP was first suggested in DiversCo due to a recommendation by management consultants 
who reviewed and assessed the organisational systems, procedures and structure before the 
GM took the lead in initiating the implementation of the ERP. The scope of the ERP and the 
selection process were designed based on the assumption that there was neither funding nor a 
financing deficit at DiversCo that might fundamentally change the business structure that 
aims for equal growth without any priority preference towards specific sectors. 
During the implementation, the weak financial state of DiversCo was about to explode. This 
fact, which was discovered late in the implementation process, led DiversCo, by necessity not 
by choice, to change its original business strategy, followed by snap decisions such as selling 
the sanitary business and diverting resources from this to contracting. From a role and 
responsibilities perspective, who is to be held responsible for these unplanned changes that 
adversely affected the ROI of the ERP implementation? Is it the GM, owner or the 
management consulting company? 
 
DiversCo had prepared a good strategy beforehand, which facilitated a strong basis from 
which to develop a proper ERP scope and plans. The GM took the lead in developing a 
corporate business strategy that indicated substantial growth through diversification across 
retail, manufacturing and contracting, where most of the financial support was expected to 
come from banks through the securities provided by the owner. As per Fig 6.1, the GM 
inferred the strategy from the management consultant before he articulated the received 
inputs into a corporate strategy. In effect, by necessity and not by choice, the strategy had 
been dramatically changed through tight cost reductions and by shifting the focus to 
contracting. 
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This sudden change in strategy created an adverse effect for the whole ERP initiative. For 
example, a few weeks before reaching the go-live stage, a sanitary business was sold. All the 
effort that was allocated to implement ERP in the sanitary business was considered waste; not 
only the loss of the money spent but also the adverse effect to the team morale as staff 
witnessed their efforts wasted. Shifting the focus to the contracting unit led the non-
contracting business units to be considered low priority in terms of funding, resource and 
importance. If this was made clear at early stages of ERP implementation, it would have 
changed completely the basis for the selection process. What went wrong was not related to 
the strategic decision itself but rather the lack of appropriate coordination on how this 
decision is affected the existing ERP plans. The inadequate communication of this strategic 
change has also adversely affected ERP implementation outcomes. The main lesson from this 
case is that ERP plans must include a thorough review of the strategic plan. This review 
should include clear communication to senior executives and board members regarding the 
direct effect of the chosen strategy on the ERP plans. This includes a need to engage ERP 
planners regarding any major strategy changes during the ERP journey to assure continuous 
consistency between the static plan and the ERP plans. Selling the sanitary business unit at 
the heart of the implementation, after incurring enormous license and implementation cost, 
demonstrates how poor consistency between corporate business strategy and ERP plans can 
adversely affect ROI of ERP implementation. 
 
6.2.1.2 Point-of-Sales: Learned Lessons  
Implementing point-of-sales software is considered one of the highest priority requirements 
for the fashion company. This is based on the fact that it represents a fundamental 
requirement for both fashion retail and electrical retail. The technical staff members from 
DiversCo´s side, after four years from the starting date of the project, successfully 
implemented a solution. What is the significance of this?  
The in-house technical support member, without being officially instructed, found a solution 
to the problem. A small software application is being used as a communicative layer between 
the remote warehouses and the show rooms, eliminating the need to implement a complete 
point-of-sales application. The question to be asked, here, is: Why did it take so long to 
resolve this critical task? This delay cost time and money and, more importantly, it adversely 
affected staff morale towards the ERP system.  
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6.2.1.2.1 Roles and Responsibility Analysis  
The stakeholders involved in the problems indicated above are as follows: 
1. Pre-sales and sales consultant from ERP vendor side. 
2. ERP consulting implementor. 
3. Supervisory consultant. 
4. Functional managers. 
5. IT section members from DiversCo. 
6. General Manager. 
 
Although pre-sales and sales members admit that their ERP product does not have a point-of-
sales module, they both confirm that either a third party application or a so-called work-
around solution can be integrated. On the other hand, neither third party applications nor so-
called work-around solutions were precisely defined. Several attempts to implement third 
party applications failed. 
 
The sales executive from the ERP vendor side explains: 
"We represent a specific ERP vendor product. Our primary role is to explain 
what our product can and what it cannot handle. For the requirements that our 
product cannot handle we are only suggesting alternative solutions for our 
potential customers and thereafter we cannot be held responsible for third party 
software applications that we do not own or represent" 
The supervisory consultant admitted that it is part of his responsibilities to play a significant 
role in this case but he is constrained by the limited alternatives in the market and the humble 
support from the vendor side. The supervisory consultant explains: 
"I understand that it is part of my responsibilities to work with both ERP consulting 
and ERP customer till this issue is completely closed. I was constrained by the 
limited knowledge the ERP vendor has and support ability they can provide. I 
expect them to search from their international customer base to find previous 
customer faced similar problem to avoid reinventing the wheel and inventing 
solution from the ground level." 
 
The functional manager of fashion retail commented that he was aware that the ERP does not 
support the point-of-sales functionalities but he was given assurance that he would be able to 
generate sales invoices from the systems and to search the entire inventory across all show 
rooms. The fashion manager explains: 
"The sales consulting made it clear that there is no point-of-sales module but I was 
not aware about the implication of such shortage. Since the beginning, the two 
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major requirements from our end was clear automatic generation of sales invoices 
and on-line inventory viewing" 
 
The case analysis shows that the supervisory consultant´s contract expired before the point-
of-sales issue was resolved. The general manager explains that the supervisory consultant´s 
contract was not renewed as the local team could handle the outstanding issues. The general 
manager explains: 
"The aim of hiring the supervisory consultant is to assure that the 
implementation plan is consistent with the leading practices. Since most of the 
outstanding issues require a more sort follow-up effort and hands-on 
investigation we took the decision not to renew his consulting contract" 
 
The question to be asked is why did such a problem remained unresolved for four years from 
the starting date of the implementation? The case can be considered as problematic in terms 
of determining among the stakeholders, who should be blamed or be held responsible for 
such a failure and such a delay, whilst recalling the following facts: 
1. From the customer´s side, it was made clear that this was a major requirement. 
2. The ERP vendor made it clear that the ERP product does not include point-of-sales. 
3. On the other hand, the sales representative from the vendor side and the supervisory 
consultant confirmed that alternative solutions can be found and implemented. 
4. Two solutions failed after considerable waste of time and money. 
5. The IS member from the DiversCo side eventually successfully implemented a solution.  
 
The sales and presales members and the supervisory consultants stated clearly that DiversCo 
requirements could be met through alternative solutions. However, they also stated that 
approving such an alternative solution is the responsibility of DiversCo. However, there was 
no support, neither from the vendor nor from the consulting firm, to find the right alternative 
solution. The supervisory consultant contract expired before resolving this critical matter. 
Eventually, this critical ERP deliverable remained unresolved. Although the DiversCo team 
members eventually managed to resolve the issue, the solution was costly in terms of time 
and attitude, which adversely affected the potential ROI from the ERP system. 
 
6.2.1.2.2 Suggestions and Recommendations  
Based on this analysis of the issue, suggested recommendations could be adopted to avoid 
such problem to emerge. Table 6.2 summarises the recommended steps to ensure proper 
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identifications of critical processes, along with more detailed instructions that can govern 
smooth implementation. 
Table 6.2 Recommended roles and responsibilities for effective definition of missions critical process  
No Step Description 
1 The client should identify clearly all the critical requirements of the mission. 
2 Sales and pre sales members should provide definite answers if the standard functionalities of the ERP 
product cannot handle some or part of the mission´s critical requirements. 
3 If the shortages of the functionalities do not affect the selection decision, the consulting firm needs to 
document the mission critical requirements in a separate section of the requirement definition. 
4 The consulting team needs to aggregate all mission critical requirements that cannot be met by the 
standard system functionalities in a separate list supported by an action plan. 
5 The ERP project managers from customer and implementor sides need to link these actions with the ERP 
implementation master plan. 
6 The supervisory consultant should always ensure that all mission critical requirements are marked as 
milestones in the master plan. 
7 The supervisory consultant should always integrate, validate and embody the implementation of the third 
party or the work-around software solutions within the ERP implementation master plan. 
8 The go-live cut-off date should not be determined or approved before all completing all mission critical 
requirements. 
9 The ERP executive management should not discontinue the supervisory consultancy agreement without 
obtaining a document that states clearly all outstanding or incomplete solutions for mission critical 
requirements. 
10 As part of customer service and quality assurance, the ERP consultant is expected to review the ERP 
master plan and advise the customer if there is no plan in place for implementing solutions for mission 
critical requirements that cannot be met by standard functionalities of the ERP. 
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6.2.1.3 Preparation for ERP Implementation  
The case description demonstrates that the GM has emphasised preparation of the 
organisation for ERP implementation. There are, however, a number of areas that seem to 
missing from these efforts, which led to adverse effects for the implementation outcomes. 
 
Firstly, a significant delay in implementing ERP in the factory business unit evolved because 
of the problem that there was no network link between the factory and the head-office. This 
problem was only discovered after the implementation reached the test stage. Secondly, the 
testing of ERP in the fashion business unit failed several times due to the fact that most 
fashion sales members were found to be computer illiterate. Due to this, the standard ERP 
user training was not adequate to enable them to use the system. Unplanned hands on training 
had to be provided by the support team, which adversely affected their resource priorities and 
their committed deadlines. Thirdly, in the electrical retail business unit, the need to issue the 
Implementation consultant 
to develop the Holistic 
Req. definition 
Fig 6.1: Relationship between roles, responsibilities and mission critical process – DiversCo Case 
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sales invoice before receiving purchasing invoices adversely affected the completion of the 
three way matching process (purchase order, invoice and receiving). The situation would 
have been completely changed if this process was carefully reviewed and optimal suggestions 
were developed and implemented at an earlier stage of the implementation process.  
 
The stakeholders involved in the problems indicated above are as follows: 
1. Functional members. 
2. ERP consulting implementor. 
3. Supervisory consultant. 
4. General Manager. 
5. Technical Support member from DiversCo side. 
6. Technical support members from the implementor side. 
 
The analysis of the case shows that the challenges identified were not discovered during early 
contracting or planning stages. The senior consultant from the consulting implementor states: 
"During the demonstration sessions or early planning stage none of the mentioned issues 
were raised by DiversCo members" 
 
The DiversCo members, including functional and technical members, defended their position, 
arguing that they were unable to identify those issues in the first place because they did not 
anticipate its adverse effect on the implementation. The technical member from DiversCo, for 
example, denied the responsibility for the delay that was caused by the absence of the 
communication link. He states: 
"It was known and I felt that I had not to inform that there was no communication 
link between the factory and the head office. If I was asked I would have explained" 
 
The electrical retail functional manager explained that the practice to include items in the 
sales invoice before the item is registered in the inventory is an inherited process. On that 
basis he denied taking the responsibility of the adverse effect of this practice to the 
implementation. The electronic retail business unit states: 
"We cannot be held responsible; the practice is being used for quite long time 
based on our customer needs and requirements. We had never and ever refused 
any alternative solution to facilitate the integration requirements with other 
modules" 
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The fashion manager also defends his position, arguing that the fact that the sales men were 
computer illiterate was well known. He states: 
"Most of sales-men expected to be computer illiterate. It was the first computer 
system they have been asked to use; the entire team knows this as a fact" 
 
On the other hand, at least for some of the issues, the implementor consultant denied some of 
the responsibilities. He explains that their scope is limited. Although they acknowledged that 
they have a role to play in all the three aspects mentioned in the examples above, the role 
they have is an advisory one. The senior implementor states: 
 
"Our scope, as specified in the contract, is limited to configure the system 
according to the agreed requirements and we were not hired to do open-
ended task list nor resolve all organisational issues" 
 
For the issue of the poor communication link between the head office and the factory, he 
states: 
"It is a common sense that network and communication link need to operate 
between the factory and head office to leverage the integration. If we were asked to 
handle we would have provided necessary details and awareness but it was 
completely outside our scope of work" 
 
From his end, the supervisory consultant did not completely deny responsibility but at the 
same time he defended his position that the consulting agreement with DiversCo covers basic 
supervision activities. The supervisory consultant states: 
"My role is to supervise the implementation and to intervene as needed between the 
implementor and DiversCo. But the magnitude and dedication level suggested by the 
consulting agreement cannot cover beyond basic and generic supervision scope" 
 
From the aforementioned examples, it may be concluded that the failure to explore and 
identify hidden issues that might adversely affect the ERP ROI represent a risk factor. Such 
hidden problems might have different natures, which includes either technical, people, 
structure or process. The adverse effects of such issues are represented in the form of an 
implementation delay, increased consulting cost, reduced employee efficiencies and the 
morale of the ERP team and the end user‟s attitude towards ERP. 
 
Proper Timing for Announcing the ERP Project 
The GM announced the ERP formally to the entire team twice. The first announcement came 
after the supervisory consultant completed the first draft of candidate ERP vendors to be 
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invited. Secondly, the core team was invited after the awarding of the ERP implementer. 
These announcements created a positive impact on the key users behaviour towards 
promoting and making the ERP a success. One of the key users states: 
“The two gatherings that I attended raised my motivation towards ERP significantly. 
After the first one I took the demo sessions very seriously and after the second one I 
prepared myself to dedicate enough time for ERP implementation” 
 
It is important for the organisation leader to motivate the team for ERP. The effect of the 
motivation is strongly connected to choosing appropriate timing for the motivational efforts. 
 
6.2.1.4 The Lack of Identifying Mission Critical Process 
The point-of-sale issues in the fashion business unit and the invoice generations in the 
electro-mechanic retail business represent a high percentage of the total failure across all 
parts of the implementation. While examining the nature of the difficulties that the 
organisation went through during the implementation, this may lead to a conclusion that both 
business units, i.e., fashion and electro mechanic retail, have very basic requirements that 
need to be met. For fashion, the system needed to achieve two goals: first, to generate the 
customer invoice instantly via the bar-code reader; and second, to provide online inventory 
inquiries across all the outlet stores at any point of sale, so that sales persons could verify, 
online, an item‟s availability, colour, size, etc. 
 
For electro mechanic retail, the generation of invoices was only required for the showrooms. 
If these basic requirements were met successfully in timely manner, the ERP ROI would have 
been dramatically increased. Most of the difficulties faced in these two areas would have 
been avoided if such issues had been carefully studied, analysed and examined at an early 
stage so that proper solutions could have been prepared and forwarded to the ERP team to 
implement. For this to happen, segregating key processes that can be marked as mission 
critical for further review, understanding and analysis could have led to the development of 
necessary solutions.  
 
6.2.1.5 Leadership Through Effective Decision Making  
The case analysis shows that the DiversCo management showed an excellent model of 
leadership through a series of effective decision-making processes. This is can be inferred 
from decisions such as: 
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1. Discarding HR module implementation and purchasing of other add-on software 
applications. 
2. The decision to dismiss the internal application support member. 
3. The decision to change the main key user. 
If such critical decisions were not made in a timely manner, it would have created an adverse 
impact on the implementation results. 
 
6.2.1.6 Significant Influence of Supervisory Consultant  
The case review indicates various significant roles played by the supervisory consultant 
during the different implementation stages and levels. He facilitated proper communication 
links between DiversCo members themselves; between consultants and DiversCo members at 
operational level; and between the implementer and DiversCo at the executive level. The 
sales manager of the ERP vendor explains: 
"It was one of the most efficient and successful sales process we ever done; the third 
party consultant hired by DiversCo made it easier, efficient and to the point discussions 
and meetings" 
 
His presence and contribution enabled effective decision-making process at the first, second 
and the third stage of the implementation. His involvement led to the resolution of conflicts, 
either between DiversCo members or in cases where a conflict emerged between DiversCo 
members and consultants.  
A number of success factors can be drawn from the effective engagement of the supervisory 
consultants. Firstly, it can be seen from the case study that DiversCo selected the best 
consultant. The general manager explains:  
"I looked around to find a qualified assistant to assure a success to the ERP project as I 
have other challenging and competing priorities so I might not be available to resolve 
ERP issues. I am lucky that I found the right candidate who fits exactly for the 
purpose” 
 
Secondly, the roles and responsibilities given to the supervisory consultant were clear and 
well-defined. As per the following quote from the supervisory consultant, he was given a 
clear task to do, including well-defined roles and responsibilities. Thirdly, the supervisory 
consultant has the required knowledge and experience of the area where his consulting scope 
is defined. Prior to assuming his responsibility in the project, the supervisory consultant was 
involved in two successful implementation projects. The supervisory consultant explains: 
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"My involvement succeeded because I have been clearly informed what am I 
expected to deliver; and the task being requested was something I am good at and 
have the previous experience" 
 
Fourthly, since the roles and responsibilities had been well defined to a great extent, it 
reduced the need for an excessive number of formal meetings. E-mail was an efficient 
communication method between the supervisory consultant and all stakeholders. In some 
cases, conference calls were arranged for the issues that might require dynamic conversation, 
persuading, explaining, etc.  This point not only enabled DiversCo to maximise its benefits 
from the consulting service, with a low cost, and also affected, in a positive manner, the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, it underpinned, from an early stage of the 
implementation, the DiversCo ownership of the implementation.  The general manager 
explains: 
"With full respect to the consulting services; most of the cases they tell us something 
we already know but we lack either the courage or the ownership to do it. Therefore, 
involving consulting services when it's not necessary is as if we encourage a spoon 
feeding alike type of services" 
 
Fifthly, the supervisory consultant was empowered by the DiversCo management to lead the 
implementation to pass further steps towards going-live stage without a need to go back to 
DiversCo management to obtain authority. Even if obtaining authority is required, it was in a 
simple form, such as an e-mailed approval request, or an around-the-table meeting between a 
few members of the team. 
 
Fig 6.2 CSF for SV  - DiversCo Case 
Critical Success Factors for 
Effective ERP Supervision 
Proper Selection 
of the 
supervisory 
Consultant 
Clarity of Roles 
and 
Responsibilities 
Knowledge & 
Practical 
Experince In ERP 
Implementation 
Effective use of 
Communication 
tools and 
techologies 
Empowerment 
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6.2.2 Further Analysis – ElectCo Case 
6.2.2.1 Information Systems Prior to ERP Adoption  
The description of the case demonstrates that the ElectCo management and end users were 
frustrated about the legacy systems. On the other hand, the three-year business plan shows 
that projected turnover was significantly increased. The management and end users 
frustration towards legacy systems led the performance of the IT department to be considered 
as dissatisfactory. This perception of the performance of the IT department led executive 
management to blame the IT department for not having a written strategy. The absence of a 
written ERP strategy does not come as a surprise, due the fact that the ElectCo organisation 
itself does not have a written strategy. The former IT manager offered the following 
description: 
"When I joint ElectCo I found the IMIS director was completely depressed since he 
was always in a blame position for not having an IMIS strategy. But when I 
investigated the matter I found surprisingly that ElectCo itself does not have a 
strategy! So on what basis we shall develop an IMIS strategy for a company who does 
not have a strategy!!” 
 
ERP, thereafter, was regarded by end users and the executive management as a fast-track 
solution to satisfy information systems requirements. This may justify ElectCo‟s insistence 
on purchasing one of the top-listed ERP products, as end users and management seemed 
convinced that purchasing the best ERP product would automatically resolve the deficits of 
the legacy systems. Fig 6.3 demonstrates perceptions towards ERP by ElectCo, which 
indicates that by choosing a top class ERP product, business efficiency can be achieved. The 
main finding is that management, along with end users, have not studied why the legacy 
systems failed to achieve business efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Plan Indicates 
substantial growth in three years 
Management and End users 
are frustrated from 
information Systems 
Achieve Business 
Efficiency 
Fig 6.3 Managing expectation - ElectCo 
Adopt Best ERP Product 
1. Discard all legacy systems. 
2. All software applications 
requirements through ERP 
channel. 
 
Lead To 
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6.2.2.2 Business Process Efforts  
Table 6.3 describes examples of the activities performed by ElectCo prior to adopting the 
ERP implementation. This reflects the level of awareness regarding the importance of 
business process management whilst adopting ERP implementation.  
Table 6.3 Business Process Activities prior ERP Implementation - ElectCo case 
No
 
Process Activity
 
1 ElectCo conducted a comprehensive internal process review exercise conducted by 
manufacturing and the IMIS team, three years prior to the implementation 
2 Thirty two members from all departments attended a training course in process management a 
few weeks before starting the implementation 
3 Two IMIS members attended international advanced process management courses  
4 As part of the implementation guidelines, it was made evident that in case existing ElectCo 
processes are inconsistence with ERP standard processes, then the processes were to be 
streamlined to avoid customising the system. 
 
Moreover, the implementation indicates that there are some processes that were seriously 
considered during the implementation. This is followed by continuous follow-up and full 
cooperation until these processes are finally streamlined through ERP implementation. Table 
6.4 describes a number of processes that were identified and successfully optimised by ERP. 
 
Table 6.4 A Number of  Identified Critical Processes Successfully Optimised by ERP - ElectCo case 
No
 
Critical Processes
 
1 Full automation of the purchasing process that included paper-less online approval 
2 Ensure the system generates the time sheets online for the manufacturing technicians. 
3 Ensure that basic attributes of the employee master file are captured and maintained through the 
system. 
4 Ensure that finance can have efficient and timely manner monthly closing of financial books. 
 
6.2.2.3 Preparation for ERP Implementation  
ElectCo was in a good position in terms of its readiness for implementing ERP. The analysis 
of the case infers two main reasons for such readiness. First; the first version of the systems, 
policies and procedures of ElectCo was inherited from the Western founding partners of the 
company. This fact enabled ElectCo to adopt international business practices, which can be 
seen to confer a competitive advantage in comparison to local companies. This advantage 
positively expedites the development of the staff‟s interpersonal skills and business practices. 
Such Western influences can be seen as an advantage for ERP implementation as ERP was 
developed, and evolved, in Western countries. Second, there are several pieces of evidence 
that suggest that ElectCo invested a lot in ERP readiness and awareness. The first readiness 
investment element is demonstrated by the business process management activities (Table 
6.3). There are several DiversCo members who attended international ERP conferences and 
exhibitions, which represent the second readiness investment element. The third readiness 
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investment element is demonstrated by the effective use of the demo sessions and the 
successful engagement of end users during the selection process. A member and focal point 
from every department was involved in the demonstration sessions of each and every ERP 
product demonstration, including the preparation of the show-me list. These sessions served 
not only to evaluate the functionalities and ERP capabilities but can also be seen as an 
effective awareness and educational tool. The only exception is HR; their absence from the 
above-mentioned opportunities created an adverse effect on HR implementation at the later 
implementation stages. 
 
6.2.2.4 Effective Project Structure and Ownership 
The case analysis indicates that ElectCo never delegated the ownership of the ERP project to 
any external party. This ownership started from IMIS until further empowerment was 
obtained from the COO; then IMIS and the project manager took more of an ownership role.  
ElectCo had made firm decisions connected to the roles and responsibilities that were of 
assistance in gaining, implementing and leveraging ERP benefits. The decision to replace the 
Vice President of HR as a direct result of poor ERP implementation performance is an 
excellent example of the ElectCo commitment to leveraging ERP benefits and ensuring its 
success. It can be seen that the design of the project organisational structure (Fig 5.3) assisted 
in strengthening ElectCo´s ownership and accountability towards the ERP success.  
 
6.2.2.5 HR Modules: Lessons Learned 
From the HR history that has been summarised in Table 5.5 and the review of the 
stakeholders involved (Fig 5.7) a number of lessons can be learned. The first lesson was 
discussed through the analysis of the adverse effect of hiring a less competent consultant (Fig 
5.8). The “HR recovery plan” project can suggest three steps to ensure smooth 
implementation. Firstly, to analyse and assess HR staffs capabilities: secondly, to assess HR 
readiness, in terms of the availability of data and the HR procedures; and, thirdly, to approve 
proper HR organisational changes including hiring staff that can understand and undertake 
ERP implementation. The lessons to be learned from both the implementer and the ERP 
vendor side are summarised in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5 Roles and responsibilities- learned lessons: HR modules -  ElectCo 
Check List – Implementer 
No
 
Check Point Description
 
1 Do we have a qualified implementation consultant? 
2 Does the consultant possess adequate module knowledge? 
3 Does he possess the necessary communication skills to assist in communicating clearly the 
implementation status along with the difficulties he might face during the implementation? 
4 Do we have a backup support for the consultant in case he fails at any point in time? 
Check List – Vendor  
1 While providing an offer to any client, did we make sure that no further software development 
(either as localisation or upgrade) is required before? 
2 Have we checked or verified that our implementer partners have qualified consulting team 
who understands and can implement the system properly? 
3 Do we have enough back-office support to our Implementation partners? 
4 Do we have a service level agreement that govern the relation between the back-office support 
and our implementation partners that states clear timelines and escalation process? 
5 Is there any escalation procedure in place so the client, who is the ultimate beneficiary of the 
ERP product, knows when and how to contact the ERP vendor directly if the implementor 
fails to deliver? 
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6.2.3 Further Analysis - (AgriCo) 
6.2.3.1 The First & the Second Implementation Cycles 
6.2.3.1.1 Preparation for ERP Implementation  
The holistic analysis of the various management initiatives that started in parallel with 
implementing ERP indicates that the CEO aimed to transform the organisation in a swift 
manner. The transformation attempts to change the inherited governmental processes, 
practices and culture. Most of these initiatives, besides their massive cost, are connected with 
a very long payback period where the board could not agree in the continuous spending 
without short-term returns. What seemed to weaken the CEO position was that he failed to 
generate a number of quick wins where he could raise the confidence level within the board 
of directors and to preserve their support. These ambitious initiatives lacked proper settings 
that could have ensured their smooth implementation.  
 
When ERP was first introduced, there were only twelve personal computers in the 
organisation. This not only reflects the shortages of necessary machines but also reflects the 
fact that the AgriCo taskforce lacked necessary computing or information systems practices 
and knowledge. The issues from the technical side, during the first implementation cycle, 
demonstrate a complete ignorance of the necessity of planning ahead for the infrastructure. A 
good example of this is that a snap decision had to be made at the heart of the implementation 
stage to change the operating system. Another example of the lack of readiness assessments 
and rectification plans was the fact that the link between the network link between the factory 
and head office failed after the announcement was made for the go live stage. 
 
6.2.3.1.2 Implementation Methodology Findings 
It can clearly be seen that the recommended implementation methodology was not followed 
during the first implementation cycle.  The enthusiasm from the CEO to reach the go-live 
stage as part of the over-all fast track approach adversely affected the recommended 
implementation methodology. This includes inadequate effort in studying the existing 
situation, the training plan and the transition phase from the legacy to the new system. 
Improper customisation management is another example of neither following the suggested 
methodology nor adopting a clear strategy regarding the handling of customisation requests 
from end users. As per the RCT report, there are two observations that are connected with 
customisation management. First, the customisation was requested by end users, directly to 
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the implementer, without any indication of a clear strategy regarding its priority. Second, 
there was no clarity of the customisation process. 
 
The second implementation cycle, on the other hand, demonstrated full compliance with the 
recommended implementation methodology (Table 6.6), as advised by ERP vendor which, in 
turn, led to the success of the second implementation cycle. 
Table 6.6 Health Check Recommendations- Implementation Methodology:  AgriCo Case 
The RCT report states ”the recommended methodology should have been and must be followed for the 
success of the implementation that includes:‟‟ 
No
 
Description 
 
1 All required tasks stated in the methodology should have been documented. 
2 Implementer is to agree with AgriCo team on the execution steps. 
3 To ensure all team members clearly understand the aim and benefits from its implementation. 
4 To ensure all implementation phases are clear and integrated 
 
6.2.3.2 ERP Stakeholders Review  
A number of influencing stakeholders in the implementation journey will be reviewed in 
terms of their influence, roles and responsibilities and the lessons learned from their 
engagements and interactions in the implementation context. 
 
The engagement of a new CEO before the first implementation cycle began converted the 
ERP from an idea or option to an action that was to be completed. The IT director was 
hired to complete this task in the first cycle. The CEO and the IT director were seen as the 
most influencing stakeholders at the very early beginning of ERP journey. The third 
stakeholder in AgriCo implementation was the implementer who had been assigned to 
implement the system. When the first implementation failed, a new CEO and IT director 
were hired to recover the implementation. This time, the ERP vendor was successfully 
involved to conduct a neutral health check to analyse why the implementation had failed 
and to draw a road map for a success path to turn failure into success. 
 
Once he took over, the IT director recruited an application manager who had experience of 
implementing ERP to handle the implementation and he extended his role to coordinate, 
educate and communicate with business managers. The first health check assignment 
conducted declared that both the implementer and AgriCo management shared the 
responsibility for failure through improper planning from the implementer and poor project 
management and supervision from the AgriCo side.  
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The RCT report states: 
"The primary reason of the failure is the poor project planning and the 
break-down of the project into non-integrated phases do not ensure integration. 
Additionally the implementation style used by the implementor was 
inappropriate. 
AgriCo can be held responsible of the failure due to the poor control over 
the project including the inappropriate change of the project manager and the 
complete absence of conducting meetings periodically to discuss 
implementation issues and problems” 
 
The process of defining business requirements was not properly managed in the first 
implementation cycle as end users were disengaged from this process. The manufacturing 
general manager describes phase one of the implementation: 
“That implementation was as if it was cooked in the laboratory and 
brought to AgriCo to use. We were requested to feed the implementer with 
the requirements without any feedback then we were told a few months 
later to use the system” 
 
The newly appointed IT director played a significant role in turning the implementation 
process into a success. The primary success factor was that he engaged executive managers 
and end users through better coordination and more effective communication.  In effect, the 
process of capturing and identifying requirements became smooth and successful. The system 
administrator from AgriCo emphasised the role of communication in leading the second 
implementation to success by offering the following description: 
“If I am to summarise how the IT director turned the implementation from 
failure to success in one word; this is effective communication with business 
owners” 
 
In summary, the primary stakeholders of the first and the second implementation cycles 
were the CEO, the IT director and the implementer. The fourth stakeholder is the ERP 
vendor through their role in conducting the implementation health check process. 
 
It can be inferred that the stakeholder who recently joined the organisation made a 
difference and turned failure in to success through slight changes in understanding and 
managing their roles and responsibilities.  
The audit review, through the health check, redefined the roles and responsibilities among 
the implementer and the end users that covered the necessary details of the required 
documentation, business requirements, etc. It states clearly that end users should own the 
process and therefore it is their responsibility to identify their requirements, business 
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process, business practices and their future directions. The implementer, on the other hand, 
requested to assume the role to review end user‟s inputs and advise necessary feedback. 
This is very significant in case the mapping process of those requirements in the system 
can lead to any issues worth further reviews or problems to be resolved. The RCT report 
states: 
"The Implementer is requested to prepare necessary documentation for each 
module that includes all AgriCo procedures, to hand over to the implementer 
key and special AgriCo business requirements and the proposed solutions.  The 
implementer is also requested to submit necessary changes to AgriCo in timely 
manner. AgriCo is requested to review and approve all documents taking into 
consideration to view it as these systems are tightly connected and integrated 
and to consider solutions for AgriCo as a one unit; to ensure that all submitted 
documents meet AgriCo requirements and needs”. 
     
The ERP vendor also advised all stakeholders regarding the possible risks associated with 
the implementation, along with the actions necessary to mitigate the risk (Table 6.7).  The 
end user‟s expectations towards the ERP benefits and results were also adjusted.  
Table 6.7. Risk Analysis : 2
nd
 Implementation AgriCo 
Risk Description Probability 
1 Project management: it‟s imperative that PM is dedicated to the project. Medium 
2 Resistance to change especially after the restudying of the requirements. Medium 
3 The only choice left is to redesign the chart of the account which leads to redoing the 
implementation. 
Medium 
4 Implementer may not agree to make agreed changes. High 
5 The absence of technical qualified team from AgriCo. Low 
6 Readiness of  key data: (the possibility that opening balances not ready in the needed 
time especially inventory) 
Medium 
7 No approval from AgriCo on suggested solutions, especially that procedures need to 
be completed thereafter. 
Low 
8 The experience level of the team who handles procedures compliance and complete 
procedures with the new system. 
Medium 
9 Continuity of the task force (possibilities of resignations during the implementation) Low 
 
6.2.3.3 The ‘’Future of AgriCo’’ Project Analysis 
6.2.3.3.1 The Change of ERP Ownership Observations 
Two different IT directors took the lead of the first and the second implementation cycles, 
and the manufacturing general manager was appointed to lead the third implementation 
cycle. This decision was made based on the second health check recommendations that this 
implementation cycle should be managed by the business side and not from the IT 
department. 
 
Transferring ownership, along with project management, from the IT department to 
business owners can be seen as positive. The analysis, however, shows a lack of detailed 
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roles and responsibilities of the new project manager. More specifically, there is no clear 
mandate that governs the relationship between him as project manager from the business 
side and other business owners and functional managers. Neither the detailed roles and 
responsibilities provided nor his mandate empowered him to take necessary actions at the 
process level. This is can be seen as a root cause of most of the “future of AgriCo project” 
issues. 
 
One of the earliest challenges he faced was the absence of proper documentation of the 
existing practices. Although the ERP team had done this process on the business owner´s 
behalf, it was a challenge to convince business owners to agree on the existing practices. 
The PM expresses his frustration and states: 
“Business owners do not have documented business process that explains what they 
do. So as part of the project we have did this documentation on their behalf but we failed to 
make them agree and sign for the existing practice.” 
One of the findings is that when business owners are asked to implement best practices, they 
fail to choose or determine what they consider to be the best practices. 
The project manager states: 
“When it comes to make the business owner to sign he demands for getting best 
practices or alternatively request the team to sell the system to them where the 
project manager said with laugh „I am sorry I am not a salesman‟”  
 
6.2.3.3.2 Business Process Hidden Cost  
 
The example of the issue of the integration between the sales transactions (see section 
5.4.1.4.1) demonstrates how un-identified processes that need to be streamlined or 
improved can lead to hidden costs. The application and manufacturing manager states: 
“Since we gave up in pursuing support from sales manager to implement a 
process that ensure aggregation of sales values to be posted to ERP without any 
further changes thereafter, we chosen to develop a process of getting sales data 
Table 6.8  Examples of business process deficits - AgriCo 
No Description 
1 The major focus from the time of ERP evolution within AgriCo was to implement the system „as is‟, 
which explains AgriCo‟s tendency to avoid being involved at the process level 
2 During the second stage, after the failure of the first one, AgriCo chose to shorten the 'as is‟ scope 
rather than getting involved in business process management 
3 The “future of AgriCo” stage which again focused on the process improvements, was addressed 
through the applications implementation alone, without any parallel effort to address the business 
process management issues; that  shortfall resulted in the project failing to reach the full closeout and 
the Manufacturing Director suffering the consequences 
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from each sales outlet on daily bases and we handles the integration and all 
necessary administrative sales activities without the knowledge of the sales 
department” 
 
This example demonstrates the hidden cost of not defining and optimising existing processes 
and business practices before ERP implementation reached an advanced stage. It may be 
observed that the RCT report of the first health-check states: 
"We must indicate that AgriCo must change some business processes and 
cycles to leverage the system benefits” 
 
However, the prime mission of the critical process of phase one was to migrate the data from 
the legacy systems to ERP successfully and discard the legacy systems. The “future of 
AgriCo” stage, which focuses on the process improvements, was addressed through the 
applications implementation only, without any parallel effort to address the business process 
management issues. The “future of AgriCo” phase consists of several mission critical 
processes, which include: 
1. Monitoring company performance. 
2. Shortening the financial closing times. 
3. Reducing the cycle times. 
 
Each main process should have been reviewed in detail, in order to ensure full understanding 
of the existing sub process and business practices. Had this been undertaken, this would have 
opened the door for various improvements to the process itself.  
Since mission critical processes were not managed properly, end users hide their resistance to 
change the existing practices and processes using various excuses such ERP deficits, 
incompetent consultants, failure to recommend best practices from the system, etc. 
 
If such a process-based review had been undertaken and an updated processes and business 
practice had been agreed, end users could then have been educated, at the process level, 
regarding what they would have been expected to do differently and how ERP could, 
thereafter, have been expected to assist them in managing the new processes and practices.  
In the absence of proper management of the mission critical processes including conducting 
necessary training on process management, conflict is expected to emerge between end users, 
ERP project manager and consultants. 
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The “future of AgriCo” project manager states: 
“When it comes to conflicts, I have seen conflicts evolve from the lack of ERP 
understanding that includes understanding ERP outcomes to be perused. This lack 
of understanding advocates basic educational sessions to be provided to executive 
managers from ERP team and it‟s not easy for senior executive staff to accept being 
educated by ERP consulting team!! This is where more resistance to change 
increases which motivates conflict acts to evolve” 
 
The PM Manager elaborates on what he states by giving an example of the required decision 
in choosing the appropriate costing method in order to configure finance module according to 
that method. The CFO justified the delay in making such decision that he expects from the 
ERP team to suggest best practices in choosing the appropriate method.  
 
6.2.3.4 Project Management  
Project management differs between the three implementation phases. The project 
management was explicitly considered a failure in the first implementation cycle. The 
success made in project management in the second implementation cycle, on the other hand, 
can be seen as a direct result of the compliance project management recommendation part of 
the health check. The audit process by the health check properly identified three main project 
management stakeholders, namely the implementer, AgriCo and the project manager. Table 
6.9 shows specific project management roles and responsibilities for both the implementer 
and AgriCo. The primary role of the project manager was to go through the list, finalise it, 
conduct frequent meetings and resolve pending issues. This includes ensuring obtaining sign-
offs for each task. 
Table 6.9 RCT Recommendations for Project Management 
No Implementer is requested to: AgriCo is requested to 
1 Define a project protocol that includes all team members, 
advisory committee members, project managers, meeting 
dates, introduce demonstrating outputs for review and 
approval and all other necessary information that helps the 
project management 
Implement the suggested project 
structure especially the project 
sponsor, advisory committee and 
project manager. 
2 Assign a qualified project manager to review the project 
status and ensure the quality of the implementer‟s work. 
Work with the implementer to conduct 
regular meetings at the taskforce and 
the advisory committee level. 
3 Amend project plan as needed and review such amendments 
with AgriCo management 
Ensure proper documentation of the 
minutes of meetings (MOM) 
 
The third implementation cycle can be considered as a moderate success in terms of project 
management. The primary deficit of the project management resulted from the unnecessary 
dragging out of several action items and the inability to develop a formal closure for the 
project. The difference between the second and the third implementation cycles, from a 
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project management perspective, can be seen with regards to two issues. First, the scope of 
the “future of AgriCo” stage is concerned with the business process management aspects. The 
scope of second cycle, on the other hand, is limited to implementing the “As Is‟‟ modules. 
Second, the third implementation was dealt with as an internal project, so there was less 
pressure from external stakeholders to bring this project to a formal closure stage.  
 
Table 6.10 explains the project management ranking and differences between the three 
implementation phases. 
Table 6.10 Overall Ranking of Project Management Use – Agrico Case 
 1st Cycle 2nd Cycle 3
rd
 Cycle 
Objective Implement ERP  
„as is‟ 
Implement ERP 
 „as is‟ 
Align business process 
Results Failure Success Survival 
Project 
Management 
Description  
A number of PM 
techniques and tools used, 
but in a typical task list 
format assuming total 
ignorance of the change 
process and the end user 
engagement. The result 
was that the potentially 
good aspects of project 
management practice did 
not lead to ERP success 
PM management tools 
and practices used in a 
more realistic and 
rational view of the 
nature of ERP project. 
The project 
management process 
places a lot of 
emphasis on the 
coordination of 
activities that ensures 
in high quality results  
This stage provides 
more insights into the 
underlying business 
processes and the real 
ERP implications on 
business activities. It 
shows, however, the 
minimum use of project 
management practices, 
formalities and tools 
 
6.2.3.5 Leadership 
The leadership spirits and practices can be explained using different examples from 
the three ERP implementation phases. 
 
The first leadership finding can be seen from the capacity of the new CEO leadership to 
turn the failure of the first implementation cycle into a success. The challenge that faced 
the first cycle coexisted with major changes in the organisation, as most of the line 
managers were changed. There was, as a result, a complete de-motivation towards the ERP 
implementation.  The new CEO led the process by admitting the failure and taking proper 
actions and decisions that are summarised in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11 The Actions Taken by the CEO between the 1
st
 & 2
nd
 implementation phase - AgriCo case 
No Description 
1 Meeting with concerned members to admit the failures and to suggest a new way to move forward. 
2 The hiring decision of a qualified information systems director to lead the ERP process. 
3 The support of allocating budget to hire a qualified ERP applications consultant. 
4 The empowerment of the IS director including the first health-check process and the hiring of the 
new implementation consulting team. 
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The second leadership observation can be extracted from the behaviour of the project 
manager during the second phase. Although he was empowered and supported by the CEO, 
the PM tends to use his influence and communication skills with key users and he avoids 
using the CEO´s power to enable key users to cope with the project requirements. The project 
manager tends to obtain the buy-in from the business owners to the system by convincing 
them of the systems benefits rather than using enforcement. 
 
The CEO demonstrated another leadership model upon starting the third implementation 
cycle. Before the evolution of the “AgriCo future” project, several complaints were noted by 
the vast majority of executive staff on the ERP product, where explicit pressure was exerted 
to influence the CEO to replace the existing ERP vendor. The CEO took the lead and listened 
to all the different opinions, and he decided to invite the existing ERP vendor to conduct a 
second health check to find out whether the ERP vendor need to be replaced by a new 
alternative or not. At the same time, he took a courageous decision and appointed the 
manufacturing director to lead the project that was named, at a later stage, as “the future of 
AgriCo”, which implicitly meant that ERP ownership was transferred from IT to the business 
side.  
Table 6.12 Leadership Examples : AgriCo 
The CEO Role and the First Failure 
The first failure coexisted with major organisational changes The new CEO led the process by 
accepting the failure, taking important decisions and nurturing several initiatives that included: 
1. Meeting with the ERP team members concerned, in order to admit the failure and suggest a 
new way forward 
2. The decision to recruit a qualified Information Systems Director to lead the ERP process 
3. Allocating budget to recruit a qualified ERP Applications Consultant 
4. Empowerment of the IS Director, including during the first health-check process and 
recruiting a new Implementation Consulting Team 
PM Leadership of the Second Project 
The Project Manager's leadership behaviour during the second phase was demonstrated by his 
tendency to use his influence and communication skills with key users and to avoid employing the 
power delegated to him by CEO power, in order to ensure that key users to coped with the project 
requirements. 
The CEO‟s Leadership in Initiating “Future of AgriCo” 
Before the evolution of the “AgriCo future” project, several complaints had arisen about the ERP 
product, these coming from the majority of executive staff engaged in the project; there was 
explicit pressure on the CEO for the existing ERP vendor to be replaced. The CEO listened to all 
the different opinions and decided to invite the existing ERP vendor to conduct a second health 
check and to formally capture all the deficiencies and to examine all the complaints made by the 
executive managers.  At the same time, he appointed the Manufacturing Director to lead the 
project that was known, at a later stage, as “the future of AgriCo”. 
The Manufacturing Manager Leadership vs. “The Costing Method” 
The PM of the third implementation stage demonstrated excellent influencing skills to get tasks 
done. Most of the accomplishments achieved through the influence role he played with business 
owners and end users and through management power he has granted from the CEO. Despite 
resistance to change from the business owners; he extended his efforts towards developing their 
skills and knowledge and motivated them to implement the system successfully. 
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6.2.3.6 Integrated Training Plan 
The analysis of the case reveals that the training process in the first implementation cycle was 
inadequate and was confined to the form of instructor-led sessions. Poor training, as per the 
health-check, combined with disengagement of the IT department in the first implementation 
cycle, represented a prime reason for the failure. On the other hand, the effective training 
process turned the second implementation to success. Moreover, it ensured sustainable 
knowledge transfer after the go-live stage, as the IT department took the lead in facilitating 
and implementing the required ERP future enhancements and maintenance. 
 
The RCT report states: 
"The ignorance of engaging IS team in the beginning of the project to be 
actively involved in the implementation activities lost the knowledge 
transfer process to be completed that include system and database 
maintenance, training for new end users, modifications and development of 
new reports, possibility of implementing new modules and application 
support for end-users” 
 
Table 6.13 describes how the proper definition of roles and responsibilities between AgriCo 
and the implementer led to the training success. 
 
Table 6.13. Roles and Responsibilities - ERP Training: 1
st
 health check-AgriCo 
No Implementer is requested to: AgriCo is requested to 
1 Evaluate the training process, end user requirements and 
prepare the integrated plans to retrain end users. 
Evaluate trainees after each 
training course and identify their 
strengths and weaknesses in order 
to 1) achieve better results and 2) 
to recognise the adherence of 
applying the system as per AgriCo 
policies and procedures. 
2 The training is to be designed as per the approved 
implementation methodology. 
3 To link training between system capabilities and business 
practices of AgriCoAssign qualified project manager to 
review the project status and ensure the quality of the 
implementor work. 
 
The review of the difficulties and challenges that emerged in the „‟future of AgriCo‟‟ project 
revealed training deficits. The training shortages were found in the business process 
management as they represent a prime reason for not achieving higher ROI value. The second 
implementation stage did not suffer from the absence of the business process management 
training as the scope of this was confined to the „As Is‟. 
 
The holistic analyses of the case, including all phases, demonstrate the absence of an 
integrated training plan. Dominant training efforts primarily covered the application and 
technical aspects of the system. The painful experience the „future of AgriCo‟ project 
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manager had gone through can be seen to be connected to the lack of ERP knowledge by 
business owners. This knowledge gap could have been filled through extended and 
integrated training plans that should cover applications and process management. The PM 
indicated that he had noted such a knowledge gap but that he found it very difficult for 
business owners to admit their need for ERP training, especially if it was received from the 
PM directly. The “future of AgriCo” project manager stated: 
“I have realised the significant ERP understanding gap. If such gap was 
addressed properly and filled through adequate integrated training plans 
most of the critical implementation issues would have been resolved easily 
and much more benefits achieved from ERP. Moreover, the project would 
have been completed successfully on time. I tried personally to fill this 
knowledge gap but I failed as I found it was not easy for senior executive 
staff to accept being educated by ERP consulting team!!” 
 
 
6.2.3.7 Go-Live Vs. Audit Process Analysis 
The first and second implementation cycles indicate that go-live outcomes can act as an 
accurate measure of success or failure. It can assess whether the implementation is properly 
planned and the implementation steps were followed. The detailed go-live plans during the 
second implementation cycle represent valuable lessons. The health check suggested detailed 
procedures that should be followed by the implementor and reviewed by end users. The 
process starts with evaluating each module in terms of the go-live readiness (Table 6.14). 
 
Table 6.14. The Audit Assessment Categories of ERP Modules – AgriCo case 
No Category Description 
1 In-adequate The status is unacceptable as there are still serious problems that affect the 
project. 
2 More development 
required 
The completed task, either by AgriCo or the implementer, represent a 
minimum acceptance standard but it‟s subject to improvement. 
3 Adequate The completed task either by AgriCo or implementer is acceptable. 
 
There are two supporting lessons that can be learned from the first and the second 
implementation cycles related to the data migration and to the procedures for the final move 
to the production. Before any module is approved for the go-live, it is necessary to review the 
procedures and work instructions. Necessary amendments can be made as needed before an 
official change request to install the new change in the production. Once system staff receive 
this formal change request, another review from the system perspective will be received, to 
allow an assessment of how these changes are to be incorporated.  
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Part of the reason for the failure of the first implementation cycle related to data migration, as 
per the RCT report, which stated: 
¨there was no clear strategy on data that need to be migrated to the new system” 
 
This go-live point, therefore, is an excellent time point at which to review the data migration 
process, including a review of what data needs to be migrated, when the data might need to 
be migrated, and who will verify or will be accountable for the testing and verification of the 
data after it has been migrated. Fig 6.4 summarises the necessary steps, work instructions and 
procedures for the go-live stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of the „future of AgriCo‟ did not reveal technical problems during the go-live 
transition, and AgriCo didn‟t need a third party consultant to assist the IT department. This is 
proof that the organisation, at that stage, had reached a confident level that the local staff  
were capable of managing this process. In summary, it can be argued that the preparation of 
the go-live represents an excellent opportunity in the reviewing of the roles and 
responsibilities among stakeholders and to evaluate the implementation. Furthermore, this 
review requires necessary corrective actions to be taken that ensure the implementation is 
back on the track of achieving a higher ROI. 
Complete 
procedures & 
work instructions 
Verify 
procedures 
System 
Inspection 
Necessary changes to the system 
Announcement 
of the real use of 
the system 
1. Study business 
procedures 
suggested by 
Implementor. 
2. Add necessary 
procedures. 
3. Review these 
procedures by 
AGRICO. 
4. Plan for the 
transfer to the new 
system. 
5. Complete user 
1. Make necessary changes to the system as per 
the procedures under the condition that it does 
not require major changes to the core design 
like charter of accounts, multi-org, etc. 
2. Build and configure the integration of 
employee master, payroll & inventory with the 
Finance. 
3. Ensure consistency between the system, 
procedures and work instructions. 
4. Necessary customisation. 
5. Full test from AGRICO side 
6. Approval by AGRICO. 
7. Complete user training. 
8. Transfer of previous year balances. 
9. Announcement of the new system 
 
1. Plan for the 
transfer to the new 
system. 
2. Complete user 
training. 
3. Transfer of 
previous year 
balances. 
4. Announcement of 
Fig 6.4. Final completion procedures – AgriCo 
Case 
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6.2.4 Further Analysis – ServCo 
6.2.4.1 Roles and Responsibilities lessons 
This case clearly demonstrates roles and responsibilities lessons that can be discussed in line 
with the implementation phases. 
 
6.2.4.1.1 Transition from the First to the Second Implementation Cycle  
The description of this case demonstrates that, at the time of launching the project, 
fundamental issues emerged from the O&M partner that required enormous changes to the 
implementation. ServCo, however, took the lead in revisiting the existing implementation in 
order to make the necessary amendments to comply with the O&M requirements. It can be 
concluded from the analysis of the ServCo efforts that proper management of roles and 
responsibilities played a significant role in this recovery process. Once the ERP team realised 
the significance of the issue, a proper definition of stakeholders, roles and responsibilities 
was developed and converted into an action plan. 
 
The roles and responsibilities started with the end users who formally requested that they 
actively use the system and report in writing all observations on the systems behaviour, 
starting from three days of the announcement. The IT support team also formally requested to 
register all observations in a newly created enhancement log; the project manager assumed 
the responsibility of strictly managing this process until the existing modules reached a 
stabilised state and a clear view of the extra enhancements was required. Despite the 
difficulties faced in the first implementation cycle, it can be argued that the revolutionary 
roles and responsibilities management review among the stakeholders facilitated 
development of a strong base for the second implementation cycle to successfully renovate 
significant parts of the first implementation cycle deficits. 
  
6.2.4.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities Lessons from the Second Cycle  
While analysing the project plan start-up activities of the second implementation phase, an 
interesting finding can be perceived. The implementer had suggested a very clear, realistic 
and fair roles and responsibilities definition. The ServCo project manager demonstrated 
excellent leadership in assuring a full commitment of the definition of these roles and 
responsibilities.  
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The second implementation cycle project manager offered the following description: 
“The second implementer has successfully absorbed the legacy implementation 
issues, rectified all pending problems, implemented needed additions and 
produced excellent support services. The roles and responsibilities definition 
provided by the implementer has proven to be a prime success factor that paved 
the rout for the third implementation phase success“ 
 
Table 6.15 demonstrates examples of the proper identification of roles and responsibilities.   
 
Table 6.15 Roles and responsibilities- Project management:  2
nd
 implementation – ServCo 
Responsibilities Activities for the Role 
Implementor is 
requested to 
1. Define a project protocol that includes all team members, members of the 
advisory committee, project managers, meeting dates, introduce demonstrating 
outputs for review and approval and all other necessary information that helps 
the project management 
2.  Assign qualified project manager to review the project status and ensures 
quality of Implementor work. 
3. Amend project plan as needed and review such amendments with ServCo 
management. 
ServCo is 
requested to 
1. Implement the suggested project structure especially project sponsor, advisory 
committee and project manager. 
2. Work with Implementor to conduct regular meetings at the taskforce and the 
advisory committee level. 
3. Ensure proper documentation of the minutes of meetings (MOM) 
ServCo Project 
Sponsor 
1. Provide management sponsorship and direction to the project  
2. Provide limited time for executive interview and review project progress  
3. Chair the steering committee meeting  
ServCo Project 
Manager 
1. Conduct reviews and weekly status meeting  
2. Engage with Infosys support manager in decision making process around – 
support processes  
3. Facilitate management decision and approvals  
4. Facilitate project infrastructure availability and activities scheduling  
5. Single point of contact for Infosys team from communication perspective  
   
6.2.4.1.3 Roles and Responsibilities Lessons from the Third Cycle  
The analysis of the third implementation phase demonstrates the effective management of 
roles and responsibilities. Table 6.16 demonstrates precise roles and responsibilities for the 
stakeholders from the implementor side. The definitions include project manager, functional 
analyst, change consultant, functional subject matter expert, technical developer and quality 
assurance. 
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 Table 6.16 Stakeholders roles and responsibilities – Implementor Part 
No Stakeholder Roles & Responsibilities  
1 Project Manager 1. Lead the finalization of the project work and resource plan 
2. Create the Deliverable Responsibility Matrix 
3. Lead the creation of required project planning and status documentation  
4. Monitoring Risks, Issues and Quality  
5. Support the measurement and monitoring of progress  
6. Help manage scope, schedule, budget, quality and risks 
7. Provide risk mitigation strategies and execution 
2 Functional Analyst 1. Create Business Process requirements  documentation   
2. Create Custom Functional Design                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
3. Support the development team for technical design   
4. Configuration of the System     
5. Build and Execution of Test Scripts     
6. Execute the Training to Trainers                                                                                                                                                                                  
7. Execute the conversion activity    
 Change consultant 1. Lead the creation of Communication Strategy  
2. Lead the creation of the Training and Performance support Blueprint and 
Strategy 
3 Functional Subject 
Matter Expert 
1. Provide overall product Knowledge or extensive Industry Knowledge 
2. Assist in the final decision of the product fit gap analysis 
4 Technical 
developer 
1. Create Technical Design for Customizations 
2. Build custom and interface program 
3. Create Conversion Script 
4. Execute product Test 
5. Participate in the Integration Test 
6. Fix issues with RICEW items uncovered in testing 
5 Quality Assurance Interact (on-site or remotely) with the project team to ensure that the work 
performed meets our high standards of quality 
 
Table 6.17, on the other hand, demonstrates precise roles and responsibilities for the 
stakeholders from the ServCo. It further includes the required timings from each stakeholder 
in the implementation.  The stakeholders are categorised in teams where every team member 
assumes similar roles and responsibilities in his specific area. 
It can be argued that such clarity and detailed roles and responsibilities assisted ServCo in 
developing a mature understanding of how they can be effectively involved in the 
implementation. It enabled ServCo to positively respond to the implementation requirements 
in a timely manner, which led to the avoidance of unnecessary delays and allowed optimal 
ROI from the ERP investment. 
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 Table 6.17 Project team roles – ServCo Part 
No Team Stakeholder Time Roles and Responsibilities 
1 PMO Project Director 20% The Project Director will be involved also in 
planning and mobilizing Finalization (leverage 
Compass resource) 
2 PMO Project Manager  60% ServCo PM in Plan phase is assumed high level 
of involvement based on the nature of the phase 
3 PMO PMO Analyst 40% Support of PMO (leverage Compass resource) 
4 Functional 
Team 
Business Leads 30% Usually he is a selected and trusted 
representative of the Business Users Functions, 
with corporate visibility and authority. He will 
act as a gateway with BU for Planning of 
Workshop to be held in Analyse phase. He will 
act as the gateway for the user‟s community, 
facilitating communication and decision 
making, one for each functional area related to 
HQ (Fixed Asset, Sourcing, and Self Service). 
5 Technology 
Team 
IT focal points 30% Specific skills in current IT capabilities 
supporting such processes. Able to discuss/ 
report/ communicate on current practices, and 
act as a catalyst/ change agent on to-be 
practices. In this phase, there is just one at the 
HQ level 
6 Technology 
Team 
Support DBA 
*per each area 
30%* The role will bring the required knowledge in 
the areas of DBA, System Administration and 
NW (LAN, etc.) – Among these 3 roles it is 
expected that one resource will act as prime and 
will support the documentation finalization.  
7 Change 
Team 
Change Manager  20% 
 
Representative of HR department  - To cover 
also the Change Management part – He will be 
assumed to be the gateway with Business Users 
for Training needs and schedule finalization and 
for the Communication Plan (leverage Compass 
resource) 
8 Change 
Team 
Business Analyst Change 40% Assist the Change Manager in his daily work 
 
 
6.2.4.2 The Adverse Effects of Neglecting Stakeholders 
This holistic review of the implementation process including the analysis of the difficulties 
and issues that emerge indicates a neglecting of the requirements of prime ERP 
implementation stakeholders. This mistake is a direct result of improper engagement and 
roles and responsibilities definitions among the prime stakeholders involved at the initiation 
stage of the ERP. The ERP plans were developed by government staff using government 
practices. The transition process of ServCo from government to the private sector was 
ignored whilst preparing the RFP and ERP Contract. The transition period required dual 
processes of private sector and government practices. The purchasing system for the 
government practices, for example, is governed by the Ministry of Finance rules and 
regulations. On the other hand, the private sector, which is the legal entity of ServCo, ought 
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not to follow the government purchasing system. This is because of the bureaucratic nature of 
the government purchasing systems that lacks the adequate flexibility to deal with ERP 
complexity and uniqueness. 
 
From the labour perspective, the labour law to be followed by the private sector is governed 
by the General Organisation for Social Insurance (GOSI), while government employees 
whom worked physically in ServCo under the secondment agreement were still governed by 
the government labour practices, policies and procedures. The stakeholder‟s identification 
and roles and responsibilities management are poorly defined and badly managed. The first 
implementation, as a result, lacks the proper base where the ERP team can make the 
implementation successful. The weak base of the implementation, due the previous problems 
described, led the ERP team to be in a confused state regarding addressing the requirements 
of end users. More precisely, they could not configure the ERP to cope with the real day-to-
day business operations. Further details on the effect of neglecting stakeholders for functional 
managers and O&M partner is explained in the sections below. 
 
6.2.4.2.1 Neglecting Functional Managers 
The ERP implementation was designed based on the policies and procedures that were not 
considered in the involvement of the operating and maintenance partner. In effect, it assumes 
that operation level staff received all their instructions from their line managers as per the 
organisational structure of ServCo. The O&M partner, however, was responsible and 
accountable for the knowledge transfer process including the hands-on aspects and on-job 
training. DiversCo operation teams reported technically to supervisors from the O&M party, 
which is different from the official reporting, as per the DiverSco structure.  
 
At the time of launching the ERP end users in several areas suffered from the fact that they 
were reporting to the two different line managers, one from ServCo and the other from the 
O&M partner. From the technical and knowledge side, they should report to the O&M 
appointed manager and for other issues they report to ServCo managers. However, in reality 
it is not easy for the staff to differentiate on when to report to either manager. In HR areas, 
the ERP could not serve most of the employees who have not yet transferred their contract 
from the government to the company. Their legal reporting is neither governed by the 
policies and procedures nor by the current ERP configuration. 
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6.2.4.2.2 Neglecting Operations & Maintenance Partners 
The neglect of O&M as a prime stakeholder has not only affected the ERP implementation 
investment but it has also adversely affected the business profitability. The reason is the 
contract with O&M states that a success fee is to be paid to the O&M partner based on the 
saving from water consumption; which is conditioned by tracking the consumption by ERP. 
As ServCo could not include consumption tracking in the first ERP project, the full success 
fee has to be implemented regardless of whether an equivalent saving is made or not. The 
effect of such neglect in ERP implementation context is best described by the O&M internal 
report to ServCo, which was written after it realised that the ERP would not be ready. 
The O&M partner states: 
„Amongst other things, ServCo is required to submit its Initial Service Delivery 
Plan for ICT by the completion of eighteen months of the contract signing. The 
ICT strategy is conditioned by the current situation, which is dominated by the 
absence of ERP and associated business systems, which we had expected to be in 
existence at the Commencement Date‟. 
 
The report further explained how difficult the situation became as a result of this mistake. 
The O&M report further states: 
 „This places ServCo in an extremely difficult position as it means the 
development of information systems to support all of the separate business 
divisions (Water Supply O&M, Wastewater O&M, Asset and Investment 
Management, Customer Services, Financial Management, Human Resources 
and Support Services) will be delayed compared to our expectations contained 
in our Preliminary ICT Plan, thereby making it impossible to improve services 
to customers as quickly as we intended. The absence of the expected 
information systems is a recurring theme in all of the separate reports on these 
business functions, either submitted already or being submitted for approval at 
the same time as this document.‟ 
 
This problem of not completing software applications that tracks the consumption led ServCo 
to obtain huge extra unplanned funds for a new ERP project in order to rectify the situation. 
This unplanned cost adversely affected the ROI from the ERP investment. 
The O&M describes the sense of urgency by stating: 
 „We strongly urge ServCo top management to review its ICT Strategy as a 
matter of urgency as it will affect all water services to the whole of the country 
in the future. As the saying goes, the future will last a long time.‟ 
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6.2.4.3 People Servants to Policies, Procedures & Technology 
The basis for the requirements definition for the ERP implementation of the first 
implementation cycle was the policies and procedures of the organisation. The remarkable 
observation here was that those policies and procedures were developed in isolation from the 
management team of the organisation that were hired at later stage. Most of the functional 
manager‟s feedback remarks after testing the system indicate deficits in the policies and 
procedures, meaning that, in effect, the implementer regretted accommodating those changes 
as it would call for huge reworking efforts. Hiring the consultants to develop policies and 
procedures before the organisation officially formed might be looked at positively as a head 
start. However, ignoring the significance role of the functional managers and business owners 
in reviewing those policies and procedures is seen as unwise approach. As a result, although 
business owners recognised the deficits in those policies and procedures they were requested 
by the ERP sponsor to strictly adhere to it. This is has led to a situation where people 
(stakeholders) became in a position to serve those policies and procedures. The treatment of 
the policies and procedures led to an adverse effect upon the ROI as the role of the policies, 
procedures and technology is to serve the people to achieve business efficiencies. 
 
6.2.4.4 Proper Incentive Settings for ERP Stakeholders 
A positive observation from the case can be drawn from the alignment of the staff‟s 
incentives with their contribution and involvement in the ERP implementation. The pay 
schemes for ServCo are more attractive than the traditional government pay systems of the 
Ministry. Most of the staff who worked for the Ministry were eager to transfer to ServCo. 
The process followed that each candidate started to work physically for ServCo under a 
temporary secondment contract before his performance was evaluated. If the candidate 
achieved a good evaluation, then he could be recommended for the transfer. The CEO took 
advantage of the employee‟s motives to include ERP performance and contribution in the 
evaluation.  
 
6.2.4.5 A Smooth Knowledge Transfer Process  
One of the remarkable findings that distinguish this implementation process is the dedicated 
investment to the knowledge transfer. This process is managed through the use of the ServCo 
College, which is dedicated to the training management. The analysis of the success achieved 
in transferring the knowledge can be referred to a number of reasons. Firstly, the dedicated 
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team in managing the transactions and the activities of training has taken a lot of burden from 
the ERP project manager. This return allows the knowledge transfer team to focus not only 
on the training activities, but rather they managed to focus on the quality of the supporting 
knowledge transfer activities. This is including primarily the assurance of the quality of the 
training contents, outcomes and the trainees‟ abilities to leverage the knowledge they gained 
in achieving ERP goals. Secondly, the effective use of the „train the trainer concept‟ assisted 
in developing a culture of the training continuity where the new trainer become responsible to 
look after end users training needs permanently. Thirdly, a detailed breakdown of the roles 
and responsibilities in managing the training process led to the achievement of training aims 
and objectives. The ERP implementation team become the main customer of the ServCo 
college as they specified in detail what training objectives that need to be achieved by the end 
of each training process. ServCo college specialist‟s role is to design training contents that 
are in line with the ERP implementation aim and objectives. The role of the trainer becomes 
more clear by understanding in adequate detail what is the precise knowledge that needs to be 
acquired and why this knowledge is necessary for ERP success. The task, therefore, is to 
capture this knowledge before they can transfer this knowledge to end users through training 
courses and hands on sessions. The critical success factors of the ServCo College are 
presented in Fig 6.5. 
 
  
 
 
Critical Success Factors for 
ServCo College 
Spin-off Knowledge Transfer 
from ERP core activities 
Detailed definitions of the 
Roles and Responsibilities 
towards knowledge Transfer  
The Effective use of the „train 
the trainer‟ concept 
Fig 6.5 CSF of ServCo College  
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6.3 Comparative Analysis of the Four Cases  
6.3.1 Evaluation of the Implementation Projects 
The DiversCo and ElectCo cases had only one implementation project. The AgriCo and 
ServCo sides, however, have experience of three implementation projects. It is therefore, 
more useful to evaluate each implementation project to draw more lessons that can enrich the 
study analysis and findings. Based on this approach, the four cases consist of eight 
implementation projects that are evaluated based on the analysis of the each case (See 
previous sections) in Fig 6.6. 
 
Fig 6.6 Evaluation Summary of the eight ERP Projects  
 
6.3.2 The Early ERP Activities Comparative Analysis 
This section considers the findings from the comparative analysis of the first implementation 
phases, which begin with initiating ERP in the organisation until the contract is signed with 
the ERP vendor and the implementer. 
 
6.3.2.1 The Underlying Reasons for Adopting ERP  
Every organisation shows a different reasoning for considering the adoption of ERP 
implementation. In the case of ElectCo, the first reason for adopting ERP (Fig 5.5) was to 
meet the business expansion requirements. The second reason was the dissatisfaction with the 
legacy systems. For the DiversCo situation, the potential of an ERP solution was initially 
raised by the external management consultant, who had suggested it to the Company, as part 
of his remit to develop policies and procedures. The Y2K preparation prompted AgriCo to 
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consider ERP as a solution to that issue, in combination with the requirement to upgrade its 
legacy systems. The ERP also supported the holistic new management developmental plans 
that covered all business areas, including IT, as well as responding to the pressure from 
competitors, which had already implemented ERP systems. The main driver for ServCo 
adopting ERP was the privatisation process, in which ERP was considered as a fundamental 
part of the facilitating elements required for transformation from public sector to private 
sector practices. 
 
The comparative analysis of the early ERP activities indicates a number of reasons for 
organisations to pursue ERP implementation. Fig 6.7 attempts to demonstrate the reasons for 
organisations to pursue ERP implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.2.2 The Selection Process Management  
At this stage, ERP becomes part of the executive board agenda, in all cases; it was evident 
that product selection was the first step in the pre-selection preparation tasks and activities. 
The four cases show different stakeholders engaged in the selection process (Table 6.18). For 
ElectCo and AgriCo, the selection process was assigned to the IT department while a 
freelance IT consultant was engaged by DiversCo to conduct this task. For ServCo, the 
selection process was preliminary made as a direct influence from their sister company. Apart 
from the ServCo case, the level of involvement also differed across the cases (Table 6.18).  
 
 
 
 
 
 It may be noticed (in Table 6.18) that functionality comparisons dominated the selection 
process criteria at the expense of assessing organisational readiness. Minimal efforts were 
 Table 6.18: Selection Process Management - Comparative Analysis 
 Selection Process Management Extent of Involvement 
No Org. Key Stakeholder Major Criteria 
1 DiversCo IT Free Lancer Consultant  Only 50% functionality Focus 
2 ElectCo IT Executive Manager  >80% functionality focus 
3 AgriCo IT Executive Manager 60-80% functionality focus 
4 ServCo Sister Company Influence by sister organisation 
Figure 6.7: Reasons for organisations to purse ERP 
Legacy system limitation Competition 
 New management spirit towards 
development 
Business Requirements Y2K Privatisation 
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made in terms of assessing whether the organisation is ready for the change associated with 
ERP; or whether it was necessary to develop plans to prepare the organisation for 
accommodating such a massive change. Preparing the organisation for ERP implementation 
also differs across the four cases (Table 6.19). Each case has its own strengths and 
weaknesses in their efforts to develop its readiness for the ERP implementation. 
 Table 6. 19 Strength-weakness comparative Analysis :  Readiness Perspective 
Org No Strength Weakness 
D
iv
ersC
o
 
1 Hiring a GM with a solid ERP background. Difficulties in understanding the issue of including 
sales invoice of non-stock items. 
2 Optimal usage of the selection process to increase 
awareness 
Failure to define and communicate existing 
business processes  
E
lectC
o
 
1 Attending ERP events. Assign low qualified ERP coordinator for HR. 
2 Conduct internal process management review 
before ERP implementation. 
No effort made to prepare HR for the upcoming 
change. 
3 Arrange process management course attended by 
various departments & business units. 
Improper understanding of the nature of the 
business which adversely affect the change process. 
A
g
riC
o
 
1 Health check successfully determined the 
necessary actions that increase the readiness 
level. 
No readiness preparation made for the first cycle of 
the implementation. 
2 Hiring qualified leaders for the second and the 
third implementation cycles. 
Late consideration of the business process 
management until the 3rd Implementation cycle. 
S
erv
C
o
 
1 Developing motives within end users by linking 
the level of gained ERP knowledge and skills 
within their employment and career benefits. 
Poor readiness preparation for the line managers in 
the 1st implementation cycle through an exclusive 
focus on the policies and procedures. 
2 Comprehensive change management program 
embedded within the 3rd implementation cycle. 
No process readiness considerations that align 
ServCo processes with O&M partner‟s changes. 
 
Training and awareness management at this stage also represents an interesting comparative 
element. The understanding of the significance of ERP readiness is different in the four cases 
being investigated (Table 6.20). DiversCo and ElectCo demonstrate a higher awareness level 
compared to AgriCo and ServCo who demonstrate a lower awareness. The volume of the 
preparation activities to fill the readiness gap also differs across the four cases.  ElectCo 
shows large investment in preparation activities; only a small investment in the preparation 
activities by DiversCo and the first project of AgriCo. For ServCo, the investment gradually 
increased through the three implementation phases. 
Lastly, there are four forms of training provided at this stage of the implementation that 
includes technical training, training from ERP vendors, business process and the attendance 
at ERP forums. 
 Table 6.20 Training Investment – 1st implementation phase 
No Org. 
Awareness1 FR2 Forms of training 
Technical ERP vendor3 Business Process ERP events3 
1 DiverSco High Few No Yes No No 
2 ElectCo High Many  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 AgriCo Low Null No No No No 
4 ServCo Low4 Few No Few No No 
1 The awareness of the importance of training at the early beginning of the implementation 2  Refers to the Frequency 
and number of training activities 3 Refers to forums and conferences that address various ERP aspects organised by 
ERP vendors 4  The awareness improved gradually and became optimal in phase three  
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6.3.2.3 Defining Roles and Responsibilities  
The performance of defining the roles and responsibilities among stakeholders is differing 
between the four cases during the preparation stage of the implementation. The differences 
between the cases are demonstrated in Table 6.21. 
Table 6.21 :Roles and responsibilities definitions – 1st Implementation phase 
Case Rank  Strength Weakness 
DiversCo Good 1. The GM has adequate clarity and 
experience in managing the roles 
and responsibilities. 
2. The supervisory consultant is 
assigned to manage the roles and 
responsibilities 
1. No role is defined to who 
should review the business 
processes. 
2. The roles and 
responsibilities are not 
documented. 
3. The definitions of the roles 
and responsibilities is not 
well-communicated 
ElectCo Good 1. 70% of the business owners are 
aware with their roles and 
responsibilities. 
2. The implementation methodology 
document include a formal 
documentation of the roles and 
responsibilities 
1. Very poor management of 
roles and responsibilities 
in HR modules. 
2.  Lack of defining roles and 
responsibilities  
AgriCo 1
st
 Project Poor NULL 1. Roles and Responsibilities 
not defined. 
2. Misleading communication 
2
nd
 Project Excellent Roles and responsibilities are: 
1. Well-defined. 
2. Well- documented. 
1. Well- communication 
The scope is limited to 
implement „As IS‟ so 
defining roles and 
responsibilities was not 
challenged by implementing 
process-based parts  
3
rd
 Project Fair Transfer the ownership role 
including the overall responsibilities 
from IT department to the business 
side 
1. In-adequate clarity in 
defining roles and 
responsibilities 
2. The definition of  roles 
and responsibilities lack 
necessary details for what 
is required from other 
business owners 
ServCo 1
st
 Project Poor Developing policies and procedures 
by specialised consultants  
1. Roles and Responsibilities 
not defined. 
2. Misleading 
communication 
2
nd
 Project Very 
Good 
Roles and responsibilities are well-
defined., well- documented and 
well- communication 
The scope was limited to 
renovation of the previous 
project 
3
rd
 Project Excellent 1. Roles and responsibilities are 
well-defined, well- documented. 
and well- communication 
2. The creation and effective use of 
SevCo College 
Null 
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6.3.3 Implementation Comparative Analysis  
6.3.3.1 Requirements Definition 
The requirements definition process is the first step after the implementer started his 
assignment. The management of this process among the four cases demonstrates different 
performance results (Table 6.21). ElectCo and DiversCo achieved good ranks compared to 
ServCo and AgriCo. The prime difference was that the two organisations did not need to 
repeat the implementation as they managed to identify, to a great extent, what they targeted to 
achieve. AgriCo and ServCo achieved better results in capturing their requirements at the 
second and third implementation phases. Although DiversCo and ElectCo achieved better 
results in capturing the requirements, both cases consist of a number of failed experiences 
(Table 6.22). The third implementation project in ServCo case can be seen as an ideal 
practice of defining ERP requirements which led to higher ROI. Apart from this good 
example, the comparative analysis demonstrates (Table 6.22) 1) a lack of the process of 
defining ERP requirements, and 2) the adverse effect of the poor management of defining 
ERP requirements to the ROI.   
 
Table 6.22 Requirements Definition – Various Comparative Analysis 
The rank of the overall structure and systematic requirements (poor, fair, Good, Very good, Excellent) 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
Good Good Poor1/Good2 Poor1  /Excellent2 
Examples of negative impact resulted from bad management of requirements definition process  
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
Automatic invoice 
generation for the 
fashion SBU. 
HR modules 
configuration. 
For the first cycle, end users were 
completely disengaged and the 
requirements definition doesn‟t reflect 
practical business requirements. 
The complete reliance on 
policies and procedures for 
requirements definition of 
the 1st cycle. 
1. The issues of 
including sales invoice 
items that do not exist 
in the inventory. 
1. Planning 
module 
The second and the third 
implementation cycles showed 
incidents of configuring the system 
based on assumptions without relying 
on solid approved requirements 
definition. 
1. The ignorance of the 
O&M contract in the 
requirements definition of 
the 1st cycle. 
The availability of holistic requirements definition and approvals 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
No No No Yes4 
Examples of the requirements definition gaps that ERP could not handle 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
The chosen ERP 
lacks the point of 
sales features and 
facilities and its 
integration with 
back-office 
information systems  
The chosen ERP product 
lacks the abiliy to provide 
online links between end user 
ERP screens and the policies, 
procedures and work 
instructions. 
The chosen ERP lacks the abilities 
to capture remote transactions using 
PDA devices that are needed by the 
mobile sales and distribution 
activities such as shipping, handling 
and loading products from/to sales 
and distribution outlets. 
The chosen ERP could 
not handle the O&M 
requirements fully; 
where a new system is 
purchased and 
integrated with ERP at 
later stage 
1  Poor rank for 1st implementation cycles , 2  Good rank refers to  2nd and 3rd implementation cycles 3 Poor for 1st 
cycle; Excellent for the 3rd cycle 4 For 3rd cycle only 
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6.3.3.2 Conflict Management 
The four cases demonstrated several aspects of conflict resolution and management. In the 
company DiversCo, conflict management and GM leadership were seen as complementary to 
each other in regards to ERP success, as shown in several observations. The unwritten 
strategy set by the GM was that, for ERP to succeed, the consulting organisation and 
DiversCo team should act like a unified team. There were incidents where key DiversCo 
users complained to the GM regarding the performance of the ERP consultants; the resulting 
technique, used by the GM, was always to focus on resolving the issue rather than taking 
action against the consulting company. In fact, the GM always motivated the ERP team to 
consider the knowledge deficits of ERP consultants as opportunities to advance their ERP 
knowledge through the ownership of resolution for various ERP support issues.  
 
The implementation process in the ElectCo case consists of several examples that highlight 
the occurrence of conflict and its consequent management. 
The main four areas where conflicts were developed (table 6.23) are 1) the temporary conflict 
between the PM and the finance team leader, 2) the conflict between the costing manager and 
the finance consultant, 3) the conflict between the acting material team leader and the 
consultants  and 4) the various conflicts in HR implementation. 
Apart from the HR conflict incidents, the previously extracted approach in managing the 
implementation has successfully resolved these conflicts without unnecessary escalation. 
 
The ElectCo Company‟s Human Resource (HR) team was a source of conflict incidents, at 
different levels that included the internal conflict between the HR and the IMIS departments; 
examples include the conflict between IMIS and implementer, between the implementer and 
the vendor, and various incidents between the implementer and the HR department. 
 
 Learning about managing conflict in HR implementation is summarised in the following 
points: 
1. The most important learning resulted from the IMIS department and the implementer, 
demonstrating a true cooperative partnership. The internal IMIS department took the lead 
by criticising the inefficiency in the HR area, which had stalled the ERP implementation;  
this action assisted in exposing the weaknesses in HR operations relevant to successful 
ERP implementation 
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2. The ElectCo and implementer Project Managers jointly took a wise decision that the 
issues with the HR implementation should not adversely affect the implementation of the 
other modules. The timing of escalating knowledge of HR deficiencies to the CEO was 
skilful because the success made in other implementation areas provided definite 
evidence that the source of the HR implementation failure came directly from the HR 
department. 
3. The interventions of the COO and the CEO were professional and effective, since they 
both insisted on resolving existing problems rather than apportioning blame or diverting 
attention towards contract disputes. 
 
For AgriCo, the conflict between different ERP stakeholders in the case varies in the different 
stages of the implementation. However, since the “future of AgriCo” stage reflects a more 
mature implementation process, the conflict was critically reviewed and the analysis inferred 
that the root cause of the conflict was the lack of understanding of the ERP and the results 
that could be achieved. The “future of AgriCo” Project Manager states:  
“I have seen conflicts evolve from the lack of ERP understanding, in terms of 
expected outcomes to be perused. This lack of understanding can be resolved through 
training sessions provided to executive managers. However, it is not easy for senior 
executive staff to accept being trained by the ERP consulting team! This incites 
greater resistance to change, which generates the evolution of conflict” 
 
The PM cited his experience with the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) when he delayed approval 
of the costing method that was critical for the ERP configuration. The CFO denied causing 
delay and stated that he expected the ERP team to suggest the best practices for him to 
choose from, and that they did not do so, which proves their incompetence. Such statements 
from the CFO further confirmed that such conflict resulted from a poor understanding of ERP 
concepts and his roles and responsibilities as the business owner to define precisely the 
business roles and requirements.  
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Table 6.23. Conflict management - comparative analysis summary 
The rank of the overall structure and systematic requirements (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent) 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
Excellent Very Good Good1/Fair Fair2/Good/Excellent 
Conflict management summary 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
The GM used his authority to place 
pressure on the consulting and 
vendor company by deducting from 
invoices and delaying some 
payments for the underperforming 
pieces of work, however, he protects 
the implementation plans by his 
rational use of these acts. 
The proper conflict 
management resolution by the 
PM with the finance team 
leader, has not only resolved 
the conflict, but also 
transformed the attitude of the 
financial team leader to assist 
the ERP team to manage 
conflict incidents effectively 
throughout the implementation. 
For the second and 
the third 
implementation 
cycles, no conflict 
found between 
AgriCo staff and 
consultants. Most of 
the conflict cases 
emerge between 
AgriCo staffs.  
The foundation of the 
1st implementation 
cycle is full of a lack 
of clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, 
which created an 
environment that can 
nurture conflict; 
however, the proper 
interference and 
decisiveness of the 
CEO reduced the 
conflict effects.  
In case DiversCo staffs complain 
on the lack of knowledge by the 
consultants, the GM encourages 
DiversCo staff to take the lead to 
resolve the issues that the 
consultants failed handle. The GM 
approach that the gain from 
developing the knowledge 
outweighs the effect of the 
knowledge deficit by the 
consultants. 
This conflict between the 
costing manager and 
consultant, which escalated to 
the CFO, was resolved in no 
more than half an hour by wise 
interference of both project 
managers (ElectCo & 
Implementor). 
 
The CEO and the 
IT director for the 
2nd cycle and PM 
of the third cycles 
played different 
roles in managing 
conflicts. 
The 2nd and the 3rd 
implementation 
cycles clarified in 
adequate details the 
roles and 
responsibilities 
which left no room 
for conflict to evolve 
and grow. 
The consulting organization was 
never dealt with as an external 
body. 
 
The COO and CEO 
interferences were wise and 
practical. They insist on fixing 
problems rather than fixing 
blame. 
  
A couple of decisions were made 
to replace the key users who 
demonstrated a continuous 
confrontation stand against the 
consulting company. 
   
1  Poor rank for 1st implementation cycles, Good rank refers to  2nd and 3rd implementation cycles 2  The conflict 
management improved gradually among the cycles 
 
6.3.3.3 Leadership  
Diversity in the leadership style was indicated in all four cases by the acts and practices 
observed. The General Manager of DiversCo demonstrated positive leadership qualities in the 
various implementation stages.  
Examples of leadership observed from DiversCo general manager are shown in Table 6.24. 
 
Table 6.24 Leadership examples - DiversCo general manager 
No Example description 
1 The General Manager engaged the entire team including branch managers, key users and end users for a 
joint meeting to announce the ERP project initiative. 
2 The General Manager participates in attending the demonstration sessions provided by the three ERP 
competitors. His presence to those sessions demonstrate his motivates business owners and end users to 
play positive role in the success of ERP implementation. 
3 The GM was accessible to all the teams, individuals and groups who were trying to resolve issues or 
seeking solutions. Such practices convey a clear message that the ERP implementation has priority; 
therefore the fast track channel can be employed to accomplish it. 
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The ElectCo ERP Manager demonstrated an excellent leadership model as is evident from 
several examples. The first leadership indicator was his effort to recover the ERP initiative, 
after the project was cancelled with the previous ERP vendor. His prompt attitude in 
suggesting, developing and executing an alternative plan and leading the effort until ElectCo 
signed a contract with the alternative vendor took six months, compared with the two and a 
half years for this to occur with the previous vendor. The second indicator is the ability to 
motivate, support and empower IMIS members to lead all ERP modules. The third indicator 
is the capability to motivate, support and empower team leaders from the business side so that 
they facilitated and executed ERP activities; this demonstrated his skill in influencing key 
business users without having been given explicit organisational reporting power as a key 
success factor. The fourth indicator was a positive, strong intervention to defend the 
implementer and the independent consultant on a number of occasions. He emphasised that 
ElectCo was always expected to own the implementation. The fifth indicator was a caring 
approach that was demonstrated to all the team, including members who do not belong to his 
department or section. 
 
The ElectCo case was rich in other examples of good leadership practices by the stakeholders 
that included, but were not limited to:  
 The ElectCo CEO, COO, CFO, Purchasing Manager and IMIS Director 
 The ElectCo ERP Project Manager 
 The Implementor Project Manager 
 The Implementor General Manager 
 
Examples of leadership observed from ElectCo stakeholders are shown in Table 6.25. 
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Table 6.25 Leadership Examples - ElectCo Case 
ElectCo ERP Project Manager 
The first failure coexisted with major organisational changes; most of the line managers changed 
along with complete a demotivation owing to the ERP failure.  The new CEO led the process by 
accepting the failure, taking important decisions and nurturing several initiatives that included: 
1. Meeting with the ERP team members concerned, in order to admit the failure and 
suggest a new way forward 
2. The decision to recruit a qualified Information Systems Director to lead the ERP process 
3. Allocating budget to recruit a qualified ERP Applications Consultant 
4. Empowerment of the IS Director, including for the first health-check process and recruiting a 
new Implementation Consulting Team 
Project Manager from Implementer Side 
The implementer‟s Project Manager‟s leadership style is evident from several examples. First is 
the immediate attention to, and a prompt response to, any issues raised by any stakeholder. 
Second, although maintaining a calm leadership approach, he adopted more aggressive behaviour 
especially if he sensed actions/attitudes that would have a significant adverse effect on meeting 
the deadlines. 
General Manager from the Implementer´s side 
Although his involvement in the implementation was limited, it was noticed that whenever he 
intervened, his influence was remarkable. He maintained a calm, confident and professional 
approach in all encounters with ElectCo executives. Whilst never accepting explicit blame 
directed at the implementor side, he took neither a defensive nor an attack position against 
ElectCo, at any time; take, for instance, his remarkable intervention in the ITEM master data 
migration and the conflict in the HR area. 
CEO 
demonstrated management commitment at the beginning of the implementation and took the lead 
in major changes, such as ownership of the planning module, rectifying implementation in the HR 
area and engaging and encouraging executives to own, learn and participate in the ERP 
implementation 
COO 
was the true sponsor of the ERP; always approachable and visible supporter to ensure all the 
necessary encouragement and empowerment for the ERP and the ERP team, in order to make it 
successful 
CFO 
Leadership observed primarily as: 
 demonstrating his commitment to successful ERP implementation to the Finance Team by 
insisting and ensuring that all the financial and audit requirements were met flawlessly 
within the ERP implementation stage 
 providing support and influence in other areas of the implementation that did not fall under 
his direct supervision 
IMIS Director 
Although he delegated power to the Computer Systems Manager for the majority of ERP 
activities, he mediated remarkably as follows: 
 Led in supporting and strengthening the Project Manager's position during the peak of the HR 
conflict 
 Supported, motivated and empowered the Project Manager, including nominating and 
supporting the ERP Project Manager to receive the highest presidential award. 
 
 
For AgriCo, the examples of leadership spirit and practices described are derived from the 
three ERP sub-projects (Table 6.26). 
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Table 6.26 Leadership Examples - AgriCo Case 
The CEO Role and the First Failure 
The first failure coexisted with major organisational changes; most of the line managers changed 
along with complete a demotivation owing to the ERP failure.  The new CEO led the process by 
accepting the failure, taking important decisions and nurturing several initiatives that included: 
5. Meeting with the ERP team members concerned, in order to admit the failure and 
suggest a new way forward 
6. The decision to recruit a qualified Information Systems Director to lead the ERP process 
7. Allocating budget to recruit a qualified ERP Applications Consultant 
8. Empowerment of the IS Director, including for the first health-check process and recruiting a 
new Implementation Consulting Team 
PM Leadership of the Second Project 
The Project Manager's leadership behaviour during the second phase was demonstrated by his 
tendency to use his influential and communication skills with key users and to avoid employing 
the power delegated to him by CEO power, in order to ensure that the key users to cope with the 
project requirements. 
The CEO‟s Leadership in Initiating “Future of AgriCo” 
Before the evolution of the “AgriCo future” project, several complaints had arisen about the ERP 
product, and these came from the majority of executive staff engaged in the project; explicit 
pressure to influence the CEO that the existing ERP vendor should be replaced. The CEO listened 
to all the different opinions and decided to invite the existing ERP vendor to conduct a second 
health check and to formally capture all the deficiencies and to examine all the complaints made 
by the executive managers.  At the same time, he appointed the Manufacturing Director to lead 
the project that was known, at a later stage, as “the future of AgriCo”. 
The Manufacturing Manager Leadership Vs. “The Costing Method” 
The Manufacturing Manager, who acted as the PM of the third implementation stage 
demonstrated excellent influencing skills to get tasks done. Most of the accomplishments were 
not achieved as a consequence of the power he received from the CEO and, despite resistance to 
change from the business owners, he extended his efforts towards developing their skills and 
knowledge and motivated them to implement the system successfully. 
 
6.3.3.4 Business Process Management 
The four cases exhibit the diverse understanding and management of business processes 
within the companies. There were no formal considerations of business process management 
for DiversCo; discussions concerning the business processes took place after the realisation 
that some failures were a consequence of the lack of understanding and management of the 
business processes. A good example that generated awareness of this factor was when 
salesmen in the retail electrical business unit show rooms reported that they could not create 
sales invoices from the system. An investigation of the failure to produce these documents 
revealed that some items were included in the sales invoice but there was no inventory 
record, since other, non-standard items, were bought and sold as needed to complete 
customer orders. There would have been significant savings in the implementation cost, if the 
business process concerned had been reviewed at an early stage of the implementation, 
including suggesting various options to manage this process effectively. As a temporary 
solution, the decision was made to suspend the link between the warehouse and the sales 
module, in order to allow inclusion of non-stock items in the sales invoice; this represented a 
temporary solution but under-utilised the integration functionality of the system.  
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Another example was the HR management of the contracted labour, who were not assigned 
employee numbers since they were not working under the sponsorship of DiversCo. As a 
consequence, they were unable to complete the online timesheet, their remuneration was not 
recorded in the project costing, and as a result the costing was inaccurate. These types of 
issues were finally resolved after all unnecessary extra costs had been incurred, in terms of 
time, money and the adverse attitude that developed as a result of the problems. There were 
several process management efforts within the ElectCo case; which led to the success of 
identifying and optimising various critical processes, as shown in Table 6.4.  
 
On the negative side, the case of the planning module and the failure to run MRP from the 
system revealed that there was inadequate consideration given to the process change 
requirements in this area. Additionally, the very limited benefits from the project module 
revealed that no-one led the integration of scattered administrative and non-administrative 
transactions necessary for there to be a project-driven basis. The project module failed to 
capture all the data, which can be explained by the project manager relying on the project 
module to master all project attributes. For AgriCo, one of the main findings discovered after 
the first and major failure was that AgriCo must analyse and change parts of its business 
processes. The health check report stated: 
"We must indicate that AgriCo must change some business processes and 
cycles to leverage the system benefits” 
 
The analysis of the case shows that AgriCo failed to consider the importance of business 
process management, as is inferred by the examples summarised and discussed in Table 6.8. 
For the ServCo case, the analysis shows that the ROI was significantly affected by the failure 
of managing business processes within the roles and responsibility context. These main 
processes were namely: 1) Optimising warehouse and inventory management; 2) Defining 
the HR processes to accommodate government employees and newly hired; and 3) O&M 
processes requirements.  
 
6.3.3.5 Project Management 
All four cases show common project management concepts and practices, however, each case 
had its own style of adopting them; the diversity of project management adoption allows a 
comparative analysis to indicate interesting findings. Since AgriCo had been through several 
implementation cycles, its findings are discussed separately. DiversCo adopted only simple, 
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basic project management tools and practices, with minimum use of formal style of 
communication and documentation; face-to-face communication was predominantly used.  In 
comparison to DiversCo, ElectCo employed more formal project management practices, 
although analysis of the findings still suggested excessive use of informal tools and practices. 
The style of project management employed in ElectCo played a significant role in the 
implementation success. From a stakeholder‟s project management perspective, DiversCo 
and ElectCo, indicated two aspects worth focusing on: 
 
A milestone focus rather than a typical project time line follow-up  
In the DiversCo case, the project reviews from the supervisory consultant and the GM were 
in the form of verbal discussions. The primary issue was to always monitor, review and 
update milestones and deadlines, as well as problems and suggested solutions that hindered 
progress in meeting deadlines and achieving milestones. Similarly, the analysis of the 
ElectCo project management attributes showed that both PMs placed most of their focus on 
goals, deadlines update and review; only limited consideration was given to the detailed 
project plan and the task list review. It can be inferred that both organisations focused on 
identifying selected goals as milestones, and to drive the whole team to meet those 
milestones. Each milestone was treated as if it is an independent project and sufficient 
flexibility was provided to each module team so that it could manage the project schedule of 
its part.  This contrasts with the traditional timeline view often employed in project 
management. 
 
Quick Wins 
Analysis of the behaviour of both DiversCo´s GM and the supervisory consultants revealed 
that their focus was on how to develop quick, multiple and repetitive wins. This became 
evident from the tremendous pressure to expedite the parallel run and to stress the need to 
discard the legacy systems to rely only on the ERP, at least for financial modules. The new 
section created for the two members who assumed several developmental initiatives show 
how keen the management was to recognise members who contributed positively to the 
success of the implementation. The early launch of the purchasing module, on the other hand, 
demonstrate this, since the ElectCo managers, department heads, COO and CEO all started to 
use the new system to record their approval online. The impact of that action placed more 
pressure on the remaining implementation areas in order to complete their implementation 
contributions. The key learning that resulted was that the project manager must ensure that 
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the project plan includes some „quick wins‟ as early milestones, which must be achieved. 
ERP implementation is a lengthy and resource consuming project so it is not uncommon for 
the ERP team to become bored easily. ERP success is not easily sensed at the departmental or 
individual level, therefore „quick wins‟ are crucial to maintaining momentum and positive 
spirit until the project accomplishes its targets. 
 
AgriCo Project Management Review  
For AgriCo, the lack of project management skills and practices represented a core reason for 
the failure of the first implementation cycle; the absence of real project sponsorship, 
especially after the previous project manager left, represented a major finding concerning that 
project failure.  The health check described this:  
“Only few key decision makers from AgriCo participated and their minimal 
presence made the effort less connected and lacking integration and there was 
inadequate documentation of the agreed actions and solutions between AgriCo 
and Implementor” 
 
At the same time, the adherence to project management roles and practices created success in 
the second implementation cycle, since the health check reports fully explain the project 
management roles of the organisation and the implemented. Table 6.27 provides the 
suggested roles and responsibilities related to project management for the implementor and 
the AgriCo. 
 
 Table 6.27 Proposed roles and responsibilities – Project Management : AgriCo 
No 
Roles and Responsibilities for the Second Implementation Cycle 
Implementor AgriCo  
1 Define a project protocol that includes all team 
members, members of the advisory committee, project 
managers, meeting dates, introduce representative 
outputs for review and approval and all other necessary 
information that helps the project management 
Implement the suggested project structure 
especially the project sponsor, the advisory 
committee and the project manager. 
2 Assign qualified project manager to review the project 
status and ensure the quality of the Implementor work. 
Work with Implementor to conduct regular 
meetings at the taskforce and the advisory 
committee level. 
3 Amend project plan as needed and review such 
amendments with the AgriCo management. 
Ensure appropriate documentation of the 
minutes of meetings (MOM) 
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Table 6.28: Project management review : AgriCo 
 1st Cycle 2nd Cycle 3
r
 Cycle 
Objective implement ERP  
„as is‟ 
Implement ERP 
 „as is‟ 
Align business process 
Results Failure Success Survival 
Project 
Management 
Description  
A number of PM 
techniques and tools 
used, but in a typical task 
list format assuming total 
ignorance of the change 
process and the end user 
engagement. The result 
was that the good aspects 
of project management 
practice did not lead to 
ERP success 
PM tools and practices 
used in a more realistic and 
rational view of the nature 
of the ERP project. The 
project management 
process places a lot of 
emphasis on the 
coordination of activities 
that ensures quality results. 
This stage touches more 
insights into the 
underlying business 
processes and real ERP 
implications on business 
activities. However, it 
shows minimum use of 
project management 
practices, formalities 
and tools 
 
The overall project management process for the three implementation phases is explained in 
Table 6.29. 
 
Table 6.29. Project Management – Comparative evaluation (from 1 to 10) 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
6 7.5 5 8 
The use of project management tools  
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
Basic – limited More advance Basic – not limited Advance – not limited 
 
6.3.3.6 Training 
In the cases studied, the findings regarding the role of training were significant to both the 
ERP success and failure. The training awareness is discussed (see section 6.3.2.2) and the 
results of analysing the four cases towards training are demonstrated in Table 6.19. For 
DiversCo, the formal training was limited to product training which was provided in different 
forms: 
 Formal classroom training, as per the master ERP schedule. 
 Ad hoc training as needed in workshop form, in which participants were allowed to 
suggest different scenarios and ask the consultant to demonstrate the effect of each 
scenario 
In the case of ElectCo, the training that took place represented a remarkable attribute of the 
organisation. This holistic view confirmed that ElectCo considered training to be a priority 
(Table 6.20), as is inferred from the non-stop commitment to all the ERP training types and 
the appreciation of the taskforce who demonstrated the ERP skills received as a consequence 
of the training.  In addition, ElectCo‟s commitment to the ERP training was not limited to the 
product training, but also covered the technical and process management training. ElectCo 
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also encouraged the team to attend the ERP user groups, as another source of training from 
peers in different organisations. In fact, another remarkable advantage was that the ERP 
training started as a process at a very early stage of ERP history, and the learning and 
development culture of ElectCo evolved; it was not confined to implementing the ERP 
project. The exception to this was the HR department, which failed to demonstrate any 
consideration of training as a priority; in fact, it can be argued that most of the HR failures 
and problems came from underestimating the importance of the ERP preparation and 
training.  
 
For AgriCo, the holistic approach it took to the three ERP implementation cycles 
undoubtedly shows the correlation between the training and ERP outcomes. For example, the 
health check conducted between the first and second implementation cycles is evidence of 
this. The research findings were: 
“There was no training plan in place and the training material that had been handed over to 
end users was: 
 Limited to demonstrating how to navigate and access the system 
 The indirect training process was not conducted, since AgriCo users were 
completely disengaged from the process of building and configuring the 
system 
 All end users explained that the training was in-adequate, un-planned and very 
limited to specific parts” 
 
In fact there was no training plan that linked the ERP training with business practices, for 
which a comprehensive plan was required. The health-check report states: 
"Implementor is requested to: 
 Ensure the members of AgriCo IS Department and key users of the modules that 
are not yet implemented are adequately trained;  this is necessary to make sure 
that the modules, which have already been built and configured can be 
maintained before 1mplementor  complete their assignment 
 Evaluate the training process, end user requirements and prepare integrated plans 
to retrain end users 
 Design training as documented in the approved implementation methodology 
 Link the training between system capabilities and the AgriCo business            
practices”   
 
In regards to the role of the organisation assuming the responsibility for evaluating the 
training outcome, the health-check report states: 
"AgriCo is requested to evaluate trainees after each training course and to identify 
strengths and weaknesses, in order to achieve better results and to recognise that 
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adherence to applying the system as per AgriCo policies and procedures is 
critical”  
 
The analysis of the case, covering all phases, demonstrated the absence of an integrated 
plan. The various debates, discussions and end user reactions indicated the knowledge 
and awareness gap that should have been closed; training, at all stages, was limited to the 
application and technical aspects of the system. The training process was limited to 
instructor-led applications training complemented by self-learning and hands on support 
as the only other part of the training process. If more training efforts had occurred and 
there had been a focus on training and appropriate tools had been employed, the 
implementation process could have been faster and more successful. There were few 
team members that possessed the integrated knowledge, experience and educational 
background necessary, during all implementation phases. Closing the knowledge gaps is 
essential to ensuring that all ERP stakeholders have consistent understanding, which 
enables efficient implementation and effective use of the applications. 
 
The lack of training effort was complemented by recruiting qualified IT staff during the 
second and the third phase of the implementation and by using the ERP vendor for 
consultations, which addressed the training deficiencies. There should be a balance 
between recruiting sufficient consultants and relying on internal staff by training them. 
The consequence of prioritising cost savings above adequate training is that the learning 
curve normally exceeds the allocated period that was indicated in the implementation 
time plan. 
6.3.3.7 Technical Administration 
This section addresses a number of technical issues that include the ERP configuration, 
infrastructure development and „add-on‟ SW applications. The semi-standard ERP 
configuration process is that Application Consultants from the implementer side configure 
each module according to the details given in the requirements gathering document. This is 
followed by a test process, using the system in demo mode to avoid the risk of using the 
system directly in production and it being faulty. In the four cases, it was evident from the 
findings that limited quality assurance efforts took place throughout the whole process.   
The following examples from the cases inferred the testing inadequacies: 
1. For DiversCo, there was no evidence for any comprehensive test being made during 
the transition process from test to production platform 
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2. The failure in using ERP in DiversCo‟s remote factory, in ElectCo‟s repair facilities 
and data transmission from the field to AgriCo‟s headquarters, demonstrate the fact 
that the ERP plans lacked rigour and underestimated the technical and networking 
specifications considerations. 
The reasonable common practice in the four cases was that the organisations did have a 
technical team responsible for the technical infrastructure; their scope covered the network 
administrator and system administration. The implementer provided the necessary assistance 
to enable those teams to complete the technical structure required. Three cases demonstrate 
that the vast majority of testing and specification efforts were conducted on the basis of head-
office requirements and that remote sites, such as sales outlets, warehouses and factory plants 
were considered least.  The ElectCo case shows more effort in preparing the in-house systems 
and database administration for the ERP master database administration and technical 
infrastructure, as well as the support activities, in terms of training the staff and purchasing 
the advanced servers. Despite these preparatory efforts, however, the team could not 
anticipate the technical issues that arose at the time of launching the ERP in the repair 
facilities; this unexpected problem caused an extra two months of delay. Assessing and 
upgrading the link should have taken place at an earlier stage, in which both the implementer 
and the ElectCo Project Team should have considered the potential issues.  
 
The first implementation of the DiversCo case also indicates a number of issues that ensued 
from poor technical considerations of the remote site requirements. Implementing the ERP in 
the warehouse was significantly delayed as a direct result of this mistake. In the overall case 
of AgriCo, this aspect was very similar and almost the same conclusions could be drawn, for 
instance, the first phase failure demonstrates complete ignorance of the necessity for planning 
ahead regarding the infrastructure arrangements. This was followed by improper selection of 
the operating system, which was discovered during the system launch of the second phase. 
Another symptom of that deficiency was that the network link between the factory and head 
office failed, after the announcement had been made for the second phase go live stage. The 
health check process did not specifically include investigation of the infrastructure 
development and arrangement, which indicates a grey area, in terms of defining the roles and 
responsibilities as to who should have raised this issue, at what time, and who should have 
taken the necessary actions to avoid the failure. 
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Add-on Software Applications 
The two examples found in the DiversCo case were the point-of-sale and the HR software 
packages. The implementer‟s efforts to customise the new software, in order to integrate the 
HR localisation requirements with core ERP modules, failed before DiversCo decided to 
purchase a stand-alone software application and to discard the customised part developed by 
the implementer. ElectCo initiated a project to build a product database management (PDM) 
module for manufacturing and R&D requirements; the decision was made to address the 
integration between PDM and the ERP. During the ERP implementation, the end users 
realised that the PDM was a very advanced application that provided much more than 
ElectCo required and that there were no well-defined guidelines as to how or when product 
data management could be met, whether from PDM, ERP or from integration of the two. 
 
In both the first and second stages of the AgriCo implementation, no evidence was found 
about how the add-on applications would be integrated with the core ERP functions. The 
“future of AgriCo” phases reported an enormous delay owing to the underestimation of the 
time and effort required for integrating the stand-alone application that captured daily sales 
transactions and that were needed in order to post them to the finance modules. The 
significant delay did not, however, result from the add-on software development cost but 
from integration, which was tasked with deploying the application to thirty-two remote sites, 
requiring massive technical support and coordination efforts.  
 
6.3.4 ‘Go Live' and Post Implementation Comparative Analysis  
This section explores the implementation process before and after the „go live‟ stage; a 
comparative analysis of these dimensions for the cases studied will be conducted from a 
stakeholder and a roles and responsibilities viewpoint. The purpose is to infer the key 
learning points and common findings that, ultimately, enrich and complement the analysis of 
the two implementation phases. It will investigate how and when organisations decide to 
bring ERP implementation to a close, acknowledge its completion and how they maintain 
continuous improvements in the ERP. 
 
The four cases followed different routes to the project close-out.  In the case of DiversCo, the 
GM intervened and met with the implementer, the ERP vendor and the supervisory 
consultant, in order to shortlist the pending issues. The GM conducted a thorough 
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investigation so that he could distinguish between the tasks that were likely to be completed 
and other more difficult ones; a final plan was devised to tackle those items that fell under the 
„what can be done‟ category and complex issues were discarded. For ElectCo, all team 
leaders were requested to formally provide a list of all uncompleted tasks and then take the 
initiative to prepare a conditional sign-off sheet, which excluded the uncompleted tasks.  
 
Another clever initiative was to introduce a post implementation plan and explain, before the 
project close was announced, where those snag-listed items were included in the post 
implementation plan. In a similar manner to the positive effect of the post implementation 
plan in the ElectCo case, the two health checks from the AgriCo case assisted in the formal 
considerations of the project completion status. There was, however, no clarity in the project 
closeout for the third implementation cycle, probably because it was dealt with as an internal 
project, so there was less pressure from the external stakeholders to bring the project to a 
formal close-out stage. For DiversCo, the GM requested the supervisory consultant to list 
pending issues for the ERP project completion that included the areas that had been identified 
as having barriers to implementing ERP in some areas. The short list was included in the 
sign-off sheet that the ElectCo PM prepared for the five ERP modules. For AgriCo, the first 
implementation phase was admitted as closed, as an official failure, by the CEO intervention 
and the assignment of a health-check activity. For ServCo, the first implementation phase 
was closed by the termination of the contract with the first implementor as described in the 
case description. The second implementation was governed by a fixed contract, where the 
project is closed at the end of the agreed project period automatically. The third 
implementation phase was well planned and there were no issues in delaying the close-out. 
The primary reason was that the implementation had successfully executed a change 
management program.  Through the effective management of the ServCo College concept, 
end users became ready ahead of schedule and there was no need to request the consultants to 
extend their service. 
 
It can be concluded from the cases that the ERP sponsors needed to pay attention to the fact 
that the ROI might be significantly impacted if the ERP project had not reached an official 
close-out stage. This is including the possibility to pay extra fees to the consultants and 
engaging internal resources for extra timings without realising ERP benefits. It is, therefore, 
essential for ERP sponsors to intervene in order to bring the project to a closing stage. On the 
other hand, it has been observed that there is a correlation between open-ended ERP projects 
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and the bad management of roles and responsibilities among relevant stakeholders. This can 
be demonstrated because once an audit or review is conducted, it is expected to lead in 
finding improvement opportunities in enhancing the roles and responsibilities management. 
Table 6.30 summarises the symptoms for the necessity to close-out the ERP projects by its 
sponsors.  
Table 6.30 Symptoms for the necessity of ERP Project close-out 
No Symptom Description 
1 ERP Project Manager  alerts When ERP Project Manager communicating alerts that the 
ERP project is dragging  
2 Implementer pressure – Payments In case Implementer places pressure on releasing 
outstanding payments. 
3 Implementer Pressure – Cost In case implementer complain that the project cost is 
increased without compensation 
4 End user pressure for continuing the 
parallel run process. 
End user pressure for continuing the parallel run process. 
5 Top management frustration  Top management frustration owing the project length. 
6 Irrational business owners complain In case business owners complain on ERP outcomes without 
providing convincing reasoning that support their 
complains. 
7 Tension & Blame cultural acts When tension and exchanging blames among ERP 
stakeholders on ERP outcomes 
 
6.3.4.1 Post ‘Go Live’ / Post Implementation 
During this stage, DiversCo were found to have taken tangible roles and responsibilities 
actions that included: 
 The application consultant recruited to provide the first line support was asked to 
resign and his roles and responsibilities were transferred to the system administrator 
and one accountant 
 The recently created department for corporate finance and DiversCo audit, assumes 
the role of driving the continuous improvements, in leveraging existing features and 
implementing more, including new modules or supporting ERP applications 
  The supervisory consultant role was limited to settling pending payments with the 
ERP supplier and implementer 
 
DiversCo managed to implement three continuous improvements successfully without 
seeking assistance from the implementer or from the supervisory consultant; invoice 
generation from electrical show rooms, the online timesheet from the project side and the 
add-on software in the HR area. 
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The ElectCo case revealed that the ElectCo Project Manager had excellent timing to train and 
develop the top executives by introducing the post implementation stage and its on-going 
activities. The PM succeeded in appropriately meeting his expectations by drawing their 
attention to the common factor that organisations suffer from a temporary performance dip 
after reaching the „go live‟ stage and, since this message was successfully communicated to 
the CEO, the following actions were taken: 
 A package of reward and incentive schemes was approved for the ERP core team to 
recognise their achievement and to retain them for the post implementation phase 
 The CEO successfully convinced internal teams that the uncompleted tasks remain 
within ElectCo departments for completion; department heads who owned certain 
modules aggressively took the lead in completing their parts. 
 A subcommittee headed by the CEO was formed to redress the HR implementation 
failure. After close monitoring of the HR implementation activities, the HR Vice 
President resigned and a newly appointed executive was announced as the Acting HR 
Vice President. 
ElectCo did an exemplary job in preparing and training the organisation for the post 
implementation; the Project Manager and the IMIS Director chose the correct time to 
introduce the post implementation plan and to train the ElectCo executives to appreciate that 
the „go live' stage was just the end of the beginning and not the beginning of the end. The key 
messages the CEO received at the end of the „go live' presentation were that: 
 The „go live‟ stage is neither the end nor the only measure of ERP success. 
 The „go live‟ stage is the end of the beginning. 
 It is justified for the business to experience a performance dip at the „go live‟ stage 
 It places more pressure on the areas in which ElectCo had not reached the „go live' 
stage, primarily in the HR and the Projects area 
ElectCo managed to assume full responsibility in executing the incomplete ERP tasks 
mentioned in the conditional sign-off sheets, accommodate new changes and master the ERP 
upgrades. It is inferred from the holistic analysis of ElectCo‟s actions after the „go live‟ stage 
that ERP users respected the need for continuous changes and updates to the roles and 
responsibilities. The Director had ensured perfectly that any changes that needed to be 
implemented in the test server were conducted before they were transferred to the production 
version. 
For AgriCo the post implementation differed, based on each implementation cycle as follows: 
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 The failure of the „as is‟ stage meant that implementation did not reach post 
implementation owing to the complete malfunction of literally all predecessor tasks. 
 For the successful „as is‟ stage, it can be argued that AgriCo did not close the project 
properly and therefore that there was no suitable preparation for the post 
implementation activities, which created an unnecessary gap between the second phase 
and “AgriCo future project” achievement. 
 AgriCo failed again during that project when it struggled to close the project by 
developing a smooth transition to the continuous improvement loop
 
Figure 6.8. Performance Dip - ElectCo Internal Presentation 
6.3.4.2 Project Completion Review 
When DiversCo‟s GM realised that the ERP project would not be accomplished as planned, 
he devised a new plan with the supervisory consultants, who explicitly stated who should do 
what, in order to bring ERP project to its close. During the preparation of the plan, the GM 
suggested that the team should exclude certain areas/modules and admit failures to implement 
them, and that they should include only the successful parts in the final 'go live‟ handover and 
sign-off process. ElectCo, in contrast, used two initiatives to motivate its management to 
approve the project completion. Firstly, the Project Manager initiated the process of training 
and developing executive staff about the post implementation plans, emphasising that the 
ERP project sign-off and 'go live‟ were the end of the beginning rather than representing the 
end of the process. Secondly, the formal request addressed to all module team leaders to 
shortlist pending ERP actions was included in the conditional sign-off sheet for each module. 
The Project close-off was conducted based on the progress made in completing those actions 
that comprised the sign-off sheet. HR was an exception, as a new plan was developed to 
complete HR at the time where all other modules reach the go-live. The new HR plan is 
managed in parallel with the process of closing the contract for the rest of the modules. 
Eventually, minimal outcomes were achieved from the HR modules during the first 
implementation cycle.  
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The use of the health-check process between the implementation cycles helped AgriCo to 
expedite the project close-out of the first implementation cycle and also to set specific goals 
for the second implementation cycle. One health check helped the organisation to expedite 
the project completion process for two implementation cycles. It can, however, be seen that 
the case lacked the focus to address future ERP improvements adequately, since it took the 
company more than two years before it announced the third implementation cycle. During the 
third implementation cycle, executive management still showed limited understanding of 
what the company has achieved and what it still expected to gain from ERP implementation. 
For ServCo, the second project has not experienced any close-out difficulties due to 1) clarity 
of the scope and the detailed roles and responsibilities that had been defined early and 2) the 
project operates within specific time constraints. Since the implementor „I-b‟ completed what 
he has committed for and the project time line is completed the close-out was smooth. For the 
third implementation project, the primary influence that smoothed the close-out can be seen 
from the ServCo College. This is because by the time that the project reaches the close out 
stage ServCo members are the ones who lead both the implementation and the support. The 
presence of the consultants, therefore, is seen as unnecessary. ServCo members, were clear 
on their role and they understand what is required from them and from the consultants as this 
was part of the intensive training received. The first project in ServCo, on the other hand, 
faced difficulties in the close-out stage as most end users and the management were confused 
by the poor ERP results. Further complexity in closing the project found from the ignorance 
of the requirements of the O&M partner. 
The suggested ranking of the close-out performance of the eight projects of the four cases is 
summarised in Fig 6.9. 
 
Fig 6.9: Close-out ranking between the 8 Projects  
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Continuous Improvement Request 
Is Change in 
Roles & 
Responsibilities 
required?  
Amend Roles and 
Responsibilities as 
necessarily 
Improvement development Execution 
Pre Go live Test 
No 
Go live approved – the new improvement become part of the system 
Yes 
Fig 6.10: Roles & Responsibilities after Go-Live – ElectCo Case 
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6.3.5 Holistic Perspective - Comparative Analysis  
This section addresses a number of elements that have been extracted from a holistic review 
of the comparative analysis of the four cases. It is divided into the below sections and 
subtitles. 
 
6.3.5.1 Presence & Clarity of Business Strategy  
The four cases demonstrate different practices in terms of the existence of the business 
strategy at the time of deciding to adopt ERP as a strategic IS business enabling tool (Table 
6.31). Moreover, communicating business strategies to ERP planners at the time of deciding 
to adopt ERP and during the implementation process is another element across which the four 
cases show different behaviour and practices. 
 
 Table 6.31 Comparative  Analysis – ERP Strategy perspective 
Org No Strength Weakness  
D
iv
ersC
o
 
1 Clarity of vision with GM. Failure to obtain shareholder‟s commitment 
on implementing business strategy. 
2 Effective communication of business strategy to 
ERP team. 
Lateness in identifying core vs. secondary 
business. 
E
lectC
o
 
1 The company does prepare a three years business 
plan. 
The business plan does not include any 
reference to corporate strategy. 
2 The approved ERP guidelines act as an ERP 
strategy. 
The pressure to obtain IT strategy without 
developing corporate strategy. 
3 Effective communication of business changes to 
ERP team. 
 
A
g
riC
o
 
1 The two health-check documents and the third cycle 
of ERP implementation plan cover several ERP 
strategies aspects. 
The 1st implementation cycle started without 
proper strategy. 
2 The second and the third implementation cycle have 
and implicit strategy. 
Business strategy of the 1st cycle is not 
communicated & IT strategies. 
S
erv
C
o
 
1 The early consideration of ERP reflects the 
awareness of IS role to execute business strategy. 
 
The absence of coordination between O&M 
contract and ERP implementation.is an 
implicit sign of miss alignment between 
business strategy and ERP plans; and it 
reflects poor coordination between the two 
elements. 
2 A typical application of aligning ERP plans 
according to well-defined business strategy. 
 
3 The 3rd implementation cycle is: 
Excellent communication process between strategic 
directions and ERP implementation. 
 
 
6.3.5.2 Priority Management of Mission Critical Processes  
A number of processes in every case were in more critical need of being reviewed, 
streamlined, optimised or reengineered through the implementation process (Table 6.32).  
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Table 6.32 Priority management of critical processes – Comparative Analysis 
Org No Mission critical Description Special effect 
D
iv
ersC
o
 
1 Defining the core 
business.  
Initially DiversCo did not 
distinguish any business unit as a 
primary business. At a later stage, 
contracting becomes the primary 
business. 
1. Sanitary Implementation cost 
would have been saved. 
2.  Project modules would have 
been implemented. 
3. Specialised S/W for fashion. 
4. A middle tier ERP solution 
would have been chosen. 
2 For electro-mechanic 
SBU, to define the issue 
of selling non stock 
items. 
The dominant practice that sales 
invoices include items that not in 
stock. Those items are purchased 
and included in the same invoice 
as the stock items. 
The three ways matching 
between orders, receiving and 
shipping don‟t match in the 
system. Eventually the 
integration between sales and 
inventory disabled 
3 Real time invoicing and 
stock inquiry in the 
fashion business 
The necessity to facilitate 
automatic invoice generation from 
the outlets. In addition to 
facilitating the view of the 
availability of the size and the 
color among other shops and 
warehouses. 
All attempts made to satisfy 
those basic critical 
requirements failed and led to 
an inflation of the 
implementation cost, delaying 
the project and killing the 
morale towards using a system 
E
lectC
o
 
1 Aerospace and defense 
A/E compliance. 
Enforcements made until pre go-
live to impose  A/E compliance in 
all processes 
 
 
A tremendous effort, time and 
consulting fee would have been 
saved throughout selection and 
implementation. 
2 MRP automation 
process 
The insight analysis shows that 
ElectCo follows build-to-order 
manner.  Most orders differ from 
each other which makes the full 
automation of MRP inappropriate 
A
g
riC
o
 
1 New management 
initiated mega initiatives 
simultaneously 
Those parallel initiatives lack 
priority settings and realistic 
implementation plans. At very 
advanced stages of the first 
implementation cycle, most of 
those initiatives either suspended 
or cancelled 
The absence of priority 
settings, a distinction between 
missions critical vs. non-
mission critical and failure to 
provide quick wins caused to 
turn the implementation effort 
into failure.  
2 Executives are not clear 
whether profitability is a 
priority. 
Government is the prime 
shareholder and one of the 
founders of AgriCo. This is to 
ensure quality and continuity of 
supply of food and dairy.  
The lack of defining strategic 
motives between profitability 
and continuity of services and 
products caused business 
managers to be reluctant to 
decide on business processes. 
S
erv
C
o
 
 Optimising warehouse 
and inventory 
management. 
The inherited warehouses were 
huge and have never been 
organised or managed using any 
computer system. 
The underestimation of the 
effort to organise the 
warehouses caused significant 
delay and hindered the 
implementation.  
 Define the HR processes 
to accommodate 
government employees 
and newly hired. 
The policies and procedures 
(P&P) includes only non-
government employees. 
HR manager could not use ERP 
to handle government 
employees. A number of work-
around solution outside the 
system become a normal 
practice. 
 O&M processes No changes made to the existing 
processes as in effect of engaging 
O&M partner 
The implementation collapse 
and admits its inabilities to 
accommodate the O&M 
practices and requirements. 
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6.3.5.3 Various Roles & Responsibilities Comparative Analysis  
A comparative analysis of the overall management process of the roles and responsibilities 
among the four cases is summarised in Table 6.33. It includes the overall ranking of the roles 
and responsibilities management, the ranks of the use of third party consultants and a number 
of examples on the roles of the management of the roles and responsibilities to the success of 
the implementation. 
Table 6.33 Roles and Responsibilities -  Various Comparative Analysis  
Roles and Responsibilities Documentation (poor, fair, , Good, Very good, Excellent) 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
Poor Very good Good1 Excellent 
The rank of the use/proper use of  a 3rd party to supervise the implementation (poor, fair, Very good, Good, Excellent) 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
Excellent 
A supervisory consultant was hired to do 
this task completely from selection until 
a few months after the go-live. The 
respect for his role was excellent, as the 
GM hardly accepted blame from the 
DiversCo team towards the 
vendor/implementor performance; the 
focus always shifted to fix the problem 
Fair  
ElectCo did not hire a 
third party to assume 
this role apart of the 
limited involvement 
of the manufacturing 
consultant in a very 
few areas. 
 
Good 
No independent or 
3rd party to cover 
the full 
implementation but 
the proper use of the 
health check 
partially filled this 
gap. 
Fair 
No independent or 3rd 
party hired to interfere. 
However, the proper use 
of the assessment 
process improved the 
implementation process. 
The rank of the management of the roles and responsibilities in practice (poor, fair, Very good, Good, Excellent) 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
Very Good 
Despite the poor 
documentation of the 
R&Rs DiversCo ranked 
the best in terms of the 
distinction between 
R&Rs of the ERP vendor 
vs. the customer 
Very Good 
Despite the poor 
documentation of the 
R&Rs, SiversCo  ranked 
the best in terms of the 
distinction between R&Rs 
of the ERP vendor vs. the 
customer 
Good2 
There were only fair 
consideration of the R&Rs 
identifications and definitions 
however the effective use of 
the health check helped a lot to 
recover the R&Rs 
identification and application 
Poor/Excellent3 
Despite the poor 
documentation of the 
R&Rs DiversCo 
ranked the best in 
terms of the 
distinction between 
R&Rs of the ERP 
vendor vs. the 
customer. 
Examples of the effect of the management of the roles and responsibilities to ERP success (P: Positive ;N: Negative) 
DiversCo ElectCo AgriCo ServCo 
1. (P) The overall 
implementation 
survives despite 
massive strategic 
changes occur during 
the implementation. 
2. (P) Huge cost would 
have been incurred if 
improper applications 
of R&Rs between 
vendor-customer and 
within customer 
stakeholders 
themselves.  
3. (N) ITEM master 
migration plan resulted 
from the poor 
definition of the roles 
and responsibilities. 
1. (P) Finance modules implementation 
successfully implemented.  
2. (P) The overall implementation 
completed successfully (A plan vs. 
actual difference is good as per the 
literature). 
3.  (P) The organization became self-
dependent and managed to support 
the system and initiate further 
improvements initiatives. 
4. (N) ITEM master migration plan 
resulted from the week and 
disrespect of R&Rs. 
5.  (N) HR implementation had been , 
in reality, started after the 
contractual go-live date as a direct 
result of the ignorance of proper 
identification and application of 
R&Rs. 
1. (P) The success of 
the 2nd 
implementation 
cycle can be seen as 
a direct impact of 
the proper 
consideration of the 
identification and 
application of the 
R&Rs. 
2. (N) The total failure 
of the 1st 
implementation 
cycle can be seen as 
a direct impact of 
the absence of 
R&Rs identification 
and applications. 
1. (P) Second 
implementor success 
is connected with 
proper R&Rs 
definitions and 
practice. 
2. (P) R&Rs of the 3rd 
implementation cycle 
are properly defined 
and strictly followed. 
3. (N) The failure of the 
1st cycle resulted 
from poor R&Rs 
definition. 
4. (N) O&M issues is a 
pure adverse effect 
of poor R&Rs 
management.  
1 This rank for 2nd and 3rd implementation cycles as the 1st cycle was poor  2 1st cycle Poor; 3rd  in Excellent  
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6.3.5.4 The Role & Use of Supervisory Consultants  
The four cases indicate the role and the significance of the supervising and advisory party in 
setting ERP plans. Different forms of engaging the advisory and supervisory party in the four 
cases are self-explained by Table 6.34. DiversCo case demonstrated the most effective use of 
the supervisory consultant, despite the limited budget assigned for his service in the 
implementation. For ElectCo, the engagement of the independent consultant advocates 
necessary decisions to be made, however, his roles and responsibilities were not clearly 
defined. Moreover, nobody was assigned for the role of supervising the entire implementation 
process. The CFO attempted to assume this role partially by requesting that the finance team 
participate in each implementation area to explore any implementation gaps that might 
eventually affect financials. For AgriCo, the use of the supervisory role is primarily focused 
on assessing the implementation outcomes for the first and the second projects. The role was 
extended to set up the second and the third project plans only without any involvement during 
the implementation process. The third implementation project in ServCo case represents a 
full involvement of the supervisory consultant that covers the three implementation stages.  
This is because of the parallel change program that supports the ERP plan which ensures the 
sustaining and the transfer of the knowledge. The first implementation project shows no 
involvement of the supervisory role, which as a result led the relationship between ServCo 
and the implementor to reach a dead-end state.  
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Table 6.34 The use of the supervisory consultant 
Org Supervisory 
Form 
Involvement  nature and Timing Effect to the 
implementation 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
D
iv
ersC
o
 
Part time 
consultant  
From ERP product initiation 
until several months after the 
go-live stage  
Very positive 
Very effective 
The scope was 
not well defined; 
however the 
execution shows 
clarity of the 
roles and 
responsibilities. 
E
lectC
o
 
Consulting firm 
 
Very limited to suggest starting 
document for the RFQ 
document preparation  
Very minimal  
 
Clear and 
documented 
Independent 
consultant 
Five weeks divided into two 
visits (one week in the 
beginning and three weeks at 
later stage) 
Limited however, 
his presence 
advocate ElectCo to 
take necessary 
actions to move 
forward 
Not clear 
A
g
riC
o
 
Consulting 
team from ERP 
vendor site 
Two health check assignments 
between the first and the second 
and between the second and the 
third implementation cycles 
1. Their involvement 
after 
implementation. 
2. Their contribution 
limited to the 
setup preparation, 
don‟t cover the 
continuous 
supervision of the 
execution  
Clear and 
documented 
S
erv
C
o
 
Consulting 
firms hired 
specifically to 
assess the 
implementation 
position 
Comprehensive Assessment 
conducted after the 1
st
 
implementation cycle; the 
second one after the expiry of 
the second implementor 
1. The 1st 
assessment 
restricted to the 
application only. 
2. The 2nd 
assessment 
included process 
and overall 
business issues. 
Clear, 
comprehensive 
and documented 
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6.4 Summary  
This chapter has presented the detailed findings of the case studies under discussion and 
analysed in detail the successes and failures of the eight ERP implementations over the 
course of four case studies. 
This chapter has also sought to 1) provide an in-depth analysis of the case studies that have 
been described in details in chapter five  and 2) engage in a comparative analysis that takes 
account of successes and failures across all the four organisations.  
The complexities of each case make it difficult to categorise each implementation as an 
outright success or failure, with each company demonstrating mixed experiences at different 
stages of implementation. 
However, this plurality of experiences, even within one company, presents extremely 
interesting findings. Correlation may be clearly drawn between factors such as effective 
management, communication and planning, and successful outcomes leading to higher ROI.  
The results of the case studies indicate the critical importance of effective roles and 
responsibilities management, leadership and conflict resolution and staff training and 
education in bringing about successful outcomes for implementation. Furthermore, the role of 
key stakeholders should not be underestimated and a key theme emerging from the research 
is the need for a clear requirements definition and an evident business strategy. These themes 
will be addressed further in Chapter Seven in the discussion of overall findings.  
The following chapter will build on this analysis, exploring the critical nature of roles and 
responsibilities management and providing a comparative analysis of all four case studies.  
 
Discussion of Findings and Model Development                                                  7- 1 
Chapter Seven                                                                                                                        Page 1 of 66 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Discussion of Findings & Model Development 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the findings of the 
comparative analysis of the four cases using the literature review and the published 
case studies and surveys. The discussion is presented in line with three 
implementation phases 1) pre implementation, 2) implementation and post 
implementation including the go-live stage and continuous improvements. The second 
part attempts to derive the targeted framework based on the discussion of the findings 
of the first part of the chapter. 
 
7.2 Discussion of findings 
7.2.1 Discussion of Findings – Holistic View 
7.2.1.1 Communicating Corporate Strategy to ERP Project Team:  A Priority 
The relationship between ERP success and strategic plan has been discussed in 
Chapter five section (5.4.2.3). It is a common mistake that organisations make 
strategic decisions during ERP implementation without considering how such 
decisions may affect the implementation outcomes. Such lack of communicating 
strategic changes to ERP stakeholders in a timely manner can adversely affect the 
ROI. DiversCo and ServCo are good examples of how fundamental changes in 
business strategy that evolved in the middle of ERP implementation can adversely 
affect ERP ROI. The sanitary division of DiversCo was sold after the completion of 
its related ERP implementation. Furthermore, the sudden strategic diversion towards 
contracting conflicted with the chosen ERP product that was selected to satisfy trade 
and manufacturing.  
 
The contract with the O&M business partner, in the ServCo case, was not 
communicated in a timely manner to the ERP team. As a result, both business and 
ERP incurred considerable cost effects in terms of time and money to integrate O&M 
contracts with other business requirements, through the ERP implementation. The 
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ElectCo case shows how the implementation of planning modules failed due to an 
improper understanding of the business. The lack of clarity by AgriCo regarding the 
strategic priority settings between profitability and the continuity of supplying 
products meant that line managers were unable to decide on business processes.  
 
The importance of aligning business needs and business strategy with ERP 
implementation and project plans are well-documented in the literature and is 
considered a significant parameter in determining success of failure of ERP 
implementation (for e.g. Davenport, 1998; Holland and Light, 1999; Kang et al, 2008; 
Millet, 2013; Oana, 2010). Davenport (1998), citing examples of Dell, Dow 
Chemicals and others where ERP implementations failed, attributes the main reason 
for failure in each case to the lack of the alignment of ERP systems with business 
needs. He opined that “the companies deriving the greatest benefits from their (ERP) 
systems are those that, from the start, viewed them primarily in strategic and 
organizational terms” (Davenport, 1998, p. 10).  He even suggested that a firm should 
not invest in ERP at all until a thorough study of its business implications is done 
(Davenport 1998, cited in HsiuJu Rebecca and Chwen, 2004, p.208).  Markus and 
Tanis (2000) emphasised the importance of building a “business case for investing in 
an enterprise system” in the chartering phase to decide on the go-ahead for the ERP 
system.  
 
HsiuJu Rebecca and Chwen (2004), using case-studies of five large Taiwanese and 
US manufacturing firms, reiterated the importance of aligning competitive strategy 
and ERP plans and assert that “… many firms failed to recognize the benefits of ERP 
because of the lack of planning at the strategic level” (p. 218). Kang et al (2008), who 
conducted a study of 341 Korean firms who had implemented ERP systems between 
1998 and 2001, conclude that clarity of ERP implementation objectives and ERP 
alignment to business needs produce better business performance. Oana (2010) 
stressing the same principle, investigated the relation between ERP‟s “strategic 
alignment” and its successful implementation using data collected from 87 of the 
largest companies in the Nordic countries region through surveys. She found that the 
“results showed that the more the ERP system strategy was aligned with the business 
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strategy, the more likely that the ERP project was completed on budget and on time” 
(Oana, 2010: p. 164).  
 
Ghosh and Skibniewski (2010) rate “ineffective strategic thinking and planning” as a 
key risk factor (RF) with maximum complexity. Their study was based on all likely 
risk factors mentioned in Moon‟s (who compiled the same) review of the ERP 
literature (313 articles from 79 journals) from 2000 to 2006 (Moon, 2007). The 
alignment problem caused by lack of fit between existing business process and off-
the-shelf standard vendor processes can decide the success of failure of an ERP 
implementation (Pnina et al, 2005). Thus, we can conclude with what Ike and Mogens 
(2005) state in their study: “Implementing an ERP system requires a thorough 
strategic thinking that allows companies to gain better understanding of their business 
processes” (p. 547) 
 
7.2.1.2 People should not be considered as subservient to technology 
It has been found from the cases studied that ERP can only generate its targeted 
benefits if stakeholders use it properly, something that can only be attained if the 
complete implementation process is properly managed. This is only achieved if 
process management and technology are considered to occupy a subservient role to 
stakeholders and the not the reverse. 
 
The analysis of the first implementation cycles in the Agrico and ServCo (section 
6.2.4.3) cases demonstrate that people become servants to policies, procedures and 
technology. When people became subservient to policies and procedures, such as in 
the ServCo case, the implementation failed. This finding is supported by the literature; 
Deloitte (1999) makes it very clear that ERP, at its core, is a people project. In their 
study on justifying enterprise resource planning adoption, Oliver and Romm (2002) 
explore the justification for ERP through locating the debates surrounding the 
adoption of the system in the context of communication, rationality and domination. 
The types of domination of stakeholders which ERP is related to are technology, 
process and organisation The paper contends that, in spite of the claims of ERP 
advocates to empower stakeholders to undertake their roles and responsibilities more 
efficiently, and with greater freedom, „there is some evidence to suggest people are 
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considered to occupy a subservient role to technology, process and organisation‟ 
(Oliver and Romm, 2002: p. 199). 
 
7.2.1.3 The IT role versus IT department role  
It has been found, in all the cases that have been investigated, that it is a common 
practice for ERP sponsors to rely heavily on the IT department for, and during, the 
ERP implementation. Examples from the four cases can be seen from the significant 
IT role in the ERP selection process (Table 6.18) where the process was led by IT 
departments and consultants. It was found that the IT department role facilitates and 
enables ERP implementation to succeed. However, this role is not and should not be 
stretched in order to perform activities that should be handled by business 
departments. Despite this, confusion remains with end users who tend to believe that 
the IT department is fully responsible for the ERP implementation and success.  
  
Standish Group (1999), by conducting a survey of all IT projects in America in 1998, 
stated that project management must understand the different roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders, and commented that “IT must clarify roles and 
responsibilities early on by defining the rules of engagement” (Standish Group, 1999). 
Alsalem (2009), in his study of a finance company in China, demonstrated how ERP 
implementation failed when it was perceived as a purely technical issue, to be dealt 
with solely by the IT department. The study also demonstrated, however, that when 
senior managers began to convey their enthusiasm for the new system to the whole 
company through newsletters, and through extolling the virtues of the new system 
verbally to employees, retailers and suppliers, the failing implementation is turned to 
success. 
 
The lesson that can be learned from the AgriCo case is that they assigned a project 
manager for the third implementation cycle from the business side of the company 
(See section 6.2.3.3.1), which conveyed a clear message that ERP is a business (non 
IT) initiative. ERP sponsors, however, needed to ensure that the role of IT and the 
technical aspects was clearly understood. This is essential for end users to distinguish 
between pure technical tasks where the IT department is to be involved and the non-
technical issues, where business stakeholders are to be involved. Pabedinskaite (2010) 
Discussion of Findings and Model Development                                                  7- 5 
Chapter Seven                                                                                                                        Page 5 of 66 
 
argues that ERP managers need to ensure that the teams responsible for ERP 
implementation do not become polarised between „technical‟ and „non-technical‟ 
issues. There needs to be effective communication between technical and non-
technical staff, so that everyone understands the common vision and purpose for 
which the implementation is designed to serve. Effective bridging between the 
technical and non-technical issues should also, according to Pabedinskaite (2010), 
contribute to a holistic sense of ownership of the project. Opening up channels of 
communication in this way signals a welcome shift away from traditional, linear, 
conceptions of IT project management.  
 
The comparative analysis of the go-live findings (see section 6.3.4) demonstrates why 
ServCo successfully passed the go-live stage. The ServCo College, by adopting „train-
the-trainer‟ concept, played a significant role in bridging a gap between technical and 
non-technical issues. Through the proper selection of various candidates from the 
business side, supported by a well-developed syllabus that combined necessary ERP 
knowledge with business knowledge, qualified in-house trainers became effective in 
bridging such a knowledge gap among a wide range of end users. 
 
Arlbjorn & Haug (2010) emphasise the importance of senior managers impressing 
upon all stakeholders the way in which ERP implementation relates to the company‟s 
overall goals and mission statement. This also links with the sense that the change 
should be sold as a wholesale „institutional‟ change, and not just a change related to 
the technical side of the organisation.  
 
7.2.1.4 The impact of the Post Implementation Management on ROI 
The holistic review of the cases investigated (See section 6.3.5) advocates the need for 
ERP sponsors within the organisation to strengthen their long term outlook of ERP, 
especially their understanding of the importance and nature of the post 
implementation plans before the implementation process was begun. The 
understanding of the expected performance dip (Figure 6.8) is significant.  It can lead 
ERP sponsors to plan for a number of actions. First, they may prepare necessary plans 
to improve the ERP learning curve, thus gaining performance efficiency. Second, they 
can plan to maintain the attitude of the taskforce by communicating to them that a 
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performance dip is normal in the implementation process. Third, it enables them to 
assess and mitigate business risk that might result from such a performance dip. Four, 
they are able to develop a contingency plan that includes suspending the 
implementation of some modules in case the exposed risk is found to be difficult to 
deal with. Fifth, they can ensure a smooth transition from the go-live to the 
continuous improvements stage. 
 
As Esteves and Pastor (2002) note, it can be difficult to define the roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders in the ERP implementation process. The definition of 
what each stakeholder should do, can be difficult as some roles and responsibilities 
can overlap, meaning that it is not clear which roles and responsibilities should be 
assigned to which stakeholder. What is clear, however, is that the roles and 
responsibilities should be assigned with a view to ensuring that the overall aim of the 
organisation, with regards to the ERP acquisition and implementation, are met and 
that there is no conflict between the roles and responsibilities and the achievement of 
this in the short and long term (Esteves and Pastor, 2002).  
 
As Nah et al. (2001) note, of the eleven factors they identified as being important in 
the success of ERP implementation, one of the main factors is the assignation of clear 
roles and responsibilities across the stakeholders and the appointing of a project 
champion who is responsible for overseeing that all assigned responsibilities are met 
with a view to ensuring the overall success of the project. As Liu (2009) discusses, it 
is important for all staff and people involved in the ERP implementation process to be 
aware of what is expected of them, and what the organisations‟ motivations are for 
choosing to implement the ERP, as only when all staff are following the organisations 
approach to this process will the process be successful in the long term. Failing to 
ensure that the organisational culture is supportive of the ERP implementation will 
fail the organisation in the long term, in terms of reducing the likely ROI of the ERP 
(Liu, 2009).  
  
Therefore, for higher ROI to be achieved ERP sponsors need to advance their 
understanding of the characteristics of the post implementation nature and process; 
going live with ERP is, after all, the end of the beginning of a more rewarding, long-
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term journey (Deloitte, 1999). The importance of the post go-live phase has led some 
researchers to suggest that ERP implementation should be viewed as two phases 
separated by the go-live. Willis and Willis-Brown (2002), for instance, identify two 
key stages of ERP implementation that businesses must accommodate in order to 
ensure a successful and smooth transition. Phase one refers to the period in which the 
old legacy system is phased out and the ERP system „goes live‟. The second phase 
refers to measures which the company must take following the „go live‟ stage. The 
authors again emphasise the importance of both stages to the success of the 
implementation, warning against an exclusive focus on the pre-implementation phase.  
 
The common mistake by ERP sponsors is to view the „go live‟ stage as an end goal. 
This represents a high risk as most of the ROI gains can be realised after the proper 
management of the post „go live‟ stage. As Zafeiropoulos et al. (2005) discuss, by 
ensuring that all potential risks pertaining to the successful implementation of the 
ERP are identified, and possible solutions for mitigating these risks addressed, the 
organisation can help to maximise their long-term ROI for the ERP. By using risk 
management techniques in this manner, the organisation can mitigate the potentially 
negative effects of failing to plan, thus decreasing the risk that the ERP 
implementation will fail.  
 
Such a common mistake, to fail to plan for risk management, is unfortunately 
confirmed by recent studies, such as that presented by Bharat (2012), who noted that a 
widely prevalent failing amongst senior managers is to focus almost exclusively on 
the initial stages of ERP implementation, and to view the „going live‟ stage as the end 
goal. A consequence of this is that the ERP systems that are introduced tend to be 
generic in nature and not tailored to the specific needs of the company. Although there 
may be short-term advantages to this emphasis on the pre-going live stage, in that it 
tends to ensure that deadlines are kept, and that budgets are adhered to, the long-term 
consequences are negative.  
 
7.2.1.5 The dilemma between in-house training vs. consultants hiring  
The four cases show different forms of training management 1) investing in training 
local staffs and 2) hiring and using consultants (Tables 6.18 and 6.2). The 
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comparative analysis did not specifically advise on the budget distribution between 
the two elements. At one extreme, the DiversCo case demonstrates more reliance on 
the in-house training with very minimal hiring of consultants. ServCo, in the other 
extreme, demonstrated in the first and the second projects an excess use of 
consultants. ServCo invested heavily in both directions by creating the ServCo 
College that uses both hiring consultants and investing in training. In the ElectCo case 
and the second project of AgriCo a balance was demonstrated between hiring 
consultants and in-house training. 
 
Kraemergaard & Moller (2000) highlight the problems inherent in employing external 
ERP consultants to assist with ERP implementation. They point to problems of 
consultant shortages in general, and also problems involved in managing them 
effectively once they have been appointed. Although the price of hiring external ERP 
consultants can be low compared to in-house training, the total cost for ERP 
implementation can still be „3 to 5 times the purchase price of the software‟. The 
training of in-house employees can be very costly, since a huge investment is needed 
to send the employees on training programs, and to employ extra temporary help to 
cover these staff in their absence. Once trained, such staff may also find they are in 
demand from other companies, and so there is the risk that they will leave the 
company to work for a competitor.  
 
The analysis of the four cases (Section 6.3.2.2) presented this dilemma, between the 
cost and benefits of hiring external consultants and in-house training. It shows how 
the investment in people can generate future ERP benefits.  These benefits include 
reducing consultancy fees and generating the ability for the organisation to handle 
ERP continuous improvements after the go-live stage. This is achieved through a 
focus on training the trainer and developing trainers within the organisation. In other 
words, if the organisation provided early ERP training investment it can expect higher 
ROI. 
 
The finding presented by Figure 7.1 that is adopted from the eight projects of the four 
cases can suggest a general relationship between early training and the ERP ROI 
(Figure 7.2). 
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Figure 7.1: Relationship between early Training and ROI based on Implemented Projects 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen, from the comparative findings that qualified members who 
demonstrated ERP knowledge have not relied on the standard ERP training provided 
by ERP vendors and implementor. This has been confirmed by researchers such as 
Alrashid and Al Mashari (2005) who analysed two successful cases. The researchers 
found that the concept of „train the trainer‟ is very effective to the success of the 
implementation. However, the researchers also found that for „train the trainer‟ to 
produce optimal results it should be supported by other initiatives. This includes 
placing more emphasis on self-learning, availability of training infrastructure, 
adequate support from consultants and incentive schemes for both trainers and 
trainees. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Early Training
ROI
Week Moderate     Strong 
R
O
I 
Figure 7.2: Generic relationship between early training and ROI In ERP Implementation 
L
o
w
  
  
 M
o
d
er
at
e 
  
  
H
ig
h
 
Investment in ERP Early Training 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
S
u
cc
es
s 
Discussion of Findings and Model Development                                                  7- 10 
Chapter Seven                                                                                                                        Page 10 of 66 
 
Barker et al. (2003), through the use of a case study, highlight a number of 
opportunities and pitfalls associated with the hiring of both internal and external 
individuals for the purposes of implementing ERP. One of the pitfalls outlined was 
the hiring of internal people with insufficient experience. Hiring candidates with only 
a few months experience on the job, who were new to the industry, or in some cases 
only recently graduated from college, was not a sound strategy in the case study they 
describe. Familiarity with the current business processes is deemed by Barker et al. 
(2003) to be essential, and senior managers must sacrifice the time of these 
experienced individuals normally devoted to routine day-to-day duties for the long-
term benefit of successful ERP implementation. In recognition of their achievements, 
senior management should provide rewards/incentives at particular milestone points 
in the implementation process.  
 
As Smith et al. (2011) note, project managers can become very stressed when 
managing a project such as the implementation of an ERP system. This can, in turn, 
affect their attitude towards the ERP system, which can, in turn, affect the approach 
they have towards the training of staff and the opinions they give to other staff about 
the ERP system. Having project managers who are stressed, and pessimistic about the 
ERP system will, essentially, mean that the ERP system comes to be seen, by the 
organisation as a whole, as something that is negative (Smith et al., 2011). This can 
mean that the ERP system is viewed negatively across the organisation, this meaning 
that its implementation is not as optimal as it could be and that attitudes towards the 
ERP are not conducive to the ERP functioning at its optimum capability. This, 
ultimately, means that the ROI for the ERP will not be as high as it could be, thus 
having an overall negative effect on the company´s performance. Research by Smith 
et al. (2011) suggests that it is important, therefore, that the organisation does all it 
can to ensure that the project manager, or the person responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the ERP system, is kept as stress free as possible. This means 
having clear and open communication channels and providing opportunities for the 
project manager to vent any frustrations they might have. Managing the 
implementation of an ERP is dependent, after all, on the staff chosen to plan and 
manage the implementation process.  
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7.2.2 Discussion of Findings - First Implementation Phase 
This section will consider the findings from the comparative analysis of the first 
implementation phase that begin with initiating ERP in the organisation until the 
contract is signed with the ERP vendor and the implementer. 
 
7.2.2.1 ERP Initiation Forces in Organisations  
 The forces that initiated the decision to implement ERP in the four organisations 
(Figure 6.7) indicate the internal and external stakeholders involved in this process. 
 The drivers for adopting ERP are consistent with the findings of Buonanno et al. 
(2005) whose literature review explored the internal and external factors that drive 
organisations to consider ERP; sixteen drivers were discovered (Table 7.1).  
Saatciouglu (2009) looked at the important drivers for organisations to consider 
during ERP implementation, finding that organisations see ERP as a holistic solution 
for many of the problems facing their organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other researchers, like Ike and Mogansc (2005) found that improving internal 
business processes represents the primary force for implementing ERP. The other 
forces that relate to the customer, competitor or market are secondary forces. As a 
result, the researchers emphasised to the importance of identifying these forces at 
early stage of the implementation.  Ike and Mogens (2005) reached these conclusions 
after they conducted a survey of 36 companies who had implemented ERP in the US 
Midwest, and attempted to discover the drivers for ERP implementation. They state 
that “the key driver for ERP was the internal business process with 67% of the 
respondents affirming the need to streamline” the same (p. 550). The other important 
drivers, they found were competitors, customers and market climate. It thus becomes 
Table 7.1 Drivers for ERP Initiation  (Buonanno et al., 2005) 
No Driver No Driver 
1 HW/SW obsolescence 9 Dissimilarity of procedures 
2 Euro issue 10 Logistics issues 
3 Y2K issue 11 High cost of data distribution 
4 Unsatisfactory process 
integration 
12 Forced decision (by a controlling 
company) 
5 Unsatisfactory order 
management 
13 Data redundancy and/or inconsistency 
6 CRM issues 14 Stock control issues 
7 Limited decision support  15 Unsatisfactory time-to-market 
8 Lack of flexibility 16 Other reasons 
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important to identify these drivers early and correctly to set clear objectives and goals 
for the ERP project. 
  
7.2.2.2 Lack of ERP understanding by its Sponsors 
The holistic review of the comparative analysis indicates strategic strengths and 
weakness for each case investigated (Table 6.19). This comparative analysis and the 
analysis of the early ERP activities of each case (see section 6.3.2) lead to several 
findings. Firstly, all organisations except ElectCo, tended to follow a rapid approach 
to fully implementing ERP. Secondly, the ERP sponsors of the four organisations 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the precise meaning of the „as-is‟ 
implementation approach. Their implicit understanding proved to be limited to the 
configuration requirements of the system that would be conducted by the ERP 
consultants.  In other words, their perception is that „as-is‟ is similar to the installation 
and deployment of the stand-alone software packages.   
 
Most of the efforts at the planning and preparation stage is dedicated to the evaluation 
of the product functionalities of the different ERP products. It is observed, among the 
cases being investigated, that ERP is a project that primarily needs budget allocation 
in order to purchase software licence and consultants fees. There has often been an 
inadequate effort towards merging ERP implementation with other supporting 
initiatives such as business process management, learning or change management.  
The most senior managers represented by the GM, the CEO and board of directors 
were, for example, largely unaware that ERP is a long-term initiative with a 
widespread impact on operations. There was no evidence from most of the different 
ERP projects by the four cases that can demonstrate that the ERP sponsors, who were 
empowered to take ERP investment decisions, understood the true benefits of ERP to 
the organisation. It seems that the ERP sponsors do not view ERP as a powerful 
vehicle to promote, facilitate and sustain organisational change that has the power to 
transform the organisation and lead the company to achieve competitive advantage.  
 
The lack of understanding, by ERP sponsors, of the nature of ERP and how it can 
transform the organisation generates negative consequences. Firstly, inappropriate 
decisions are made regarding the scope of ERP implementation. Secondly, the ERP 
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objectives are not set properly. Thirdly, the organisation is unable to properly define 
stakeholders and establish the definition of the roles and responsibilities that govern 
their relationships and their involvement in the implementation. Fourthly, since both 
the scope and detailed objectives were poorly defined, the organisation ignored 
identifying the „mission critical‟ processes (Table 6.31) that needed to be streamlined, 
improved or re-engineered, in order to achieve the performance targets; the EPR 
sponsors often have the perception that the ERP would automatically handle this 
issue.  
 
This lack of understanding by the ERP sponsors, which led to the poor definition of 
the scope and objectives of the ERP implementation and usage had, overall, a 
significant adverse effect on the ROI, owing to the delay in implementation of the 
ERP, inefficient process management, additional costs and failure to achieve 
significant ERP functionality.  This, as a result, led to declining performance, to 
increasing the implementation costs and to failing to achieve significant ERP benefits. 
Figure 7.1 shows the correlation between the lack of understanding of the nature of 
ERP by its sponsors and ERP failure.  
 
From this finding we can draw the following two conclusions: the lack 
of understanding of ERP by its sponsors leads to 1) inappropriate identification of 
stakeholders and 2) poor definition of roles and responsibilities (Figure 7.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other researchers support these findings. Murphy et al. (2012), for example, 
emphasised the problems that can arise from senior managers having a narrow view of 
the ERP system implementation, in particular one that fails to appreciate the inter-
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relationship between the ERP software and all the other departments that comprise the 
business. Senior managers must resist the temptation to view ERP as a process 
disconnected from other business processes and must, instead, assume a holistic 
approach to facilitating business operations. 
 
Furthermore, the literature supports the view that the success of ERP is greatly 
influenced by the morale of the sponsor. The role of the sponsor should be clear and 
consistent from the first day to the completion of the project. The project sponsor 
must provide strategic ownership of the project and ensure that senior management 
are made aware of the goals and expected outcome of the project. The sponsor of the 
project is instrumental in ensuring that the top level management is committed to the 
implementation of the ERP system. The sponsor has the ability to set timelines and 
goals to be achieved during the implementation of the project and compel the senior 
executive to work towards realising these goals. The sponsor should also be a member 
of the steering committee that is mandated with the duty of ensuring that the project is 
successfully completed. 
 
Various authors have documented the roles and definition of the project sponsor or 
champion. Roure (1999 p.4) defines a project champion as “any individual who made 
a decisive contribution to  the innovation by actively and enthusiastically promoting 
its progress through critical stages in order to obtain resources and/or active support 
from top management”. Based on this definition, a project sponsor should evaluate 
the information, choose to install the system, motivate the top level managers to 
support the system and provide a guarantee that all materials and resources will be 
availed during the implementation of the project. According to Kale (2000), a project 
sponsor is a member of the steering committee who is actively involved in the process 
of maintaining the project credibility and is committed to supporting the 
implementation of the ERP system through all the phases.  
 
The role of the project sponsor differs from that of a manager in that his role is mainly 
that of the steering committee chairman, while the manager oversees the 
implementation of the day to day activity during the implementation phase. The main 
functions of the sponsor are, therefore, that of ownership of the project and leadership 
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of the steering committees to ensure that the implementation process is successful. 
The project sponsor is also the final budget authority and is responsible for ensuring 
that the ERP project is funded as per the requirements. Lack of sponsor commitment 
may result in underfunding, lack of resources and delayed payments, which affects the 
success of ERP systems. The change management process that results in business 
disruptions must be authorised by the project sponsor and hence, he plays a critical 
role in the development of the project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Murphy et al. (2012) highlight the fact that in the cases in which a narrow perspective 
is taken, there tends to be a failure to comprehend the impact that the ERP will have 
on organisational culture.  In order to prevent such adverse consequences to the 
implementation outcomes, Murphy et al. (2012) recommend that senior managers 
adopt a more holistic attitude to ERP.  
 
Senior managers were cited by Grabski et al. (2011) as visualising the ERP process as 
linear, characterised by a start, middle and a clearly defined endpoint. This is, 
essentially, a mechanistic attitude, which relegates responsibility for the project to a 
few individuals in the IT department.  The consequence is that the overall success of 
the implementation is endangered. In order to avoid this error, Grabski et al. (2011) 
emphasised the necessity for ERP sponsors to take a holistic view of implementation 
and to engage the whole company in the ERP implementation process. Grabski et al. 
(2011) emphasised that all stakeholders need to understand the institutional nature of 
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the change.  The conceptualisation of the change via a wholly traditional project 
management model is to be avoided, rather, senior managers should be acutely aware 
of the impact ERP has on organisational change and the employees who will use it. 
 
Boyer (2001), in his case-study detailing the Go-Live and Final preparation stages of 
a ERP system MERLIN (Boyer was the project sponsor as well) set up to replace 
legacy systems for a US County, comments that 
“a well-defined organization chart and clear roles and responsibilities are 
particularly critical. The project sponsor should communicate project 
organization, roles and responsibilities to the project team from the beginning 
of the project. Obtaining agreement on individual roles and responsibilities 
helps to set expectations up-front so as to avoid confusion later in the 
process.” (p. 41). 
 
7.2.2.2.1 Lack of Definition of Roles and Responsibilities  
 As demonstrated in Figure 7.3, organisations are expected to lose a lot of the ERP 
capabilities and benefits if they proceed from the selection to the execution stage 
without clearly defining roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. The four cases 
show (section 6.3.2.2 and Table 6.18) that the dominant practice that both the pre-
selection and the selection processes focus on is the functionality comparison between 
ERP products. Inadequate considerations were made, by the ERP sponsors, to prepare 
the organisation for the change derived by ERP (Table 6.19). Similarly, the 
comparative analysis demonstrates (See section 6.3.2.2) inadequate efforts in defining 
the roles and responsibilities among the various ERP stakeholders before the 
implementation started (Table 6.21). More precisely, this deficit is observed while the 
organisation moves from the preparation to the implementation stage.   
 
It can be noticed that the implementation projects where roles and responsibilities are 
defined early (Table 6.21), achieved highest ROI. Similarly, the most failed 
implementation projects are the ones where the definition of the roles and 
responsibilities at the preparation stage is poor.  For instance, the second 
implementation of AgriCo and the third one of ServCo achieved the highest ROI 
among the eight studied projects, leading to correlation of ERP success with the 
proper definition and communications of the roles and responsibilities before the 
beginning of the implementation (Figure 6.6). 
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Figure 7.5:  Relationship between definition of Roles and Responsibilities and ROI  
The relationship strong between the definition of the roles and responsibilities at early 
stages of the implementation and the higher ROI suggest that this relationship may be 
generalised as presented in Figure 7.3. 
This lack of attention to the stakeholder roles and responsibilities led to the second 
finding, that organisations neither engaged with nor empowered any party to develop 
and manage these roles and responsibilities. Finally, the comparative analysis found a 
lack of understanding of the relationship between the ERP vendor, implementer and 
customer. Despite the fact that the ERP sponsors describe the relationship with ERP 
vendor and implementor as a partnership, it is widely found that this concept was 
inadequately communicated to the taskforce. 
 
The comparative analysis also demonstrated that implementation success cannot be 
obtained by a one-time definition of roles and responsibilities. Defining roles and 
responsibilities should be treated as a dynamic process with flexibility to amend these 
as the business and implementation require. The ElectCo case, for example, 
demonstrates the discussion between material and production on the issue of who 
should lead the planning process. This example indicates that roles and 
responsibilities definitions are expected to change during the implementation process.  
 
Similar to the planning discussion, AgriCo, decides to transfer ERP project ownership 
from IT to the business side. The primary reason, as per the report prepared by 
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consultants, is to make business people responsible for ERP results. For ServCo, the 
key user was replaced due to persistent conflict with the consultants, and the in-house 
applications consultant was dismissed due to poor performance. Furthermore, a new 
department was created and assigned high ERP performers to manage the process of 
completing pending ERP tasks and continuous improvements.  
 
Finally, the comparative analysis indicates that arriving at well-defined roles and 
responsibilities between ERP vendors, implementor and client is a challenging 
process. The greatest challenge was found to be in the management of internal 
stakeholders who tend to shift the responsibilities to the implementor. The HR in the 
ElectCo case is a good example of how difficult it can be to manage internal 
stakeholders. It took the project manager two years to put HR implementation on 
track. Most of the struggle in the third ERP project of AgriCo centred on the 
resistance to change from the internal stakeholders. This is clear from the issues of the 
costing method and the integration of the sales transactions. The automatic invoice 
generations for both electro-mechanic and fashion in DiversCo case represent a good 
example in this manner. All stakeholders involved in this process were unaware in 
adequate detail how the new system was affecting these two important processes and 
what was required from each individual stakeholder. This leads to the conclusion that 
the ERP sponsor and the project manager need to be aware that it is crucial to 
communicate to stakeholders how the new system is going to affect them.  
 
This finding is precisely supported by Tiwana and Keil (2009) who argued that, in 
order for ERP implementation to be successful, senior managers must have a thorough 
understanding of the way the new ERP system will impact upon all stakeholders in 
the organisation. Roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined as this ensures that 
there are no serious project management, communication problems or conflicts and 
confusion later. This is even more crucial as any ERP project team is a cross-
functional one and companies often cannot find the resources to let all ERP project 
team members work solely on the ERP implementation alone; many individuals work 
on multiple projects at the same time (Ike and Mogens, 2005). 
Hossain et al (2011) in their case study of six Saudi organizations found some 
interesting evidence pointing to the dangers of unclear role definition in ERP projects. 
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For instance, they found that during the chartering phase in one organisation, top 
management interfered with the selection of ERP system vendors. They also found 
cases of reluctance by top management to change business processes and refusal by 
owners and top management to delegate authority to low-level employees in the 
shakedown phase. Clear definition of authority and early delegation and proper 
stakeholder agreements could have prevented these severe problems in EPR 
implementation. 
 
7.2.2.2.2 The Role of the Requirements Definitions   
The comparative analysis of the findings (Tables 6.21 and 6.22) shows the 
relationship between the definition of ERP organisational requirements and the ROI. 
If the organisation defines its requirements in a clear manner, ERP ROI is expected to 
improve. As per the examples mentioned from the cases (Table 6.21), the adverse 
effect of the poor definition of requirements to the ROI definition was found to be 
underestimated. 
 
The base for defining requirements is seen to be limited to the input received from end 
users who explained only their departmental needs. This was evident from the narrow, 
departmental focus of requirement definition gathering in the companies studied, in 
which departmental interest is served at the expense of efficiency targets at the level 
of the whole organisation. No adequate effort is seen to capture the business 
requirements from a holistic manner. If this is done, then defining requirements to be 
assessed against the business processes that involves cross-departmental requirements 
definition. It has been found that end users and consultants are aware of this 
requirements definition gap. However, there is no stakeholder found to be responsible 
to fill the gap of the holistic and cross-departmental requirements definition. 
 
Researchers like Pnina et al (2005) emphasize that proper “gap analysis” is necessary 
to prevent future implementation difficulties. Those difficulties are expected from the 
mismatch between the standard ERP processes and the existing business practices. To 
resolve this problem by determining the extent of configuration/customisation 
required is “critical to the success of an ERP implementation project, since it 
determines the future processes of the enterprise” (p. 640). 
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7.2.2.3 Organisational Readiness vs. Roles and Responsibilities Management 
Organisational readiness, which involves several aspects, including conducting initial 
assessments and development plans in order to prepare the organisation for the change 
associated with ERP implementation, was found to vary considerably in the four 
organisations (Table 6.19). The relationship between readiness for ERP and ERP 
success can clearly be seen in the results of the comparative analysis. DiverSco and 
ElectCo achieved better results in readiness and building ERP awareness, having 
succeeded in reaching the go-live. On the other hand, AgriCo and ServCo, which 
demonstrated minimal readiness, failed to reach the go-live and they ended up starting 
a new implementation project.  
 
Efforts to improve readiness (as shown in Table 6.20) can be described as informal, 
poorly organised and not considered as a priority. In other words, the comparative 
analysis indicates that there is an underinvestment in the effort of analysing the 
organisational readiness for implementing ERP.  This is because the lack of readiness 
is followed by inadequate efforts to improve awareness of the magnitude of change 
required to derive optimal ROI of ERP. Consequently, no effort is expected to define 
the roles and responsibilities among the stakeholders towards leading the change that 
is derived from ERP. The readiness deficit, therefore, acts as an obstacle to 
understand the significance of identifying stakeholders and the roles and 
responsibilities to govern their relationship.  
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As indicated in Table 6.33, DiversCo and ElectCo achieved a „very good‟ rank in 
defining their roles and responsibilities before the implementation process started. On 
the other hand, AgriCo and ServCo achieved a „poor‟ rank in defining their roles and 
responsibilities in the first implementation. Given the success that DiversCo and 
ElectCo experienced, it indicates that proper and adequate investment in ERP 
readiness leads to ERP success through effective definitions of roles and 
responsibilities among stakeholders. This finding is demonstrated in Figure 7.6. 
 
A review of the literature in this area demonstrates that ERP is not just a standard 
business initiative but represents a revolutionary, massive change management 
exercise. As Beheshti (2006: p. 184) states:  
¨ERP are designed to improve competitiveness by upgrading an 
organisation‟s ability to generate timely and accurate information 
throughout the enterprise and its supply chain¨.  
 
Researchers argue that such a complex initiative requires a company to be ready and 
prepared prior to tackle the implementation of such a project; for instance, Al-Shawi 
(2007: 189) confirmed the importance of conducting a readiness assessment before 
tackling a large IS investment:  
“It is important that organisations identify their level of readiness to 
integrate new IS into their current operations prior to committing large 
investment into the development and implementation of these systems” 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Introducing “measuring readiness” Phase (Alshawi ,2007) 
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Al-Shawi (2007; pp. 191-192) justifies his opinion and recommends that the 
assessment should take the form of guidelines, which functional managers can use to 
assess the organisational gap, prior to the commencement of any new IS investment.  
Al-Shawi (2007) describes the readiness assessment phase as: 
“The new phase will provide an organisation with an early warning of the 
risk level that they might face during the implementation of a new IS and 
therefore will act as a risk measurement (to) buffer” 
As shown in Figure 7.7, the timing of the readiness assessment phase is suggested to 
hold a pivotal position in a continuous circular process of IS development within the 
organisation. Shafaei and Dabiri (2008) developed an EFQM-based model mapped 
to common ERP CSFs to assess enterprise readiness for ERP implementation and 
applied the model on an Iranian CNC machine manufacturer, intending to implement 
an ERP system. They concluded that the organisation was not ready for ERP. 
  
Baki et al. (2004) conducted a retrospective investigation on the readiness of 47 
Turkish companies from different sectors who had already implemented ERP 
systems of major vendors using a simple and practical organizational assessment 
checklist (OAC). The data was collected from surveys (questionnaires) sent to the 
target companies using ERP systems. They concluded that only seven of 47 
companies (14.9 per cent) scored above 90 points, the cut-off for them to be 
considered full ready for ERP implementation. 
 
7.2.2.4 Training vs. Roles and Responsibilities Management 
The analysis of the research findings shows that training has a positive impact in 
mitigating the risk presented by the lack of readiness. Table 6.21 shows that, due to 
their early training preparations, ElectCo achieved good implementation results and 
had a smooth go-live process. Based on the previous discussion (see section 6.2.3.6) 
the holistic view demonstrates that, apart from HR area, ElectCo considered training 
to be a priority, and this can be evidenced from the company´s non-stop commitment 
to all types of training.  
 
The AgriCo case clearly demonstrates how the inadequately integrated training plan 
that was intended to cover the period beyond the application training, resulted in the 
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first failure. As described in Table 6.13, ineffective roles and responsibility training 
management led to the first implementation failure.  
The health check conducted between the first and second implementation cycles is 
evidences this, stating that:  
“There was no training plan in place and the training material that had 
been handed over to end users was: 
 Limited to demonstrating how to navigate and access the 
system 
 No indirect training process was conducted, since AgriCo 
users were completely disengaged from the process of 
building and configuring the system 
 All end users explained that the training was inadequate, un-
planned and limited to specific parts” 
 
There was, in fact, no training plan that linked ERP training with business practices, 
for which a comprehensive plan was required. The health-check report states: 
"The implementer is requested to: 
 Ensure the members of AgriCo IS Department and key users of the 
modules that are not yet implemented are adequately trained; this is 
necessary to make sure that the modules, which have already been built 
and configured can be maintained before implementor complete their 
assignment 
 Evaluate the training process, end user requirements and prepare 
integrated plans to retrain end users 
 Design training as documented in the approved implementation 
methodology 
 Link the training between system capabilities and the AgriCo business 
practices”   
 
On the other hand, the second implementation was successful due to the proper 
definition of training roles and responsibilities (Table 6.13).  
 
In DiversCo, the ERP sponsor was conscious of the wisdom of commencing training 
at an early stage in the implementation process. He demonstrated a high awareness of 
the significance of training (Table 6.20). Owing to budget and resources constraints, 
this early-stage training was limited to basic ERP training and the demo sessions that 
were offered by the ERP vendor. However, different forms of training methods were 
used that fit with the small training budget. 
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The investment in staff development enabled DiversCo to successfully reach the go-
live stage. This can be demonstrated by the fact that, through the use of local 
resources, DiversCo succeeded in maintaining technical support and continuous 
improvements that relates to ERP. The influence and motivation of the ERP sponsor 
succeeded in promoting a self-learning culture in DiversCo case. The best example of 
this is that one of the accountants succeeded in resolving ERP application support 
issues that the implementer was unable to handle. The same accountant made several 
other improvements, including leveraging ERP features by introducing innovative 
scenarios and new ERP features. Eventually, those innovative initiatives led to 
business process improvements. 
 
The ServCo College led to the success of the third implementation cycle (see section 
6.2.4.5). The knowledge transfer that resulted is a direct result of the detailed 
definition of the roles and responsibilities (Figure 6.5). The comparative analysis 
undertaken arrived at the conclusion that ROI is strongly related to appropriate 
investment in training before implementation commences. Early training has been 
seen to enhance the decision-making processes surrounding ERP. It led to a more 
effective management of roles and responsibilities amongst the diverse range of end 
users. It can assist in defining a comprehensive responsibility matrix, which clearly 
defines the relationship between the implementer, the IT department and end users, 
according to their responsibilities. If key users do not receive adequate training before 
the ERP implementation begins, potential issues such as improper definition of 
requirements and resistant to change can emerge. Such issues are likely to increases 
and hinder the progress of the implementation process. Consequently, it led to the 
ineffective management of the relationship between the implementer and end users. 
Through the discussion of the comparative analysis (section 6.3.3.6), the positive and 
negative experiences extracted from the cases can be summarised in Figure 7.8. 
 
The correspondence between training management and ERP success is supported in 
the literature. Deloitte (1999) found that inadequate training was one of the major 
barriers to the successful implementation of ERP. Other researchers attempted to 
consider the inadequate training as of the most important critical factors or ERP 
implementation success. Hawking et al. (2004), for instance, ranked inadequate 
Discussion of Findings and Model Development                                                  7- 25 
Chapter Seven                                                                                                                        Page 25 of 66 
 
training efforts third out of ten of the barriers they had identified to realising the full 
benefits of ERP.  A literature review study by Ngai et al. (2008) looked at the critical 
success factors (CSFs) for ERP implementation, across ten different countries/regions, 
finding eighteen CSFs, with training and education being the second most frequently 
cited reason for the success of ERP implementations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For training to realise these benefits, it must have two important characteristics; 
broadening scope and training continuity. 
 
7.2.2.4.1 Broadening Training Scope  
The overall analysis can draw a result that there is a significant impact of the effective 
use of different forms of training (Table 6.20) and the overall ERP project success 
(Fig 6.6). 
 
For DiversCo, formal training was limited to product training, which was provided in 
different forms including formal classroom training and ad hoc training in the format 
of a workshop in which participants were allowed to suggest different scenarios and to 
ask the consultant to demonstrate the effect of each of the alternative scenarios 
presented. ElectCo‟s commitment to ERP training was not limited to the product 
training but also covered technical and process management training. ElectCo also 
Figure 7.8 Relationship between Training, roles and responsibilities and ERP ROI 
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encouraged the team to attend ERP user groups, as this provided another source of 
training from peers in different organisations. The early consideration of ERP training 
and the variety of training forms assisted ElectCo in developing an ERP learning 
culture across the organisation. For the AgriCo Case, the lack of training efforts, 
especially during the second phase, was complemented by recruiting qualified IT staff 
and leveraging ERP vendor resources. An analysis of this case, covering all phases, 
shows the absence of an integrated plan. The only exception of considering a 
comprehensive and integrated training plan is the third implementation in the ServCo 
case. Since ServCo realised how expensive developing comprehensive training would 
be, ServCo College was introduced and implemented. As the case analysis shows, the 
establishment of this College represents a prime success factor for the third 
implementation phase.  
 
In all failed projects of the four cases, training process is seen to be limited to the 
technical side of ERP and to the very basic application training. The comparative 
analysis indicates that, in order to reduce the ERP implementation cost and produce 
more beneficial outcomes, training should consist of three main features. First, the 
training should have a broad cover encompassing multiple dimensions. Second, the 
training should be designed in an integrated manner, considering other 
implementation issues. Third, it is important to ensure synergies between the 
technical, application and process training activities.  
 
7.2.2.4.2 Training Continuity  
While analysing the four cases, it can be clearly demonstrated that there are few team 
members that possessed integrated knowledge elements. Those elements include 
experience and educational background necessary to contribute to the processes 
required for a successful implementation during all implementation phases. Filling 
such knowledge gaps is essential to ensuring that all ERP stakeholders have adequate 
understanding, which enables efficient implementation of ERP and effective use of its 
applications. Training should not, therefore, be considered as a one-time activity, 
limited to a few people; retraining should be normal practice, not the exception.  
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Prior studies, such as that of McCredie and Updegrove (1999) support the suggestion 
that training should not be regarded as a one-off activity. Their findings suggest that 
training should be on-going and should cover as many people in the organisation as 
required, including newcomers, and that advanced training should be arranged for 
staff as and when necessary.  The re-training of senior employees was advocated as a 
good investment, since they are strongly committed to the organisation and training is 
a part of the rewards program that also supports the enhancement of organisational 
learning (McCredie and Updegrove, 1999).   
 
Mashari et al.,(2003) suggests that user training and involvement should be pursued 
throughout from the design, initiation and implementation of the system. It is also 
critical that pre-implementation and post-implementation training takes place in order 
to facilitate the assimilation of an ERP system (Umble, et al., 2003). This view is 
further supported by Davenport, et al., (2004) who suggests that post-implementation 
training has a positive effect on all aspects within the organisation. This training 
might include regular meetings, the exchange of views and regular discussion of 
problems and issues that may arise (Umble, et al, 2003). 
 
Knowledge transfer is also a key factor in the overall success of the implementation 
(Wang, et al., 2007). It has been demonstrated that poor user performances with 
regard to ERP systems is commonly caused by knowledge gaps between the ERP 
functionalities and those required by the firm implementing the system (Everdingen, 
Hillegersberg, & Waarts, 2000). Markus & Tanis (2000) also argue that successful 
implementation of ERP depends on identification of knowledge gaps and subsequent 
transfer and utilisation of this knowledge. Volkoff & Sawyer, (2001) and Willcocks & 
Sykes (2000), argue that critical ERP success factors are influenced by a firm‟s ability 
to acquire knowledge and use it during the exploitation of the new system. Firms 
should aim at tapping knowledge from the system developers, technicians, project 
managers and other consulting firms.  According to Wang et al. (2007), successful 
knowledge transfer results to the development of an ERP system that meets the 
client‟s expectation and enables the user benefit from all the functions provided by the 
system.   According to Wang et al. (2007), inadequate knowledge transfer leads to 
common problems experienced during the ERP system implementation such as: “the 
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system takes too long”, “system is too costly”, “the system will interrupt business 
activities” and “benefits will never be realized”. Most ERP system incorporates the 
best practices within a given field and the transfer of this knowledge to the 
organisation will improve its overall performance. 
 
7.2.2.4.3 Summary of Training Management Findings Discussions 
A number of findings related to training and development can be extracted from the 
analysis of the four case studies.  Firstly, perceiving training as a priority and 
promoting a culture that encourages capturing ERP knowledge through self-
development has a major impact on the ERP ROI. Successful ERP training enables 
organisations to expedite the knowledge transfer from consultants to the in-house 
staff. This generates several strategic benefits, including a reduction in consulting 
costs and an increase in user confidence levels with ERP. This also assists in 
completing the project on time and the in-house resources can still manage ERP 
continuous improvements after the go-live.  
 
Secondly, significant training gains can be expected if the organisation develops a 
learning culture. This culture is developed through an encouragement to the staff to 
apply as many self-learning principles as possible. This can be supported by investing 
in implementing the train-the-trainer programs.   Significant training budgets can be 
saved and enormous training gains can be achieved if the management recognise and 
appreciate self-learning effortsto thattt. The management appreciation of the training 
efforts and outcomes is to include monetary and monetary incentives. Examples of the 
training gains include a reduction in the budget of consultants and the number of 
process improvements that the new trainees can implement. 
 
Thirdly, evaluating ERP training outcomes should always be the responsibility of the 
client and should not be delegated to either the implementer or to the ERP vendor.  
 
Fourthly, there should be a balance between training in-house staff members and the 
use of external consultants. In general, more use of external consultants is expected at 
early stages of the implementation. Their involvement then needs to be gradually 
decreased as the knowledge transfer to the local staff members is increased.  
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Fifthly, ERP sponsors need to broaden the scope of the ERP training to cover 1) 
technical, 2) business process and 3) the application training.  
 
7.2.2.5 Summary of the First Implementation Phase  
The holistic review of this first implementation phase demonstrates that it is 
imperative to identify the internal and external forces that motivate the organisation to 
adopt ERP. A thorough understanding of these forces supports the decision-making 
process and the implementation approach that is to be adopted. Those decisions 
include, but are not limited to, the identification of the implementation scope, its 
objectives, the overall implementation strategy, mission critical processes, roles and 
responsibilities, and the integrated training plan. If this is achieved, it can be argued 
that the organisation has successfully developed a strong base for achieving higher 
ROI across the next implementation phases. 
 
The summary of the findings from the first phase are summarised in Figure 7.9. 
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Figure 7.9: Defining roles and responsibilities at pre-implementation phase  
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Davenport (1998), citing the case of Compaq Computer, gave another important 
reason for identifying critical processes pre-implementation – the loss of a company‟s 
unique source(s) of competitive advantage by adopting standard processes 
indistinguishable from competitors and which replace the organization‟s own unique 
processes (p. 8). 
 
Ghosh and Skibniewski (2010), in their exploratory study of all critical success factors 
(CSFs) mentioned in literature from 2000 to 2006, compiled by Moon (2007) 
comment that having an adequate business plan and clear goals and objectives from 
the beginning is an important CSF for ERP implementation success. Hasibuan and 
Dantes (2012), in their survey of 74 companies based in Indonesia rated „clear goals 
and objectives‟ as the third important key success factor (KSF) in the project 
preparation stage (pre-implementation phase) of an ERP project. Mabert et al. (2006) 
stated that a chief success criterion for ERP implementations is the completion of the 
project on time and within the budgeted resources (p. 18). A regression model 
developed by them with empirical data from a survey of ERP implementations in the 
US manufacturing sector show that the planning variables: 1. Top management 
involvement and 2. Clearly-defined objectives contribute positively to on-time, 
within-budget implementation (Mabert et al, 2006). 
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7.2.3 Discussion of Findings – Second Implementation Phase  
7.2.3.1 Conflict Management and Leadership 
7.2.3.1.1 Conflict Management  
The comparative analysis summarised the conflicts that evolved in the cases and how 
the company managed the conflict (Table 6.23). The comparative analysis of the eight 
projects implemented by the four cases shows the impact of the process of defining 
roles and responsibilities among stakeholders on the emergence and management of 
conflicts.  
 
Conflict can be expected to emerge if the implementation process has not identified 
all relevant stakeholders and if their roles and responsibilities are poorly defined. This 
can be drawn from Figure 7.6 that details how the improper definition of stakeholders, 
roles and responsibilities can mislead the implementation which creates an 
environment for conflict to emerge, grow and to be become difficult to resolve. 
 
In such a case, it is expected that conflict management would become ineffective. On 
the other hand, if stakeholders are clearly identified and their roles and responsibilities 
are clearly defined, conflict is not expected. Furthermore, in cases where conflicts 
arise, the proper definition of roles and responsibilities can mitigate negative effects 
of this conflict. 
 
As Aubert et al. (2013: p. 64) state, ¨…communication quality is repeatedly listed 
among the top success factors to be considered when implementing an ERP system¨. 
The research conducted by Aubert et al. (2013) suggests that different aspects of 
communication quality impact different aspects of project success, with the form of 
communication assumed to be having the ability to avoid conflict from being 
generated and to ensure conflict management processes in place are effective at 
mitigating conflict where and when it arises.  
 
This conclusion is best described by the project manager of the third implementation 
cycle of AgriCo case, who states: 
“When it comes to conflicts, I have seen it evolve from the lack of ERP 
understanding. More precisely, the lack of understanding the different 
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roles of different stakeholders and responsibilities of the business owners 
in providing needful input that can lead implementation to succeed‟‟ 
 
The following figure (Figure 7.10) shows the impact of the clarity in defining roles 
and responsibilities and the proper identification of stakeholders on the possibilities of 
the emergence of conflicts and the effectiveness of its management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top management has a crucial role in ensuring this as it can set up conflict resolution, 
change management and communication structures directly or indirectly, by 
allocating or delegating resources. Its visible support for the ERP project can reduce 
user resistance, minimizing conflicts from end-users and lead to more effective 
communication and conflict resolution in the consulting process (Wang and Chen, 
2006: p. 1033). They also stated that visible top management support should be 
critical for inter-unit conflict resolution during the ERP implementation process (p. 
1036). 
 
Jaaskelainen and Pau (2009), studying internal ERP stakeholder conflicts through an 
experimental research project focused on three large company-wide ERP projects at 
companies headquartered in Finland, all of which have already implemented ERP 
systems, show how role conflicts impact negatively on business commitment to ERP. 
They advise one of the firms with scope conflicts to “state project organizations‟ roles 
and responsibilities clearly improve communication procedures to avoid escalation” 
(p. 22). 
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Figure 7.10: Relationship between roles and responsibilities and conflict management 
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7.2.3.1.2 Leadership  
A diversity of leadership styles was found across all four cases as witnessed by the 
acts and practices observed in the people leading the ERP implementation. Those 
leadership examples that have been discussed (See section 6.2.3.5) have found a 
relationship between leadership and effective conflict management. The analysis of 
the examples discussed in section (6.2.3.5) is summarised in Fig 7.11 which indicates 
that effective leadership leads to better mitigation of conflict if it arises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This relationship from the comparative analysis shown in Figure 7.12 suggests a 
relationship between the strength of leadership and mitigation of the negative effects 
of conflict if it arises. 
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the implementation in order to prevent deficiencies in commitments result in a poor 
implementation (Somers and Nelson, 2001). Senior and low level management must, 
therefore, be committed to the process of implementing ERP and ensure that the 
necessary resources are available (Nah and Delgado, 2006).  
 
Weiling & Kwok (2008) indicate that the senior leaders have a significant impact on 
ERP implementations by fostering a required organisational culture that ensures the 
success of the system. Positive organisation culture leads to participative decision-
making process, power sharing, collaborations, employee empowerment, learning and 
development. All these aspects are important in the successful implementation of the 
ERP as they result in the creation of an enabling environment for the implementation 
of the system.  
 
Recent studies have shown that the implementation of ERP is affected by many 
impediments and this affects the overall performance of the systems. Kim, Lee and 
Gosian (2005) documented the main impediments to ERP implementations as: 
conflict of interest, lack of human resource involvement, failure to redesign the 
business process as per the ERP requirements, lack of change management strategy 
and resistance by the system users. All these problems can be significantly solved 
through effective leadership and development of a good corporate culture. Senior 
management must develop strategies of resolving conflicts that arise during the 
change process.  Hong & Kim, (2002: p. 25) state that “even the very best system in 
the world will fail if end users do not believe in it”, thus emphasising the critical 
factor of effective leadership. ERP implementations result in different resource 
allocations and power distribution and this has often resulted in conflict. This results 
in the formation of groups within the organization that oppose each other. Senior 
leaders must prevent this by effective role allocation, ensuring that the users work as a 
team and solving any arising issues promptly. 
 
7.2.3.2 Business Process Management 
The influence of business process management on the ERP ROI has been addressed in 
previous chapters (section 6.3.3.4). The comparative analysis (Table 6.32) 
exemplified the significance of the mission critical processes to the ROI. The impact 
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of inadequate management of business processes to the implementation ROI varies 
among the four cases. For the AgriCo case, the inappropriate management of the 
mission critical process hindered the third implementation cycle from achieving 
significant benefits. A good example of the adverse effects of the inadequate 
consideration to the business process is the delay in deciding the costing method. 
Such a decision would normally take a few days which delays the implementation for 
two months. This is because the process of pricing and costing the product and 
services has neither been studied nor planned to be improved. For DiversCo, it led the 
first implementation cycle to collapse and to initiate another new implementation 
project. 
 
The results and discussion of the preparation steps (Figure 7.9) suggested including 
the definition of mission critical processes. In each example mentioned in Table 6.32, 
the individual case analysis shows that the recommended process by (Figure 7.9) was 
not followed. In the first project of ServCo case, for example, a primary stakeholder 
was not identified like the O&M partner.  Sometimes, important processes were not 
treated as mission critical like the MRP process in the ElectCo case, managing the 
warehouse in the DiversCo case, aggregating sales data in the AgriCo case and real-
time invoice printing of the fashion outlets in the DiversCo case (Table 6.32). From 
the comparative analysis, such deficits in managing business processes are either 
related to the poor readiness assessment or to the ineffective training management. 
 
The struggles faced by ERP project managers as a result of improper business process 
management are best described by the project manager of the third implementation 
cycle of AgriCo case, who states: 
“This lack of ERP understanding advocates the resistance from business 
owners to share or define their current business processes and practices. This 
is, in effect, hinders defining the to-be processes that represent the base for 
ERP configuration. This is where more resistance to change increases which 
motivates conflict acts to evolve‟‟ 
 
Previous discussion leads to the conclusion that, in the context of the roles and 
responsibilities of the stakeholders, business process management is a significant ROI 
factor. The summary of the relationship between business process management, 
stakeholder‟s identification, definition of roles and responsibilities and ROI is shown 
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in Figure 7.8. The figure (7.8) demonstrates that proper definition and management of 
the roles and responsibilities minimises the risk of the ineffective management of the 
business processes. The figure shows that there is a correlation between the definition 
and the awareness of the roles and responsibilities and the mitigation of a number of 
key implementation elements including the business process management. This can 
lead to a direct relation between the proper definition of the roles and responsibilities 
and the business process management in the ERP implementation context figure 
(7.13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the figure (Figure 7.13) shows, if the organisation developed adequate awareness 
and definitions of roles and responsibilities in the planning stage, it is likely to 
minimise adverse effects of the business process deficits.  This result is presented in 
Fig 7.14 where it shows that for instance ElectCo and DiversCo achieved lower rank 
in managing business process due to a number of deficits (Table 6.32). However, 
since the both cases achieved higher rank in defining roles and responsibilities, the 
deficits in managing business processes have less impact on the ROI (Figure 7.14).  
 
It is usual for company‟s business processes to be subject to re-engineering (BPR) in 
an ERP implementation, where they will be replaced by standard processes (which are 
configured or customised later as per requirements) from the ERP vendor, as they 
need to fit the framework of the target ERP system (Davenport, 1998; Pnina et al, 
2005). This gives rise to dangers of widespread disruption during and after the project 
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for all stakeholders – the new processes may be less robust, very unlike older ones or 
not perform as per expectations.  
 
 
Figure 7.14 Impact of defining roles and responsibilities on minimising business process risk  
 
7.2.3.3 Project Management 
The findings of the comparative analysis show different success made in the project 
management tools and practices (Table 6.29). As Boersma and Kingma (2005) 
discuss, the project manager plays a pivotal role in the successful implementation of 
ERP in organisations.  
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wins are important in ensuring that the end users are motivated by the outcomes in the 
short run. They state that the implementation of the system should be done rapidly so 
that the organisation can reap benefits more quickly and sustain their competitive 
position. They argue that such implementations should be done on high impact 
production lines and services first so that the changes can be recognised at an early 
stage. The authors state that managers should carefully evaluate aspects such as 
improved cash flows, reduced floor space, increased productivity, reduced operation 
costs and inventories as they are directly affected by the implemented software.  ERP 
system ability to improve the transaction time, reduce inventories and enable faster 
processing of consumer transaction should be used as incentives for the end users to 
accept the system.  
 
Kimberling (2012), a consultant with an ERP company details ways through which an 
organisations can benefit from ERP.   He states that, even though an ERP system can 
be implemented quickly, it is impossible for the company to reap all the benefits 
within a short time. It is therefore necessary for the managers to identify short term 
achievements and use them as motivating factors for long term achievements. He 
argues that mangers should encourage quick utilisations of the system such as using 
emails/ websites to communicate with clients and other employees, streamlining 
operations after go-live stage, reducing the number of employee/ in active employees 
and enabling faster processing of orders and other issues within the organisation.  
 
Harmom (2009) states that quick wins are important when managers want to promote 
the utilisation of given ERP software. Such quick wins may come in form of 
motivating employees who successfully use the software so as to encourage the others 
to do so or in form of  improving customer service (this can be done easily and it has 
direct impact on service improvement such as a reduction of the order processing 
time), reducing customers, improving the working conditions of employee (this can be 
done by ensuring that employees use less effort in their day to day activities), using 
websites to communicate and organisation meetings where employees can discuss on 
the success and experiences with the new system. The management also needs to 
show other stakeholders that the implemented software has the capacity to save on 
costs, time and improve the business processes within the organisation. In addition to 
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ensuing that quick wins are achieved, managers should ensure that long term goals of 
ERP are monitored and achieved within the stipulated time. Harmom (2009) cautions 
that managers may focus on short term goals which may not be viable in the short run, 
it is therefore necessary that leaders study the benefits of ERP before engaging in 
tasks such as reducing the number of employees.  
 
Ike and Mogens (2005) in their survey study of 36 companies with ERP systems 
found that two-thirds of ERP projects were initiated by top management and that 
project management principles and top management support explained nearly 30% of 
the variances that impact ERP implementation success.  
 
7.2.3.4 Technical Administration  
The comparative analysis noted negative impact on ROI as a direct result of the 
ineffective management of the technical aspects of ERP implementation (see section 
6.3.3.7).  Examples of the technical issues are network connection setups, system 
performance, compatibility between the database and the operating systems.  
 
All cases showed unplanned stoppages that resulted from poor readiness, either from 
the network, from the operations systems or at the application level. A number of 
conclusions can be drawn from the review of the technical issues that arises in the 
implementation. 
 
Firstly, the importance of planning for the technical parts of the implementation 
should not be underestimated. Failures in the technical settings or installation of the 
ERP can create costly mistakes. Secondly, project managers need to include in the 
master plan the tasks that are related to installing additional software applications 
which need to be integrated with ERP. These add-on software applications are chosen 
to fill the functionality deficits that ERP modules cannot handle. Therefore, they 
should be including in the implementation plan. Otherwise, if ERP implementation is 
completed, optimal ROI might still not be realised due to the adverse effect of the 
incomplete state of the adds-on applications parts. Thirdly, the process of using data 
in production instead of the TEST version need to be governs by strict procedures. 
This procedure is to ensure full data security and accuracy during the data transfer 
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process. As Ram et al. (2013) note, the ERP implementation is only as successful as 
its weakest link and the weakest link in many organisations is the system quality. By 
improving the system quality, the chance of improvements in ROI on ERP increases 
(Ram et al., 2013).  
 
The ERP system has many potential technical issues arising during its 
implementation. It is important that the management identify and resolve these 
technical issues. Somers and Nelson (2001) indicate that for successful 
implementation of the ERP system, it is important to involve both business managers 
as well as the technical team leaders. This will ensure that the key technical issues 
affecting the implementation of the system are addressed in a timely manner when 
they occur. They suggest that managers within the organization should work with 
experienced people within the organization to ensure the successfully implementation 
of the proposed system. During the initial implementation, technical issues may affect 
the operation of the system and it is important that managers, consultants and 
employees with technical knowledge are involved during the design and 
implementation phase of the system. This would be necessary in ensuring that 
technical issues do not affect the functionality of the ERP system at go-live stage.  
 
Research carried out on the major technological risks that are likely to occur during 
the implementation of ERP document lack of ERP expertise among the professionals 
working within an organization as one of the key risks. This increases the 
implementation risk as none of the employees are aware of how the system operates. 
This presents a lot of difficulty for the existing firm members who are not able to 
align themselves in solving the complex technical issues that emerge during the 
implementation of the ERP.  
 
It is necessary that the managers assess the knowledge level among the employees and 
ensure that consultants are hired so as to assist during design and implantation phase. 
The managers can seek solutions from independent experts and consultant so as to 
ensure that there are no system integration problems. Kay (1999) indicates that most 
ERP software is based on new programming languages that the existing technical 
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professional don‟t have. This requires that the organization collaborate with experts 
and consultants to ensure the successful implementation of the system.  
 
7.2.3.5 Summary of the Second Implementation Phase 
The holistic review of this second implementation phase demonstrates that it is 
imperative to undertake many basic planning requirements prior to starting to think 
about implementing an ERP. One of the most basic aspects of such preparation is to 
ensure that the planning of the ERP is comprehensive; failing to plan for this will 
mean that the implementation could be doomed to failure. Aside from this, as this 
review of the second implementation phase has shown, it is important to ensure the 
quality of the software systems in place. By failing to do this, the organisation runs 
the risk of failing in their efforts to implement the ERP system. By preparing as well 
as possible as far in advance, and by recruiting an efficient and effective project 
manager, problems that could damage the success of the implementation could be 
avoided. The summary of the findings drawn from the second implementation phase 
is presented in Fig 7.15. 
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7.2.4 Discussion of Findings – Third Implementation Phase  
This section discusses the findings of the third implementation phase that covers the 
go-live and the management of the post-implementation activities. 
 
7.2.4.1 The Roles and Responsibilities vs. Close-out Stage  
After the go-live stage, the implementer is requested to provide his support to the 
client until end users become familiar with the new system. Once the system reaches 
certain level of stability consultants can leave the site and the project close-out can be 
announced.  
 
Evidences from the comparative analyses found that the ERP sponsors struggled to 
bring the ERP implementation projects to a close out (see section 6.3.4.2). The results 
of the eight implemented projects by the four cases, in terms of the degree of success, 
are presented in Figure 6.9. It can be noticed that the projects which properly defined 
the roles and responsibilities at the preparation stage are the ones who experienced 
less difficulties in the close-out stage. This finding can be drawn by comparing the 
results of the evaluation of the close-out (Figure 6.9) and the clarity in defining roles 
and responsibilities of those eight projects (Table 6.21). This can lead to the 
suggestion that defining roles and responsibilities correlates with the ability of the 
ERP implementation to close-out the project successfully  
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This is important finding for ERP sponsors to understand and to act upon accordingly: 
the close-out stage is a very reliable test to assess the success of the implementation. 
This result is inferred from the link between the two relationships 1) between the early 
definition of the roles and responsibilities, the early training and the ROI (Figure 7.2 
and Figure 7.3); 2) between the early definition of roles and responsibilities and the 
smoothness of the close-out stage (Fig 7.16). 
 
Hasibuan and Dantes (2012) note that the post-implementation stage of ERP is 
concerned with deployment and includes stabilising operations, optimisation,  
eliminating “bugs”, systems maintenance, user support, system upgrades and getting 
to normal operations. It includes operational, support, maintenance and monitoring 
procedures. While Gartner (2011) states that governance processes be defined and 
finalised before the implementation phase of the project (i.e. starting with Design) 
begins, the post-implementations audits and reviews to gain feedback and insights 
into the ERP implementation are just as vital. Grabski et al (2001) developed a model 
to identify risk and controls for ERP implementation and placed internal auditor‟s 
involvement as a critical control. They further show a case study of an organisation to 
show how internal auditor involvement was very relevant and crucial to its ERP 
implementation success even after “Go Live”. 
 
Boyer (2001) in his case-study detailing the Go-Live and Final preparation stages of a 
ERP system MERLIN (Boyer was project sponsor as well) set up to replace legacy 
systems for a US County noted that change management and communication needs 
did not end once the project was implemented, but were part of the ongoing support 
needed to ensure that MERLIN would be an efficient and effective tool. He noted how 
a post-implementation critique session conducted by the county showed the need for 
early planning for communication and change management governance aspects. 
(Boyer, 2001, p. 43). Oana (2010) summarised this aspect of ERP or any Information 
System project thus:  “After the go-live stage, ERP implementations require a 
continuous improvement effort that involves alignment between the latest 
requirements of the business model and the update/change to the ERP software.” (p. 
158-159) 
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The first recommendation for the ERP sponsors in this regard is to pay attention to the 
signs that indicate the need to intervene to close the project (Table 6.30). The second 
recommendation to the ERP sponsor at this point that he is expected to stress to the 
entire task force that ERP is not the beginning of the end but it rather to be the end of 
the beginning. This point can be further linked to communicate that a temporary 
performance dip is expected (Figure 6.8) before the second wave of ERP starts 
(Figure 7.17). 
 
Fig 7.17 Post Implementation „‟Second wave‟‟ – (Deloitte ,1999) 
7.2.4.2 The Role of the Audit Process  
The relationship between 1) the early definition the roles and responsibilities, 2) the 
success of the close-out stage, and 3) the ROI is discussed. ERP sponsors, therefore, 
need to verify that the roles and responsibilities amongst stakeholders are still clearly 
defined before the go-live stage. If the audit process indicates that more effort is 
required to redefine the roles and responsibilities, then corrective implementation 
actions have to be made. The corrective action role is to ensure that the roles and 
responsibilities are well defined before the organisation can move to the post go-live 
and continuous improvements stage. 
 
The audit process is illustrated in Figure 7.18. 
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Once the organisation passes the go-live, then any improvements made through ERP 
falls under the continuous improvements.  
 
ERP implementation can be successful if the organisation demonstrates its abilities in 
using, leveraging and improving ERP applications using its own resources.  This can 
only be achieved by conducting roles and responsibilities audit review and making 
any necessary amendments at each ERP continuous improvement stage (Figure 7.19) 
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The audit of the governance aspects of ERP implementations is necessary to ensure 
that IT helps the enterprise in the achievement of its business goals (Anantha Sayana, 
2004). Anantha Sayana (2004) mentions that it is “very important for an IS auditor to 
carry out an audit of the governance aspects of an ERP project” and points out this as 
a neglected area. He also recommends the governance audit to be done best in the 
ERP initiation stages though it should be done at different stages throughout the life 
of the project, beginning with the initiation, then mid-term stage, post-go live and 
finally post-system stabilization. Glover et al. (1999) argued that internal audit should 
be involved in an ERP system implementation early rather than later. Streamlining a 
governance and management structure that satisfies all stakeholders is a difficult task. 
(Ghosh and Skibniewski, 2010: p. 541). 
 
In their research, which benchmarked the outcomes for companies that had 
implemented ERP, Deloitte (1999) found that a substantial body of knowledge was 
missing about what companies could do in order to realise a return on their ERP 
investment. Figure 7.17 shows that the „go live‟ stage is just one milestone in the ERP 
implementation journey. At least three additional stages lie ahead for organisations to 
reach the „synergise‟ stage, as described by (Deloittee, 1999; 38): 
“This is really another level of change: new competencies, redefined business 
processes… In this stage the organisation is able to achieve new, sweeping 
changes that fundamentally benefit the company”. 
 
Other authors, for instance Hawking et al. (2004), suggest that ROI is gradually 
maximised as the implementation undergoes, and passes through, five phases: 
1. Implement core ERP. 
2. Maximise value of core ERP. 
3. Extend enterprise application within company. 
4. Extend enterprise applications to partners. 
5. Adaptive application environment. 
 
It has been found that at this stage of the implementation, in which few steps remain 
before the ERP „go live‟ milestone is achieved, all stakeholders should be kept 
informed about their roles and responsibilities and how the imminent changes to the 
ERP will impact them. This can be achieved by ensuring that an adequate 
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communication process takes place between the senior managers and the stakeholders. 
This finding is supported by Tiwana and Keil (2009) who argue that, in order for ERP 
implementation to be successful, senior managers must have a thorough 
understanding of the way the new ERP system impacts all stakeholders in the 
organisation. In their study, Singh & Bhattacharya (1995) argue that successful ERP 
system implementation is contingent upon adequate communication between senior 
management and all of the company‟s stakeholders, with a view to fully briefing them 
on the implications of the new ERP system and the role the new system will play in 
enhancing the performance of the company. Where appropriate, this appraisal should 
permit stakeholders to grasp the relationship between ERP and the overall process of 
change management.  
 
Hasibuan and Dantes (2012) notes that the post-implementation stage of ERP is 
concerned about deployment and includes stabilising operations, optimisation,  
eliminating “bugs”, systems maintenance, user support, system upgrades and getting 
to normal operations. It includes operational, support, maintenance and monitoring 
procedures. While Gartner (2011) states that governance processes be defined and 
finalised before the implementation phase of the project (i.e. starting with design) 
begins, the post-implementations audits and reviews to gain feedback and insights 
into the ERP implementation are just as vital. Grabski et al. (2001) developed a model 
to identify risk and controls for ERP implementation and placed internal auditor‟s 
involvement as a critical control. They further show a case study of an organisation to 
show how internal auditor involvement was very relevant and crucial to its ERP 
implementation success even after “go live”. 
 
Boyer (2001) in his case-study detailing the go-live and final preparation stages of a 
ERP system MERLIN (Boyer was project sponsor as well) set up to replace legacy 
systems for a US County noted that change management and communication needs 
did not end once the project was implemented, but were part of the on-going support 
needed to ensure that MERLIN would be an efficient and effective tool. He noted how 
a post-implementation critique session conducted by the county showed the need for 
early planning for communication and change management governance aspects. 
(Boyer, 2001: p. 43). Oana (2010) summarised this aspect of ERP or any Information 
Discussion of Findings and Model Development                                                  7- 48 
Chapter Seven                                                                                                                        Page 48 of 66 
 
System project thus:  “After the go-live stage, ERP implementations require a 
continuous improvement effort that involves alignment between the latest 
requirements of the business model and the update/change to the ERP software.” (p. 
158-159). 
 
7.2.5 Conclusion of the Discussions  
The holistic review of this first implementation phase demonstrates that it is 
imperative to identify the internal training requirements of the staff in place at the 
company with a view to understanding what the current state of knowledge is and 
what, therefore, the training needs are amongst the staff. By ensuring that the roles 
and responsibilities of all stakeholders are identified and understood, prior to the 
implementation, the implementation process can be ensured of a higher probability of 
success, as all stakeholders will be aware of what they need to do and why, thus 
allowing them to act responsibly and appropriately with regards to the ERP 
implementation process. It is important to recognise that communication is vital, 
across the organisation as a whole, before, during and after the ERP implementation, 
as clear communication is vital to ensuring that any and all problems are identified in 
a timely manner and, as such, solved before they become major problems that threaten 
the implementation process, in the short term, and the ROI, in the long term.  
 
This holistic finding is supported by Verville and Halingten (2003) who used a case-
study approach to study the team composition and effect of role definition on the ERP 
acquisition process of 4 large organisations. They concluded that team composition 
and role definition are critical factors affecting the acquisition process. The 4 
organisations were found to exercise better control (through clear definition of 
authority), minimise conflicts (especially from end-users) and thus conclude the 
projects smoothly. 
Discussion of Findings and Model Development                                                  7- 49 
Chapter Seven                                                                                                                        Page 49 of 66 
 
7.3 Deriving a Model for Holistic ERP Implementation  
Previous sections and chapters demonstrate the significance of identifying 
stakeholders, defining their roles and responsibilities and how it can relates to the 
return on ERP investment. This conclusion includes a number of key elements that are 
drawn from the holistic review of the ERP implementation process. Given that these 
elements are emphasised throughout the discussion, it is appropriate to consolidate 
them into a model. The model is holistic in nature and centered on the identification 
of stakeholders and the management of the roles and responsibilities that govern their 
relationships. This section will provide a description of the role of the model elements 
in the implementation process, as well as their inter-relationships. The model is 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.3.1 Deriving the Model  
The discussion of the findings produced four summaries for the three implementation 
phases and the continuous improvements stage (see Figure 7.9, Figure 7.15, Figure 
7.18 and Figure 7.19). The discussion of the findings from the three implementation 
phases indicates that the management of roles and responsibilities consists of three 
implementation milestones. These three milestones require ERP sponsors to intervene 
in order to ensure that roles and responsibilities are defined, audited, reviewed and 
properly maintained.  
 
The first milestone is the emergence of the first revision of the roles and 
responsibilities agreement (Figure 7.9). At this point, ERP sponsors can make sure 
that all stakeholders have clarity regarding their roles and responsibilities, something 
that is important, as discussed, before the implementation process is begun. The 
second milestone is suggested as occurring after the completion of the requirements 
definition process. 
 
It is not expected that ERP fulfill 100% of the business requirements. Therefore, it is 
required to revise the ERP implementation to include the necessary tasks to close the 
deficits of the ERP functionalities, i.e. the functionalities that ERP cannot fulfill. 
Revising ERP plan leads to the emergence of the second revision of the roles and 
responsibilities definitions (Figure 7.15). 
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The third milestone is associated with the audit review process that has been 
suggested, and is required before the go-live stage (Figure 7.18). At this point, the 
ERP sponsor can verify whether the current state of the implementation reflects the 
preset scope and objectives. ERP sponsors can verify before approving the move to 
the go-live stage that all stakeholders have adequate clarity on their roles and 
responsibilities. This review is expected to produce the third revision of defining roles 
and responsibilities among stakeholders. Once the organisation passes the go-live 
stage successfully ERP sponsors need to ensure that the roles and responsibilities 
audit is embedded within each and every ERP continuous improvement (Figure 7.19).  
 
The three milestones that require the involvement of the ERP sponsor to define and 
review the roles and responsibilities are aggregated and presented in Figure 7.20.  
Figure 7.20: Milestones of defining roles responsibilities in ERP Implementation  
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The findings from the discussion of the three implementation phases are summarised 
in the four figures (Figure 7.9, Figure 7.15, Figure 7.18 and Figure 7.19). Each figure 
can be seen as a subset of the target model that will be developed and presented later 
in this Chapter. Figure 7.20, on the other hand, summarises the three milestones that 
ERP sponsor is requested to ensure proper definition, review and amendments of the 
roles and responsibilities. The combination and integration of those four sub-models 
can be used to derive a holistic model for ERP implementation from the perspective 
of managing the roles and responsibilities among stakeholders (Figure 7.21).  
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Figure 7.21 Roles and responsibilities management-based holistic model of ERP implementation 
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7.3.2 Overview of the Model 
The elements of the holistic model (Figure 7.21) are briefly described in Table 7.2. 
The Chapters containing the case analysis have highlighted a number of elements that 
were found to be critical to the implementation of ERP. A comprehensive 
understanding of these key elements, which follows a holistic approach and attempts 
to understand their inter-connectedness, is the base of the model.  
 
7.3.3 The Model Elements  
The key attributes of the model illustrated in Figure 7.21 & Table 7.2 are explained 
further in the following sections. 
Table 7.2 Description of  ERP implementation holistic Model Key attributes 
No Model Attribute Purpose in increasing ROI 
0 Implementation phases It enables ERP sponsors to visualise Implementation as a 
three-stage process. Each stage represents a milestone for 
defining and amending roles and responsibilities among 
stakeholders. 
1 Change drivers  Describing stakeholders involved in the initiation stage that 
trigger the change through adopting ERP implementation. 
This includes proper understanding of the underlying reasons 
for initiating and adopting ERP.  
2 Preparation steps  Describes necessary planning steps that include: 
1 Scope, objectives 2 Strategy 3 stakeholders identification & 
hiring 4 vendor & implementor selection 5 preliminary roles 
&Responsibilities identification 6 integrated training plans 7 
Defining mission critical processes along with necessary plan 
8 readiness assessment 
3 Requirements gathering 
process Vs. Roles & 
Responsibilities 
amendments 
The detailed outcomes of the requirements gathering process 
is expected to identify ERP functionality gaps. This can 
trigger plans for managing those gaps through initiating 
parallel tasks/sub-projects along with ERP implementation. 
Necessary amendments to the first revision of Roles & 
Responsibilities agreement are required. 
4 Core implementation 
processes and activities 
This refers to the core implementation processes that include 1 
business process management 2 conflict management 3 
leadership 4 project management 5 training 6 Technical 
management 
5 Roles & Responsibilities 
Audit  
This refers to the need for an audit process to review roles and 
responsibilities before the GO-live. This is will lead to the 
emergence of a new revision of the roles and responsibilities 
agreement. 
6 Post Implementation 
process  
The experiences that the organisations lived before the go-live 
need to be embedded within its practices and culture. Roles 
and responsibilities management need to always be an 
essential part of any ERP continuous improvement process.  
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7.3.3.1 Implementation phases 
The study suggested using the approach of dividing ERP implementation into three 
phases. ERP sponsors need to thoroughly understand these implementation phases. 
The three phases are differentiated by two key milestones: the first milestone is the 
starting date of the implementation process, as specified in the signed contract with 
the implementor. This milestone separates the planning and preparation from the 
implementation and execution phases. 
 
The second milestone is the go-live stage, which separates the implementation and 
execution from the go-live, the post implementation phase and the process of ensuring 
continuous improvements in the ERP. ERP sponsors need not limit their 
understanding only to the three phases and the two milestones only. They should 
develop, at least at a high level, the key elements of the model. 
 
7.3.3.2 Change Drivers 
The sources of ERP drivers can be classified into external and internal stakeholders. 
Examples of external stakeholders include external consultants, competitors and 
government agencies. Examples of internal stakeholders include CEO, executive 
managers and IT directors.  The proper identification of the external and internal 
stakeholders who suggested implementing ERP in the organisation is essential.  In 
particular, it is important to understand and analyse their driving forces to adopt ERP 
as this can assist in 1) defining the three essential elements; scope, objectives and to 
define mission critical processes that ERP is expected to improve 2) to use the three 
essential elements to measure the success of the implementation. 
 
7.3.3.3 Preparation Steps 
The preparation steps are related to the change drivers (as discussed previously) that 
suggested the need for the ERP in the first place. This is followed by proper alignment 
between the ERP plans and corporate strategy at all implementation stages. This 
should be followed by an identification of the required stakeholders and the outlining 
of a realistic scope and objectives for the ERP implementation. Consistency between 
the analysis of drivers of the change, scope and objectives is fundamental for 
obtaining optimal ROI. 
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Defining the precise scope and objectives offers benefits to the organisation 
throughout the remaining implementation steps. Firstly, it acts as a checkpoint in 
measuring the ERP results. Secondly, the proper definition of the scope and the clarity 
of defining objectives facilitate decision-making process throughout the 
implementation phases. Thirdly, it paves the way for ERP sponsors to define roles and 
responsibilities, authority and to define the responsibility matrix amongst the 
stakeholders.  
 
On the other hand, failure to define proper scope and objectives can lead to several 
risks. Firstly, inadequate empowerment to the ERP project manager is expected which 
in effect hinders decision-making. Alternatively, the unnecessary escalation in 
obtaining decisions from higher management level leads to extensions of the time line 
and reduces the ROI due to the excess cost of the implementation delay. Secondly, in 
the case of fundamental changes that evolved in the business during the 
implementation process, it would be difficult to align the ERP plans to cope with 
those changes. Thirdly, evaluating ERP implementation could become difficult and 
there would be no clear reference for obtaining an accurate ROI value. 
 
Defining the scope and objectives should be in line with corporate strategy and such 
consistency alignment needs to be maintained throughout the implementation phases. 
Failure to maintain consistency between the corporate strategy and the ERP plan 
settings can lead to a number of consequences that adversely affect the 
implementation. As a result, the original scope and objectives that were defined at an 
earlier stage of ERP implementation might be no longer appropriate for achieving the 
desired strategic changes. The management of roles and responsibilities among ERP 
stakeholders might become ineffective. Eventually, ROI value would be decreased 
through the possibilities of 1) ignoring significant requirements, 2) automating 
unrequired processes, 3) unnecessary implementation delay and 4) poor management 
of resources. Once the scope, objectives and strategies become clear and identified 
two parallel directions started as per Figure 7.21. 
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7.3.3.3.1 Stakeholder’s Hiring 
Organisations need to select the right resources to drive the preparation steps from the 
ERP implementation. Those resources must have adequate qualities and past 
experience to ensure proper management of the first implementation processes.  
 
Hiring the skilful stakeholders at this early stage is very significant in achieving an 
optimal ROI. Engaging the right stakeholders, who possess adequate experience, will 
assist ERP sponsors in reviewing, aligning and amending the ERP scope, objectives 
and strategies. Their effective involvement at an early stage can always ensure that the 
detailed plans fit precisely with the predefined scope, objectives and strategy. The 
required skills and experience of stakeholders who will be leading the first 
implementation process should not be limited to technical or ERP functionality 
knowledge. ERP sponsors need to be supported by stakeholders who possess adequate 
change management experience in particular in regards to the best modes of adopting 
ERP and the best ways of implementing ERP. It is a great advantage if the 
stakeholders have a balance of both successful and failure implementation experience. 
The success experience enables them to implement successful practice while failure 
experience taught them not use  techniques that may lead to failure. 
  
The more experience those stakeholders have, the greater the chance that they can 
guide the implementation team to pursue success and to avoid failures. Stakeholders 
with such robust knowledge and experience cannot easily be found and they are 
normally highly paid. The cost of hiring those stakeholders at an early stage can lead 
to a higher return on investment at the end of the implementation and so it can be 
argued that the cost of employing them for a short period is justified. 
 
ERP sponsors must be warned that the value of hiring such skilful resources can be 
achieved if they are involved at the planning and preparation stage. The results from 
engaging the skilful resources will be totally different if they are engaged to recover a 
failure implementation. For example, if the planning and preparation processes led by 
incompetent resources and the skilful resources are engaged thereafter,, the cost of 
engaging skilful resources to recover the implementation will be higher and the value 
from their engagement will be very much less.
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Once those skilful resources are hired, their experience should be leveraged by ERP 
sponsors, especially in the process of developing and shaping plans for the 
implementation of the ERP. It is not necessary that such a highly qualified consultant 
should be hired in a full time capacity throughout the implementation phases. They 
can be hired in a form of part time or through the hourly rate arrangements. Highly 
qualified consultants who possess a wider range of skill sets and experience are 
required, however, for shaping and reviewing the plans for the ERP. Their second 
involvement in the ERP implementation is at the point where the implementation 
requires a comprehensive audit that aims to assess the outcomes against the original 
scope and objectives. 
 
It is not necessary that the rest of implementation resources possess prior experience 
with ERP. The deficits in their ERP knowledge can be fulfilled through well-designed 
training and through the development of a well-defined implementation plan.   
 
7.3.3.3.2 Product, Vendor & Supervisory Selection  
As the ERP scope, objectives and strategy are developed, this leads to the selection of 
the specific ERP product and the external implementation partner. Some organisations 
have adequate budget and in-house expertise to be able to manage the selection 
process. Others might need a third party to fill this experience gap. The selection 
process milestones always need to be assessed against the predefined scope, 
objectives and strategy. There is no harm in doing this; it is, in fact, healthy to amend 
the scope, objectives and ERP strategy based on the findings from the selection 
process. It is always essential that the scope, objectives and ERP strategy remain 
consistent with the selection process decisions. Smooth implementation calls for 
consistency between the two.  
 
There is no standard form of engaging external consultants to assist in managing the 
selection and supervision of the implementation process. The supervisory party can be 
a consulting house, a freelancer or a permanent specialist hired on a full-time basis. 
What really matters is that the ERP sponsors need a third party who should have a 
neutral perspective between the implementer and the organisation. To accomplish his 
mission, the supervisory consultant needs to intervene in a timely manner once he 
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sees any inconsistency between the selection process and the predefined scope and 
objectives of the process.  
 
For a supervisory party to succeed, a communication channel with the ERP sponsor 
must be opened and must remain active. In the case of any misalignment between the 
selection, scope and objectives, either the ERP sponsor needs to get involved, or to 
empower the supervisory party to take proper action. In either case, the ERP 
implementation should be brought back on track in terms of maintaining full 
consistency of the ERP plans and the three predefined elements (i.e. scope, objectives 
and ERP strategies). The supervisory consultant is responsible for assuring that the 
first revision of the roles and responsibilities agreement among stakeholders at this 
point is complete.  
  
7.3.3.3.3 Mission Critical Processes, Readiness & Training Plans  
It is imperative to include in the plan and objective settings processes that are to be 
considered as mission critical. If these processes are identified then streamlined or 
optimised through the implementation process this is will lead to the achievement of 
maximum ROI. 
 
In the absence of defining mission critical processes, the ERP implementation can 
easily be dragged out and, potentially, the implementation delay might spiral out of 
control. This is because there are an enormous number of processes that ERP is 
capable of optimising. In effect, it is very difficult to achieve optimisation for all 
processes. Once mission critical processes are defined, it is imperative thereafter to 
assess the readiness level of the organisation for implementing ERP. The readiness 
assessment results can suggest necessary training and development plans to close the 
deficits readiness gaps. The process required to fulfil the deficit gap can either be 
conducted before or during implementation. The outcome of the readiness assessment 
can lead to the recommendation of critical decisions such as organisational 
restructuring, staff rotation or hiring new skilful resources to occupy existing or new 
positions.  
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The assessment might guide to revisit the scope, objectives and mission critical 
processes, owing the fact of the current readiness state of the organisation. If the 
readiness results indicate that those predefined element are very ambitious, it is highly 
recommended to replace them with more realistic ones. It is the role of the 
supervisory consultant to lead the process of review of 1) the proper setting of the 
scope, objectives and mission critical processes, 2) to conduct the readiness 
assessment and 3) to develop adequate alternatives for ERP sponsors before he can 
approve the final version of scope, objective and mission critical processes. 
 
If this process is not followed in the suggested order, the implementation is expected 
to experience difficulties that might adversely affect the ROI. These adverse effects 
can be seen in the form of delay, for example, or repetitive rework, trial and error 
solutions, incurring unnecessary costs and negative morale towards ERP 
implementation.  
 
The outcome of the readiness assessment can lead to a number of initiatives. Firstly, it 
can suggest training or education requirements for stakeholders at different 
implementation phases. This can ensure that the training plan is effective and can lead 
to higher ROI. Secondly, it might suggest the need to replace some of the 
stakeholders. It is possible to suggest hiring new stakeholders either from external 
sources or through internal hiring from within the organisation. Thirdly, it can suggest 
reengineering some processes before the implementation started. A significant 
adverse effect on ROI is expected if the ERP sponsors fail to conduct a readiness 
assessment.  
 
A common mistake in most ERP implementation projects is to limit training scope to 
teach end users how to navigate between ERP screens. It is the responsibility of the 
supervisory party to ensure that the training process covers all the necessary skills, 
knowledge, and competences that are required to achieve the target objectives. ERP 
sponsors should keep in mind that continuous training is always required to assure the 
sustainability of the benefits that can be achieved from ERP. Training requires not 
only a budget to be allocated but, also, that necessary actions are taken towards 
building a training culture that motivates stakeholders to acquire the knowledge and 
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skills that are required to achieve optimal organisational results through ERP. Once 
the ERP sponsors have succeeded in developing such motives for the stakeholders to 
learn, stakeholders can achieve optimal ERP training results. It is expected that they 
will leverage available training and knowledge tools and resources. In short, they can 
demonstrate higher training returns using a much smaller budget, which in return 
improves the ROI of the ERP.  
 
It is recommended that if employees have contributed positively to the ERP 
enhancements during the post implementation stage, either in terms of quality of 
enhancements or quantity of enhancements, they should be entitled to receive 
incentive payments, provided through HR systems.  
 
7.3.3.4 Requirements Gathering Process Vs. Roles and Responsibilities  
The management of requirements definition correlates with the management of 
stakeholders. It is the role of the supervisory consultant to conduct a holistic and 
integrated requirements definition review. This review is to ensure not to miss 
necessary requirements that the user driven process of capturing requirements is 
unable to address.  
 
Once these requirements gaps are identified then it is strongly recommended that 
parallel plans be developed in order to ensure these requirements gap are fulfilled. 
These plans need to clearly show the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders 
who are to be involved. This leads to the emergence of the second revision of the roles 
and responsibilities agreement among stakeholders.  
 
Roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined as this ensures that there are no 
serious project management, communication problems or conflicts and confusion 
later. This is even more crucial as any ERP project team is a cross-functional one and 
companies often cannot find the resources to let all ERP project team members work 
solely on the ERP implementation alone; many individuals work on multiple projects 
at the same time (Ike and Mogens, 2005). This will make it more difficult to clearly 
allocate duties. 
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Top management has a crucial role in ensuring this as it can set up conflict resolution, 
change management and communication structures directly or indirectly, by 
allocating or delegating resources. Its visible support for the ERP project can reduce 
user resistance, minimizing conflicts from end-users and lead to more effective 
communication and conflict resolution in the consulting process (Wang and Chen, 
2006, p. 1033). Wang and Chen also stated that visible top management support 
should be critical for inter-unit conflict resolution during the ERP implementation 
process (p. 1036).  Clear delineation of responsibilities of the two top management 
groups (Board of Directors and CEOs/Executives) will ensure a cohesive “top 
management” team to provide fully integrated support to the ERP system 
implementation project. (Fitz-Gerard and Carroll, 2003) 
 
Maditinos et al (2011) stated that insufficient communication of users‟ needs, goals 
and aspirations to external consultants may undermine the implementation of the ERP 
system.  Esteves and Pastor (2002), through a literature review and web survey 
identified project sponsor (in a project champion role) as a critical success factor in 
ERP projects. Verville and Halingten (2003) used a case-study approach to study the 
team composition and effect of role definition on the ERP acquisition process of 4 
large organisations. They concluded that team composition and role definition are 
critical factors affecting the acquisition process. The 4 organisations were found to 
exercise better control (through clear definition of authority), minimise conflicts 
(especially from end-users) and thus conclude the projects smoothly. Albert (2006), 
using a case study of a large organisation with 3 major divisions showed how 
changing role definitions (esp. of the Board - project sponsor) and lack of stakeholder 
responsibility agreements led to deviation from initial project goals with major 
conflicts by three stakeholder groups with their own interests, leading to 3 separate 
ERP projects in various stages of implementations. 
 
Skok and Legge (2002), also using evidence from 5 case-studies of organisations 
emphasize the importance of involving key team members from the top management 
early, right from project beginning to resolve or mitigate conflicts of interest. 
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7.3.3.5 Core Implementation Processes and Activities 
The previous section addresses the planning activities, while this section addresses 
core execution activities. After the requirements have been defined, consultants start 
the configuration of the system in the test server. End users take necessary actions 
toward preparing the data that need migration from legacy to the ERP system.  The 
core implementation process phase is centred on project management and, primarily, 
on the qualities and competencies of the project manager. A qualified project manager 
with a proper attitude and empowerments is expected to increase the ROI.  
 
The project manager is responsible for the execution of the agreed training plans that 
include technical and functionality training. The configuration process of both the 
hardware and the application, along with the detailed plans of when and how end 
users should use the system either in the TEST or Production servers are also part of 
the project management responsibilities. The project manager is also responsible for 
ensuring smooth flow between the implementation of the core ERP modules and the 
add-on software applications that have been included in the larger ERP master plans. 
 
The management team are expected to experience difficulties and face challenges 
with some stakeholders who might resist the change caused by the implementation.  
These challenges are not confined to the ERP applications that are related to 
stakeholders, such as the ERP vendor, the consultant or the ERP team.  Difficult 
challenges come from the inefficient processes and business practices, as he might 
lack adequate empowerment to fix or resolve them. The ERP sponsor should, 
therefore, be accessible in order to intervene immediately once the project manager 
reports any business process issue. Due to the various implementation pressures in 
completing tasks, meeting deadlines, competition in acquiring resources, etc. conflict 
among stakeholders is expected to emerge. 
 
A qualified ERP project manager is expected to resolve most of the conflicts, however 
higher level management are expected to solve a few conflict cases. 
 
Leadership from the ERP project manager and the ERP sponsors is essential, not only 
to resolve conflicts but also to ensure that the entire organisation is working as a team 
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to achieve a unified corporate ROI from the investment made in the ERP. Training 
management is a critical success factor for the model. This is because most of the 
decline in ERP implementation results from poor readiness. Training is always a 
facilitating tool that allows such obstacles to be overcome. Where financially viable, 
the flexibility to conduct as many training sessions as necessary should be provided. 
Last but not least, the project manager is requested always to ensure timely manner 
solutions for technical administration issues that include but are not limited to 
networking, database issues, systems performance, hardware, and software errors. 
 
7.3.3.6 Roles and Responsibilities Audit 
One of the unique advantages of the model is the structured process for conducting an 
audit process of the roles and responsibilities of related stakeholders. The audit 
process aims to ensure that the three key elements of scope, objectives and ERP 
strategies are fulfilled before the organisation moves from the implementation to the 
go-live phase. This involves a review of the second revision of the roles and 
responsibilities agreement. It is always expected that through the heat, speed and the 
complexity of core implementation activities, that the roles and responsibilities 
agreement should be significantly changed. It is the responsibility of the person 
responsible for the audit process to identify any differences between the second 
revision and the reality. 
 
It is highly recommended that an independent stakeholder conduct the audit review 
for three reasons. First, to ensure that the current state of the implementation meets 
the predefined scope. Second, to make sure that mission critical processes are 
improved. Third, to review the current version of the document that defines roles and 
responsibilities. The review might lead to suggest necessary changes to roles and 
responsibilities before the go-live stage. It is also preferable to hire the same 
supervisory body who reviewed the scope, objectives and who helped with the 
identification of the mission critical process. The previous supervisory consultant has 
the advantage of understanding deeply the mission critical processes and underlying 
reasons behind nominating them. In addition, he has developed relationships between 
various implementation stakeholders which can assist in facilitating the audit review. 
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If this task is assigned to another consultant, it is expected that 1) he needs extra time 
and effort to understand the basis for defining those mission critical processes, 2) the 
investment advantage of understanding the culture and knowing various stakeholders 
made in the first implementation phase will be lost. The outcome of the audit review 
will lead to the emergence of a third revision of the roles and responsibilities 
agreement.  
 
Another advantage of conducting the audit process is to assess the expected ROI from 
ERP implementation. This can be conducted through proper assessment of: 1) the 
achieved gains from optimising the mission critical processes, 2) the analysis of the 
actual versus budgeted implementation cost and 3) the analysis of the actual versus 
budgeted implementation time.  
 
7.3.3.7 Post Implementation Process 
The post implementation, go-live and the audit processes are tightly connected. ERP 
sponsors need to realise the temporary performance dip (Figure 6.8) upon reaching the 
go-live point. More than at any other time, the involvement of ERP sponsors is 
needed at this stage in order to lead the organisation until the organisation passes that 
performance dip. Their support and leadership is required until the organisation has 
developed trust in its ability to sustain the ERP stability and until they have ensured 
the effective management of the ERP continuous improvements. ERP sponsors are 
requested to remain responsible for leading ERP continuous improvements. This 
includes consistency and synchronisation between the roles, responsibilities and the 
ERP continuous improvements. 
 
Full adherence to the roles and responsibilities management leads after the go-live 
stage encourages adopting ERP continuous improvements. This in return increases the 
learning curve in the organisation to revise, as needed, the roles and responsibilities 
along with the ERP improvements made. As the learning curve shows a sharp 
increase, the ERP sponsors will see a fundamental change in the relationship between 
the ERP and the organisation. The perception of ERP will change from an outer tool 
to an embedded organisation engine or as an inside organ of the organisation body. 
This organ or the embedded engine can always play the assistance organisational role 
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in adopting further business improvements, no matter how difficult or complex these 
improvements are. The organisation will then act as a player who boosted his fitness 
competency and has the power to accomplish hard tasks in a short period of time 
without burning up his energy. 
 
7.4 Summary  
This chapter has two parts, discussions and deriving the proposed model. For the first 
part, it provides discussion and external validation of the qualitative data analysis 
presented in Chapters Five and Six. Besides the comparative analysis of the four 
primary cases, an attempt was made to see how these cases compare with other 
organisational experiences reported in secondary case studies. Other empirical 
surveys were used for comparisons to support the findings.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into three parts as per the three 
implementation phases that have been chosen for this research, as discussed in 
Chapter Four. These three parts are 1) pre-implementation, 2) implementation and 3) 
the post implementation, go-live and continuous improvements. 
 
The second part of the chapter was concerned with deriving the model this study aims 
to produce. The elements validated through primary and secondary data were 
consolidated in holistic model for implementing ERP that is centred on the 
management of the roles and responsibilities among stakeholders. 
 
The model elements are divided into seven parts that start with the three 
implementation phases. The second part describing stakeholders involved in the 
initiation stage that trigger the change through adopting ERP implementation. This 
includes proper understanding of the underlying reasons for initiating and adopting 
ERP. The third part describes necessary planning steps that include 1) scope and  
objectives, 2) strategy, 3) stakeholders identification and hiring, 4)  vendor and 
implementer selection,  5) preliminary roles and responsibilities identification, 6) 
integrated training plan, 7)  defining mission critical processes and 8) readiness 
assessment. 
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The fourth part describes the necessity to redefine the roles and responsibilities if 
necessary after completing the requirements definition process. The fifth part refers to 
the core implementation processes that include 1) business process management, 2) 
conflict management, 3) leadership, 4) project management, 5) training and 6) 
technical management. 
The sixth part refers to the need for an audit process to review roles and 
responsibilities before the GO-live. This will lead to the emergence of a new revision 
of the roles and responsibilities agreement. 
The last part is concerned with the post implementation process which aims to turn 
the experiences that the organisations had before the go-live need to be embedded 
within its practices and culture. Roles and responsibilities management needs to 
always be an essential part of any ERP continuous improvement process. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to summarise key findings of the research. The main results will be 
presented in a brief descriptive form, in addition to its proposed contribution to the 
research field. It also highlights, through various discussions, what may be considered 
as limitations of this research. Finally, it will suggest further avenues for research that 
may be conducted based on the findings of this investigation. 
  
8.2. Summary of Research  
As the management of stakeholders in an ERP context is a relatively new concept, 
both research and practice in this field are still immature. At the concept level, 
confusion remains in the literature around how stakeholders can be best managed to 
derive maximum return from ERP investment. From a research point of view, many 
writings about ERP appear to lack empirical evidence of how better ROI can be 
achieved from the implementation. Much of the existing literature focuses on singular 
success factors perspective of the implementation. Most of the other empirical studies 
on ERP have focused on the adoption and implementation issues of ERP systems 
(Markus et al., 2000, Kumar et al., 2003, Law and Nagi, 2007; Maheshwari ,2007). At 
the practice level, it has been repeatedly cited that as many as 75% of the 
organisations fail in implementing ERP (Rasmy et al, 2005;Wang et al, 2007). This 
means that ROI from the ERP investment is not achieved as a direct result of 
overrunning costs, overrunning time or from discrepancies between the expected and 
the realised benefits. 
 
The existing critical success factors models insist that effective senior management is 
fundamentally required to support ERP implementation in order to achieve its 
success. ERP sponsors such as the board of directors or executive staff are, therefore, 
critical to successful implementation. However, existing literature lacks both the 
clarity and the necessary detail regarding the way in which management support can 
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be best delivered and managed. It also lacks the empirical evidence on how ERP 
sponsors can supervise ERP investment and ensure that such investments produce the 
targeted ROI. It is not practically expected that ERP sponsors develop a strong 
understanding of each singular perspective of the various existing ERP models. 
Besides its narrow focus, existing ERP models are presented in a form that is seen as 
too detailed for ERP sponsors to understand and implement.  
Despite the fact that ERP sponsor’s support is essential; it is not practically expected 
that they will be available for the implementation most of the time. Therefore, they 
need a delegation mechanism for the vast majority of ERP activities while they still 
remain responsible for the overall ERP success. To achieve this objective, ERP 
sponsors need an effective roles and responsibilities tool that is easy to understand and 
implement. This tool can allow ERP sponsors to supervise the implementation ROI in 
a holistic manner.  
 
From this perspective, there has been a call for a holistic model of ERP 
implementation centred on the management of roles and responsibilities. This model 
aims to enable ERP sponsors, primarily in Saudi Arabia, managing the relationship 
between stakeholders towards maximising ROI. Yet studies that have attempted to 
investigate maximising return from ERP investment from stakeholder’s perspective 
are significantly few. Such studies, that address the management of roles and 
responsibilities among ERP stakeholders, are scattered among different theories. It 
also lacks the holistic approach and need comprehensive integration so it can assess 
ERP sponsors to manage ROI effectively. 
 
ERP is a complex phenomenon since it affects nearly all business units (Boonstra, 
2006). Each employee inside the organisation is involved in the ERP implementation 
process at different levels. The effect of ERP implementation is extended to include 
external parties such as the organisation’s customers, suppliers, and government 
agencies. A holistic understanding involves a review of the process, people, 
technology, structure and different management systems. 
 
The holistic approach, when studying implementation, therefore entails unifying 
schools of thought and research. This includes a review of existing critical success 
factors for ERP implementation from various perspectives. A strong base has been 
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created for more informed research and successful practices in the management of the 
roles and responsibilities in ERP context. This study has sought to contribute to this 
area of research and practice.  
 
Adopting a holistic view, it reviewed a large body of literature relevant to ERP 
implementation models concerning many issues involved in its implementation.  
From the literature, the categorisation of the ERP implementation into three 
implementation phases was chosen as a base for structuring the investigation. 
A comprehensive analysis of the success factors among different models was 
undertaken in order to nominate the most influencing factors to the implementation 
success. These filtered factors were used to develop the basis for preparing interview 
questions. Relevant elements to the stakeholders roles and responsibilities 
management were then explored in the field using case studies. This was aimed at 
investigating how various elements that interact with stakeholder management are 
being operationalised in implementing ERP in real organisational settings. 
Furthermore, the investigation focused on how ROI is affected by the interaction 
between those nominated elements and the roles and responsibilities management. 
The review covered all implementation phases, preparation and planning, 
implementation and post implementation and continuous improvements. 
 
Through this type of investigation, the study proposed a holistic model for ERP 
implementation centred on the roles and responsibilities management among ERP 
stakeholders. The model of ERP implementation has finally emerged as a result of 
this investigation effort.  
 
Despite the limitations of this study, it provides significant findings. First, this study 
demonstrates that organisations possessing adequate knowledge of the most important 
ERP concepts can lead to the implementation success. However, it is evident that such 
knowledge often remains theoretical when there is a lack of effective guidelines to 
assist in leveraging this knowledge to produce a higher ROI. In other words, this 
knowledge remains theoretical while organisations struggle how to use them in 
practice. The proposed model attempts to fill this theory-to-practice gap in the real 
ERP implementation settings. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations                                                                        8-4 
Chapter Eight                                                                                                                         Page 4 of 11 
 
Second, the study findings demonstrate that organisations who implemented ERP are 
still confused whether they have achieved the targeted benefits or not. Typically, the 
IT department is the only stakeholder who is proud of the successes achieved in the 
implementation. The IT department indicates success through the discarding of legacy 
systems, unifying software and hardware platform, configuring ERP modules and the 
effective use by end users. However, the stakeholders from the business side often 
still have a number of doubts whether or not they have really achieved efficiency and 
cost saving benefits or not. The model has suggested a clear mechanism in setting 
specific performance targets that can be audited during the implementation and 
measured after the go-live stage. 
 
Third, the overall findings have indicated that the organisational experience in 
integrating business strategy and on-going ERP implementation process is still 
immature. This study has found that ROI is adversely affected by the inconsistency 
between corporate strategy and implementation plans. The necessity to align 
implementation plan settings and the corporate strategy as per the findings should not 
be limited to the start-up implementation phase. Such alignment needs to remain 
consistent throughout the implementation life cycle that includes the stage of post 
implementation and continuous improvements. It is not expected that organisation 
ought to change its strategy because of ERP. However, changes in the corporate 
strategy need to be coordinated in a timely manner with the existing ERP plan settings 
as ERP can be an effective source for strategic decisions. 
 
Fourth, the findings have shown that there are three milestones where the roles and 
responsibilities can be defined and reviewed. The first milestone is before the 
beginning of the implementation project when both ERP team and consultants are 
ready to start. The second milestone is before completing the requirements definition 
and finding the ERP requirements gap. The third milestone is before the go-live stage 
where a comprehensive review of the roles and responsibilities audit needs to be 
conducted. The roles and responsibilities review should be embedded within each and 
every ERP improvement after the go-live and during the post implementation. 
 
Fifth, this study has demonstrated the significance of the post implementation stage 
which requires comprehensive understanding and advance planning. In fact, the 
Conclusions and Recommendations                                                                        8-5 
Chapter Eight                                                                                                                         Page 5 of 11 
 
results have shown that the success made in the post implementation is the best 
certificate that the implementation is successful. The success in the post 
implementation is connected with the proper definition of the roles and 
responsibilities. This is clearly understood from the previous findings that state; 1) the 
significance of conducting comprehensive roles and responsibilities audit process 
before the go-live stage, 2) the importance of inculcating the roles and responsibilities 
review in each and every ERP continuous improvement. Success in the post 
implementation phase is therefore essential for achieving higher ROI. Furthermore, 
post implementation plans cannot succeed without; 1) ERP sponsors to develop strong 
understanding to its significance and nature, 2) the inclusion of post implementation 
in the ERP master plan itself.  
 
Sixth, the study has found a number of elements that correlate with the stakeholders’ 
roles and responsibilities in the implementation context. Those elements both interact 
with and contribute to, and are involved with and affected by the management of the 
roles and responsibilities perspective. Those elements are 1) strategy, 2) readiness, 3) 
training, 4) business process management, 5) project management, 6) conflict 
management and 7) technical management. The research has demonstrated how 
proper definition, review and audit of the roles and responsibilities interrelate with the 
effective management of those mentioned elements.  The proper management of the 
roles and responsibilities can lead to higher ROI through the optimal management of 
the aforementioned elements. 
 
Seventh, the study shows the significant role of the ERP vendor and Implementer to 
obtain higher ROI. However, the study found that most implementation difficulties 
relate to the stakeholders of the organisation such as the end user and functional 
managers. Issues connected with the ERP vendor and consultants can be dealt with 
easier and faster than the issues of the end users and functional managers.  
 
Eighth, this study has reinforced the need to develop clear ERP implementation 
targets. This can be presented to end users and consultants in a form of mission 
critical processes that are required from the system to achieve performance gains. This 
is found to be important as it will 1) sharpen the focus and unify the effort to achieve 
those targets, 2) ensure that implementation produce tangible benefits, 3) allow the 
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achievement of quick wins which is important to preserve positive attitude and trust in 
ERP  and 4) to provide a measurement criteria for the project success. Without this, 
the implementation may be vulnerable to 1) uncertainty of achieving benefits, 2) lack 
of measuring the ERP success, 3) adverse effects on staff morale towards ERP and 4) 
ultimately, adverse effects on the ROI. 
 
Finally, based on the overall findings of this study, a proposed model for holistic ERP 
implementation was developed. It is centred on the management of the roles and 
responsibilities among stakeholders. Detailed descriptions and illustrations for the 
workings of the model elements were given, based on empirical investigation of four 
primary case studies, representing diverse organisational experiences with ERP 
implementation. Further descriptions were also given through a review of secondary 
data and literature review. The secondary data includes published case studies and 
surveys. The primary themes around which descriptions were given are the 
implementation phases, selection process and start up activities, implementation 
process that include project management and the management of training, business 
process and conflicts, post implementation and ERP continuous improvements. 
 
8.3. Contribution of Study 
This study aimed to contribute to research and practice. The theory of stakeholder 
management in the ERP context field is still immature and inadequate; this study 
aimed to act as an opening for mature theory building. It represents scattered aspects 
of ERP literature in a new form that integrates and unified different models of ERP 
implementation. Prior research places an emphasis on the significance of senior 
management support in ensuring implementation success. However, no detailed 
guidelines are provided that explain how senior management support can be best 
provided and how it can lead to better ROI.  
 
This model closes this gap and reduces the ambiguity of the way in which ERP 
sponsors can lead the implementation process to achieve better ROI. The uniqueness 
of this model is exemplified by its holistic characteristics, and the fact that it is easy to 
understand and implement and consists of clear milestones. Owing these features, the 
model is specifically tailored for the needs of ERP sponsors as they can supervise the 
ROI with minimal follow-up effort. This can be assured as the model is equipped with 
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a clear mechanism of defining and maintaining the roles and responsibilities 
throughout the implementation lifecycle. The model will continue to serve ERP 
sponsors in the long-term until ERP becomes an embedded part of the organisation 
competencies. It serves the implementation until ERP acts as organ of the organisation 
body or as an inside engine to facilitate changes and continuous improvements.  
 
The overall findings of this study can guide future work to various areas. As has been 
demonstrated from the findings of this study, successful ERP implementation does not 
accord with the narrowly-focused perspective, and research in this field has to take a 
broad approach.  
 
From a practical point of view, this research has provided several major contributions. 
As many organisations suffer from the low rate of return from the ERP investment, 
this study provided useful tool to improve the ROI. Executive management teams who 
assume the ERP sponsor role can use the suggested model to derive the promised 
implementation benefits. It can assist them from the early beginning of the decision to 
adopt ERP until the implementation reaches the post implementation stage and 
continuous improvements. This study provides a fine example of how process, people 
and technological factors can be managed together with a clear people focus.  
 
From this investigation, practitioners can derive a better understanding of the 
management of roles and responsibilities in real ERP implementation settings. The 
current practices of ERP implementation which follow narrowly-focused approaches 
is enhanced by the model proposed by this study. These enhancements resulted from 
the balanced perspective of this model which permits the unification and integration 
of the capabilities and strengths of the existing models.  While the primary uniqueness 
of the model is the roles and responsibilities focus, other models can still be used 
alongside the proposed model. For example, the proposed model consists of 
management of training and business process management. The existing models of 
training and business management can still be followed to satisfy these two elements 
while the entire implementation is governed by the proposed model. 
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8.4. Limitations of Study 
Despite considerable effort made to enrich the study it still has a number of 
limitations. The stakeholders and the roles and responsibilities management ERP 
context can be described as a green research field. This broadens its research scope, 
challenges faced by the different organisation experience. The number of cases 
reviewed is also still inadequate to generalise the research findings. 
 
From the literature, the stakeholder’s management in an ERP context is a relatively 
new research topic, rendering the available theory inadequate. This leads to the 
adoption of an exploratory approach that dictates, by its nature, a widespread review 
of relevant literature and need to collect an extensive amount of data.  This may lead 
to the development of a more holistic and integrative understanding of the 
management of stakeholders and the roles and responsibilities. This is, in effect, 
demands a broadening of the scope of the study. 
 
Due to the holistic approach taken it is not possible to claim that the study has 
exposed all issues related to the management of stakeholders and the roles and 
responsibilities in ERP implementation context. This is due to various constraints 
including, but not limited to, time frame, limited access to organisational information 
and the size of the PHD final thesis. As quoted by Al-Mashari, (1999) Given the 
limited time frame, a complete investigation of the phenomenon under consideration, 
particularly with case studies, could not be undertaken (Eisenhardt, 1989; Al-Mashari, 
1999). 
 
 For the chosen cases, necessary efforts were made to interview as many stakeholders 
as possible but this inevitably faced constraints. For example, some stakeholders 
involved could not been interviewed due to the fact that they have changed their 
employers and they could not be reached. However, a balance of replacement list also 
acted as a backup plans to fill such information gathering gaps. The nature of the 
study requires a wider span of review to cover as many implementation phases as 
possible. In effect, it was difficult to find adequate candidate for each and every 
implementation phase especially for organisations that implemented more than one 
ERP project. 
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Time frame for interviews was a constraint at least for some candidate stakeholders. 
To complement interview findings documents related to the history of the 
implementation were provided. This represents a helpful tool to complement and 
enhance interview findings, however, a few documents were either no longer 
available or could not be accessed. The researcher undertook significant efforts 
towards assuring candidate stakeholders to be as open to share necessary details and 
opinions as possible. However some candidates were more open to share detailed 
information while a very few provided only what they thought to be adequate. The 
researcher, for those limited cases, sought secondment from different peers or 
counterpart stakeholders to ensure not to miss necessary details. However it cannot be 
denied that lack of ultimate openness from some interviewees represent a constraint. 
 
Time constraints had a significant impact on the nature of the case study  evaluation. 
Studying ERP stakeholders demands a longitudinal approach that permits the 
observation of the implementation phases over a long period of time. This is essential 
in order to observe the necessary details of all the implementation phases throughout 
the organisation as they progress. A longer time period would have afforded the 
capture of further details, which could enhance the recommendations and conclusions 
presented here. 
 
Organisations normally start claiming credit by taking the initiative of adopting ERP 
systems. This, in contrast, creates pressure for implementation team to admit 
implementation mistakes as this is will adversely affect the overall image of the 
organisation. This pressure results in some interviewees considering underlying ERP 
implementation details as private information. 
 
In addition, the nature of this study involves critical investigation of senior 
management involvement and contributions. This required capturing as many details 
as possible that can expose mistakes or poor decisions made by executive 
management. It is understandable that participants such as functional managers, end 
users or IT staff members may be reluctant to share this type of detail. However, all 
efforts were made to ensure quality of data captured by providing adequate assurance 
in terms of the privacy and confidentiality of the captured information. Despite this, 
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concerns remain that some information may have been obscured or withheld, meaning 
that the data should not be regarded as complete, or without bias.  
 
This study, for the reasons outlined above, primarily relied upon qualitative data 
drawn from interviews, and as a result, the extent to which the conclusions may be 
generalised is limited. A potential improvement to the study, or an area of further 
research, would involve the addition of closed questions within the interview 
questions that would permit greater scope for generalisation of the results. 
 
8.5. Recommendations for Future Research  
Previous discussions confirmed that this study can not cover the full scope of the 
research theme. However, it may act as a catalyst for further research. This 
investigation has found a lack of understanding of how stakeholders, roles and 
responsibilities can be best managed to achieve higher return from ERP investment. 
This conclusion is reached through the qualitative data collection process and through 
the review of the literature. 
 
This study provides ample opportunities for further research work in this area. The 
holistic model proposed in managing roles and responsibilities among ERP 
stakeholders may be considered as starting point for further refinement and testing. 
For example, the research methodology chapter justifies the use of qualitative 
approach for building this holistic model. As a result of the model proposed by this 
study, an opportunity for a quantitative approach to the research has emerged. This 
could test several hypotheses derived from the findings using a number of variables to 
investigate both model components and their inter-relationships.  
 
The proposed model covers three implementation phases in a holistic manner. There 
is still room for further examination through exploratory studies for the elements that 
fall specifically in particular implementation phases under investigation. It may be 
observed that research findings could be extended to cover specific areas such as 
industry, region, or an examination of the way in which these findings differ between 
large corporate environments versus small and medium organisations. Most of the 
secondary data used to support the model are extracted from studies conducted in 
developed countries like United States and Europe. Further studies can be conducted 
Conclusions and Recommendations                                                                        8-11 
Chapter Eight                                                                                                                         Page 11 of 11 
 
to assess whether the results found are applicable in the context of a developing 
economy.  
 
Finally, the management of ERP stakeholders under investigation in this study 
touches on components that relate to other emerging and existing management 
approaches. This includes process management, change management, strategic 
management, e-government and CRM. It also relates to various human resources 
theories and practices such as talent management and leadership. It would, therefore, 
be interesting for researchers to explore how the concepts of stakeholders, roles and 
responsibilities in ERP context integrated with such management approaches and 
practices. 
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